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Abstract 
The U.S.-American foreclosure crisis and related economic crises have had severe and wide-reaching 
effects for the global economy, homeowners, and municipalities alike.  These negative changes led to 
federal, state, regional, and local responses intended to prevent and mitigate foreclosures.  As of yet, 
no research has examined the community- and neighborhood-level impacts of local foreclosure 
responses.  This research seeks to determine the economic, physical, social, and political changes that 
resulted from these responses. 
A mixed methods case study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, home to Cleveland, was used to identify local 
level foreclosure responses—i.e. those carried out at the county level and below—and their effects.  
The qualitative component was comprised of semi-structured stakeholder interviews, including local 
governmental representatives, advocacy groups, and neighborhood representatives.  Two community 
subcases were investigated in depth to further examine the mechanisms and effects of foreclosure 
responses. 
The quantitative component supplements the qualitative component by means of a quantile 
regression model that examines relationships between foreclosure responses and changes in property 
value at the Census tract level, used to approximate communities.  The model integrates data for the 
entire county and estimates coefficients at various quantiles of the dependent variable, which 
uncovers variations in the associations between the variables along the dependent variable’s 
distribution.  That is, with quantile regression it is possible to determine whether foreclosure responses 
have different effects depending on community conditions. 
The results indicate that the national and local context are of particular importance when responding 
to the foreclosure crisis.  Lackluster national level responses necessitated creative and innovative 
responses at the local level.  The Cleveland region is characterized a weak housing market and its 
concomitant vacancy and abandonment problems.  Thus, post-foreclosure responses that deal with 
blighted property are essential.   
A wide variety of foreclosure responses took place in Cuyahoga County, in the form of systems reform, 
foreclosure prevention, targeting, property acquisition and control, legal efforts, and community- and 
neighborhood-level efforts.  Several strategies used in these responses emerged as themes:  targeting, 
addressing blight, strengthening the social fabric, planning for the future, building institutions and 
organizational capacity, and advocacy.   Physical and economic impacts are closely linked and are 
brought about especially by responses using targeting and blight reduction strategies.  Social impacts, 
such as increased identification with, investment in, and commitment to the community occurred as 
the result of responses that used the strategies of strengthening the social fabric and planning a shared 
future for the community.  Finally, the strategies of building institutions and organizational capacity 
and advocacy resulted in increased political power in the form of more local control and additional 
resources for neighborhoods and communities. 
These results provide deeper insight into the effects of the foreclosure crisis and local responses to it 
on neighborhoods and communities.  This case study identifies the importance of targeting, blight 
removal, strengthening social bonds, planning for a shared future, increasing organizational capacity, 
and advocacy in addressing the foreclosure crisis on the community and neighborhood levels, 
especially in weak housing market cities where need far outstrips the available resources.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Between 2007 and 2012, the world and particularly the United States experienced several interrelated 
economic crises, including the subprime crisis of 2007 to 2009 (U.S.), the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 
(U.S.), the Great Recession of 2007 to 2010 (international), and the ongoing foreclosure crisis that 
began in 2010 (U.S.).  A major component of and cause for these crises was the U.S. housing bubble 
and its subsequent collapse.  In addition to worldwide economic contraction, one outcome was an 
exceptional increase in foreclosures in many areas of the United States. The impacts of the crisis varied 
geographically, depending on the regional and local housing markets and economies. This research 
focuses on the foreclosure problem and foreclosure responses in one county characterized by a weak 
housing market and a weak economy:  Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where the City of Cleveland is located.  
This chapter introduces the foreclosure problem, introduces the research objective and research 
questions, explains the scope of the research, and introduces the format and content of the work. 
1.1 The Foreclosure Problem 
The U.S. foreclosure crises came about largely as the result of the swift and sudden deflation of the 
housing market bubble, itself due to deregulation in the mortgage industry and the increasingly risky 
loans and consequent inflated housing prices it made possible.  This high-risk lending environment led 
to increasingly inflated property values, spurred by the easy availability of credit.  However, these 
changes also caused the increasingly unstable and speculative mortgage market—as well as the larger 
financial system—to become unstable.  Though some warned of the eventual inevitable consequences 
of continuing this path, in general these concerns were ignored. 
The first wave of foreclosures is termed the subprime crisis:  As interest rates rose, large numbers of 
subprime and other non-traditional, low quality loans defaulted and went into foreclosure.  Financial 
institutions took possession of these properties and then sold them, usually at the discounted prices 
long typical for foreclosed properties. Property values began to fall and it became impossible for many 
homeowners with expensive loans to refinance, 1 which triggered additional foreclosures.  The decline 
in home values, coupled with a weak general economy and the implosion of the financial sector, 
contributed greatly to the U.S. financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 and the international Great Recession of 
2007 - 2010.  What began in the subprime residential mortgage sector spread throughout financial 
markets, due to the overleveraging of large financial institutions and the fact that the global financial 
system was more interconnected than had been previously realized (Mishkin, 2010).  Job loss and other 
employment-related problems resulting from the economic crisis then caused many homeowners to 
miss mortgage payments, extending the foreclosure crisis to prime loans and affecting many loans that 
were thought to be “safe.”  This second real estate crisis is known as the 2010 foreclosure crisis.  
In this work the two foreclosure crises are referred to simply as the foreclosure crisis.  This is due to 
the fact that the two are interrelated, with the subprime crisis laying much of the groundwork for the 
subsequent 2010 foreclosure crisis, and the fact that the two crises and their effects are difficult to 
                                                          
1 This was particularly common for those with ARMs, or adjustable rate mortgages, the use of which increased 
greatly leading up to the foreclosure crisis.  These loans consist of an initial period characterized by a lower 
interest rate and thus lower monthly payment, followed by an interest rate increase and increased monthly 
payment, which was often beyond the borrower’s ability to pay.  During the easy credit period lead up to the 
crisis, one could easily refinance to a new ARM before the initial low interest rate reset. 
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extricate from one another.  The foreclosure crisis and the related national and international economic 
crises have had far-reaching effects on many levels:  individually, locally, regionally, nationally, and 
internationally.  National level impacts are briefly introduced later in this section; impacts at lower 
levels of geographic aggregation will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2.3.   
Foreclosure is the legal process used by lenders to recover the balance of a mortgage loan,2 after the 
borrower has stopped making payments, by forcing the sale of the asset which backs the loan in order 
to recoup the losses that result from nonpayment of the loan.  Technically, the lender can initiate a 
foreclosure for any breach of the mortgage contract; in general this occurs only for non-payment 
(Ambrose & Capone, 1996).  Used in this work, the term foreclosure refers specifically to residential 
mortgage foreclosure. 
The national level impacts of the foreclosure crisis were massive.  The national foreclosure rate peaked 
above 0.11% in 2010, which had varied between 0.01% and 0.02% pre-crisis (Zillow, 2015).  Home 
prices fell an average of 30% between mid-2006 and mid-2009 (St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, 2014). 
Between June 2007 and November 2008, U.S.-Americans lost 25% of their net worth (Altman, 2009).  
The unemployment rate doubled from 5% in 2008 to 10% by the end of 2009 (St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank, 2015), and retirement assets, U.S.-Americans’ second-largest household asset after home 
equity, declined by 22% (Altman, 2009). 
Though the foreclosure crisis affected the entire nation, some areas were impacted much more heavily 
than others.  The foreclosure crisis hit especially hard in two distinct groups of states:  (1) in overheated 
housing markets, such as Florida, California, Nevada, Arizona, New York, and New Jersey; and (2) in 
weak housing markets in areas which have experienced long term economic decline, particularly in the 
Rust Belt, including Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio.  This research focuses on Ohio, characterized by a 
weak economy and housing market. 
1.1.1 Roots of the Crisis 
This section first introduces the development and meaning of homeownership in the U.S., followed by 
the relationship between homeownership and race, and the role of deregulation and financialization 
in order to set the context for the U.S. housing market and the foreclosure crisis.  Though the aspects 
covered in this section do not cover all the underlying issues that helped build the housing bubble and 
its eventual deflation, they do cover some major contextual factors necessary to understand how the 
crisis developed and played out. 
Importance of Homeownership 
The concept of homeownership in the U.S. should be properly situated.  First, it is well known that the 
U.S. has relatively high levels of homeownership.  Leading up to the foreclosure crisis, the rate peaked 
at 69.2% in Q4 2005.  The foreclosure crisis caused this rate to drop; as of Q2 2014 the rate was 64.7% 
and apparently continuing to decline (U.S. Census, 2014).  This increase in the homeownership rate 
                                                          
2 For the remainder of this document, the term “loan” refers to mortgage loans, specifically those for residential 
properties. 
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before the foreclosure crisis was supported by federal housing policy but it is also inextricably linked 
to the cultural significance of homeownership in the United States.3  
The twentieth century saw homeownership, particularly suburban homeownership, change from a 
privilege of the wealthy to the normal expectation of the middle class.  Seen as a social good, 
homeownership, and the house itself, became an integral symbol of the self in American society.  
Today in the United States it is assumed that homeowners are more attached to their communities 
and are better citizens than renters, who are presumed to be poor, transient, and politically suspect.  
Likewise tax structures incentivize homeownership and greatly favor homeowners.  The language 
attached to renters itself encompasses stigma; renters are described as tenants who live in units within 
a complex, while homeowners are residents who live in homes within a neighborhood (Krueckeberg, 
1999). 
One concept associated with homeownership, intertwined with status connotations, is that of the 
“ladder of life,” a term coined by Constance Perin.  The ladder of life is an ideation which declares a 
proper order of ascension through social time and space, with single-family homeownership at the 
top.  Renting is a form of tenure appropriate only to singles, young couples lacking children, and the 
elderly.  Those who are tenants at other points in the life cycle are lacking or deviant (1977). 
Figure 1.1:  U.S. Homeownership Rate traces the rate from 1890 to 2008.  It can be seen that the U.S. 
had a high rate of homeownership, hovering above forty-five percent, well before the twentieth 
century began.  The 1920s saw a steady increase in the rate of homeownership, fuelled by the decade’s 
increased credit availability.  The rate fell throughout the 1930s as the housing market collapsed and 
foreclosures were rampant.  Seeing the path out of the Great Depression through housing, policy 
makers created New Deal policies to restore credit liquidity to the housing market and simultaneously 
created jobs in construction and real estate. 
 
Figure 1.1:  U.S. Homeownership Rate   
Source:  U.S. Census, Historical Census of Housing Tables:  Homeownership & U.S. Census, Housing Vacancies and 
Homeownership (CPS/HVS) 
This trend, begun in 1934 with the establishment of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), 
established the use of the housing sector as a countercyclical measure to cushion periodic recessions, 
such as the predicted, but unrealized, recession based on wartime overproduction immediately 
                                                          
3 Of course, these two factors are not isolated.  Public policy and the cultural importance of homeownership both 
influence and reinforce one another. 
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following World War II.  By boosting the housing sector, and subsequently demand for durable goods, 
the perceived nationwide demand deficiency could be solved.  If implemented early enough, as in the 
post-World War II situation, recessions could be avoided entirely.  As a result, homeownership was 
used to stabilize the economy and grew steadily through much of the twentieth century (Elliott, 
Feldberg, & Lehnert, 2013). 
The roots of the role and meaning of homeownership in the U.S. reach back to the colonial era.  Doucet 
and Weaver contend that the origins of the drive for homeownership in North America stem from 
protests against concentrated land holdings in Europe.  The early settlers saw the new continent as 
open to a different system of land ownership.  Doucet and Weaver also point to a cultural memory of 
land ownership as the key to political and economic power.  They acknowledge that the period when 
suffrage was limited to property owners in the United States was short, but believe that when 
combined with a long history of limited suffrage in Europe an association had been culturally instilled 
(Doucet & Weaver, 1991). Kreuckeberg links this conception of homeownership to today, pointing to 
the contemporary claim of being a (property) taxpayer, which of course means property owner, to call 
attention to one’s importance and status (1999).4 
Federal efforts to encourage ownership have their roots in the colonial period as well.  Mitchell points 
to federal land distribution to war veterans in order to “forestall the evils of a collection of landless, 
disgruntled ex-soldiers by helping them become landowners,” which was maintained after the 
Revolutionary and Civil Wars (Mitchell, 1985, p.40).  The cash-poor but property-rich federal 
government’s provision of property indicates that property ownership was recognized as promoting 
independence and self-sufficiency as well as preventing dependence and the potential for lawlessness 
(Krueckeberg, 1999).  The Homestead Act of 1862 was another federal policy that encouraged 
landownership.  Families who settled 160 acres for five years would own them for free; however, this 
experiment resulted in a high failure rate, with less than fifty percent of the settlers lasting the five 
years and many slipping into tenancy.  This resulted in fears as the tenancies reflected poverty, debt, 
and un-American socialist sympathies (Krueckeberg, 1999). 
The meaning of homeownership at the turn of the twentieth century can be traced along lines of self-
help, reform, the separation of home and work, gender roles, and improving status.  Advertisements 
of the 1890s connected property ownership and its attendant rights to status, particularly that of the 
new middle-class.   This investment would improve status, maintain correct gender relations, aid in 
raising healthy children and create more affluent families (Garb, 2005).  Harris and Pratt enumerate 
three important changes that were occurring relative to the home:  (1) the long-term shift in paid 
employment away from the house; (2) the home took on new meanings: haven for family life, 
protection from stimulation and threat of the city, refuge from an alienating and exhausting world of 
work, a place of security, privacy, and personal control; and (3) the home as an important status 
symbol, a measure and symbol of personal success (1993). 
The late-nineteenth century was also characterized by reform movements oriented toward the 
improvement of living conditions for the poor and working class.  Especially focused on the problems 
                                                          
4 While renters do in fact pay property taxes indirectly through rent payments, there is a common but false 
conception that renters “freeload” off of the tax contributions of homeowners.  This is reflected, for example, by 
the resistance of homeowners to the creation (through building or rezoning) of additional rental properties 
nearby.  It is also reflected by the fact that only four states recognized renters as paying property tax (via rent 
payments) and were thus entitled to an income tax deduction (Krueckeberg, 1999). 
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of slum housing, reformers were concerned with both physical deficits—poor sanitation, 
overcrowding, and a lack of ventilation and sunlight—as well as the social defects they believed were 
caused by substandard material conditions. By abolishing inferior housing, reformers hoped that 
problems ranging from the spread of disease to crime and vice would be solved (Wright, 1981).  This 
movement focused on housing condition, not housing tenure status.  However, the building industries 
effectively co-opted efforts for housing reform into their messages of the benefits of homeownership.  
Advertisements stressed “natural and healthy environments” to market health as a commodity, and 
implied that only skilled builders could incorporate natural benefits with new sanitation and other 
technology in the suburban owner-occupied home.  Advertisements of the time also asserted the 
homeowner’s increased independence due to his ability to remake nature and harness its benefits for 
the health of his family (Garb, 2005). 
Meanings of homeownership in the early twentieth century continued along the path of reification of 
owner-occupation begun at the end of the nineteenth century. Homeownership continued to be 
associated with protection and masculinity, women’s traditional responsibility and the raising of 
healthy children, and qualities of thrift and independence (Hutchinson, 1997; Lands, 2008).  Other 
connotations were added, such as the homeowner as patriot, an extension of the traits of masculinity 
and family protection to the trait of protection of the republic.  A homeowner was a committed and 
true American, particularly important in light of fears that stemmed from the Bolshevik Revolution—
“Be a Patriot, Buy a Home” (Lands, 2008). 
Conversely, tenants couldn’t be true Americans, and their commitment to the republic wasn’t as 
certain.  National Association of Real Estate Brokers (NAREB) publications contrasted the qualities of 
owners and renters:  homeowners live in the ideal single-family home, are thrifty, independent and 
committed to the American way of life; renters are prone to crime and cause social disorder (Lands, 
2008).  Others asserted that middle class apartments encouraged sloth, sexual immorality, and divorce 
(Hutchinson, 1997).  Important figures indicated mortgage indebtedness was socially acceptable and 
even desirable (Lands, 2008). 
Today, homeownership is the major form of wealth accumulation for many Americans, in particular 
Americans of color.  Thirty-one percent of American wealth is in home equity; this number is nearly 
doubled for Americans of color, at 61% (The Greenlining Institute, 2014).  Conventional wisdom has 
long considered investing in a home and building equity to be a foolproof way to build wealth, though 
the foreclosure crisis has caused some to question this (Rappaport, 2010). 
Homeownership & Race 
An introduction to the history of and relationship between homeownership and race is also necessary 
to properly situate the U.S. housing context.  The history of racism and housing helps to explain the 
disparate impacts of the foreclosure crisis on black and other American minorities.   
Discrimination has played an important role in mortgage lending throughout the history of the U.S. 
mortgage lending market.  Many banks and savings and loans5 considered the maintaining of 
neighborhood “purity” to be a responsibility in their line of work.  In general, financial institutions were 
averse to lending to black Americans and entirely excluded minorities from obtaining loans for 
                                                          
5 Savings and loans, also known as thrifts, are depository institutions that make mortgage and other loans. 
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properties in white neighborhoods.6  African Americans were thus left with the options of obtaining a 
mortgage from a black lending institution, which were relatively uncommon, or using the services of 
informal lenders (Immergluck, 2009a). 
The only path to homeownership available to many blacks was that of the land contract.  Land 
contracts are a type of rent-to-own plan; this system was used to exploit black homeowners and 
extract capital through the use of abusive conditions.  One missed payment resulted in complete 
forfeiture of all payments and equity in the property up to that point.  Such a scheme could be used as 
a continuous source of income by cycling through many vulnerable buyers over time (Immergluck, 
2009a; Orser, 1994).  These properties were overpriced, due to both the extortionate conditions and 
the pent-up demand for homes and property in the geographically limited areas open to blacks. 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created in 1934 in response to the Great Depression 
and the high rates of foreclosures seen at that time.  The administration’s role was to regulate interest 
rate terms and to standardize mortgage terms.  The FHA also promoted and helped to institutionalize 
redlining, the practice of geographically defining areas acceptable and unacceptable for mortgage 
lending on the basis of race.  The term received its name as a result of the risk-rating maps the FHA 
and HOLC (Home Owners’ Loan Corporation) provided that rated areas “Best,” “Still Desirable,” 
“Declining,” and “Hazardous” (Orser, 1994).  These practices effectively kept black Americans out of 
the mortgage market:  in 1950 only 2.3% of FHA-insured mortgage loans were made to non-whites 
(Immergluck, 2009a). 
A second discriminatory measure was that of exclusionary covenants, which were legal until 1948 (the 
FHA officially stopped using them in their mortgage underwriting in 1950).   Restrictive covenants were 
included in property transactions to prevent buyers from selling, leasing, or transferring the property 
in the future to an undesirable inhabitant—generally blacks, but these agreements often applied to 
other minority groups, such as Jews. 
The 1960s marked a transition from outright discriminatory housing and lending practices to increasing 
protections—at least superficially—for minorities.  In 1962, President Kennedy issued Executive Order 
11063, disallowing racial discrimination in federal housing programs.  The Civil Rights Act was passed 
in 1968.  Title VIII, also known as the Fair Housing Act, prohibited discrimination in housing markets, 
including the practice of redlining.7  Though this was a large step forward, Title VIII left much to be 
desired.  To prove a Fair Housing Act violation, it was necessary to show racial animus as a motivating 
factor for the practice rather than simply showing evidence of racially disparate impact.  As well, the 
enforcement provisions of the act were toothless, rendering the legislation more symbolic than 
effective. 
Progress continued gradually:  the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was passed in 1974, for which the 
burden of proof was disparate impact rather than disparate treatment; this means that it is only 
                                                          
6 This section focuses on discrimination toward black Americans, who are the largest American racial minority 
and have a particularly frought history. However, other American minorities, such as Hispanics and Jews, have 
experienced housing discrimination as well.  
7 However, this prohibition applied only to the approving of loans to credit-worthy individuals and not to activities 
such as marketing or the provision of banking services.  Lenders could easily sidestep these requirements using 
practices such as setting a minimum loan amount, effectively excluding black borrowers (Immergluck, 2009a). 
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necessary to prove that outcomes are different for protected classes.8  In response to the fact that 
blacks were rejected at twice the rate of whites for home mortgage loans, the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act, which required banks and thrifts to collect and disclose data on lending patterns, was 
passed in 1975.  Two years later the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed, requiring federal 
regulatory agencies to push banks and thrifts to provide banking services to all constituents in their 
service areas.9 
Though legally much progress was made with respect to discriminatory housing and lending practices 
over this period, enforcement was lacking and in many ways the situation did not change.  Amid calls 
for increased CRA regulation, CRA data was made public and banks and thrifts were required to report 
data including race, gender, and income for each loan application.10  These changes allowed 
community groups and individuals to get involved and to pressure regulators to hold institutions 
accountable.  These changes led to the Federal Reserve releasing a report showing that blacks were 
rejected for home loans at a rate two to three times that of whites with similar incomes.  This briefly 
had an impact on CRA regulators and the ratings they gave out, with 11.7% of evaluated institutions 
receiving less than satisfactory ratings in 1990 and 1991—up from an average of 2.4% between 1985 
and 1988.  However, by 1993 this had dropped to about 5% (Immergluck, 2009a). 
Though many believe that racial discrimination in mortgage markets is a thing of the past, these 
practices have occurred in recent history.  These discriminatory practices, combined with the 
importance of homeownership culturally and financially, have resulted in strong disadvantages for 
African Americans.  For example, the exclusion of black Americans from homeownership has had a 
large effect on the comparative wealth of black and white Americans (recall that homeownership is 
the major investment vehicle for many Americans).  Though, as a proportion of total wealth, black 
Americans have approximately twice their wealth in home ownership (59%) as white Americans (31%), 
the median wealth of black Americans is $5,677 in comparison to $113,149 for white Americans 
(Kochhar, Fry, & Taylor, 2011).  Black Americans are also comparatively inexperienced with regard to 
mortgage loans and other financial products—21.4% have no bank accounts, in comparison to 4.0% of 
white Americans (Burhouse & Osaki, 2012)—which meant that black Americans are, as a group, more 
vulnerable to predatory and fraudulent lending. 
This assertion is borne out by the phenomenon of reverse redlining.  Reverse redlining, or greenlining, 
is the practice of targeting African Americans and other minorities for subprime and/or predatory 
loans, often with exorbitant or unnecessarily high interest rates,11 balloon payments, and unnecessary 
fees and charges.  This was largely facilitated by the fact that African Americans and immigrant 
populations have little experience with mortgage lending and thus tend to seek lenders informally, by 
asking a friend, acquaintance, or religious leader (Kaplan, 2008).  It is also facilitated by the continuing 
segregation of African Americans (both homeowners and renters) in specific areas.  Reverse redlining 
has resulted in a rate of origination of subprime loans to minorities that is well above what would be 
                                                          
8 Protected classes are characteristics of individuals that cannot be targeted for discrimination.  These classes 
currently include race, color, religion, national origin, age (over 40), sex, pregnancy, citizenship, familial status, 
disability status, veteran status, and genetic information. 
9 The CRA was not initially enforced; regulators used administrative rule-making to avoid this. 
10 Previously HMDA data only applied to loan originations, making it difficult to assess whether racial patterns 
were present in loan-making decisions. 
11 For example, many borrowers were steered into subprime loans, although they qualified for more affordable 
and less risky prime loans. 
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expected given their credit histories and other measures of risk.  It reflects the exploitation of 
geographic, racial, and socioeconomic imbalances:  “. . . it is clear that the profits extracted by these 
lenders are based on systemic inequalities in access to information, capital, industry resources and 
power” (Wyly, Atia, Foxcroft, Hamme, & Phillips-Watts, 2006, p.123). 
Deregulation & Financialization 
The U.S. mortgage market began a shift toward increased deregulation in the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  This deregulation in turn helped financialize the mortgage market.  Financialization refers to 
both the increasing dominance of the financial sector in comparison to other sectors of the economy12 
and the transformation of tradable goods and services into financial instruments.13  Mortgage 
securitization, or the packaging of contractual debt (such as residential mortgages in this case) into 
financial instruments that can be bought and sold and used for investment purposes, also grew 
immensely during this period. 
Dan Immergluck’s 2009 book, Foreclosed, thoroughly investigates the history of the U.S. mortgage 
market and the growth of high-risk loans that appeared on the heels of federal mortgage market 
deregulation.  His 2009 conference paper, From Global Buck to Local Muck, provides a more concise 
overview of deregulatory changes that occurred during the 1980s.  I use the 2009 overview here to 
provide a summary of major legislative changes relevant to the mortgage market.  Yves Smith’s 
Econned (2010) also provides a thorough investigation of the development of U.S. financial markets 
over time leading up to the foreclosure crisis. 
DIDMCA, or the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, established 
the phased elimination of state usury (interest rate) limits and made national banks bound to only the 
usury limits of their home states,14 even when originating mortgages in other states.  Thus states could 
“export” higher interest rates from less regulated states to more highly regulated states; this change 
greatly reduced states’ abilities to regulate mortgages within their borders (Immergluck, 2009b).  In 
1982, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA) was passed, which further overrode 
state consumer protection efforts by preempting state laws that regulated “alternative” loans—those 
containing non-standard terms, such as balloon payments and adjustable interest rates.  This pair of 
acts preempted state consumer protections for mortgages made by both depository institutions 
(DIDMCA) and non-depository institutions (AMTPA) (Immergluck, 2009b). 
The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act (SMMEA) of 1984 facilitated “private label” 
securitization by allowing federally-chartered financial institutions to invest in RMBS15 and overriding 
state regulation to allow state-chartered financial institutions to do so as well. The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 created a new financial instrument, the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC), which 
further enabled securitization by clarifying the tax treatment of the instrument (Immergluck, 2009b). 
The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 increased consumer demand for mortgages by allowing mortgage 
interest to be deducted when filing taxes, but did not allow consumers to deduct other consumer 
interest, such as that paid on credit cards or auto loans.  The result was that mortgage debt, even high-
                                                          
12 Alternatively, it can be defined as “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial 
channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (Krippner, 2005, p.174). 
13 Such as bonds, loans, futures, options, derivatives, and stocks, among others. 
14 An institution’s home state is the state in which it is registered and pays taxes. 
15 Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities. 
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cost mortgage debt, became cheaper for consumers in comparison to other types of debt 
(Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006). 
In the wake of the savings and loan crisis that began in 1986, regulatory changes further increased 
securitization.  As part of the savings and loan bailout legislation that followed, the holding of RMBS 
was given favorable treatment in comparison to the holding of mortgages made by the financial 
institution via lower capital reserve requirements.  The decline of savings and loans had begun in the 
1970s with the advent of RMBS, by the 1990s, deregulation and favorable treatment for securities had 
all but removed thrifts (savings and loans) from the mortgage market, leaving it dominated by the 
GSEs16 and later by private financial institutions.  Thrifts had once experienced a competitive advantage 
as the result of their knowledge of local housing markets, but deregulation and increased securitization 
reduced the significance of this difference (Immergluck, 2009b). 
During this period, the U.S. mortgage market was transformed:  from a local to a national market, from 
an originate-to-hold to an originate-to-sell model, and from more regulated originators (savings & 
loans) to less regulated originators (mortgage companies and mortgage brokers) (Immergluck, 2009b).  
These changes were not accidental; federal deregulationist policy supported and furthered 
securitization over the savings and loan model.  The push for deregulation is part of a general shift 
toward neoliberalism, which prizes growth, free trade, privatization, deregulation, and limited 
government intervention.  The active role of the state in reducing regulation in the mortgage market 
was intended to increase liquidity and thus provide opportunities for economic growth (Newman, 
2008). 
As the financial sector grew in economic importance, the sector lobbied for additional deregulation, 
which then allowed it to grow further in importance, and so on.  In particular, new market segments 
were opened to the financial industry through deregulatory changes as the financial industry worked 
to create demand—which was not particularly difficult given the primacy of homeownership in U.S.-
American values and the continuous house appreciation seen in this era (Newman, 2008). 
Prior to deregulation, the U.S.-American mortgage market worked on the principle of credit-rationing.  
Either one qualified for a mortgage loan or one did not.  This standard was replaced with risk-based 
pricing, where borrowers considered more risky could receive a loan with a higher interest rate 
(subprime) or “alternative” features, such as a variable interest rate or a balloon payment.  This shift, 
enabled by deregulation, opened new market segments—borrowers who had previously been shut 
out of the mortgage market—and helped transform mortgages into commodities that could be freely 
bought and sold (Immergluck, 2009b).  Investors desired securities made up of these mortgages, 
because the higher risk entailed higher yields.   
This deregulation reflected and reinforced changes in American attitudes concerning business and 
finance.  Yves Smith (2010) wrote of “a shift in collective identity away from membership in 
communities and toward actors in markets” between the 1960s and 2000s (p.112), which made 
deregulatory changes more palatable and even appealing.  Several authors have pointed to the U.S. 
federal government’s deregulatory shifts as being focused on providing international capital access to 
neighborhoods and homeowners, rather than the other way around—that is, global investment and 
                                                          
16 The GSEs, or Government Sponsored Enterprises, are the financial services corporations created by the U.S. 
Congress, among them Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FHLMC). FNMA and FHLMC were created in order 
to reduce risk and increase the flow of credit in the housing market. 
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growth were facilitated through the exploitation of homeowners and neighborhoods (Aalbers, 2008; 
Immergluck, 2009b; Newman, 2009).   
The “landscape of precariousness” created by neoliberal deregulationist policy, reductions in the social 
safety net, and the restructuring of employment resulting from globalization and demands for 
increasingly flexible work17 played a vital role in the foreclosure crisis (Fields, Libman, & Saegert, 2010; 
Nettleton & Burrows, 2001).  Those who had historically been shut out of homeownership were 
impacted hardest:   
The low-income and largely African-American homeowners . . . entered homeownership during 
a time of unprecedented expansion of ownership predicated on notions of wealth 
accumulation, neighborhood revitalization, and improved opportunities for future generations.  
In the act of investing in the future of their family and community, households already 
occupying a position of radical risk became further exposed to the negative externalities of 
larger political-economic processes shaping employment opportunities, income stability, and 
access to social welfare (Fields et al., 2010, p.660). 
1.1.2 Foreclosure Crisis Timeline 
The subprime18 boom of the 2000s that led up to the foreclosure crisis was actually the second wave 
of subprime mortgages.  The first subprime boom occurred in the mid-nineties and peaked in 1997 or 
1998.  The roots of this boom can be attributed to federal deregulation of mortgage policy that began 
in the 1980s.  Newer, non-depository mortgage institutions were not subject to the same regulatory 
burdens as savings and loans and banks, such as the CRA.  This allowed the new lenders to make loans 
that drained equity through high points and fees, sometimes returning to the same customer 
repeatedly, drawing down the property’s equity each time.  At the same time, securitization, or the 
packaging of mortgages together to be sold to investors, was increasing in popularity among private 
mortgage lenders.  This encouraged expansion to a more national market, in order to diversify the 
mortgage securities and spread risk over a larger geographic area (Immergluck, 2009a).   
The first subprime boom stalled from 1999 to 2001, due to the economic recession and other factors.   
The aftereffects were increased foreclosures in specific geographic areas and equity loss for many who 
did not lose their homes.  These effects were geographically limited, particularly to areas characterized 
by poorer and minority homeowners (Immergluck, 2009a).  Though some policymakers attempted to 
draw attention to this issue, it was generally considered an isolated urban problem. 
The first subprime boom did not have the same broadly disastrous consequences as the second.  This 
is due to a variety of factors.  First, though securitization played a significant role in the 2007-8 
foreclosure crisis, this was not the case in the mid-nineties.  Though the use of securities was increasing 
                                                          
17 For example, the use of “independent contractors” to replace positions previously held by employees, the rise 
of self-employed workers, and the use of variable hours and real-time scheduling software. 
18 Subprime loans are characterized by higher interest rates and poor or no collateral against the loan.  The 
increased interest rates are intended to be risk premiums to make up for the increased likelihood of default.  
Traditionally, subprime borrowers have been those with FICO (credit rating) scores below 640, though there is 
no hard and fast definition.  Please refer to the glossary for definitions of additional mortgage- and foreclosure-
related terms. 
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at that time, they were much less complex and relatively transparent—that is, investors could 
reasonably assess their risk, unlike more modern mortgage securities.   
Second, the loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) of mortgages during the first subprime boom were relatively 
low, because the share of subprime refinance loans dominated the share of subprime home purchase 
loans.19  Many subprime borrowers were withdrawing equity from their homes, increasing their 
mortgage debt (Immergluck, 2009a). 
Thirdly, the first subprime boom was more geographically isolated than the second.  Minority 
borrowers in particular were targeted.  Between 1993 and 1998, the incidence of subprime loans 
increased twenty-nine fold in predominately black neighborhoods, but only by 2.3 times in 
predominately white neighborhoods.  Mortgage companies also employed technological 
advancements to geographically target minority borrowers and to exploit pre-foreclosure data in order 
to target borrowers in trouble for additional refinance loans (Immergluck, 2009a).  Though the effects 
of the first subprime bust were similar to those of the second—i.e. foreclosures increased drastically—
the scale of these effects was much smaller and geographically isolated to lower income and minority 
areas (Immergluck, 2009a).  As a result, the first subprime boom received much less attention than the 
second, which occurred on a much larger scale and affected a wide variety of borrowers and 
geographies. 
In 2002 the second subprime boom—the one responsible for the foreclosure crisis—began.  These 
subprime loans tended to be purchase loans, as opposed to refinance loans.  This meant that the loan-
to-value ratios were much higher during this boom than the first, and that homeowners had greatly 
reduced equity in comparison. 
The conditions for a second subprime boom were created through unusually high home price 
appreciation between 2002 and 2005, the combined result of very low interest rates and tight housing 
markets, and investors’ increased appetite for risk (Belsky, 2008).  In particular, the deflation of the 
dot-com bubble had freed up investment capital that was now searching for new markets (Adrian & 
Shin, 2008; Belsky, 2008). 
The use of non-standard, or alternatively structured, loans increased greatly in the second subprime 
boom.  These loans, which require low or no documentation to prove one’s ability to make loan 
payments, existed prior to the second subprime boom but were rare and generally limited to wealthy 
real estate investors and the wealthy self-employed.  These loans came in many forms, such as 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) that offered a “teaser rate” for either two or three years before 
reverting to a much higher rate for the remainder of the thirty year term.  It was not unusual for 
borrowers to be reassured they could simply refinance when the interest rate was scheduled to reset. 
Other alternative loan structures included negative amortization, where the balance of the loan 
increases up to a certain point before payments are due, and interest-only mortgages, where the 
borrower at first pays only the interest and not the balance of the loan.  Another was the NINJA, or no 
income no job or assets, loan that required no documentation outside of the applicants’ credit rating.  
                                                          
19 Home purchase loans are used to buy a property, while home refinance loans are used either to obtain 
improved mortgage terms—in particular a lower interest rate—or to withdraw equity to use for other purposes, 
such as to make home repairs and improvements, to service other debt (for example credit card debt), or to 
finance direct spending (for example to cover medical expenses or replace earnings lost as the result of declining 
wages). 
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Another non-traditional method of financing was the “piggyback” loan, in which a borrower would 
take out a loan for 80% or 90% of a property’s value, and then another loan to cover the remaining 
10% or 20%.  This resulted in the borrower putting zero money down on the mortgage. To give an idea 
of the extent, in 2005 50% of all subprime loans were no or low doc loans (Immergluck, 2009a). 
Securitization took off during this period as well, in both volume and complexity.  In 2001 there were 
$87 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued; by 2006 this value had increased over fivefold 
to $450 billion (Immergluck, 2009a).  As mortgages were securitized and sold, the quality of the loans 
themselves became less important to lenders because defaults, and thus losses, would likely occur 
after the loan had been securitized and sold.  Instead, mortgage originators generated profit via 
origination volume and high fees.  The degree of complexity in securities increased tremendously 
during this time; many securities were based on other securities, with the actual mortgage loans 
several layers below.20  The increased degree of complexity meant that few, if any, investors truly 
understood what they were purchasing and instead relied on the ratings provided by the three major 
credit ratings agencies.  Today, these ratings institutions are considered to have played a key enabling 
role in the development of the foreclosure and financial crises by providing overly optimistic ratings to 
mortgage-backed securities even as underwriting standards dropped precipitously.21  It was possible 
to lower underwriting standards because financial institutions no longer kept all their mortgage loans 
on the books; rather they were sold and securitized, meaning that the additional risk engendered by 
reduced underwriting standards had no negative financial impact on the originating institutions. 
Focusing on house prices in hot real estate markets, many became transfixed by the “virtuous circle” 
of high-risk lending and increasing house prices.  Essentially, everyone was making money.  
Homeowners watched their equity increase on its own; mortgage brokers, appraisers, and real estate 
agents saw increased incomes due to the increase of real estate activity; financial institutions were 
faced with a seemingly unending demand for MBS products; and investors believed they were 
purchasing reliable and stable products that were likely only to increase in value as real estate 
appreciated and international demand grew (i.e. high yield and low risk products).  In response to 
declining affordability, underwriting standards were lowered in order to keep mortgage origination 
levels high; thus the self-reinforcing cycle continued. 
Meanwhile, the regulation of mortgage products continued to decrease.  This period saw growth in 
non-bank financial institutions, which, as mentioned, were not subject to the same degree of oversight 
as banks and thrifts.  Many states passed “mini HOEPA”22 laws that restrict high-cost lending; however, 
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) often pre-empted these 
regulations at the federal level. 
One might ask why this process was allowed to continue and why so many were blind to the reality of 
what was occurring.  First, of course, is that those whom a process favors—all or most of those listed 
                                                          
20 For example CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) and CDSs (credit default swaps).  More on these products 
and their roles in the foreclosure and financial crises can be found, for example, in Immergluck, 2009a; 2009b 
and Smith, 2010. 
21 This was largely due to a perverse incentive structure in which ratings agencies were paid by the firms 
requesting ratings for their financial products.  Thus, in order to keep customers, the ratings agencies had an 
incentive to provide high ratings, lest their clients “shop around” for better ratings from one of the other main 
ratings agencies. 
22 Mini HOEPA refers to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, which provided the Federal 
Reserve board broad powers to regulate lending.  Mini HOEPA laws were modeled after this act. 
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as “making money” above—are unlikely to notice or call attention to its deficits.  Secondly, there was 
an ideological component concerning the superiority of a deregulated market; increasing prices were 
seen as evidence of deregulation’s success.  Thirdly, the ratings agencies were assumed by investors 
to be rating derivatives accurately.  Fourthly, even those with an intimate knowledge of the statistical 
models used in MBSs and other financial products underestimated the systemic risk.  A normal 
distribution was used in these models—this is generally the preferred distribution for economists and 
others to work with, due to its tractability.  However, the actual distribution underlying the phenomena 
being modelled had a much higher peak and much fatter tails than a normal distribution would.  The 
assumption that these events follow a normal distribution had severe consequences because it caused 
financial theorists and economists to greatly underestimate the risk inherent in the system they were 
manipulating.23 
Beginning in late 2006, the housing market began to slow down and credit tightened.  This meant that 
for many borrowers, the option to refinance as rates increased was no longer available.  The rates of 
seriously delinquent borrowers and defaults increased drastically.  At first, primarily subprime loans, 
and especially ARMs, were affected.  In 2000, the foreclosure start rate for subprime mortgages was 
9.4%; by the second quarter of 2008 it was above 17% (Immergluck, 2009b).  Next, delinquencies and 
defaults spread to Alt-A loans.24  Since the housing sector had been a major driver of the U.S. 
economy,25 this slowdown spread to the general economy and credit tightened greatly.  
Unemployment rates rose, and the foreclosure crisis began expanding to prime loans as well—that is, 
“good” loans with quality underwriting—as homeowners lost jobs and experienced other financial 
hardships such as divorce or illness.   Of course, this was the other side of the “virtuous circle”—a 
vicious circle of price depreciation, tightened credit, and increasing delinquency, defaults, and 
foreclosures. 
As the U.S. housing market bubble peaked in 2006, foreclosures began to increase at a startling rate. 
The national foreclosure rate increased by two-thirds from 2006 to 2007 (from 1.2% to 2.0% of 1-to-4 
unit residential non-farm mortgages).  It continued to increase, reaching 4.6% of all active loans by 
2010 (U.S. Census, 2012b).   
Figure 1.2 tracks the foreclosure filing and completed foreclosure rates for the U.S. between 2000 and 
2013.  Up through 2004, the foreclosure rate remained relatively steady, varying between five and 
seven hundred thousand completed foreclosures per year.  Toward the end of 2004, foreclosure 
completions began steeply climbing; the steep increase in foreclosure filings lagged about a year 
behind completions but trended in a highly similar manner.  Both rose consistently between 2005 and 
2010, and began slowing down before reaching their peaks of 3.9 million foreclosures and nearly 3.6 
million foreclosure filings in 2011.  Foreclosures and foreclosure filings then decreased steadily, though 
as of 2013 both rates remained at approximately twice their pre-crisis value. 
                                                          
23 Please see Yves Smith’s book, Econned, for thorough explanations of the modeling issues involved in the 
financial crisis. 
24 Alt-A stands for Alternative A-paper.  Alt-A mortgages are considered riskier than prime mortgages but less 
risky than subprime mortgages, and thus tend to have interest rates above those seen in prime mortgages and 
below those seen in subprime mortgages. 
25 The housing sector has long been an important component of the U.S. economy; however, the increased 
financialization of the real estate sector that occurred during the second subprime boom exaggerated this 
further. 
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Figure 1.2:  U.S. Foreclosure Rate (2000 - 2013)  
Sources:  RealtyTrac, Federal Reserve, Equifax 
In some areas the foreclosure rate far exceeded the national rate.  The state of Ohio saw an 
extraordinary increase in the foreclosure rate—the foreclosure rate at least quadrupled between 1996 
and 2007 in 70 of the state’s 88 counties (Christie, 2007c).  Though rankings vary by dataset used and 
over time, the state of Ohio has been consistently in the top ten foreclosure states throughout the 
crisis; at the height of the crisis it stood as the state with the sixth-highest rate (RealtyTrac Staff, 2008). 
Cuyahoga County, the object of this study and where Cleveland is located, experienced the highest 
county foreclosure rate in all of Ohio for at least nine years (2005 – 2013) (Schiller, 2014).  Slavic Village, 
a Cleveland neighborhood, was declared the “epicenter of the foreclosure crisis” due to its zip code 
having the greatest number of foreclosure filings in the nation in 2007—783 foreclosure filings for 
16,211 households, or 4.83% of households (Christie, 2007b).  In comparison, the U.S. rate in 2007 was 
one foreclosure filing per fifty households, or 1.98% of households (Day, 1996; RealtyTrac Staff, 2008). 
1.1.3 Effects of the Crisis 
The negative effects of foreclosures have been significant, widespread, and varied.  Across the country, 
the number of mortgages at some point in the foreclosure process increased 204% between October 
2006 and October 2008 (Mallach, 2009).  As well, the housing bust initiated the national (and 
international) financial crisis of 2007-2009, due to the heavy speculative investment in U.S. home 
mortgages both domestically and internationally.  By early 2008, analysts were estimating losses on 
MBSs and other mortgage-derived financial products to be on the order of $500 billion (Mishkin, 2010). 
In 2007, it was estimated that the cost of the national recession was 40% of the U.S. GDP for that year 
(Johnson, 2013). 
On the homeowner level, foreclosure brings stress, uncertainty, potential or actual displacement, and 
negative credit impacts.  Many renters living in units foreclosed upon faced the same impacts, often 
with even less notice and with no avenue of recourse.  Both homeowners and renters who have 
experienced foreclosure face difficulties in finding new accommodations, as credit reports will reflect 
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the foreclosure or disrupted rental tenure (Belsky, 2008; Crump, 2008).  Experiencing foreclosure also 
carries social stigma and the accompanying feelings of fear, shame, and guilt.  Recalling the importance 
of homeownership to personal and social identity in the U.S. context, Fields et al. describe the danger 
of foreclosure:  “The threat of foreclosure represents a significant disruption to the identity and social 
status associated with ownership; the spatial context of daily life; the constancy of the social and 
material environment and one’s control over it; and the home as a site of refuge” (Fields et al., 2010, 
p.653, citing Hiscock et al., 2001; Dupuis and Thorns, 1998). 
Neighborhoods, communities, municipalities and other jurisdictions are sometimes overlooked victims 
of the foreclosure crisis.  Foreclosures and their aftereffects are not evenly distributed across space. 
As individual foreclosures accumulate in specific areas, neighborhoods and communities are faced with 
increasing vacancies, vandalism, unsafe properties, high residential turnover, and drops in property 
values.  Residents lose hope in their neighborhoods and communities and decrease their personal 
investment in them.  These effects increase with each additional foreclosure, resulting in a self-
reinforcing cycle of displacement, destruction of social networks, and decreasing quality of life for 
residents.  The foreclosure crisis negatively affected municipalities and other jurisdictions as well.  They 
lost property tax revenue as a result of falling house prices, while simultaneously seeing demands on 
services, such as homeless shelters, financial assistance, police, and vacant property maintenance, 
increase. 
Mallach (2009) asserted that the secondary impacts—that is, the impacts on (non-foreclosed) 
properties, neighborhoods, communities, and local governmental jurisdictions—may outweigh the 
primary effects of the crisis.  He states: 
The secondary effects . . . arise from the close relationship between foreclosure, 
disinvestment, and vacancy, often leading to abandonment of the properties.  While these 
outcomes are not inevitable . . . they are widespread.  Moreover, they are most likely to occur 
precisely in the most vulnerable communities, such as struggling lower-income and minority 
communities in cities and older suburbs (p.17).   
He also cited a Credit Suisse projection (2008) that estimated 8.1 million foreclosures occurring by 
2012, with an expected impact on house values of $1.5 trillion.  In fact, between 2007 and 2011, four 
million foreclosures had been completed and 8.2 foreclosure starts had occurred (Bennett, 2012), 
indicating that while Credit Suisse’s forecast of 8.1 million foreclosures by 2012 was likely high, but 
also provides an idea of the magnitude of the crisis’ economic impact. 
It is important to be aware that the term “foreclosure crisis” is somewhat misleading—the crisis played 
out in different ways, to different extents, and at different times.  Ashton (2008) suggests two reasons 
for this: subprime lending, which expanded the mortgage market to new borrower groups and new 
geographies; and the varying conditions of local and regional economies and housing markets, which 
are related to the magnitude and reach of spillover effects due to foreclosures.  Inner cities and older 
suburbs, which tend to have weak economic conditions and higher proportions of minority residents 
(who were targeted especially for subprime loans), were generally hit harder than newer, outer 
suburbs.  These older areas had already experienced disadvantage as the result of redlining, de facto 
redlining, the decline of industry and blue collar employment, and the first subprime crisis, among 
other factors, which then set the stage for comparatively exaggerated decline as the result of the 
foreclosure crisis.  This geographically patterned and unequal decline results in a long-term 
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restructuring of the urban environment and continued disadvantage for these geographies (Ashton, 
2008). 
1.1.4 Aftermath 
Though there have been responses designed to both prevent and mitigate foreclosures, the demand 
has far outstripped capacity (see Section 2.4).  By 2014, the national foreclosure rate was 1 in 1126 
housing units, much below the crisis level (RealtyTrac Staff, 2013c).  However, many areas continue to 
face elevated foreclosure rates.  As well, housing values on the national level remain approximately 
20% below the pre-crisis values observed in 2006 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2014); meanwhile nearly one-fifth of residential mortgage holders owes more on the 
mortgage than the property is worth (Dougherty, 2014). 
Ohio continues to have one of the highest foreclosure rates in the nation—in early 2014 it had the 
tenth-highest foreclosure rate.  The Cleveland metropolitan area had the sixth-highest foreclosure rate 
in the country at this time, with one in fourteen residential mortgages delinquent and a foreclosure 
rate of 7.2% (down from 9.5% one year previous) (Dixon Murray, 2014). 
In the wake of the housing and economic crises, a vast array of regulatory changes was proposed.  
These included changes affecting consumer choices, lender and servicer operations, foreclosure 
procedures, and the financial sector.  For the most part, these changes were not passed into law or 
enacted by the governing regulatory agency.  As well, many of these changes would affect future 
occurrences, but would not directly impact the current crisis. 
A particularly important regulatory change that did not come to pass is allowing bankruptcy courts to 
modify the mortgage terms of creditors.  These changes, which could include reducing the principal, 
changing the interest rate, and adjusting the term length, are referred to as mortgage cramdowns.26  
Senator Durbin proposed cramdown legislation in October 2007, but the financial industry blocked it 
through lobbying efforts (Immergluck, 2013).  With the introduction of HAMP, one of the federal 
responses to the foreclosure crisis, cramdown legislation was reintroduced, which would provide a 
‘stick’ to complement the ‘carrots’ ensconced in the HAMP incentive payments.  Cramdown legislation 
would push servicers to modify loans to the current market value of the property of their own accord; 
otherwise this was likely to occur outside of their control in bankruptcy proceedings (Immergluck, 
Alexander, Balthrop, Schaeffing, & Clark, 2011).  The expected effect would be that many more 
homeowners would be able to remain in their homes and continue making mortgage payments (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010).   
Two main changes came out of the crisis at the national level, the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  The Dodd-Frank Act was intended as a 
“sweeping overhaul of the United States financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not 
seen since the reforms that followed the Great Depression” (Obama, 2009).  The key objectives of the 
Dodd-Frank Act were (1) to limit the risk of financial activities, and (2) to limit the damage that would 
be caused by the collapse of a large financial institution, such as observed in the 2007-8 financial crisis.  
However, the act has had many critics and overall does not satisfy these two objectives.  First, the act 
                                                          
26 Cramdown is a term for the practice of the court modifying debts (presumably against the creditors’ wishes) 
in bankruptcy court.  Bankruptcy courts have the authority to reduce other types of debt, but not home mortgage 
debt. 
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continues the government partnership with large financial institutions that creates the “too big to fail” 
phenomenon.  Second, the act tends toward an ad hoc system of intervention rather than using a rules-
based system.  Though not particularly convincing as far as a “sweeping overhaul” goes, the act does, 
overall, improve the U.S. financial regulatory landscape (Skeel Jr., 2010).  The Dodd-Frank Act also 
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which is responsible for matters of 
consumer protection with respect to the financial sector (e.g. mortgages, student loans, payday 
lending).  As of this date the impacts of the CFPB remain unclear. 
The crisis led to calls for policy changes at well.  For example, Hank Paulson, Secretary of the Treasury 
from 2006 to 2009, called for a reduction in subsidies to homeowners and a reduction in federal 
government policies promoting homeownership in order to keep homeownership at sustainable 
levels, rather than encouraging those unprepared for homeownership into a mortgage to increase 
homeownership as a means in and of itself (Paulson, 2010). 
The crisis at first appeared to have changed cultural attitudes toward homeownership as well.  What 
was seen as a “can’t lose” wealth-building opportunity was regarded more warily.  However, as the 
market slowly stabilized, attitudes quickly reverted (Rohe & Lindblad, 2013)—though it is not clear 
whether this is due to optimistic beliefs, increased confidence is the regulatory system, or the 
realization that, dispite its limitations, housing remains the best investment vehicle available to the 
middle class. 
1.2 Research Objective & Research Questions 
Previous research shows strong evidence of relationships between foreclosures and neighborhood 
change. Researchers have found evidence that indicators of neighborhood change, such as decreasing 
median income and increasing unemployment rate, are associated with increased foreclosure rates 
(Baxter & Lauria, 2000; Cotterman, 2001; Williams, Beranek, & Kenkel, 1974).  Others have found 
evidence of a relationship in the opposite direction, that an increased foreclosure rate is related to 
increases in indicators of neighborhood change, such as increased crime rates (Immergluck & Smith, 
2006a), decreased property values (Immergluck & Smith, 2006b), and increased housing market 
segregation (Lauria & Baxter, 1999; Leonard & Murdoch, 2009). Two efforts to examine the possible 
cyclical nature of the relationship between neighborhood change and foreclosures have been done by 
Baxter & Lauria (2000) and Li (2006).  Both isolated the relationship direction temporally, with the 
results indicating the relationship is significant in both directions, providing evidence of a cyclical 
relationship. 
Additionally, a large body of research has tied individual opportunity to spatial location. That is, one’s 
neighborhood (or spatial context) significantly determines one’s potential educational, occupational, 
and health opportunities, among others; these opportunity fields then constrain outcome possibilities 
(Galster & Mikelsons, 1995; Galster & Keeney, 1988; powell, 2003).  This indicates that neighborhood 
health and stability is important to individual outcomes, which, in aggregate, strongly affect municipal 
and regional health and stability.  While not the focus of this research, these impacts must be kept in 
mind. 
The combined implication is that there are significant relationships between foreclosures and 
neighborhood change, which have important impacts on opportunity, outcomes, and quality of life.  
Given the extent of the foreclosure crisis and a limited and relatively ineffective federal response, many 
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localities have created local foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs in an effort to reduce the 
severity of the effects.   These programs include efforts both to prevent foreclosures and to limit their 
negative effects.  There is evidence that these programs improve outcomes on the homeowner level; 
however research is lacking concerning the impacts of these foreclosure-related programs on the 
community and neighborhood levels.27 
Pre-foreclosure interventions, which include foreclosure prevention counseling and foreclosure 
mediation, have been shown to significantly reduce the incidence of foreclosures among participants 
(Mayer & Temkin, 2009). However, examination of the impacts on the neighborhood level is lacking.  
One objective of this research is to determine what, if any, relationship these programs have with 
neighborhood stabilization. 
Post-foreclosure interventions include landbanking, demolitions, Board of Revisions foreclosures on 
non-maintained properties, and targeting specific neighborhoods.28  In contrast to pre-foreclosure 
interventions, these efforts are frequently intended to have a benefit on the neighborhood level. 
However, the degree and extent of their impacts are unknown.  My research attempts to determine 
what these neighborhood-level impacts are and how they occur, using data from expert interviews 
supplemented with quantitative analysis of changes in residential property value. 
This examination of efforts to stabilize neighborhoods and communities during a period of large-scale 
economic and demographic change may provide insights pertinent to other instances of swift 
neighborhood change, as evidenced by high residential turnover and vacancy rates.  Specifically, this 
research can help identify which types of programs are appropriate and effective for intervention in 
changing neighborhoods, in particular those facing the continuing negative effects of the foreclosure 
crisis. 
Thus, in order to meet the research objectives, the following primary research question is posed: 
Do foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an impact on neighborhood well-
being?   
To realize this, the following subquestions are examined: 
 Under what political, social, and financial constraints do foreclosure responses in 
Cuyahoga County operate, and how do these constraints impact their operation and 
impacts? 
The context within which foreclosure responses operate plays a critical role determining their design, 
implemention, and effects.  The foreclosure context provides both opportunities and constraints 
within the problem space in which foreclosure responses are developed.  This aspect is key to 
understanding what occurred in Cuyahoga County and why. 
 What foreclosure responses have been implemented in Cuyahoga County?  How have 
these responses been created and developed? 
                                                          
27 Tracts from the 2010 U.S. Decennial Census are used to proxy neighborhoods in this research.  For a discussion 
of this choice, and its benefits and drawbacks, please see Sections 2.1.2 and 3.4.2. 
28 Targeting sometimes includes pre-foreclosure interventions as well. 
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The first task of this research is to establish which foreclosure responses have been used in Cuyahoga 
County, as well as how these responses have been created and developed.  
 To what extent are these foreclosure responses implemented and/or utilized?   
 What distribution of outcomes is seen?  Do these vary among neighborhoods and 
communities? 
To examine the impacts of foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts, it is necessary to determine 
where and how they are being implemented and used.  Paying attention to the neighborhood context 
is essential to understanding this.  One example of neighborhood context is the level of resident 
perception and engagement, which, while difficult to measure, may have a large influence on the 
utilization of programs.  The associations between socioeconomic and spatial characteristics and the 
use of foreclosure responses are investigated as well. 
 What strategies have been used in the foreclosure responses observed in Cuyahoga 
County? 
The strategies used in developing and implementing the foreclosure responses observed in Cuyahoga 
County are of particular interest.  Due to the degree of overlap and interconnection between various 
foreclosure responses in the county, identifying the key strategies employed in these responses allows 
for clearer analysis of the community and neighborhood impacts observed, as well as facilitating policy 
recommendations. 
 What neighborhood and community impacts are observed? Are these physical, 
economic, social, and/or political?   
In order to evaluate foreclosure responses on the neighborhood and community levels, it is necessary 
to determine what impacts occur on these levels and which responses are associated with these 
impacts. In addition to the economic implications of foreclosure interventions, it is important to 
investigate physical and social impacts.  One reason is that economic changes may lag behind physical 
and social changes; a second is that economic factors alone are a poor measure of neighborhood 
quality.   
 Do these impacts vary according to certain neighborhood and community 
characteristics? 
Some interventions may be more effective in particular neighborhood conditions than others.  For 
example, foreclosure counseling is only available to homeowners for their primary residence.  As a 
result, areas with high concentrations of renters may not see the same impacts as those dominated by 
homeowners.  This research attempts to investigate whether the effects of foreclosure responses 
differ according to various factors associated with neighborhoods and communities, such as 
geographic location within the metropolitan area, race, or income level. 
This research seeks to answer these questions via a case study of the foreclosure problem and 
foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, a county hit early and heavily by the foreclosure crisis 
that has developed a myriad of foreclosure interventions and is considered a national leader in 
responding to the foreclosure crisis.  Exceptionally rich data on socioeconomic, geographic, and 
property characteristics is also available for the county.  These characteristics make Cuyahoga County 
an ideal candidate for a case study investigating local responses to the foreclosure crisis.  See Section 
3.2 for more on this selection. 
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Though using a case study as the unit of analysis limits the study’s potential generalizability, on the 
other hand it allows for detailed and in-depth investigation of a leading instance of foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation.  The results and analysis then provide a starting point for investigating other 
instances of local responses to the foreclosure crisis and similar instances of swift neighborhood 
change; the results also support the generation of testable hypotheses for further quantitative work. 
In the qualitative component of the work Ifirst conducted semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders involved in the response to the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga County.  Participants were 
interviewed concerning their experiences of the foreclosure crisis and with foreclosure responses, 
including what efforts they are involved in, how these efforts work or should work, what effects they 
have seen on individual and neighborhood levels, and what opportunities and constraints are present. 
The qualitative analysis is supported by a quantitative analysis. I investigate the effects of pre- and 
post-foreclosure interventions across the spectrum of residential property value29 change, in an effort 
to determine whether impacts and effectiveness differ by the extent to which the foreclosure crisis 
negatively impacted the economic health of a community or neighborhood.  Thus, an objective of this 
research is to determine if certain efforts are particularly appropriate or effective for particular types 
of neighborhoods or communities. 
By answering these sub-questions, it is possible to answer the primary research question of the effect 
of foreclosure-related interventions on neighborhoods in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and to some extent, 
in other U.S. cities with weak housing markets in general. By paying attention to contextual factors it 
is possible to hypothesize, or in some cases explain, why programs are or are not effective.  This 
research can then assist in better designing and targeting efforts to stabilize neighborhoods facing 
swift and substantial change in the future. 
1.3 Scope of the Research 
This research examines Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the central county in the Greater Cleveland 
metropolitan region.  The county contains 59 municipalities and townships, the largest of which is the 
City of Cleveland.  In addition to the county itself, the 443 Census tracts30 of the 2010 U.S. Decennial 
Census are the objects of analysis in the research.  Each jurisdiction is made up of a number of Census 
tracts, meaning that individual jurisdictions can be examined as well by aggregating the appropriate 
Census tracts.  
Cuyahoga County is located in northeast Ohio within the Rust Belt, a region of former economic 
strength based substantially on manufacturing, particularly steel.  The decline began in the late 1960s 
and 1970s, resulting in sustained losses in industry, employment, wealth, and population.  Today, 
Cleveland, and the Rust Belt in general, continue to have weak housing markets, characterized by a 
housing supply that outstrips demand, low to negative housing appreciation, and an elevated vacancy 
rate.  Like the strong housing markets in California, Nevada, and Florida, Ohio was hit heavily by the 
foreclosure crisis, but the problem, its impacts, and appropriate responses differ significantly.  For 
example, weak market regions, such as Ohio, tend to have sizeable vacancy and REO31 problems, while 
strong markets don’t, due to excess housing demand found in those regions.  Thus, this research 
                                                          
29 Please note that unless otherwise specified, the term “property value” refers to residential property value. 
30 Excluding the tract assigned to Lake Erie. 
31 REOs will be defined and discussed in Section 2.2.1. 
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examines only a weak housing market region and the results and analysis cannot reasonably be 
extended to strong market regions without additional study. 
Cuyahoga County was selected as the case study for this research for several reasons.  First of all, the 
county, and especially the City of Cleveland, were hit both early and heavily by the foreclosure crisis.  
Thus foreclosure responses were developed earlier in Cuyahoga County than in most parts of the 
country, making the county, the City of Cleveland, and the community of Slavic Village, among others, 
leaders in the development and implementation of both pre- and post-foreclosure responses.  
Secondly, a major advantage of using Cuyahoga County for this research was the availability of both 
primary and secondary resources, including a highly-developed, publicly-available social, economic, 
and property data system; knowledgeable respondents comfortable and experienced with interviews, 
testimony, and other public and semi-public speech; and a large body of academic and policy research 
pertaining to the county and foreclosures.  
The research combines quantitative and qualitative analysis, with the quantitative data reflecting the 
period 2000 to 2010. The qualitative data were collected during 2011 and 2012, but refer to a much 
longer period, in some cases extending back to the beginning of the foreclosure problem in the 
Cleveland area during the late 1990s.  The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research inform 
one another, rather than being conducted independently. 
Foreclosure responses occurring on the county level and below are investigated, with federal and state 
responses discussed for context and to clarify the linkages between more local responses and higher 
level, particularly federal, responses.  Many federal responses fund local responses, in the form of 
competitive grants.  Money from these grants can only be used in ways that fit federal program 
guidelines, which often constrain possibilities on the ground. 
1.3.1 Terminology 
Terminology plays an important role in this research.  A clear understanding of the meaning of key 
terms in this research is necessary both for clarity and precision.  Here I clarify several terms as they 
are used in this work:  neighborhood, community, locality, neighborhood change, neighborhood or 
community well-being, neighborhood or community stability, and local level.   
In practice, the terms neighborhood, community, and locality are used very loosely and in some cases 
interchangeably, with definitions varying from user to user, and often from context to context for the 
same user.  I use the term neighborhood to denote what Suttles (1972)32 refers to as the ‘local network 
and the face-block’ or ‘home area.’  This is the idea of neighborhood as one’s immediate 
surroundings—a rule of thumb would be the area reachable within a five to ten minute walk from 
one’s residence—that varies from individual to individual.  This is the level on which one would expect 
a relatively dense web of social connections and relationships.  I use the term community to denote 
Suttles’ ‘defending neighborhood,’ which is the smallest concept of neighborhood that is generally 
identifiable to both residents and outsiders.  I use Census tracts to approximate what I call communities 
and Suttles calls defending neighborhoods.  Finally, the ‘community of limited liability’ or ‘locality,’ is 
the third level in Suttles’ four-level neighborhood hierarchy.  This is the area recognized and used by 
outsiders, in particular government and commercial interests, in addition to residents.  In this research 
                                                          
32 See Section 2.1.1 for more on Suttles’ four-level hierarchy of neighborhood and other conceptualizations of 
neighborhood. 
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I use the term locality to refer to this concept of neighborhood. I also equate the official Statistical 
Planning Areas (SPAs) used by Cuyahoga County with localities.  The SPAs within the City of Cleveland 
are what many would refer to as districts or quarters; outside of Cleveland the SPAs align one-to-one 
with the suburban municipalities and townships.  For clarity, I have included Table 1.1 listing the 
various geographical concepts used in this research. By “External Definition” I mean pre-existing 
concepts of the term that are generally recognizable and which the terms used in this research 
approximate.  In two of the three cases, these terms are a priori geographically defined. 
Table 1.1:  Geographical Concepts used in this Research 
Term used in this 
research 
Suttles (1972) term External Definition 
Neighborhood Local network and the face-
block/Home area 
Resident-defined 
neighborhoods 
Community Defending neighborhood Census tract (2010 
boundaries) 
Locality Community of limited 
liability/Locality 
Statistical Planning Area 
(SPA) 
 
I should note that the use of the terms neighborhood and community by interviewees may or may not 
correspond to these definitions.  Both terms have a broad range of acceptable meanings and are 
highly-context dependent.  For example, Barbara Anderson of the Slavic Village community uses the 
term neighborhood to refer to both her ‘home area,’ when she speaks of the activities of the Bring 
Back the 70s Block Club, as well as to refer to the entire Slavic Village community—her ‘community of 
limited liability’ or ‘locality.’  However, I believe that the meanings of these terms when used by 
interviewees are sufficiently clear from context. 
Difficulties arise with the term neighborhood change. Within the planning research tradition, the term 
neighborhood change is a broad and flexible term:  the ‘change’ of interest can be any alteration in 
neighborhood conditions or make-up, while the ‘neighborhoods’ of interest are generally defined by 
convenience, i.e. on what geographic level quantitative data are presently available.  This means that 
in practice, the neighborhoods studied in neighborhood change research are Census tracts, block 
groups, or blocks.  This research uses the Census tract level for the quantitative model of neighborhood 
change.  Given the variety of meanings encompassed by the term neighborhood, I take care to use the 
term Census tract when discussing the model and results in order to avoid blurring the meaning of the 
term neighborhood, as defined above.  However, the section of the literature review that deals with 
neighborhood change theories and empirical work uses the term as it is in the literature, although 
many of the ‘neighborhoods’ in the literature are much larger than the scope intended by the use of 
the term in this work.   
Two terms related to neighborhood change are neighborhood stability and community well-being.  
Neighborhood (or community) stability33 refers in the general sense to whether changes are occurring 
in a neighborhood that result in a change in the neighborhood’s character.  The use of the term in the 
academic literature focuses on in- and out-movers to a neighborhood.  That is, a stable neighborhood 
                                                          
33 Neighborhood stability is the term favored in the literature; for the purpose of clarity I use both neighborhood 
stability and community stability, depending on which level of aggregation is under discussion. 
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has a stable population and thus (relatively) stable characteristics.  Shifts in a neighborhood’s 
population make-up can result in a variety of changes to a neighborhood’s character, whether 
economic, spatial, cultural, or demographic.  I use the term neighborhood stability when discussing 
the quantitative component of the research, which captures aspects such as population, race, and 
socioeconomic status.  
Community (or neighborhood) well-being34 is a concept used to assess a community’s ability to fulfill 
the economic, social, cultural, and political needs of its residents as well as to replicate itself.  Defining 
community well-being is highly subjective, and socially-determined normative measures are often 
used to assess it.  Components of community well-being include residents’ degree of socioeconomic 
security, the degree of social inclusion, residents’ social cohesiveness and solidarity, cultural vitality, 
the level of autonomy and empowerment of residents, and environmental sustainability (Al-Haydari, 
2011; Miles, Greer, Kraatz, & Kinnnear, 2008).  In this research the term community well-being 
encompasses all of these components, and the assessment of community well-being is based on 
residents’ and experts’ subjective assessments, rather than a quantitative framework.  Note that 
neighborhood and/or community stability is a component of neighborhood and/or community well-
being.  It may either increase community well-being, for example in the case of a neighborhood with a 
stable population that is able to uphold community norms, or decrease it, in the case of an 
impoverished neighborhood that remains in poverty over the longer term. 
Finally, I use the term local, as in local foreclosure responses or local level responses.  By local I mean 
at or below the county level.  Thus, local foreclosure responses are those organized and undertaken at 
the county, municipal, township, community, or neighborhood level.  The use of the term local is 
primarily to exclude higher level responses, namely federal and state. 
This document includes a large number of terms specific to the financial, mortgage, and affordable 
housing sectors.  I have included a glossary in order to clarify these terms as needed.  The work also 
includes a large number of abbreviations.  The Table of Abbreviations lists these and their 
unabbreviated versions for reference. 
1.4 Overview 
This chapter has introduced the foreclosure context and the research objectives.  To do so, several 
roots of the crisis, including the importance of homeownership in U.S.-American culture, the United 
States’ continuing history of racial discrimination and property ownership, and the deregulation and 
financialization of the mortgage market by the federal government.  A brief history of the foreclosure 
crisis was given, followed by a summary of the major effects of the crisis. 
The research objective, to determine the community- and neighborhood-level impacts of foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation efforts in a weak housing market county, was presented, as well as the 
choice to investigate this by means of a case study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, both an epicenter of the 
foreclosure crisis and a leading example of the use of foreclosure responses. 
Chapter 2 investigates and criticizes key areas of literature related to this research.  It begins by 
discussing the term neighborhood, both as it is conceptualized and as it is used empirically.  
                                                          
34 Similarly, community well-being is the term used in the literature, but I use both community well-being and 
neighborhood well-being in order to differentiate between spatial levels of aggregation. 
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Neighborhood effects are also introduced.  The second topic is that of foreclosures, in which the 
foreclosure process is introduced, patterns and trends associated with foreclosures are discussed, and 
the impacts of foreclosures on individuals, neighborhoods and communities, and municipalities are 
presented.  Third, theories of neighborhood change are introduced and research pertaining to the 
relationship between neighborhood change and foreclosures is reviewed.  Finally, research and policy 
papers on foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts are discussed and criticized.   
Chapter 3 is devoted to the research design, empirical methods, and data.  In this chapter I explain my 
choices and decisions in the research process, and what factors went into these decisions.  Of particular 
interest are the reasoning for the case study approach and case selection, and the choice to use mixed 
methods.   
Chapter 4 introduces Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland, before presenting the course of the 
foreclosure crisis in the county.  Particular attention is paid to spatial patterns that are present in the 
socioeconomic conditions in the city and county, and which were exacerbated by the foreclosure crisis.  
Two communities are profiled:  Slavic Village, a working-class community on the east side of Cleveland, 
also known as ground zero for the foreclosure crisis; and the City of South Euclid, one of Cleveland’s 
inner suburbs that has also been affected by the crisis. 
Chapter 5 addresses the first four sub-questions: 
 Under what political, social, and financial constraints do foreclosure responses in 
Cuyahoga County operate, and how do these constraints impact their operation and 
impacts? 
 What foreclosure responses have been implemented in Cuyahoga County?  How have 
these responses been created and developed? 
 To what extent are these foreclosure responses implemented and/or utilized?   
 What distribution of outcomes is seen?  Do these vary among neighborhoods and 
communities? 
To do so I present and analyze the foreclosure responses that occurred in Cuyahoga County in response 
to the foreclosure crisis.  First the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative, a county-run program, and 
the Strategic Investment Initiative, a program created and implemented by non-profits, are introduced 
and discussed.  Next, a variety of foreclosure responses addressing property acquisition and control 
are presented, followed by an investigation of neighborhood-led responses to foreclosures that have 
occurred in Slavic Village and South Euclid.  Finally, the response context, or what constraints and 
opportunities stakeholders in the county had to work with, is discussed, with special attention to how 
this context affected the creation and use of foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County.   
Chapter 6 addresses the final three sub-questions: 
 What strategies have been used in the foreclosure responses observed in Cuyahoga 
County? 
 What neighborhood and community impacts are observed? Are these physical, 
economic, and/or social?   
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 Do these impacts vary according to certain neighborhood and community 
characteristics? 
First the qualitative results are summarized and discussed.  Then the quantitative model results are 
presented and interpreted.  Finally, the qualitative and quantitative results are synthesized and 
presented. The sub-questions are specifically addressed in the following sections: 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the work, summarizing the research and its results, discussing further 
avenues for research on and related to this topic, and provides conclusions and policy suggestions. 
A table of abbreviations is included for reference and can be found following the table of contents. 
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Chapter 2 Neighborhoods, Foreclosures, & Neighborhood Change 
This chapter reviews the scientific and policy literature concerning the major thematic areas pertinent 
to this research.  The intention is to situate this research within the larger scientific discussion and to 
provide reasoning for and evidence to support many of the choices and assumptions made in the 
research. 
The first section discusses neighborhoods.  First the task of defining and operationalizing the concept 
of “neighborhood” is discussed.  This is particularly important because this choice transforms 
neighborhood from an abstract concept to a specific and concretely-bounded instantiation.  This then 
greatly influences the research:  in what is examined, what is ignored, what is detected and what is 
overlooked.  Then the concept of and evidence for neighborhood effects are discussed.  This discussion 
can be extended to communities, and how they are conceptualized and operationalized as well. 
Secondly, residential mortgage foreclosure is introduced.  The process is explained, with a focus on the 
particular processes in the state of Ohio and Cuyahoga County, followed by a discussion of foreclosure 
patterns and impacts, particularly on the community and neighborhood levels. 
Thirdly, the neighborhood change literature is presented and reviewed. Major theories of 
neighborhood change are presented and discussed, followed by a more focused investigation of the 
theoretical and empirical literature concerning neighborhood change and foreclosures. 
Finally, foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts are introduced and discussed.  Efforts on the 
federal, state, and local level are presented, with attention to their relationships to one another and 
how these affect individual efforts, particularly on the local level.  
It should be noted that this research relies on policy papers, newspaper accounts, and working papers 
in addition to academic articles published in peer-reviewed journals.  This is done because the research 
was done in situ as the foreclosure crisis and its effects continued; many important aspects have yet 
to be researched and thus data was drawn from additional sources.   
2.1 Neighborhoods 
Careful consideration of the concept of neighborhood is central to this research.  While the general 
concept and idea of neighborhood is broadly understood, specifying precisely what is meant by 
neighborhood is much more difficult.  Thus, the purpose of this section is to establish a foundation for 
the discussion of neighborhood change.  It seeks to answer three questions:  What is a neighborhood? 
How can it be operationalized?  What effects do neighborhoods have on residents? 
2.1.1 Conceptualizing Neighborhood 
A variety of definitions have been proposed in the scientific literature; however, a definitive concept 
of neighborhood remains difficult to pin down theoretically, and much more so operationally. 
Hunter (1979) illuminates the difficulty in defining neighborhood by stating that "We can state that 
uniformly it is considered a social/spatial unit of social organization, and that it is larger than a 
household and smaller than a city" (p.270).  He makes this rather facetious specification in light of the 
fact that the inclusion of additional criteria easily moves into a normative definition, as opposed to 
merely descriptive.  The emergence of this problem can be seen in Schwirian’s (1983) distinction 
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between a neighborhood and a ‘residential area,’ where a residential area lacks sufficient relationships 
between residents to qualify as a neighborhood—yet one can imagine many residents would in fact 
feel their  ‘residential area’ is a neighborhood.   
Hunter (1979) notes that typologizing neighborhoods occurs in one of three ways.  At one extreme, 
the neighborhood is defined with ease as the major criterion is “often little more than a spatial, 
statistical aggregation of individual characteristics” (p.271).  At the other are neighborhoods defined 
by resident perceptions, which can vary significantly from resident to resident (Coulton, Korbin, Chan, 
& Su, 2001; Coulton, Jennings, & Chan, 2012; Haney & Knowles, 1978). The third option lies somewhere 
in the middle.  This tension between easily defined, or pre-defined, neighborhood units and difficult 
to define, or perhaps realistically impossible, neighborhood units based on the perceptions of those 
living there continues to pose difficulties.  
Galster’s (2001) presents an especially thorough and flexible definition of neighborhood: 
"Neighbourhood is the bundle of spatially based attributes associated with clusters of residences, 
sometimes in conjunction with other land uses" (p.2112). 
He lists ten categories of spatial attributes that make up this bundle: 
 Structural characteristics of the residential and non-residential buildings 
 Infrastructural characteristics 
 Demographic characteristics of the resident population 
 Class status characteristics of the resident population 
 Tax/public service package characteristics 
 Environmental characteristics 
 Proximity characteristics 
 Political characteristics 
 Social-interactive characteristics 
 Sentimental characteristics (p.2112). 
Key to this definition is that all of the attributes are spatially based, though each attribute may have a 
different spatial extent.  Thus, he suggests that each researcher define neighborhoods based on the 
attribute of interest (Galster, 2001).  Thus one’s neighborhood as defined by local social network will 
likely differ from that defined by the school district. However, his proposed solution does not apply to 
all research questions; for example if one were to investigate employment rates by neighborhood it 
would be difficult to come up with neighborhood boundaries based on employment locations.  He also 
notes that certain aspects may be absent, such as social-interactive characteristics (thereby including 
those areas Schwirian would exclude), though noting that there can be differences in the “degree of 
presence of neighborhood” (p.2113). 
Galster’s definition aligns relatively well with Suttles’ (1972) four-level hierarchy of neighborhood and 
Kearns & Parkinson’s (2001) three-level hierarchy derived from Suttles’. Each level has its own 
boundaries and functions.  The smallest level is the ‘local network and the face-block’ or ‘home area,’ 
which varies by individual and has fuzzy boundaries (approximately a five to ten minute walk from 
one’s home).  The functions of the home area revolve primarily around local social networks and 
feelings of belonging.  As introduced in Section 1.3.1, in this work the term neighborhood corresponds 
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roughly with the Suttles’ home area.The next level is the ‘defending neighborhood,’35 which is the 
smallest concept of neighborhood generally identifiable to both residents and non-residents; it 
contains small businesses and institutions, such as markets and churches. It is analogous to the term 
community in this work.   The ‘community of limited liability’ or ‘locality,’ determined and recognized 
more by governmental and commercial interests than residents, is the level at which concerns of 
planning, service provision, and the housing market function, and are approximately equivalent to the 
statistical planning areas (SPAs) in the City of Cleveland.36  Finally, the ‘expanded community of limited 
liability’ or ‘urban district/region,’ which tend to encompass entire sections of a city, fulfill the functions 
related to employment networks, leisure activities, and broader social networks (Kearns & Parkinson, 
2001; Suttles, 1972). 
Of particular conceptual importance, as noted by Hunter (1979), is neighborhood as the spatial and 
social unit that forms a link between the everyday lives of individuals and the broader institutions and 
mechanisms of society.  He argues (following Burgess, 1973) that excluding the context in which a 
neighborhood is embedded limits neighborhood research to description and precludes explanation.  
Hunter (1979) provides four neighborhood functions that play a role in linking individuals to larger 
urban society:   
(1) The economic function links the neighborhood to the larger economy via production and 
consumption activities; primarily oriented around, though not limited to, housing.  
 
(2) The administrative function realizes the provision and distribution of public services; i.e. the 
link between individuals and state-provided services. 
 
(3) The political function defines, aggregates, and organizes the efforts and concerns of local 
neighborhood groups; often instigated by economic and housing concerns. 
 
(4) The socialization and socialability function builds social networks and perceived commonality, 
facilitated by local neighborhood interactions, shared identification with and commitment to 
the neighborhood.  Hunter notes that this function tends to be stronger in weaker 
communities, suggesting that this function is the result of constraint, not choice. 
These conceptualizations of neighborhood are advanced and encompassing; however, none provide 
information as to how to actually delineate neighborhoods.  Looking at the research question, it is clear 
the choice of neighborhood boundaries is critical to the research.  The objectives are to identify 
community- and neighborhood-level impacts of foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs, and 
to see if these impacts are related to neighborhood change and/or stabilization.  To do so it is necessary 
to look for these impacts at the appropriate neighborhood scale—but what is this and how does one 
determine it?  The literature provides little direction—rather, most neighborhood change research 
(see Section 2.3) simply uses an at-hand level of aggregation, such as the Census block, block group, or 
tract.  It appears that researchers generally use a trial and error approach to determine the appropriate 
neighborhood scale.  Despite this, the implications of various instantiations have important impacts on 
                                                          
35 Kearns & Parkinson exclude this level in their typology. 
36 Outside of Cleveland, SPAs match one-to-one with municipal boundaries.   
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the research and must be considered.  Thus, the next section discusses possibilities to operationalize 
the concept of neighborhood for research applications. 
2.1.2 Operationalizing Neighborhood 
Although neighborhood boundaries are variable and substantially resident-defined, most 
neighborhood research uses convenient, a priori-defined boundaries, such as U.S. Census boundaries 
(blocks, block groups, tracts), zip codes, or TAZs (Traffic Analysis Zones) (Dietz, 2002; Guo & Bhat, 2007; 
Reibel, 2011; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002).37 This approach has been criticized for its 
lack of theoretical and empirical foundation; that is, spatially-based research is undertaken using more 
or less arbitrary spatial entities (Coulton et al., 2001; Coulton, 2012; Coulton et al., 2012; Guo & Bhat, 
2007).  This may also invite biasing in the form of the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP)38 (Guo & 
Bhat, 2004; Guo & Bhat, 2007; Openshaw, 1984).  That is, the use of incorrectly scaled geographical 
aggregations may have caused inconsistent findings and/or statistically insignificant results for factors 
related to neighborhoods.  This amounts to looking for the phenomena of interest in the wrong places.  
For example, Hipp (2010) found increased significance of socio-demographic characteristics, 
residential stability, and perceptions of crime and disorder on the micro-neighborhood scale as 
opposed to the broader neighborhood scale, as delineated by Census tract. 
There are two main ways in which researchers have attempted to address these problems.  The first is 
to use resident-defined neighborhoods.  Haney & Knowles (1978) found that inner city, outer city, and 
suburban residents were all equally capable of perceiving their neighborhoods, and do it in similar 
ways—the same level of richness and detail was provided by all three groups.  They also found that 
suburban residents generally defined their neighborhoods as larger and with more clearly-delineated 
boundaries than city residents.  Coulton et al. (2001) explored the issue of resident-defined 
neighborhoods by asking twenty residents in each of seven Census block groups in Cleveland to draw 
the boundaries of their neighborhoods on maps.  However, in addition to being empirically impractical 
for studies of moderate or large scale, the resulting neighborhoods defined varied significantly even 
amongst spatially proximate, demographically homogeneous individuals.  Coulton et al. (2001) did find 
that the size of resident-defined neighborhoods and the size of Census tracts closely matched; 
however, residents’ maps generally included portions of multiple Census tracts.  A later study, done by 
Coulton et al. (2012), used GIS mapping results from 6,224 respondents in low-income neighborhoods 
of ten cities to examine perceptions of neighborhood size.  They found that, on average, residents 
defined their neighborhoods approximately 30% smaller than the average Census tract, and 
approximately a quarter of respondents as much smaller, approximately 20% of a typical Census tract.  
Approximately 25% of the variance in scale was due to the context (i.e. the neighborhood), leaving the 
remainder possibly due to individual perception.  Finally, they found that those with higher education 
and income, those who are younger, those who have lived in their community longer, and those who 
have been more active in the community all tend to define their neighborhoods as larger than the 
average respondent does (Coulton et al., 2012). 
A second effort to overcome the limitations of pre-defined neighborhood boundaries is the use of 
‘sliding neighborhood’ definitions. These definitions are designed to account for neighborhood 
                                                          
37 It should be noted that U.S. Census unit boundaries do have some history of resident influence, via local census 
tract committees (Krieger, 2006).   
38 The MAUP and its implications will be further discussed in the next section. 
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boundary variations, which have been seen to vary empirically according to the attribute of interest 
and characteristics of the respondent. Guo & Bhat (2007) examined three neighborhood boundary 
operationalizations: (1) a ‘fixed neighborhood’ boundary, which used Census boundaries, (2) a ‘circular 
neighborhood representation,’ which used a radial distance centered on the dwelling unit, and (3) a 
‘network-band representation’ which used street network nodes within a specified radial distance to 
bound the neighborhood.  The latter two are examples of sliding neighborhood definitions.  Neither 
sliding neighborhood definition resulted in a statistically significant change in model fit over the fixed 
neighborhood specification. 
Grannis (1998) found that residents interact more with people within their ‘tertiary community,’ that 
is, smaller streets of residential character easily reachable by foot from their residences, with major 
thoroughfares acting as boundaries. In this regard, pre-defined boundaries are somewhat more 
acceptable; major streets and other geographic boundaries are often used to set these boundaries.  
Gauvin et al. (2007) found that existing boundaries were often created using less arbitrary factors, such 
as neighborhood homogeneity, historically defined neighborhoods, geographic or natural boundaries, 
the presence of a sense of place, and the presence of social networks. 
While pre-defined neighborhood boundaries have their limitations, several factors result in their 
continued use.  These include the inconsistency of, and therefore difficulty in operationalizing, 
resident-defined boundaries; the lack of statistical improvement seen in more theoretically motivated 
neighborhood definitions; and on a more practical level, the unavailability of data beyond that 
bounded by Census or other administratively defined areas.  The possible implications of this will be 
discussed in Section 3.4.2 later in this work. 
2.1.3 Neighborhood Effects:  the Importance of Neighborhood 
Conceptualizing and operationalizing the term neighborhood is necessary in order to investigate 
whether neighborhoods have effects on or influence the behavior of their residents, and through what 
mechanisms these effects may occur.  Here the evidence for neighborhood effects is examined, 
followed by a discussion of the many difficulties in modeling neighborhood effects. 
Much empirical research has shown that the outcomes and behaviors of individuals in a neighborhood 
tend to cluster together (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebaniv, & Sealand, 1993; Galster & Mikelsons, 1995; 
Goux & Maurin, 2007; powell, 2003; Sampson et al., 2002).39  As mentioned previously, neighborhoods 
are also inherently spatial. This also affects outcomes (Galster & Killen, 1995; Galster & Mikelsons, 
1995; powell, 2003); for example proximity to public transportation or employment opportunities will 
likely affect the employment rate in a neighborhood.  These outcome clusterings are referred to as 
neighborhood effects (Dietz, 2002).  Though there is a large body of neighborhood effects research, 
the precise causality remains generally unclear (Diez Roux & Mair, 2010).  More recent research 
investigates the stress as the causal pathway, where neighborhood disadvantage results in increased 
acute and chronic stress for residents, which then translates to poorer health outcomes (Adler & 
Stewart, 2010). 
                                                          
39 These outcomes and behaviors include: infant mortality, low birthweight, child intellectual development, child 
maltreatment, educational outcomes, high school dropouts, teen childbearing, adolescent delinquency, crime, 
substance abuse, homicide, accidental injury, marriage, fertility, suicide, health outcomes, labor force 
participation, employment, earnings, wealth accumulation, physical and mental health outcomes, and the ability 
to engage in political and civic processes. 
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Neighborhood effects are a primary reason to undertake this research—if the negative impacts of 
foreclosures affected only individuals it would be unnecessary to examine the effect of foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation efforts on the neighborhood level.  Thus this section will introduce 
neighborhood effects as a concept, discuss neighborhood effects research and its shortcomings, and 
consider strategies to avoid these pitfalls.  It should be noted that the neighborhood effects literature 
is dominated by quantitative work, and the literature discussed below reflects this. 
According to Dietz (2002), there are three possible types of neighborhood effects.  The first is a pure 
endogenous effect, which indicates that individual behaviors are affected by neighbors’ behaviors; that 
is, each individual is influenced by the aggregate behaviors of the neighborhood residents.  This 
indicates that influencing one individual’s behavior in a neighborhood can have spillover effects on the 
behaviors of the rest of the neighborhood.  The second type is a correlated effect, where residents in 
a neighborhood simply have similar characteristics and behaviors; that is, individuals have self-sorted 
themselves into homogeneous neighborhoods, resulting in outcome clustering.  In this case, 
influencing one individual’s behavior would not influence the behavior of others in the neighborhood.  
The third type is referred to as contextual, exogenous, or place effects, where neighborhood clustering 
occurs due to influences outside of the neighborhood, such as racial sorting due to systemic 
discrimination in the housing market (Dietz, 2002). 
However, with respect to the influence of neighborhoods on outcomes, both what is occurring and 
how it is occurring remains unclear (Dietz, 2002; Goering & Feins, 2003; Goux & Maurin, 2007; 
Oreopoulos, 2003; Sampson et al., 2002; Weinberg, Reagan, & Yankow, 2002).  Discriminating between 
the three types of neighborhood effects described above would answer the ‘what’ question, but leaves 
the ‘how’ question open.  This is in part due to the fact that neighborhood effects research is 
predominantly quantitative and thus more suited to determining what occurs but less likely to uncover 
how or why it occurs (van Ham, Manley, Bailey, Simpson & Maclennan, 2012).  Dietz (2002) reviews 
the major theories underlying neighborhood effects, which stem primarily from sociology and 
economics.  In the sociological realm, one group of theories posits that individual interactions spread 
positive or negative behaviors (contagion, epidemic, and collective socialization theories), while others 
are based on a zero-sum game where the benefit of one is necessarily detrimental to others 
(competition theory and relative deprivation theory).  Though not as closely tied to neighborhoods as 
the sociological theories, economic theories that relate to neighborhood effects include peer effects 
models and local interactions, a branch of game theory (Dietz, 2002). 
Several authors point out the significant gap in the literature between theory and empirical work 
(Dietz, 2002; Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Sampson et al., 2002).  While the neighborhood effects 
theoretical literature presents a variety of possible mechanisms, the empirical literature remains 
concerned with establishing the existence of neighborhood effects and of which type they are, 
particularly whether endogenous neighborhood effects exist or not (Dietz, 2002; Goering & Feins, 
2003; Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Oreopoulos, 2003; Weinberg et al., 2002).  The continued efforts 
to address this question preclude the investigation of which theoretical mechanisms fit the observed 
phenomena most appropriately. 
The difficulty in establishing the existence of neighborhood effects is due to several difficult to resolve 
data and model specification problems.  They include spatial and temporal issues, the neglect of 
neighborhood sorting, omitted variables, and the reflection problem (Dietz, 2002; Galster & Killen, 
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1995; Goering & Feins, 2003; Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Oreopoulos, 2003; Sampson et al., 2002; 
Weinberg et al., 2002). 
Spatial misspecification, that is, the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP), can negatively affect the 
validity of neighborhood effects research (Dietz, 2002; Galster & Killen, 1995; Goering & Feins, 2003; 
Sampson et al., 2002).  The core of the MAUP is that the spatial boundaries selected affect the results, 
which implies that it is essential to correctly bound the geographical entity at hand—in this case the 
neighborhood—in order to produce reliable results (Fotheringham & Wong, 1991; Guo & Bhat, 2004; 
Openshaw, 1984).  Given that the proper definition of neighborhood depends on the phenomenon 
under investigation—one that may only be hypothesized—this problem can often be intractable.  Even 
in instances when it is hypothetically resolvable, data limitations may prevent this.  Dietz (2002) notes 
the additional spatial problem of multiple neighborhood membership; for example, when individuals 
attend a church outside of their neighborhood of residence, they may be strongly affected by the 
individuals in the neighborhood of their church.  This would not be captured by a neighborhood effects 
study that uses only the neighborhood of residence. 
Temporal issues in neighborhood effects research include the use of point-in-time, or snapshot, data, 
when many neighborhood effects are likely lagged effects, rather than instantaneous effects (Goering 
& Feins, 2003).  While many studies account for this, selecting the correct time lag remains difficult. 
Many econometric models of neighborhood effects ignore the sorting of individuals into 
neighborhoods, and rather treat it as a random, pre-determined assignment.  This treatment of 
neighborhood assignment as exogenous, when it is in fact endogenous (correlated with neighborhood 
quality), results in biased estimators, and moreover the direction of the bias is unknown (Dietz, 2002; 
Goering & Feins, 2003; Sampson et al., 2002).  Weinberg et al. (2002) found that studies which do not 
account for neighborhood sorting overstate neighborhood social effects and understate job access 
effects. 
Omitted variables cause the conflation of parental effects and neighborhood effects.  Since family 
influences have been found to generally dominate neighborhood influences, omitting important family 
characteristics from the model can bias the neighborhood effects estimators (Dietz, 2002).  Weinberg 
et al. (2004) found that this omission leads to the overstatement of neighborhood effects by an order 
of magnitude.  Goering and Feins (2003) gave examples of how the omission of parental variables could 
potentially bias neighborhood effect estimators either up or down, but noted that the addition of 
parental variables generally weakens the neighborhood effects estimates. 
A final problem with neighborhood effects modeling is the reflection problem (Manski, 1993).  This 
occurs when the individuals whose outcomes are of interest are the same individuals whose qualities 
are used to characterize the neighborhood (Oreopoulos, 2003, p.1539).  In this case it may be 
impossible to differentiate between the determinants of an individual’s behavior that belong to the 
individual and those that belong to his neighbors (Dietz, 2002, p.552). 
Dietz (2002) discusses remedies for these problems and examines studies that use them.   He notes 
that overall, studies which account for parental behaviors find lower levels of neighborhood effects, 
and those that account for neighborhood sorting see even lower levels.  Few studies, perhaps due to 
data limitations, resolve both the neighborhood sorting and omitted variables problems 
simultaneously.  For example, Weinberg et al. (2002) address omitted variable bias by controlling for 
many individual characteristics, and find that an increase of one standard deviation in (positive) 
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neighborhood social characteristics or job proximity increases annual hours worked by 6.1% and 4.7%, 
respectively.   They also find that these effects are strongest in the worst neighborhoods.  Aaronson 
(1998) controlled for family characteristics by creating a fixed effects model of sibling outcomes.  He 
found that neighborhood effects, specifically on school leaving and poverty rates, persisted after 
controlling for parental unobservables. However, neither of these studies accounted for neighborhood 
sorting, which likely introduced bias. 
Several studies examine social housing programs with randomized neighborhood (or project) 
assignment to address neighborhood sorting.  In this case, residents are not selecting their 
neighborhood of residence, so neighborhood choice can be properly treated as an exogenous variable; 
that is, neighborhood assignment is unrelated to neighborhood quality.  Kling, Liebman, & Katz (2007) 
found that in the U.S.-American Moving to Opportunity program, better neighborhoods had a positive 
effect on mental health, risky behavior, and educational outcomes for females, though males were 
insignificantly affected by neighborhoods with respect to educational outcomes and mental health, 
and negatively affected with respect to physical health problems.  In contrast, Oreopoulos (2003) 
found that in Toronto, the housing project (and therefore neighborhood) had no significant effect on 
employment outcomes, but that sibling correlations accounted for approximately 30 percent of the 
observed outcome variation.   Goux & Maurin (2003) examined the influence of the educational 
performance of adolescents in the near neighborhood on adolescent academic performance, and 
found a strong influence on adolescents at the end of junior high school.  This study also correctly 
treats neighborhood assignment as exogenous, by examining the outcomes of those living in public 
housing, which is functionally randomly assigned.  Goux & Maurin (2003) point to an advantage of their 
study, that it examines the effect of twenty to thirty adjacent households on outcomes, while 
Oreopoulos uses neighborhoods of one to three thousand households.  They posit that this difference 
in scale allows for the detection of the influence of neighborhood, while Oreopoulos’ study does not, 
citing a survey of the French Statistical Office which found that French households generally interact 
with only one to three close neighbors. 
Dietz (2002) notes that although the existence of neighborhood clustering is not disputed, the reasons 
and mechanisms for this continue to be unclear.  In particular, he points to the gap between theory 
and empirical work as the reason for this.  Neighborhood effects encompass a large variety of 
phenomena, which may operate in different manners, through different mechanisms, on different 
scales, and be visible in different specific populations.  Thus he calls for the development of 
phenomena-specific theories from which testable hypotheses can be developed and tested.  For 
example, Galster & Killen (1995) and Galster & Mikelsons (1995) hypothesizes that neighborhood 
conditions, filtered through their neighborhood social network, approximate youth’s perceptions of 
the opportunities available to them.  Secondly, he hypothesizes that depending on the range of 
opportunities available, one’s decision-making calculus will change, with those who foresee reduced 
opportunity making less considered decisions, and thus decreasing the likelihood of achieving the 
foreseen opportunities.  Galster’s model is quite complex, but posits specific mechanisms relating 
neighborhood conditions to outcomes, and allows for the construction of testable hypotheses.40 
                                                          
40 Some aspects of this theory present more difficulty than others when it comes to empirical testing.  For 
example, Galster’s idea of “cumulative causation” posits that various aspects of disadvantage, when 
simultaneously present, reinforce one another and have greater cumulative effects than any of these aspects in 
isolation.  Since the presence of these aspects is highly correlated, examining this hypothesis empirically presents 
significant difficulty due to variable simultaneity. 
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This research implicitly assumes neighborhood effects arising from the foreclosure crisis. The type of 
neighborhood effects is not explicitly investigated, though clear arguments can be made for both 
endogeneous—for example contagious default—and exogeneous—such as discriminatory lending 
patterns—neighborhood effects.  The methods—especially the quantitative method, quantile 
regression—imply the existence of neighborhood effects resulting from both foreclosures and 
foreclosure interventions as well.  Thus, the issues that plague neighborhood effects research should 
be considered in this research as well. 
2.2 Residential Mortgage Foreclosure 
This section first introduces the process of residential mortgage foreclosure, both generally and 
specific to Ohio.  Some additional specifics concerning the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County are 
given as well.  Next, research concerning the distributions and patterns of residential foreclosure is 
discussed.  This is followed by a discussion of the impacts of residential mortgage foreclosure on 
neighborhoods, along with a limited discussion of the impacts on municipalities. 
Many specialized terms are used in this section, please consult the Glossary for clarification as needed. 
2.2.1 The Foreclosure Process 
As introduced in 0, foreclosure is the legal process used by lenders to recover the balance of a 
mortgage loan, after the borrower has stopped making payments, by forcing the sale of the asset which 
backs the loan.  This is based on the concept of collateral, whereby the borrower pledges a specific 
property—in this case, the property that was purchased with the loan in question—as security to 
ensure loan repayment.  The idea is that were a borrower to fail to pay the principal and interest on 
the loan, the bank or financial institution can recoup its losses by taking possession of the property 
and reselling it.  As a reminder, within this work the term foreclosure refers specifically to residential 
mortgage foreclosure. 
This section gives an overview of the foreclosure process in Ohio.  It covers when and how a foreclosure 
action can be brought, ways to halt the process, what occurs at and after completion of the process, 
and lender alternatives to foreclosure. 
Judicial Foreclosure 
Three types of foreclosure exist in the U.S.:  strict foreclosure, judicial foreclosure by sale, and power 
of sale, or non-judicial, foreclosure.  In strict foreclosure, the least common form, the lender acquires 
title to the property when a foreclosure judgment occurs, without any sale of the property.  In a judicial 
foreclosure, the foreclosure goes through a judicial process and, when a foreclosure judgment occurs, 
the property is sold at a public auction where the lender receives the proceeds.  Finally, power of sale 
or non-judicial foreclosure allows the lender to force a sale without a judicial process.  Generally, this 
means publishing notice of the impending sale and, after a waiting period, holding a public auction, 
again with the proceeds going to the lender (Durham, 1985; Madway, 1974; Pence, 2003). 
Ohio is a judicial foreclosure state.  A major feature of judicial foreclosures is that the process is much 
longer than for other types of foreclosures.  This can be beneficial—for example, a title search is done 
as a precursor to a judicial foreclosure so that any other parties with interest are made aware of the 
suit (Durham, 1985)—as well as disadvantageous—in Ohio, the average length of the foreclosure 
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process in the second quarter of 2012 was about eighteen months (Levingston, 2012).  The deleterious 
effects of such a long foreclosure process will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2.3. 
Initiating a Foreclosure 
Once a mortgagor (the borrower) has missed a mortgage payment, the mortgage is then delinquent 
and the mortgagee (the lender or servicer of the loan) has the right to file a foreclosure suit (Madway, 
1974).  Because courts require evidence that a borrower does not intend to repay the loan, banks and 
servicers (the mortgagees) do not file foreclosure proceedings until after a borrower has missed three 
consecutive payments (Ambrose & Capone, 1996).  Prior to 90 days of non-payment a loan is 
delinquent; after 90 days the loan is in default. 
After three monthly payments have been missed, a lender or servicer can file a foreclosure complaint 
at the County Court of Common Pleas.  The borrower in default will receive a copy of the suit.  The 
borrower then has 28 days to answer the court summons, and can request mediation at this point41 
(Save the Dream Ohio, 2013).  If the borrower does not respond, and thus does not contest the 
foreclosure suit, the mortgagee can request a summary judgment (a ruling without trial), which in this 
case would rule in favor of the mortgagee (Save the Dream Ohio, 2013; ESOP Cleveland, n.d.). 
If the borrower does respond, he or she may attempt to work out an agreement with the lender or 
servicer, in which case the judge will grant additional time to find a resolution.  After this, the court 
holds a series of hearings and will move to judgment (Save the Dream Ohio, 2013; ESOP Cleveland, 
n.d.). 
Curing & Workouts 
There are essentially two ways in which the foreclosure process can be halted by a borrower, with 
cooperation from the lender or servicer.  A third possibility to halt the foreclosure would be dismissal 
of the case by a judge on the grounds that the litigant (i.e. the lender) lacks standing (cannot produce 
evidence of owning the mortgage) or has not properly followed the applicable foreclosure laws.   
Many states give borrowers a legal right to cure the mortgage before the foreclosure sale occurs.  
Curing a mortgage means that the mortgage will be brought up to date, with all missed payments, 
penalties, and legal costs accrued by the mortgagee to date paid by the mortgagor (Durham, 1985; 
Madway, 1974).   However, Ohio law does not provide borrowers a right to cure, though it is possible 
for a mortgagee to voluntarily accept the mortgage curing (National Consumer Law Center, n.d.[b]).  
Curing is often not a viable option for borrowers; in most cases borrowers stop paying their mortgage 
payments because they don’t have the financial resources.  If one can’t make the monthly payment, it 
is unlikely to be possible to pay several months at once, as well as additional fees and costs.   
Borrowers in default (or prior to default) can also pursue a “workout” with their lender.  This is an 
attempt by both parties to come to a mutually agreeable solution with the objective of avoiding 
foreclosure.  Borrowers can attempt workouts on their own, but often need the assistance of a 
foreclosure mediator or foreclosure counselor to be successful.  On their own, borrowers are often 
                                                          
41 Ohio House Bill 138 went into effect September 11, 2008 and allows the court to order mediation in any 
foreclosure case (Ohio State Legislature, 2008).  Parties can also voluntarily engage in mediation.  Mediation will 
be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.3. 
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overwhelmed by the complexity of the process, specialized terminology, and variety of parties 
involved.  Mediation and counseling will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.3.  
Completing the Foreclosure Process 
When no curing, workout, or dismissal occurs, the judge will award judgment to the lender and a 
Sheriff’s Sale of the property will be scheduled.  The Sheriff’s sale is a public auction where the property 
is sold to the highest bidder.  However, in Ohio, and many other states, the sale value must be at least 
two-thirds of the property’s assessed value; if not, the property is not sold and a second auction is 
scheduled (Durham, 1985; National Consumer Law Center, n.d.[b]).  This requirement has become 
onerous during the foreclosure crisis, due the general housing market crash as well as the reduction in 
value of individual properties due to vacancy and abandonment (see Section 2.2.3). 
Some states offer the borrower statutory right of redemption after the Sheriff’s Sale has occurred.  In 
Ohio, the borrower can redeem the property for the price of the foreclosure sale plus the foreclosure 
expenses up until when the foreclosure sale is confirmed (Durham, 1985; Pence, 2003; National 
Consumer Law Center, n.d.[b]).  This can range from a couple of days up to ninety days in Ohio, because 
the Sheriff has 60 days to inform the court of the sale and the court has 30 days to confirm the sale 
(Save the Dream Ohio, 2013).   
In most states, in cases when the foreclosure sale results in an amount less than the debt owed on the 
mortgage, a bank or servicer can pursue a deficiency judgment; that is, a ruling that the borrower must 
pay the remaining debt (Durham, 1985; Pence, 2003).  However, deficiency judgments are not pursued 
often because in most cases borrowers have minimal remaining assets to pursue. 
After the foreclosure sale is confirmed, the new owner may evict the current occupants—who may be 
the holders of the delinquent loan or renters who are not involved with the loan in any way.  When 
this occurs the Sheriff will serve an eviction notice to the residents; the time allowed to vacate varies 
by county (Save the Dream Ohio, 2013; ESOP Cleveland, n.d.).  However, many residents are unaware 
of their rights and move out upon receiving notice of a foreclosure suit.  Thus has negative impacts on 
the household level—disruption, additional housing costs, stress—as well as increasing vacancy in the 
neighborhood and increasing the likelihood of vandalism and stripping for the property.  This is 
particularly true when the foreclosure process is drawn out, which it often was during the foreclosure 
crisis, as both financial institutions and court systems were not equipped to deal with the volume of 
cases.  For example, in March 2006 in Cuyahoga County, Ohio the average length of a foreclosure suit 
was over 18 months (Weinstein, Hexter, & Schnoke, 2006). 
Post-foreclosure, many properties are categorized as REO, or real estate owned, properties.  While 
REO technically refers simply to a property owned by a bank or other financial institution, in practice 
REO refers to vacant and frequently blighted, foreclosed properties (Immergluck, 2012). These 
properties are possessed by banks as the result of Sheriff’s sales where the bank owning the mortgage 
won the auction, which tends to occur when there were no other serious bids placed.  Prior to the 
foreclosure crisis, REO properties were a relatively rare occurrence, because bidders would usually win 
the properties at auction above the bank’s minimum acceptable price; banks, not being property 
managers or real estate professionals, preferred not to take possession of foreclosed properties.  This 
has changed with the foreclosure crisis and resulting flood of foreclosed properties on the market. 
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REOs are problematic for neighborhoods because a lack of accountability is frequently associated with 
them.  They tend to be in poor condition, under- or non-maintained, and are often tax delinquent.  
Many properties that transfer out of REO are purchased cheaply by absentee investors or landlords, 
who are also often unaware or uninterested in the effect of these properties on neighborhood stability 
(Coulton, Schramm, & Hirsch, 2008c; Ellen, Madar, & Weselcouch, 2012a; Immergluck, 2012).  These 
impacts will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.3. 
Foreclosure Alternatives 
Lenders and servicers have additional options beyond foreclosures when loans default.  These include 
a deed-in-lieu (DIL), a preforeclosure sale, and loan modification and/or forbearance.  Deed-in-lieu (of 
foreclosure) occurs when the mortgagee discharges the remaining mortgage debt in return for title to 
the property.  Then the bank owns the property and the borrower is no longer indebted.  This process 
is less costly for the mortgagee because there are minimal legal costs involved (Ambrose & Capone, 
1996). Ghent & Kudlyak (2010) found that DILs (and short sales) are more likely to occur in states that 
allow deficiency judgments. 
A second alternative is the preforeclosure sale, or short sale.  In this case, rather than beginning a 
foreclosure suit, the lender or servicer allows the borrower time to sell the home in order to pay off 
the mortgage debt.  Thus, the bank and borrower avoid the foreclosure process and associated costs, 
and the property is less likely to sell at a discount due to the ‘foreclosure stigma’ (Ambrose & Capone, 
1996). 
Third, the mortgagee can modify the loan.  Options to modify the loan include modifying the term, 
modifying the interest rate, putting missed payments and fees into arrearage, or, in some cases, 
reducing the principal of the loan.  A mortgagee may also offer forbearance, allowing the mortgagor 
to skip some payments during a ‘grace period’ and then resume payments.  The missed payments are 
put in arrears or become a second lien on the property (Ambrose & Capone, 1996).  This option may 
be preferable when the mortgagor has a temporary income shortage, such as the result of job loss, 
and is likely to restart payments after a short period. 
These options ought to have been financially appealing to all parties during the foreclosure crisis.  They 
all keep homeowners in the property longer, which greatly reduces the likelihood of property damage 
that devalues the house; all reduce legal costs; and in the case of loan modification, lenders could stop 
acquiring foreclosed properties that they are not equipped to manage.  In a normally functioning 
housing market, foreclosed properties are usually discounted at sale but easily sold; during the 
foreclosure crisis many foreclosed properties became essentially valueless and unsellable, due to the 
glut in the housing market, the bursting of the housing bubble, and the deteriorated condition of many 
foreclosed properties.  However these foreclosure alternatives were relatively scarcely utilized during 
the housing crisis.   
2.2.2 Foreclosure Patterns 
Foreclosures are not evenly distributed across all loans, all borrowers, or all geographies.  A variety of 
factors are associated with increased foreclosures, as well as delinquencies and defaults, the 
precursors to (possible) foreclosure, and real estate owned (REO) properties, a frequent consequence 
of foreclosure.  In general, those foreclosed upon are similar to the profile of the “average” American, 
though somewhat younger, more likely to be Latino, and more likely to be a parent.  As well, those 
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foreclosed upon are more likely to have recently experienced financial distress and are more likely to 
live in more disadvantage neighborhoods (Niedt & Martin, 2013). 
This section will introduce and discuss many of the factors frequently associated with higher rates of 
foreclosure.  First the “traditional” indicators—those related to loan and borrower characteristics—
are discussed.  This is followed by a discussion of environmental or spatial indicators, which are factors 
related to the location of the property for which the mortgage is taken out.   
Traditional Indicators – Loan & Borrower Characteristics 
The study of factors associated with foreclosures, as well as delinquencies and defaults, was generally 
limited to loan and borrower financial characteristics until the advent of the foreclosure crisis.  More 
recent research has continued to investigate these aspects, and also expanded to look at 
socioeconomic characteristics of borrowers.  Though all of these indicators describe individuals and 
the focus of this research is the neighborhood, these studies of individual characteristics often lay the 
groundwork for neighborhood-level research due to the fact that these characteristics are unevenly 
spatially distributed.  
In their literature review of residential mortgage default, Quercia & Stegman (1992) identify the lender 
perspective as the point of view of the first generation of default studies, which began in the 1960s.  
These studies looked at the associations between loan and borrower characteristics and mortgage 
non-payment. The second generation of studies, beginning in the late 1970s, focused on the 
borrowers’ point of view; that is, the financial decision of individual borrowers of whether to continue 
mortgage payments.  A third generation, looking from the institutional point of view, began in the mid-
1980s.  More recently, in the wake of the foreclosure crisis, researchers began looking at the 
relationships between various socioeconomic characteristics of borrowers and loan outcomes.   
Quercia & Stegman (1992) provide a detailed literature review of these studies up to the third 
generation, and Section 2.1 of the Report to Congress on the Root Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis 
provides an overview of more recent literature on research investigating individual-level 
characteristics associated with loan outcomes (2010). 
In the first generation of mortgage default studies, researchers examined the impacts of loan 
characteristics on mortgage non-payment, indicated by delinquency, default, or foreclosure rates 
associated with these characteristics.  Quercia & Stegman found that loan-to-value ratio, piggyback 
mortgages (an additional mortgage subordinate to the first mortgage), and mortgage age were 
consistently associated with higher rates of default in the literature (1992).  Several authors found 
increased default probabilities associated with high loan-to-value ratios, prepayment penalties, low 
and no documentation loans, increased interest rates, and balloon payment requirements (Danis & 
Pennington-Cross, 2008; Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011; Pennington-Cross, 2003; Pennington-Cross 
& Ho, 2010; Reid & Laderman, 2009). 
Loan type also has impacts on the likelihood of default and foreclosure.  Several studies found evidence 
that subprime loans42 have a higher risk of default or foreclosure than prime loans or CRA loans (Ding, 
Quercia, & Ratcliffe, 2011; Gerardi, Shapiro, & Willen, 2007; Laderman & Reid, 2008; Lee, Rosentraub, 
                                                          
42 The definition of a subprime loan (as referred to as high-cost loans) is not universally agreed on, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) definition is often used:  loans with an annual percentage rate (APR) more than 
three percent over comparable Treasury notes. 
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& Kobie, 2010).  Gerardi et al. (2007) found that subprime loans went to foreclosure six times as often 
as prime mortgages; Coulton et al. (2008a) found subprime loans went to foreclosure over eight times 
as often.  Reid & Laderman (2009) found that adjustable rate mortages (ARMs) had a higher likelihood 
of default than fixed rate mortgages.  Agarwal et al. (2010) found that higher zip code-level 
concentrations of aggressive loan products—such as hybrid ARMs and loans requiring low or no 
documentation—had negative spillover effects on how likely nearby borrowers were to default, but 
that higher concentrations of subprime loans in general did not.  To some extent, these findings aren’t 
surprising.  Afterall, higher interest rates are charged (at least in theory) with the intention of charging 
more for mortgages deemed riskier.  Others view this line of argumentation as a cover for price-
gouging less experienced borrowers and making loans designed to fail. 
Several studies investigated the role of lender localness—that is, whether the mortgage lender has a 
physical presence in the local market.  Investigating this relationship at a variety of levels—borrower, 
zip code, and county—and over time periods ranging from 1998 to 2009, researchers consistently 
found that mortgage delinquency, default, and foreclosure rates were lower for more local lenders, 
especially with riskier and lower-income borrowers (Cortés, 2012; Ergungor, 2006; Ergungor, 2007; 
Ergungor & Moulton, 2011; Moulton, 2010). Coulton et al. (2008a) found that non-local lenders 
foreclosed earlier on delinquent mortgages than local lenders, and Xu (2012) found that more non-
local lending occurred where local banks have higher lending standards, as proxied by mortgage denial 
rate. 
The second generation of mortgage outcome research investigated the borrower’s payment decision.  
High loan-to-value ratios, referred to as negative equity or “underwater” mortgages when the ratio 
exceeds one, have been hypothesized to result in more negative loan outcomes.  This is because the 
logical financial decision would be to default when one owes more on a property than it is worth.  This 
behavior is referred to as “ruthless default.” However, while researchers found that empirical evidence 
did consistently support this, the magnitude of the effect is much lower than would be expected.  For 
example, Ambrose & Capone (1998) observed that only 7.3% of defaulted loans in their sample were 
underwater, and Foote et al. (2008) found that during the early 1990s only 6.4% of underwater 
homeowners experienced foreclosure, the result of delinquency and default. This may be due to a 
sense of duty and obligation to fulfill the mortgage contract, as well as an effort to avoid the stigma of 
foreclosure, even when it is not financially prudent. Fuster & Willen (2012) found that the critical loan-
to-value ratio that spurs default depends on the interest rate of the loan. 
Other researchers have hypothesized that triggering events, such as job loss, major illness, or divorce, 
are the deciding factor in the delinquency decision, given that other options, such as selling the 
property or using savings, are not available at that time to the borrower—a circumstance which 
frequently occurs when a loan is underwater.  Ambrose & Capone (1998) found that borrowers they 
classified as trigger event defaulters were more likely (1.66 times as likely) to cure their mortgages 
than those classified as ruthless defaulters.  One study found that medical crises contributed to half of 
all foreclosure experiences, and though the sample size was only 128, respondents and non-
respondents to the survey had similar financial, housing, and locational distributions (Robertson, 
Egelhof, & Hoke, 2008). Herkenhoff (2012) found that moderately underwater borrowers (less than 
20% negative equity) who experienced job loss were 37% more likely to default, much more than those 
experiencing only moderate negative equity or job loss alone. 
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Delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures have also been shown to be associated with the 
socioeconomic characteristics of borrowers, which are geographically clustered themselves.  Beyond 
the obvious connections with income, credit histories, and credit scores, race in particular is associated 
with these loan outcomes.  African American borrowers were found to be 44% more likely to be 
delinquent than white borrowers, and Hispanic borrowers 88% more likely (Luea, Reichenberger, & 
Turner, 2011). Anacker et al. (2012) found these likelihoods to be 42% and 159% greater for high 
income Black and Latino borrowers, respectively.  Laderman & Reid (2008) found that African 
American, Latino, and Asian borrowers were 3.3, 2.5, and 1.6 times, respectively, more likely to be in 
foreclosure than white borrowers, after controlling for credit score and income.  Coulton et al. (2008a) 
found that the foreclosure rate for African American borrowers was 28.25%, 12.83% for Hispanic 
borrowers, and 7.58% for non-Hispanic whites. 
A significant reason for this is that borrowers of color receive subprime or high cost loans more than 
three times as often as white borrowers; fifty-five percent of loans to people of color are high cost, 
while only seventeen percent are for whites (Rivera, Cotto-Escalera, Desai, Huezo, & Muhammed, 
2008).  African Americans received high cost subprime loans two to four times as often as white 
borrowers, with the discrepancy greatest in the high income category.  When African Americans 
receive prime loans, their foreclosure rates drop and are similar to that for white borrowers (Coulton, 
Chan, & Schramm, 2008a).  Reid & Laderman (2009) found that after controlling for loan terms and 
type, the marginal effects of non-white race were small, ranging from 1.3 to 2.0 percent increased 
likelihood of default. So although the high cost loan terms are at least superficially intended as a ‘risk 
premium’ to cover the increased chance of default associated with those with weaker credit histories—
who are disproportionally people of color—evidence shows that these loans are often self-fulfilling 
prophecies, if not flat-out predatory.  This practice is referred to as reverse redlining, a term which 
references redlining, a once prevalent practice of denying neighborhoods of color mortgages 
altogether (see Section 1.1.1).  The impacts are large:  Sharp & Hall (2014) found, after controlling for 
socioeconomic and housing characteristics, debt loads, and disruptive life events, that black 
homeowners who purchased their homes in the 2000s were 50% more likely to lose their homes then 
white homeowners who purchased their homes in the 2000s. 
Foreclosures have affected renters in addition to homeowners, particularly renters of color.  Allen 
(2012b) notes that in the Camden neighborhood of Minneapolis, Minnesota, more than a third of 
rental properties were in foreclosure, while only six percent of owner-occupied properties were.  
Overall, rental properties in Minneapolis were 2.4 times more likely to be in foreclosure than owner-
occupied properties.  Over sixty percent of properties impacted by foreclosure in New York City in 2007 
were rental (Been & Glashausser, 2009).  As renters have very few protections in the U.S. (Andrews, 
Sánchez, & Johansson, 2011) and generally have fewer available financial resources, foreclosures can 
be even more disruptive than they are for homeowners.  Moreover, race and tenure status overlap:  
Allen (2012b) found that at least two-thirds of African American, American Indian, and Asian 
households that went through foreclosure were renters. 
Age is also associated with negative loan outcomes.  Older people were often targeted, particularly for 
refinancing loans (equity withdrawals), which were often subprime (Cohen, 2008).  Households with 
children foreclosed upon in Minneapolis were overrepresented by a factor of 2.3.  Again, this factor 
overlapped with minority status (Allen, 2011b). 
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Finally, nativity status is associated with foreclosure incidence.  Allen (2011a), found that foreign-born 
borrowers had different outcomes for both refinanced and home purchase mortgages.  For refinances, 
native-born minorities were 1.7 times as likely to experience foreclosure as whites; but foreign-born 
Hispanics and Asians were less likely to do so, at .49 and .16 times as likely, respectively.  However, in 
the case of home purchase loans, non-native-born borrowers fared worse than native-born white 
households, though still better than native-born minority households (for native-born minorities, a 
foreclosure is five times as likely as it is for whites, and 3.4 and 1.5 times as likely for foreign-born 
Hispanic and Asian borrowers, respectively).  A reason for this is that many immigrants have no 
experience with formal banking institutions; their inexperience, coupled with the use of mortgage 
brokers from the immigrant community to build trust, allowed them to be sold high cost mortgages 
(Cohen, 2008). 
Before moving on to environmental indicators that are associated with a higher incidence of 
foreclosure, it is important to remember that these individual-level indicators are not evenly 
distributed throughout space.  Thus, these individual-level characteristics also play out on more 
aggregated spatial levels, such as the neighborhood and community. 
Environmental Indicators 
Thus far individual-level factors associated with higher incidences of foreclosure and related events 
have been discussed.  However, this research is focused on neighborhood-level occurrences.  
Discussing individual-level factors remains important, because many of these factors cluster 
geographically and thus are related to neighborhood-level impacts of the foreclosure crisis.   
In this section, factors associated with foreclosures and related events at more aggregated 
geographical levels are discussed.  Some of these studies indicate spillover effects on the neighborhood 
level, meaning that what happens to one mortgage holder in the neighborhood has effects on other 
mortgage holders in spatial proximity.  Others indicate correlated effects (or cannot distinguish 
whether spillover or correlated effects are occurring), where individuals with similar characteristics 
cluster spatially, but do not influence the probability of an event occurring for a neighbor as well.  
Studies investigating these two types of neighborhood effects generally look at socioeconomic 
characteristics, property or mortgage characteristics, and/or foreclosure-related occurrences.  These 
studies will be introduced first. 
A second type of geographic factor affecting mortgage outcomes occurs at the regional or state level.  
These factors do not operate through neighborhood effects, but instead apply to larger geographies 
and impact the entire region.  Understanding these factors helps to explain what is occurring at lower 
levels of aggregation, such as the neighborhood.  Researchers have examined two main types of 
factors, housing market conditions and the regulatory framework.  Each of these will be presented and 
discussed in turn.  
In a study of two hundred metropolitan regions, increased black-white segregation was found to be a 
predictor of subprime loan originations, which are associated with higher foreclosure rates than prime 
loans.  This result was robust even after controlling for factors including the proportion minority 
residents, poverty, unemployment, credit scores, property value appreciation, and bank accessibility 
(Hyra, Squires, Renner, & Kirk, 2013).   
43 
 
Race again appears in concert with defaults, foreclosure filings and sales, and REOs on the 
neighborhood level, operationalized at the Census tract or zip code level (Coulton et al., 2008a; Ellen, 
Madar, & Weselcouch, 2012a; Ellen, Madar, & Weselcouch, 2012b; Grover, Smith, & Todd, 2008; 
Immergluck, 2010a; Lee, 2010; Niedt & Silver, n.d.).  One study found that REO maintenance has been 
substantially worse in black and Latino neighborhoods, which has the effect of replicating race-based 
neighborhood inequality in the process of recovering from the foreclosure crisis (Hwang, 2015).  For 
example, properties with more than fifteen maintenance problems were 42% more likely to occurs in 
neighborhoods of color than in white neighborhoods and 34% more likely to contain trash or debris on 
the property than in white neighborhoods (National Fair Housing Alliance, 2012). 
For the most part, these studies examine patterns on the neighborhood level but do not examine 
whether the correlated or spillover effects are occurring.  However, Chan et al. (2011) found that 
borrowers in neighborhoods with higher shares of black residents (>40%) defaulted thirty percent 
more often than those with lower shares (<20%), regardless of the particular borrower’s race.  They 
hypothesize that this is due to a contagion effect, where the stigma associated with default in the 
neighborhood decreases as default occurrences increase. A study of a county in Alabama (Tuscaloosa) 
found that foreclosures were substantially clustered in older black neighborhoods and to a lesser 
extent in white exurban neighborhoods, while wealthy white neighborhoods were comparatively 
unaffected (Lichtenstein & Weber, 2014).  Cotterman (2001) also found an association between tracts 
with higher percentages of African American residents, as well as tracts with lower average incomes, 
and higher default rates.  However he also found evidence that this association is substantially 
attributable to lower levels of property value appreciation found in black neighborhoods.  
Many researchers also found associations at the community level (again, at the tract or zip code level) 
between negative mortgage outcomes (defaults, foreclosure filings and sales, and REOs) and indicators 
of financial well-being—median income, the poverty rate, and the unemployment rate (Immergluck, 
2010a; Laderman & Reid, 2008; S. Lee et al., 2010; Niedt & Silver, n.d.; Reid & Laderman, 2009; Richter, 
2008; Waddell, Davlin, & Prescott, 2011).  These relationships are all in the expected directions: lower 
median income, higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment rates are associated with higher 
defaults and foreclosures.  These studies again did not investigate whether correlated or spillover 
neighborhood effects were in evidence. 
Evidence was also found for relationships between homeowners under age 25 and increased 
foreclosure sales on the tract level (Grover et al., 2008) and lower levels of education and increased 
REOs in a tract (Niedt & Silver, n.d). 
Immergluck (2010b) found evidence for a relationship between both increasing housing stock age and 
central city location with increased REOs on the zip code level.   
The housing market within which a neighborhood is located also influences the patterns seen.  The 
relationship between decreases in housing prices and increased defaults, foreclosures, and REO levels 
is both logical and supported by evidence, as borrowers lose the ability to refinance or sell when 
mortgage debt increases above housing value (Gerardi et al., 2007; Immergluck, 2010c; Reid & 
Laderman, 2009).  Both Chan et al. (2011) and Agarwal et al. (2010) found evidence of contagion 
effects, where default rates increase in Census tracts that have higher rates of foreclosure notices and 
REO properties.  This result suggests a self-reinforcing aspect of the foreclosure problem.  Towe & 
Lawley (2011) examined the impact of a nearby foreclosure on foreclosure likelihood, defining ‘nearby’ 
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as the property’s thirteen nearest neighbors.  They found that a one unit increase in neighboring 
foreclosures can result in an increase in foreclosure hazard of up to 28%. Researchers found that, in 
high subprime loan neighborhoods, even traditional mortgages with low expected default rates 
experienced increased foreclosure rates (Ding, Quercia, Li, & Ratcliffe, 2011). 
Immergluck, in particular, has investigated the differences in the foreclosure crisis with respect to weak 
and strong housing markets.  Weak markets are those that had been showing decreasing, or mildly 
appreciating, home values prior to the crisis—areas such as Cleveland, Ohio and Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  Strong markets are those where high rates of housing appreciation occurred, exemplars 
being Las Vegas, Nevada and the Inland Empire in California.43  Weak market cities often had significant 
REO and vacancy levels before the foreclosure crisis, while strong market cities tended to have high 
housing demand and very low vacancy and REO levels.  In weak markets, REOs tend to be concentrated 
in the central city, while in strong markets, REOs tend to be suburbanized (Immergluck, 2009c).   
Several studies have also found evidence of housing market connectedness or clustering during the 
foreclosure crisis.  Niedt & Silver (n.d.) and Lee et al. (2010) found that foreclosures themselves cluster 
spatially. Richter & Seo (2011) found evidence for increasing intra-regional housing market 
interconnectedness during the foreclosure crisis, meaning that the impact of foreclosure-related 
disamenities is greater than would have been expected before the foreclosure crisis.  This is important 
because some negative impacts of foreclosures and REOs have spatial spillover effects, which will be 
discussed in Section 2.2.3.   
Several researchers have examined the impacts of the regulatory environment on default, foreclosure, 
and REO incidence.  With respect to the foreclosure process itself, Immergluck (2009b, 2010c) found 
that longer expected foreclosure processes reduced the number of REO properties, while longer post-
foreclosure redemption and confirmation periods increased them.   Goodman & Smith (2010) 
examined the impact of foreclosure processes on post-default loan outcomes. They found that a longer 
period between default and foreclosure was associated with fewer foreclosures, and hypothesized 
that the temporal and financial costs in these states encouraged lenders to be more selective in making 
loans.  They also found that anti-predatory lending laws reduced foreclosure and REO incidences, but 
only when the legislation had sufficiently aggressive penalties. 
Richter (2011) used a decomposition model to break foreclosure rates into the parts resulting from 
neighborhood characteristics and from the regulatory environment, using two counties in Ohio, 
Franklin and Cuyahoga, and one in Pennsylvania, Allegheny.  Within the state of Ohio, the differences 
in foreclosure rates can be mostly explained by differences in neighborhood characteristics.  However, 
between states this is not the case, indicating there is a difference on the state level—presumably 
regulatory.  She then did a counterfactual analysis to estimate the foreclosure rates if borrowers from 
one city were moved to another regulatory environment.  She found that the highest foreclosure 
probability borrowers, if moved from Cuyahoga County to Allegheny County, would have a reduction 
in foreclosure rate from approximately 19.7% to approximately 7.6%.  Examining Cuyahoga County 
                                                          
43 The Inland Empire is a metropolitan region in South California, located directed west of the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area.  It is referred to in the U.S. Census as the Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario metropolitan area. 
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more closely, it can be observed that the poorest neighborhoods have an overconcentration of non-
bank mortgages,44 and that the poorest borrowers receive high-cost loans more often (Richter, 2008). 
Xu (2012) used an instance of regulatory change to examine its effect on foreclosures.  Within the City 
of Cleveland between 2002 and 2006, a statute targeting predatory lending was in place.  In November 
2006 it was overturned.  After performing several falsification tests to exclude other possible 
explanations, such as the onset of the foreclosure crisis, Xu found that the repeal of this law resulted 
in a 30% increase in subprime loans and a 40% increase in loans by subprime lenders in the City of 
Cleveland, though the total volume of loans did not significantly change.  Most importantly, he found, 
using a difference-in-difference estimation, that after repeal there was a 49% increase in loans with 
early foreclosures45 over the period before the repeal (Xu, 2012). 
2.2.3 Foreclosure Impacts 
While the foreclosure crisis has had major impacts on the national and global economy (see, for 
example, Mishkin (2008)) and on individual homeowners and households (see Kingsley et al. (2009) for 
a brief review), it has also had severe and lasting impacts on the neighborhood level.  For example, a 
report of the United States Joint Economic Committee estimated the total average cost of a single 
foreclosure at $80,000, when the homeowner, lender, servicer, neighbors, and local government costs 
are all accounted for (Joint Economic Committee, 2007).  This section reviews the literature 
investigating these neighborhood-level impacts.   
Neighborhood-level research has focused primarily on the impacts of foreclosures on property values, 
property damage, and crime.  These three impacts are strongly interlinked and isolating the three types 
of impacts from one another is not always possible.  These aspects will be reviewed in the first two 
subsections.  Impacts on municipal service provision for neighborhoods are discussed next.  These are 
also linked to the effects on property values, property damage, and crime, which affect both municipal 
revenue and municipal demand for services.  Finally, the lesser researched topic of public health 
impacts will be discussed.  Of course there may be other impacts, which may be more difficult to 
measure or capture, which have not been researched up to this point, such as impacts on 
neighborhood social cohesion. 
As will be discussed in the following section, foreclosures are neither spatially nor demographically 
evenly distributed, and thus foreclosure impacts are also not evenly distributed.  This means that 
neighborhood change resulting from these impacts will not be evenly distributed among 
neighborhoods, and that programs to reduce or mitigate these factors influencing neighborhood 
change also likely need to be spatially targeted to have optimal effect. 
Property Value Impacts  
The impact of a foreclosure on the value of the foreclosed property has been investigated since well 
before the foreclosure crisis began.  For example, Forgey et al. (1994) used a hedonic model and found 
that foreclosed properties sell at a 23% discount in comparison to properties that have not experienced 
a foreclosure, all else held equal. Research of this type focused on the foreclosed property itself, not 
                                                          
44 A non-bank mortgage is one that is made by a financial institution that offers lending but not banking 
(depositing) services. 
45 Early foreclosures are those that occur within 30 months of the loan’s origination. 
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nearby properties, and theorized these price discounts were the result of a ‘liquidation discount,’ that 
is, the price that is paid in order to realize a foreshortened marketing period (Shilling, Benjamin, & 
Sirmans, 1990). 
More recent research has also investigated the impacts of foreclosures on adjacent and nearby 
properties.  Researchers investigated property value spillover effects of foreclosures prior to the 
foreclosure crisis; the crisis itself spurred additional research, as the potential magnitude of effects 
greatly increased as the number of foreclosures skyrocketed.  For example, Wassmer (2011) found 
average impacts of $48,827 (31.9% of property value) per nearby home in Sacramento, California.   
While some researchers have focused on capturing the extent and magnitude of these impacts, while 
others have also attempted to explain the causal mechanism behind these impacts, be it a supply 
effect, a valuation effect, a disamenity effect, or a combination thereof.  Understanding the 
mechanism(s) through which the negative effects of foreclosures occur is necessary to properly 
develop prevention and mitigation responses. 
There are many ways to investigate the property value spillover effects of foreclosures, with 
researchers choosing to focus on specific elements, such as time, space, non-linearities, and model 
type.  As with all neighborhood effects research, there are many methodological difficulties that can 
cast doubt on results, such as missing variables and spatial autocorrelation.  Though these issues are 
given only brief attention here, their potential impact should be kept in mind. Frame’s 2010 literature 
review on the effects of foreclosures on property values discusses some of these in more detail, 
particularly the influence of model specification. 
Researchers have used various spatial specifications to investigate the spillover effects of foreclosures 
on property values.  Most have used concentric, as-the-crow-flies distances, and have found 
exponentially decreasing impacts as distance from the foreclosed property increases (Gerardi, 
Rosenblatt, Willen, & Yao, 2012; Harding, Rosenblatt, & Yao, 2009; Immergluck & Smith, 2006b; Lin, 
Rosenblatt, & Yao, 2009; Shlay & Whitman, 2006).  For example, Shlay & Whitman’s 2006 study of 
home sales in 2000 in Philadelphia found large effects:  a reduction of $7,627 per property within 150 
feet of a foreclosure, the impact of which fell as distance increased, with no impact beyond 450 feet, 
approximately the length of a Philadelphia city block.  Immergluck & Smith (2006b) investigated the 
impacts of foreclosures in Chicago during 1999 and found, under conservative assumptions, that each 
foreclosure within an eighth of a mile (200m) reduced property value by .9%, totaling an average of 
$159,000 per foreclosure.  Harding et al. (2009) found a reduction of .6% for properties within an eighth 
of a mile of a foreclosure, approximately one-third less than Immergluck & Smith (2006).  Within 300 
feet (90 m) of the foreclosed property, the property value reduction was 1.3% (Harding et al., 2009).   
The aggregate impact of the impacts on nearby property values is staggering.  Using Immergluck & 
Smith’s (2006b) coefficient of -.9%, the Center for Responsible Lending estimated an average price 
decrease of $8,667 for each of 40.6 million homes, adding up to a $352 billion reduction in property 
values nationwide (Center for Responsible Lending, 2008). 
Defining neighborhood effects using concentric rings poses theoretical concerns.  Recalling the 
discussion concerning the definition of neighborhood in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, it is difficult to argue 
that a straight-line distance approach fulfills even a mildly realistic concept of neighborhood.  Kobie & 
Lee (2011) attempted to address this issue by using the face block, that is, the houses on both sides of 
one street, bounded by intersecting streets on each end, as the neighborhood unit.  This 
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operationalization captures neighborhood better than studies using Census or other more arbitrary 
neighborhood boundaries.  They found a 1.7% decrease in sales prices for homes on the same face 
block as a foreclosure in Cuyahoga County.  
Kobie & Lee (2011) also investigated whether the property value impact of a foreclosure varied by 
housing submarket.  They found that the property value penalties for each Sheriff’s Sale on the face 
block were -2.3%, -4.4%, and -3.0%, for the City of Cleveland, other Cuyahoga County municipalities, 
and the entire county, respectively.  Whitaker & Fitzpatrick (2011) also studied the impact of 
foreclosures and vacancies in Cuyahoga County, and found that in the case of a tax delinquent 
foreclosed property, the property value penalty for nearby properties is greatest in the inner suburbs, 
in comparison to the City of Cleveland and outer suburbs.  They also examined the impact of 
foreclosures on property values by neighborhood poverty level, and found that low poverty 
neighborhoods experienced larger penalties than medium poverty neighborhoods (-4.6% and -2.7%, 
respectively).  The picture in high poverty neighborhoods is more complex:  properties near foreclosed 
homes experience a minor price increase, but properties near tax delinquent foreclosed homes 
experience a -7.6% penalty.  The authors hypothesize that lenders selectively foreclose in high poverty 
neighborhoods by foreclosing only on more valuable and desirable properties that justify the costs of 
foreclosure accrued by the lender (Whitaker & Fitzpatrick IV, 2013). 
Finally, some studies have accounted for possible spatial dependencies between neighborhoods.  
These include Kobie & Lee (2011) and Leonard & Murdoch (2009).  Leonard & Murdoch (2009) 
examined the impact of foreclosures on property values over four different distance intervals:  within 
250 feet, within 500 feet, within 1000 feet, and within 1500 feet (approximately 75m, 150m, 300m, 
and 450m).  Like others, the impacts were greatest closest to the foreclosed property (-$1,666) and 
declined monotonically as distance increased.   However, when controlling for spatial dependency, 
impacts beyond 500 feet were no longer significant (Leonard & Murdoch, 2009). 
A second dimension that has been investigated concerning the effect of foreclosures on nearby 
property values is time.  Understanding the role of time is essential in order to correctly target 
foreclosure interventions. Lin et al. (2009) examined the role of the time elapsed since the foreclosure 
occurred, in combination with distance from the foreclosure.  They found that within 500 meters of 
the foreclosed property, the property value impacts are significant as far as the 5-10 year time range.  
Examining only distance, they found a significant effect up to 900 meters away, with a maximum 
penalty of -9.7% within 100 meters of the foreclosed home, which drops off quickly and then declines 
slowly to approximately -1.0% at 800 to 900 meters away.  Combining the distance and time factors, 
they found evidence of negative effects on property values up to three kilometers away when the 
foreclosure occurred less than two years previously. Between two and five years the effects can be 
seen within a 600 meter radius, and between five and ten years the effects are limited to a 400 meter 
radius (Lin et al., 2009).  Gerardi et al. (2012) found limited price impacts (-0.5% to -1.0%), which 
peaked before the foreclosure process was completed and disappeared within a year of resale to a 
new homeowner.  In contrast, Han (2013)—who examined the effect of vacancies rather than that of 
foreclosures—found that both the magnitude and operative distance of the disamenity effect of vacant 
properties increased with the duration of the vacancy period.  
Kobie & Lee (2011) examined the impact of time after a foreclosure filing occurs.  They found that the 
negative effect on nearby properties begins one year after the foreclosure filing occurs on a property 
in both the suburbs of Cuyahoga County and the county as a whole. This variable was not significant 
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within the City of Cleveland (Kobie & Lee, 2011).46 Translated into dollar amounts, the property value 
penalty in Cuyahoga County suburbs is approximately -$4,340 per foreclosure filing within the face 
block.   However, this variable should be considered carefully:  one year out from a foreclosure filing, 
many of these filings will have gone on to a Sheriff’s sale, another variable included in Kobie & Lee’s 
model.  It may be that the foreclosure filing one year previous variable is, in reality, a less accurate 
proxy for Sheriff’s sales and thus (partially) detects the same phenomenon.  Similarly, Gerardi et al. 
(2012) found that negative price impacts on nearby properties peaked after the foreclosure suit had 
been filed but before the foreclosure process was completed and disappeared within a year of resale 
to a new homeowner.   
Schuetz et al. (2008) examined the marginal effect of foreclosure filings.  In addition to finding 
corroborative evidence for the space and time relationships discussed above, they found that 
foreclosure filings have a nonlinear effect on property sale prices.  For example, between 250 and 500 
feet from a foreclosure filing (75 to 150 m), one to two filings did not have a significant effect on sales 
prices, but three or more filings did.  Between 500 and 1000 feet (300 to 600 m) no effect was observed 
for five or fewer filings, but six or more filings were associated with a reduction in nearby sale prices 
of -2.8% (Schuetz, Been, & Ellen, 2008).  Lin et al. (2009) also found evidence for a scale effect by 
comparing the price penalties during boom and bust periods of the housing market cycle, and found 
that the effects were more pronounced during weak housing market periods when more foreclosures 
occurred. 
Gerardi et al. (2012) examined the price impacts of foreclosures for the fifteen largest metropolitan 
statistical areas in the U.S. This research also examined the role of vacancy and property condition.  
They found that vacant foreclosed properties had a negative effect approximately twice as large as an 
occupied foreclosed property (-1.1% compared to -0.6%).  With respect to property condition, negative 
effects were present only for properties in below average condition and for which no information on 
property condition was available.  In fact, foreclosed properties described as above average condition 
had a significant positive effect on nearby home sale prices (Gerardi et al., 2012).  Mikelbank (2008) 
carried out a similar study in Columbus, Ohio, and found that foreclosures impact properties within 
250 feet (75 m) by approximately -2%, while vacant properties within the same distance have an 
impact of approximately -3.5%.  Although a large proportion of foreclosed properties were both vacant 
and in below average condition during and after the foreclosure crisis, Gerardi et al’s (2012) and 
Mikelbank’s (2008) studies provide evidence that can help guide policy responses—namely that from 
a property value impact perspective, foreclosures themselves are less problematic than vacant and 
undermaintained properties.  
Sumell (2009) found that nearby foreclosures depress the sale prices of foreclosed properties 
themselves.  That is, for each percentage increase in foreclosures, the discount on the sale of a 
foreclosed property increases by 4.5%.  This indicates that the price-depressing effect of foreclosures 
is self-reinforcing.  It is also a reason why foreclosure impacts are spatially concentrated in particular 
neighborhoods. 
Researchers have proposed several possible mechanisms through which the foreclosure discount on 
nearby properties occurs.  There are three major theories:  (1) the supply effect, in which foreclosed 
                                                          
46 However, as discussed earlier in this section, Sheriff Sales did have an effect on nearby property values within 
the City of Cleveland. 
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properties increase the supply of houses on the market and thus shift the equilibrium point of the 
supply-demand curve; (2) the valuation effect, where foreclosed properties, which themselves sell at 
significant discounts, impact the appraised value of nearby properties through the comparable sales 
valuation approach;47 and (3) the disamenity effect, where negative externalities associated with the 
foreclosed property negatively impact the desirability of nearby properties and thus lower their prices 
(Lee, 2008).  
For the most part, researchers have found evidence indicative of the disamenity effect as the 
mechanism that results in lower nearby house prices; however these studies do not actively investigate 
which mechanism is occurring (Campbell, Giglio, & Pathak, 2011; Clauretie & Daneshvary, 2009; 
Gerardi et al., 2012; Harding et al., 2009; Leonard & Murdoch, 2009).  Though Lin et al. (2009) 
hypothesize that the negative price effects of foreclosures are due to the comparable sales pricing 
model, their model is not specified in a way that allows the mechanism to be discerned.  Hartley (2011) 
attempted to separate the supply and disamenity factors by comparing the impacts of nearby single-
family foreclosures and multi-family foreclosures on single-family properties. His reasoning was that 
single family foreclosures add to the supply of single-family properties on the market, while multi-
family foreclosures do not add to the single-family market supply.  However, both can influence nearby 
single-family property sale prices via a disamenity effect.  The results indicated that the vacancy rate 
of the tract determines the dominant mechanism:  in low-vacancy tracts, he observed a 1.6% reduction 
in single-family home prices due to a supply effect, and no reduction due to a disamenity effect.  In 
high-vacancy tracts, he observed a 2% reduction due to a disamenity effect, and no reduction due to 
a supply effect (Hartley, 2010). 
These changes in property values are important:  as nearby properties lose value, nearby homeowners’ 
equity is reduced.  These homeowners themselves may experience financial difficulties, for example 
due to job loss, resulting in their inability to make mortgage payments.  The lower the equity in the 
property, the less likely the distressed homeowner will be able to sell or refinance the property, and 
the more likely the homeowner will experience foreclosure.  This foreclosure, in turn, will reduce 
nearby property values, continuing the cycle of devaluation and increasing the likelihood of additional 
foreclosures. 
Property Damage & Crime Impacts 
Another important negative consequence of foreclosures is increased property damage and crime.  
Based on the research on foreclosure-induced property devaluation mechanisms, it can be seen that 
there is strong evidence indicating that it is not so much the foreclosure itself that causes these adverse 
effects; rather, it is due to the property damage and crime disamenities that are strongly associated 
with the occurrence of a foreclosure.   
Property damage and crime are a primary negative effect of concentrated foreclosures on 
neighborhoods.  Often, vandals strip the property, removing anything of value in the house—copper 
pipes and wiring, hardwood floors, aluminum siding.  Once this has occurred—wiring and pipes ripped 
out of the walls, no exterior protection to the structure, the property usually becomes unsalvageable, 
                                                          
47In the U.S., properties are professionally appraised for both sale and tax purposes.  A key part of the appraisal 
process is the use of comparables, which are nearby properties with similar characteristics.  The recent sales 
prices of these properties are used to set a benchmark for determining the appropriate valuation of the property 
in question. 
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worth much less than it would cost to repair it (National Vacant Properties Campaign, 2005; Kingsley, 
Smith, & Price, 2009; Wilson & Paulsen, 2010).  Unsecured properties invite squatters and other 
activities, including drug use, prostitution, and, as reported to me in Cleveland, an instance of goats 
being kept inside a vacant house with the objective of harvesting their manure for fertilizer (Gardner, 
May 11, 2011; Kingsley et al., 2009; Wilson & Paulsen, 2010). These users (excluding the goats) 
sometimes build indoor fires for warmth or light—according to the National Vacant Properties 
Campaign, more than $73 million in property damage was incurred nationwide as the result of over 
12,000 fires in vacant properties (2005). 
To set the stage for this discussion of property damage and crime resulting from foreclosures, it is 
important to note the key role blight and crime play in residents’ perceptions of neighborhood quality.  
Greenberg (2009) investigated the role of neighborhood problems in residents’ perceptions of 
neighborhood quality.  He found that crime and blight were the major determinants of a perception 
of poor neighborhood quality, and without exception, when both crime and blight were present, the 
neighborhood was rated as poor quality by residents.  Asking residents what problem was most 
important in their neighborhoods, 72% rated their neighborhoods as poor named crime or blight.  In 
contrast, residents who rated their neighborhoods as fair were more concerned with the absence of 
recreational facilities and poor-quality schools, in addition to crime.  Using a discriminant analysis, 
Greenberg found that the presence or absence of litter and trash, abandoned houses, factories, and 
other businesses, occupied buildings in poor and dangerous condition, vandalism, and drug-related 
crime in the neighborhood had the largest associations with negative evaluations of neighborhood 
quality.  The results show that rectifying blight and crime problems is a necessary prerequisite step 
before other improvements (such as improved schools, recreational areas, and other public services) 
will affect perceived neighborhood quality (Greenberg, 1999).  The key influence blight and crime play 
in directing neighborhood change should not be underestimated when designing policies to address 
the neighborhood impacts of the foreclosure crisis. 
Cui (2010) examined crime and foreclosures in Pittsburgh, Pennslyvania, and found that foreclosures 
themselves did not affect crime, but that vacancies were associated with a 15% increase in violent 
crime. However this study is unable to determine causality, because the independent and dependent 
variables are measured simultaneously.48  However, Stucky et al. (2012) found that prior year 
foreclosures predicted both violent and property crime in Indianapolis, Indiana.  Breaking these 
categories into specific crime descriptions, foreclosures were seen to predict increases in aggravated 
assault and burglaries in particular, but not robberies, larcenies, or vehicle thefts (Stucky, Ottensmann, 
& Payton, 2012).  As well, Baumer et al. (2012) examined the causal relationship between foreclosures 
and crime in fifty large U.S. cities.  They found positive relationships between foreclosures and robbery, 
and foreclosures and burglary.  However, they noted that these relationships varied significantly in 
magnitude across cities, and added additional variables to investigate this.  They found that foreclosure 
and robbery are more closely linked in cities where the foreclosure rate is lower and socioeconomic 
disadvantage is high.  The relationship between foreclosure and burglary is stronger in cities where 
new housing construction is limited and the police force size has decreased by a larger amount 
(Baumer, Wolff, & Arnio, 2012). 
Immergluck & Smith (2006a) examined the relationship between foreclosures and crime in Chicago, 
Illinois.  They found a significant, positive relationship between foreclosures and crime—a one 
                                                          
48See Kirk & Hyra (2012) for a discussion of this issue. 
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standard deviation increase in foreclosures (approximately 2.8 foreclosures per 100 owner-occupied 
properties) resulted in a 6.7% increase in violent crime in the Census tract.  With respect to property 
crime, they found no significant relationship, though they noted the coefficient was positive and 
speculated that the lack of significance may be due to underreporting (Immergluck & Smith, 2006a).  
Goodstein & Lee (2010) also found evidence that foreclosures increase burglary, larceny, and 
aggravated assault, estimating total nationwide community costs of at least $17.4 billion. 
Katz et al. (2013) investigated foreclosures and crime in Glendale, Arizona, which is part of the Phoenix 
metropolitan area.  They added a timelag component to the study in order to capture the duration of 
any foreclosure-induced crime impacts, and also examined both pre- and post- housing crisis periods.  
Prior to the crisis, one additional foreclosure in the Census block resulted in thirty additional calls for 
service to the police per one thousand residents. After the crisis, an additional foreclosure resulted in 
nineteen additional calls for service.  They found that these impacts on crime were short-term:  for 
total, property, and violent crimes the effect lasted three months; for drug-related crime the effect 
lasted four months (Katz, Wallace, & Hedburg, 2013). 
It is possible that the short-term nature of the crime effect reported by Katz et al. (2013) applies only 
in certain contexts, depending on the metropolitan area’s housing market strength.  The study by Katz 
et al. (2013) takes place in Phoenix, Arizona, a strong housing market area.  In contrast, Immergluck & 
Smith’s (2005) study (which did not include a temporal component) examined the Chicago 
metropolitan area, which can be described as a mixed market—it experienced some housing market 
appreciation, but also began experiencing increased foreclosures significantly before the foreclosure 
crisis began nationwide.  In strong markets, foreclosed properties are often quickly purchased and re-
occupied, while in mixed and weak markets the vacancy period can extend much longer, possibly until 
the structure is demolished (Swanstrom, Chapple, & Immergluck, 2009).  Given this, and the links 
between vacancy, property damage, and crime, it is quite possible that increased crime due to 
foreclosures will last longer in mixed market areas and even more so in weak market areas, such as 
the Cleveland metropolitan area. 
Municipal Services Impacts 
The impacts discussed in the previous section—crime and blight—create increased service needs for 
the neighborhood—among these, increased court costs associated with foreclosure proceedings, 
increased police presence (for patrolling affected areas and to carry out evictions), more city-provided 
maintenance to care for and secure abandoned properties (securing properties, grass cutting, garbage 
removal), and increased need for demolitions, to name a few (Hartman & Robinson, 2003; Kingsley et 
al., 2009; Mallach, Mueller Levy, & Schilling, 2005; McFarland & McGahan, 2008; Rothstein, 2008; 
Schilling, 2009).  Additionally, residents displaced as a result of foreclosure may need increased 
temporary assistance services, though the evidence for this is mixed and many displaced residents 
double up with friends or family rather than relying on public services (Burt, 2001; McFarland & 
McGahan, 2008; Rothstein, 2008). 
Apgar et al. (2005) conducted a case study on the municipal costs of foreclosure in the City of Chicago.  
They documented 26 individual costs incurred by 15 governmental units while performing services 
related to foreclosures.  These range from simple, inexpensive tasks such as recording the deed 
transfer to large and complex costs such as demolition ($6,000 per unit) and fire suppression ($14,000 
per fire) (Apgar, Duda, & Gorey, 2005).   
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In a second related report, Apgar & Duda (2005) presented five common foreclosure scenarios in the 
City of Chicago and presented the costs associated with each.  These are listed below in Table 2.1 to 
give an impression of the possible cost scenarios experienced by municipalities when dealing with 
foreclosures. 
Table 2.1:  Municipal Costs under Various Foreclosure Scenarios  
Source:  Apagar & Duda (2005) 
Scenario Expected Cost to 
Municipality 
Vacant & Secured Property $430 
Vacant & Unsecured Property $5,358 
Vacant & Unsecured Property, Demolition Planned $13,542 
Property Abandoned before Foreclosure Complete $19,227 
Abandoned Property Damaged by Fire $34,199 
 
Simultaneously, as neighborhoods require additional services, the municipal tax base used to fund 
services decreases as properties decrease in value and more homeowners have difficulty paying their 
property taxes.  Post-foreclosure owners are often difficult to track down and frequently do not pay 
their property taxes or properly maintain their properties (Rothstein, 2008). In addition to the 
municipal services listed above, public schools are funded primarily through property tax in many parts 
of the U.S. and thus are significantly affected, meaning that primary education in general in areas with 
high levels of foreclosure is negatively impacted. 
Public Health Impacts 
The final type of foreclosure impact is that which affects public health.  Considering the impacts 
described in the preceding pages, several possible public health concerns come to mind:  the negative 
consequences of increased stress and uncertainty for homeowners, the psychological impacts of 
displacement on homeowners, their families, and tenants living in properties that are foreclosed upon, 
and the increased likelihood of injury resulting from the increase in poorly-secured vacant buildings. 
Early in the crisis, the public health impacts of foreclosures was extremely under-researched.  Bennett 
et al.’s 2009 article stated that, as of mid-2009, no research examining the public health impacts of the 
foreclosure crisis had been carried out.  In their article, the researchers hypothesize that the 
foreclosure crisis may have significant public health impacts, hypothesize a mechanism—based on the 
evidence that stressful life events precede episodes of depression, and also encourage unhealthful 
behaviors as coping mechanisms—and suggest integrating public health-oriented efforts into 
mortgage delinquency intervention programs (Bennett, Scharoun-Lee, & Tucker-Seeley, 2009). 
Since then, some studies have linked foreclosure incidence and negative health occurrences.  
Researchers found evidence that individuals experiencing foreclosure have higher incidences of 
depression, insomnia, hunger, lower health status, and less access to health resources (Alley et al., 
2011; Crump, 2013; McLaughlin et al., 2012; Osypuk, Howard Caldwell, Platt, & Misra, 2012).  In a 
qualitative study, most respondents reported experiencing foreclosure as a “long term state of crisis 
and stress” (Crump, 2013, p.154).  Two public health articles investigated whether living in areas where 
foreclosure incidence is higher has an effect on health.  Currie & Tekin (2011) found that 
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neighborhoods with a sudden increase in foreclosures have significantly increased in hospital visits for 
both emergencies and preventable conditions, and that this increase falls disproportionately on 
minorities.  Schootman et al. (2012) found that female breast cancer survivors were 2.39 as likely to 
rate their health as fair or poor when they lived in high foreclosure risk areas.  Children in households 
experiencing foreclosure experience depression and other mental health issues more often, and 
display statistically significant declines in academic performance (Bowdler, Quercia, & Smith, 2010).   
Using a database covering sixteen states, a recent study determined that the incidence of suicides 
triggered by severe housing distress—i.e. due to foreclosures and evictions—doubled between 2005 
and 2010.  Nearly 80% of the suicides occurred before the actual foreclosure or eviction took place, 
and the suicides were overwhelmingly white (87%) and male (79%) (Fowler, Gladden, Vagi, Barnes, & 
Frazier, 2015). 
A Center for Disease Control and Prevention dispatch found an association between foreclosures and 
human West Nile virus infections, which increased 276% from the summer of 2006 to the summer of 
2007, with non-maintained swimming pools of foreclosed properties determined to be the likely 
disease vector (Reisen, Takahashi, Carroll, & Quiring, 2008).     
A review of the exigent research concerning the health impacts of foreclosures (35 studies) found that 
32 (91%) found evidence of negative health effects.  These studies measured a variety of health 
impacts:  mental health outcomes (24 studies/75%), physical health outcomes (10 studies/31%), health 
behaviors (4 studies/13%), and domestic violence and child abuse (3 studies/9%).  Five of the thirty-
five studies examined the public health impacts of foreclosures on the neighborhood level, with three 
finding statistically significant relationships.  However, all but three of the studies were judged to be 
at risk of bias, as none had an experimental of quasi-experimental research design and few used 
instrumental variables to address this shortcoming (Tsai, 2015). 
2.3 Neighborhood Change & Residential Mortgage Foreclosures 
The discussion above makes clear many of the impacts foreclosures can have on the neighborhoods in 
which they occur.  When enough foreclosures occur in spatial and temporal proximity, they can result 
in neighborhood change.  Since the purpose of this research is to determine whether foreclosure 
interventions may be able to stop, slow, or reverse undesirable neighborhood change, and in which 
particular contexts, it is necessary to first examine the literature on neighborhood change.  Please 
recall the use of the terms neighborhood change and neighborhood in the neighborhood change 
literature (and thus within this section) differs from that used in the remainder of this document.  For 
additional clarification refer to Section 1.3.1. 
This section first briefly discusses defining neighborhood change, followed by an introduction of major 
neighborhood change theories and related empirical work for each.  Following this, the limited 
literature on the relationship between foreclosures and neighborhood change is reviewed in greater 
detail.   
2.3.1 Defining Neighborhood Change 
Despite being an important research topic in several disciplines—economics, sociology, geography, 
and urban planning—there is no clearly stated, agreed upon definition for the concept of 
neighborhood change.  In fact, there is no one agreed upon term for the phenomenon.  Various 
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researchers and articles refer to “neighborhood change,” “residential sucession,” neighborhood 
revitalization,” “neighborhood decline,” and “neighborhood stability,” to list the most common terms.  
Like defining neighborhood itself, one can make overly broad, impractical statements—“any change in 
a neighborhood”—or one can easily slip into normative definitions that privilege one dimension of 
neighborhood over another.  
In fact, most articles addressing neighborhood change do not define neighborhood change as a 
concept.  Even those articles which are reviews of major theories of neighborhood change generally 
omit this matter.  In most cases, empirical research on neighborhood change simply states the 
indicator used to capture neighborhood change, without clarifying exactly what this proxy represents 
or what advantages and disadvantages it has.  Temkin & Rohe (1996) critically note that researchers 
tend to focus on the variable or concept of neighborhood change germane to their field—property 
values and income for economists, the area’s role in the greater metropolitan context for sociologists, 
and spatial phenomena for geographers.  This can be problematic, because many research questions 
require a clear theoretical construct in order to effectively create and test hypotheses about 
neighborhood change. 
This is not to say that no efforts to define neighborhood change have occurred. Schwirian (1983) 
writes, “From the broader perspective any change in people, place, interaction system, shared 
identification, or public symbols represents a type of neighborhood change” (p.84).  Sociologists and 
human ecologists of the Chicago School perspective assume that any change in the population or 
composition of the neighborhood will affect the other aspects of the neighborhood.  These researchers 
focus on population changes due to birth, death, and in- and out-migration as the predominant 
mechanisms underlying neighborhood change (Schwirian, 1983). 
Many researchers investigating neighborhood change examine it from an economic perspective and 
thus use economic indicators as their proxy for neighborhood health or status.  For example, 
researchers have used the poverty rate (Galster & Mincy, 1993), income (Gould Ellen & O'Regan, 2008), 
and home values (Rosenthal, 2008) to approximate neighborhood health.   Zielenbach (2000) created 
an index incorporating property value, per capita income, and residential loan volume to capture 
neighborhood conditions.  He chose these indicators in order to account for both the economic 
conditions of the residents and the extent to which the neighborhood is integrated into the city’s 
market system; that is, to account for both the situation of the residents and of the place itself.  
Aitken (1990) points out that including residents’ perceptions of neighborhood change is essential.  He 
criticizes the general lack of user perspective in considering neighborhood change and its effects.  To 
my knowledge, this shortcoming continues in neighborhood change research.  Presumably this is 
primarily due to the ease of using larger-scale, pre-prepared quantitative data such as U.S. Census data 
or proprietary neighborhood data available for purchase.  
Hunter (1979) argues for neighborhood change research germane to policy, stating that to avoid being 
a purely descriptive field analysis must connect neighborhood change to the larger forces of society.  
Not only what and how must be determined, but also “. . . what must be changed to alter the sequence 
to maximize alternative values, and how to do it” (p.274).  Cautioning against viewing neighborhoods 
as wholly passive entities subject to the effects of larger economic, political, and social forces, he 
suggests researchers investigate neighborhood change by examining their roles in and effects on the 
larger urban system. 
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In this study I have selected the percent change in total residential property value as the indicator for 
neighborhood change in the quantitative model.  Thus, it can be said that the quantitative component 
is more place focused than resident focused. However, I have integrated the perceptions of 
neighborhood residents into this examination of neighborhood change, particularly in the qualitative 
phase and as well when interpreting the results of the quantitative model.  Thus this research includes 
both a place-based and a resident-based analysis, which I hope adds to and further legitimizes this 
study’s conclusions. 
2.3.2 Theories of Neighborhood Change 
Historically there have been three major categories of neighborhood change models:  ecological, 
subcultural, and political economy.  Each of these model types focuses on a different geographic level 
and mechanism of neighborhood change.   Two other types of neighborhood change models, the 
synthetic model and tipping models, will be introduced here as well.  
Ecological Models 
Ecological models originated with the Chicago School sociologists, who likened neighborhood 
transition to the transition of natural areas, with the key element of change being population change.  
These models are predicated on neighborhood change being a natural process based in economic 
rationalism where various groups and land uses compete for desirable space, analogous to species 
invasion and succession (Pitkin, 2001).  
Invasion-succession models are conceptualized in two ways:  the push model, where one group 
“pushes” the original group out (Burgess, 1925) and the filtering model, in which residents are “pulled” 
to better quality housing (Hoyt, 1933).  Push factors include perceived and real changes in crime and 
safety, environmental pollution and degradation, the proximity of undesirable land uses, decreases in 
public services, and changing demographics in the neighborhood, such as racial change. Pull factors 
include the availability of newer, more modern houses, the movement of jobs to other areas of the 
city, and increased proximity to amenities such as shopping and recreational space (Solomon & 
Vandell, 1982).  Thus, neighborhood change is seen to be a natural and beneficial process:  as new 
housing is built, households filter to these preferable units, which then allows the next group of 
households to filter up to the units vacated by the first group, and so, resulting in improved housing 
across all groups (Temkin & Rohe, 1996).   
The neighborhood life cycle model extends the invasion-succession model, and can be conceptualized 
as a series of invasion-succession occurrences.  Posited by Hoover & Vernon (1959), the neighborhood 
life cycle model is comprised of five stages:  development, transition, downgrading, thinning out, and 
renewal, though not all areas necessarily go through all five stages and some may repeat stages.   
A second type of ecological model focuses more on consumer choices and are known as bid-rent or 
border models (Temkin & Rohe, 1996). Bid rent models posit that households trade off space and travel 
time in selecting housing locations:  those closer to the center have increased costs per spatial unit, 
but reduced travel costs (measured in time), and those farther from the center are cheaper per spatial 
unit but have increased travel costs.  Border models are similar, but include social factors, such as 
income or neigborhood racial composition, as well (Pitkin, 2001). 
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Ecological models can be criticized as being overly deterministic.  In this view, neighborhood change is 
inevitable and natural, which implies that intervention is unnecessary and likely counterproductive.  As 
well, neighborhood change is seen as beneficial for all, with everyone moving up the housing quality 
ladder as new houses are constructed and households filter through the existing stock.  These models 
lend support for policies to increase the housing supply through new construction and to increase the 
mobility of those in lower quality housing and neighborhoods, which can be observed in many U.S. 
housing policies, such as Moving to Opportunity for those receiving housing assistance, and tax credits 
and other incentives to spur new building (Pitkin, 2001; Temkin & Rohe, 1996).  However, these policies 
ignore the remainder of the neighborhood residents who do not ‘filter up,’ discounts the agency of 
residents and stakeholders by accepting all neighborhood change as natural and predetermined, and 
ignores non-economic factors such as social ties that bind individuals to neighborhoods. 
Researchers using ecological models of neighborhood change often use economic models.  These 
models incorporate variables such as the age of the housing stock, housing size, socioeconomic 
characteristics, crime rates, and distance to the central city. They tend to use a measure of relative 
neighborhood economic status, such as resident income or property values, relative to the 
metropolitan average, as the dependent variable intended to capture neighborhood change (Coulson 
& Bond, 1990; Schwab, 1987; Rosenthal, 2008).   
Sub-Cultural Models 
Drawing on critiques of the deterministic, economically-focused ecological models (Pitkin, 2001), 
subcultural models focus on the role of human agency and resident actions in determining 
neighborhood change, with an important role assigned to identity-based subcultures, such as ethnic 
groups (Gans, 1968; Suttles, 1972).  Subculturalists are influenced by Firey’s (1945) definition of urban 
space, which includes sentiment and symbolism as an element essential to defining and shaping urban 
space (Pitkin, 2001; Temkin & Rohe, 1996).  Rather than focusing on external forces, as in ecological 
models, sub-cultural models focus on forces from within the neighborhood itself, such as leadership, 
identity, social networks, and active decision-making roles (Schwirian, 1983).  Thus, “noneconomic 
factors such as social networks, socially determined neighborhood reputations, and the degree to 
which neighbors feel a sense of attachment to their community influence a neighborhood’s stability 
over time” (Temkin & Rohe, 1996, p.162).   
Subculturalists point to the fact that not all neighborhoods in a city take the same trajectory over time.  
Thus, the ecological models must be missing something, or the city’s neighbourhoods ought to follow 
the same paths, separated only by the time lags between when the houses were initially constructed.  
Subculturalists identify local neighborhood identity as the missing aspect in the neighborhood change 
process.  Neighborhoods with stronger identities and stronger social networks will remain viable, while 
those lacking identity and social capital are more likely to decay (Temkin & Rohe, 1996). 
Subcultural models also view neighborhoods as heterogenous—that is, not all neighborhoods have the 
same character, and not all neighborhoods are equally appealing to all residents (Pitkin, 2001).  
Residents choose to move to or remain in a neighborhood for reasons such as the sense of place, a 
local subculture within which they feel comfortable, and sentimental ties, in addition to weighing the 
costs of inhabiting the structure (Pitkin, 2001). 
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Thus, subcultural models of neighborhood change support neighborhood preservation policies that 
strengthen local identity and networks and work to preserve, or revive, the character of the 
neighborhood.  These policies focus on strengthening and supporting the neighborhood from inside, 
using the resources of the neighborhood itself, its people, their agency, and its particular 
characteristics, be they historic, cultural, locational, or other (Temkin & Rohe, 1996).  The influences 
of subcultural models of neighborhood change can be seen in policy initiatives that use terms such as 
“asset building” and “comprehensive community initiatives” (Pitkin, 2001, p.8). 
Research that uses subcultural theories of neighborhood change are often ethnographies of particular 
neighborhoods.  These generally include in-depth qualitative investigations of neighborhood 
subcultures.  Urban sociologists often study neighborhood change using subcultural theories as well; 
quantitative models attempt to capture aspects such as social capital, local institutional infrastructure, 
the level of community interactions and neighboring, trust, and neighborhood identity (Schwirian, 
1983; Temkin & Rohe, 1998). 
Political Economy Models 
The last of the major theoretical neighborhood change models, political economy models center on 
the role of larger political and economic forces in determining the development course of 
neighborhoods.  These models are based in neo-Marxian analysis of production, accumulation, and 
space (Pitkin, 2001).  The foundational theory of this vein (proposed by Molotch (1976)) is the urban 
growth machine theory, in which coalitions of urban elites seek to capture and retain economic power 
by promoting real estate and population growth (Logan & Molotch, 2007; Molotch, 1976). 
These models of neighborhood change look at neighborhood change as neither a natural process nor 
a process that can be determined from within the neighborhood (Temkin & Rohe, 1996).  Political 
economy models situate neighborhood change within the larger urban structure and changes that 
occur within it.  It explores the linkages between economic and political institutions and actors and 
business and housing markets (Schwirian, 1983). In this view, the factors and decisions affecting 
neighborhoods and neighborhood change are made by a group of elites who control the land and 
financial interests of a metropolis.  Neighborhood change occurs as the result of a conflict between 
exchange value—that is, the potential profit from the exchange of a commodity, in this case land—
and use value, the utility of the good, in this case using it as one’s neighborhood.  Use value includes 
aspects such as attachment to place and the value of social interactions.  Neighborhood stability occurs 
when exchange and use values match (Temkin & Rohe, 1996). 
Political economic models of neighborhood change place the controlling factors outside the realm of 
the neighborhood itself.  However, unlike ecological models, they view the state and institutions as 
affecting neighborhood change.  Thus, institutional policy changes, such as the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA), which requires banks to lend in the areas they have branches and was 
designed as a response to redlining, are considered the appropriate policy tools for influencing and 
controlling neighborhood change (Temkin & Rohe, 1996). 
Research using political economic frameworks occurs in a variety of disciplines, including sociology, 
geography, and political science.  Examples of research investigating neighborhood change using 
political economic theories examining the impacts of redlining and tax depreciation schedules on 
neighborhood change—how these larger policies play out at the neighborhood level (Schwirian, 1983).  
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Other political economic research traces relationships between globalization and the related economic 
restructuring to changes at the neighborhood level, for example as the result of manufacturing job loss 
(Pitkin, 2001).  Schwirian (1983) describes neighborhood change research from the political economic 
perspective as descriptive and inductive, though later research expanded to quantitative modelling 
(Galster, Mincy, & Tobin, 1997) and case studies (Aalbers, 2006; Smith, Caris, & Wyly, 2001) as well.   
Synthetic Models 
Several researchers have conceptualized a model of neighborhood change which incorporates aspects 
of all three major model types, known as the synthetic model or social capital model of neighborhood 
change (Pitkin, 2001).  These models are in response to shortcomings of the individual models, namely 
that each formulation independently is (1) overly simplistic, (2) focuses on either exogenous or 
endogenous factors, but never both, and (3) cannot be applied on both a micro- (neighborhood) and 
macro- (city or regional) scale (Galster, 1987; W. Grigsby, Baratz, Galster, & Maclennan, 1987; Temkin 
& Rohe, 1996; Temkin & Rohe, 1998; Zielenbach, 2000).  Each of the three major model types discussed 
above rely on one primary type of causal mechanism to explain the phenomena of neighborhood 
change.  It is unsurprising that reliance on any one mechanism would fall short in describing something 
as complex as the changing situations of neighborhoods within the urban context. 
Temkin and Rohe’s (1996) synthetic model of neighborhood change integrates the ecological, 
subcultural, and political economic models into one model where the various factors proposed in each 
of these model types influence neighborhood change and one another.   While others have proposed 
similar models of neighborhood change that combine aspects of the three major theories, these other 
models do not include mechanisms through which various influences interact with and influence one 
another (Temkin & Rohe, 1996).  Temkin and Rohe stress the importance of neighborhood social 
relations, but caution that they are a necessary but not sufficient condition for longer-term 
neighborhood stability.  The ability of neighborhood residents and representatives to reach out to 
institutional and political actors and leverage resources is key to maintaining neighborhood stability, 
which itself requires a strong neighborhood social fabric.  
Temkin and Rohe’s (1996) model includes the following factors that influence long-term neighborhood 
change: 
 national economic, social, and political conditions, 
 metropolitan area maturation,  
 metropolitan-level economic, social, and political characteristics, 
 the nature and extent of metropolitan-level changes,  
 locational, physical, and social characteristics of neighborhoods, 
 neighborhood-level maturational forces, 
 short-term changes in neighborhood-level physical and social characteristics, 
 perceptions of short-term neighborhood-level changes, 
 the responses of institutional actors, and 
 the responses of local residents (p.166). 
With respect to policy implications, Temkin and Rohe (1996) note the opposing purposes of ecological 
model-influenced and subcultural model-influenced policies.  They note that policies with an 
underlying ecological theory of neighborhood change advocate individual-based responses that assist 
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individuals in weaker neighborhoods move to stronger neighborhoods, while those with an underlying 
subcultural theory advocate place-based responses that seek to strengthen the social fabric and 
identity of weaker neighborhoods.  Given this, they suggest context-specific policy responses; that is, 
to tailor responses to each neighborhood, depending on its to current characteristics.  They suggest 
that a neighborhood with either a weak social fabric or a lack of political power should be organized 
to strengthen this weakness; but a neighborhood lacking both a strong social fabric and political power 
may be a good candidate for voluntary deconcentration of residents (Temkin & Rohe, 1996). 
Tipping Models 
Threshold, or tipping, models are a subtype of neighborhood change model.  The difference between 
these models and those described above is in the form of the relationship between various factors and 
neighborhood change, and a subsequent change in the way neighborhood change is modelled, rather 
than a difference in the underlying theory concerning the change mechanism.  Thus, tipping models 
can be used to quantitatively implement any of the theories described above. 
Tipping models were initially used to explain racial change in neighborhood composition (Goering, 
1978; Schelling, 1971).  The hypothesis is that there exists a threshold value that, once reached, triggers 
more rapid and perhaps unstoppable changes (Galster, Quercia, & Cortes, 2000; Schelling, 1971).  
These models are based in behavioral theories, including theories of collective socialization, corner 
solutions, collective efficacy, gaming, preference, and contagion models (Galster et al., 2000; Quercia 
& Galster, 2000).   
Quercia and Galster’s (2000) review of threshold models used in neighborhood change research 
indicates that a “tipping point” exists for many factors, including racial change, income succession, high 
school dropout rates, college completion, wages and income, welfare exits, poverty duration, hours of 
work, employment, and teen childbearing.  Developing a model of neighborhood change that 
incorporates a threshold effect can be accomplished by adding a spline specification, rather than the 
usual linear specification, for the variable suspected to have a threshold relationship with 
neighborhood change.  However, Quercia & Galster (1997) draw attention to four factors which 
complicate the matter:  (1) the geographic scale at which the threshold effect occurs (recall the MAUP 
problem discussed earlier in this chapter); (2) whether the effect occurs on an absolute or relative level 
(i.e. does the count or the proportion matter); (3) whether the relationship is continuous or 
discontinuous, and thus which mathematical specification is appropriate; and (4) the time at which the 
impacts occur.  All of these factors make capturing threshold effects difficult in practice. 
Research has not been conducted on the possibility of a threshold effect for foreclosures; however, 
Børsum (2010) has carried out theoretical work on the potential for contagious mortgage default and 
research exhibiting evidence of the self-reinforcing nature of foreclosures, such as Agarwal et al. 
(2010), Chan et al. (2011), and Towe & Lawley (2010), may also be indicative of a threshold effect. 
2.3.3 Foreclosures & Neighborhood Change 
A significant body of research establishes links between neighborhood change and foreclosures. For 
example, researchers have found that both decreasing neighborhood median household income and 
increasing black homeownership rates increase the foreclosure rate of a neighborhood (Cotterman, 
2001), and that an increasing unemployment rate increases both the default and foreclosure rate 
(Baxter & Lauria, 2000; Williams, Beranek, & Kenkel, 1974).  Examining the relationship from the other 
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direction, increased foreclosures are associated with increased neighborhood change as indicated by 
increased crime rates, decreased property values, and increased housing market segregation (Baxter 
& Lauria, 2000; D. Immergluck & Smith, 2006; Immergluck & Smith, 2006b; Leonard & Murdoch, 2009).   
Others found that the presence of certain neighborhood characteristics impact the rate of 
neighborhood change.  Factors that are associated with increasing the pace of neighborhood change 
include larger shares of multifamily housing, lower income households, higher rates of residential 
mobility, and poor initial housing construction quality (Grigsby, 1963; Metzger, 2000).  
Examining the impact of foreclosure rates on neighborhood change using a lagged model, Li & Morrow-
Jones (2010) found that higher foreclosure rates are associated with increases in the black population 
proportion, the female-headed household rate, median household income,49 and the unemployment 
rate.  These changes are indicative of increased resident turnover, signifying neighborhood change.  In 
particular, it appears that black residents and female-headed households either move in or 
disproportionately remain in neighborhoods that have experienced higher levels of foreclosures.  This 
study examined neighborhood change at the block group level, the smallest geography used by the 
U.S. Census.50  This is a lower level of aggregation than generally used in quantitative neighborhood 
research and is more likely to capture effects than research using more aggregated neighborhood 
units. 
Li & Morrow-Jones (2010) assert that these results point to the possibility of increased residential racial 
segregation and residential concentration of poverty as the result of foreclosures.  This evidence 
supports the research carried out by Lauria (1998) on foreclosures and neighborhood racial transition 
in New Orleans, Louisiana.  He used a political economic theory of neighborhood change to link larger 
economic changes (an economic recession and related sectoral shifts in the metropolitan economy) to 
changes in neighborhoods by means of a case study. He found that foreclosures occurred due to job 
loss, which then accelerated neighborhood change by means of racial transition when black 
homeowners purchased the foreclosed properties (Lauria, 1998). 
In a follow-up to Lauria (1998), Lauria & Baxter (1999) used a panel design to investigate the 
relationships between race, foreclosures, and neighborhood change at the Census block group level in 
New Orleans. They found that foreclosures increase the rate of neighborhood racial transition, 
particularly in neighborhoods with low incomes and with a pre-existing and increasing black population 
(Lauria & Baxter, 1999). 
Several researchers hypothesize that foreclosures and neighborhood change have a cyclical 
relationship; however, modeling this proves difficult.  Both Baxter & Lauria (2000) and Li (2006) have 
used statistical modeling techniques to investigate this, with the results indicating that there are 
significant relationships between foreclosures and neighborhood change in both directions.  Baxter & 
Luria (2000) used Structured Equation Modeling (SEM), a quantitative technique that allows for 
bidirectional relationships between endogenous variables.  This method allows the investigation of a 
cyclical effect between factors.  Again investigating New Orleans, they found that residential 
                                                          
49 Upon further investigation, the positive relationship between foreclosures and increased median incomes is 
limited to a subset of neighborhoods that experienced significant redevelopment during the time period of the 
study.  After excluding these neighborhoods, the relationship between foreclosures and median income is 
negative. 
50 Census Block Group populations range from approximately 600 to 3,000 people; the Census lists 1,500 people 
as the optimal size. 
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foreclosures increased the process of racial transition in neighborhoods, and that as abandonment and 
racial transition increased (due to increased unemployment), foreclosures increased.  They observed 
that foreclosures had the greatest impact on neighborhood change, in the sense of racial succession, 
in neighborhoods that had previously growing, but limited, black populations (Baxter & Lauria, 2000). 
Li (2006) circumvented the issue of a bidirectional relationship between foreclosures and 
neighborhood change by temporally isolating the two relationships using Iterated Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (ITSUR).  She found that neighborhood characteristics affect foreclosures, specifically 
educational attainment levels, median household income, and the average proportion of income spent 
on housing costs.  Her study examined both Cuyahoga County and Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio, 
and found that racial composition and rates of change have an effect on foreclosures in Cuyahoga but 
not Franklin County.  Examining the relationships from the opposite direction, foreclosures were seen 
to affect later neighborhood education levels, female-headed household rate, and the poverty rate.  
She cautioned that though the use of panel data allowed the two directions of the relationship to be 
isolated, there are factors not accounted for by the model, such as changes in policy and potential 
missing variables that could confound the relationships (Li, 2006). 
Foreclosures, Crime, and Neighborhood Change 
Wilson & Paulsen (2010) present a theory connecting concentrated foreclosures to neighborhood 
decline, with blight and crime being the primary path mechanisms.  They conceptualize property 
deterioration as a two-stage process:  the first stage occurs before foreclosure, when the property 
owner encounters financial difficulties and stops maintaining the property.  The second stage occurs 
after foreclosure, when the property is vacant.  Their theory begins with blight, which encourages 
crime, which creates more blight in a mutually reinforcing cycle, which then cause additional problems 
to the neighborhood (Wilson & Paulsen, 2010).   
In the first stage, prior to foreclosure and repossession, properties may deteriorate in several ways.   
Owners are often unable or unwilling to continue maintenance and upgrading activities on the 
property, which can in some cases result in substantial structural damage (Hartman & Robinson, 2003).  
In many cases this lack of maintenance is externally visible, creating a negative externality for nearby 
properties.  In some cases owners facing foreclosure or eviction take valuable components of the 
house with them—for example sinks—or intentionally damage the property (Wilson & Paulsen, 2010).  
In the case of rental properties, landlords sometimes continue collecting rent while forgoing all 
necessary upkeep and repairs. 
The second stage occurs once the property is vacant.  The lack of maintenance and repairs continues, 
and deterioration increases and becomes more severe, especially when precautions such as turning 
off the water supply to the property are not taken (Kingsley et al., 2009).   In the case of concentrated 
foreclosures, the result is “neighborhoods plagued by empty, foreclosed houses send[ing] the signal 
that the neighborhood has been abandoned and that the properties are ripe for unrestrained and 
undetected criminal activity” (Wilson & Paulsen, 2010, p.19).   
Meanwhile, the neighborhood’s social fabric is weakened.  Residents’ perceived risk of crime 
victimization increases as vacancies increase and the neighborhood’s appearance deteriorates.  This 
perception leads to a desire to escape and some residents moving out.  As residents leave the 
neighborhood, the number of vacant structres increases and the distance between residents grows, 
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resulting in fewer social interactions.  This cycle becomes entrenched and self-reinforcing (Rountree & 
Land, 1996). 
Wilson & Paulson present this theory of foreclosure, crime, and neighborhood change as an 
accelerated version of the neighborhood lifecycle model of neighborhood change:   
Mass and clustered foreclosure can alter [the neighborhood lifecycle] model in the sense that 
stages are advanced through quickly because the households in the neighborhoodhave little 
or no population in them and therefore no guardian to protect and invest in them; if the initial 
construction quality of these houses is poor or average, it could be accelerated even more. In 
either case, once a neighborhood has reached the downgrading stage, crime begins to move 
in and acts as a reinforcing factor, both hastening and deepening neighborhood decline 
(Wilson & Paulsen, 2010, p.26). 
Though the authors analogize their model to the neighborhood lifecycle model, an ecological theory 
of neighborhood change, they point to the important role of outside factors in neighborhood change 
dynamics as is the case in political economy models.  For example, in this discussion both the larger 
foreclosure and economic crises and the impact of these crises on municipal service delivery are larger 
forces that play out on the neighborhood level. 
2.4 Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation Responses  
Given the significant, and often severe, impacts of foreclosures on individuals, neighborhoods, and 
localities, many responses have been launched to counteract them.  These responses have occurred 
at many levels—federal, state, regional, county, municipal, and neighborhood—and initiatives from 
various levels often influence and interact with one another.  These relationships are sometimes 
positive, for example federal funding of local initiatives, and sometimes negative, for example when 
federal or state governments nullify lower level legislative changes. 
These responses can be categorized into two categories:  pre- and post-foreclosure responses, which 
focus on prevention and mitigation, respectively.  The responses take many forms:  from programs and 
legislative changes to neighborhood clean-ups organized on the block level.  I use the term responses 
to capture both programs and policy changes. 
This section will first discuss federal level efforts, which include both prevention and mitigation efforts.  
Second, state level responses will be introduced.  These responses are primarily regulatory and 
legislative responses.  Third, local level responses are discussed, which are again divided into 
foreclosure prevention efforts and foreclosure mitigation efforts. 
2.4.1 Federal Responses 
The U.S. government’s response to the foreclosure crisis has been characterized by a wide variety of 
responses.  There have been a particularly large number of foreclosure prevention programs, though 
they have seen very limited success.   These programs will be introduced, discussed, and criticized 
below.   
With respect to foreclosure mitigation efforts, the federal government has had a more focused and 
successful response, which is comprised of a funding effort that channels money to states and 
municipalities, an REO acquisition program, and increased tenant protections.  However, these efforts 
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have been criticized as unwieldy and insufficient to address the problems at hand.  They will be 
introduced, discussed, and critiqued below.   
Third, the federal regulatory response has been characterized by many legal and policy change 
recommendations, and one major legislative act.  However, for the most part these changes were 
either not instituted, or instituted in a weakened form.   As well, for the most part these changes will 
affect future occurrences and do not affect the current crisis (an overview of these recommendations 
and changes was given in Section 1.1.4). In some instances the federal government also stepped in by 
nullifying state legislation aimed at countering or responding to the foreclosure crisis.  These changes 
and preemptions will be discussed in Section 2.4.2.   
Finally, the federal response is considered as a whole and critiqued. 
Federal Foreclosure Prevention Programs 
Various branches, agencies, and departments of the U.S. federal government have rolled out a variety 
of foreclosure prevention programs, beginning in October 2007.  The programs have attempted to 
avert foreclosures by refinancing or modifying mortgage loans.  These programs have been 
characterized by voluntary participation by servicers, sometimes with financial incentives; some refer 
to this approach as “all carrot, no stick.”  Homeowner eligibility has varied by program.  The various 
programs are very briefly introduced in this section; for more thorough descriptions and criticisms, 
please consult Immergluck, 2013; Fields, Libman, & Saegert, 2010, pp.669-672; Gerardi & Li, 2010; 
(Immergluck et al., 2011; McCoy, 2010; or U.S Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2010.  
Some programs, particularly those that are updates or modifications of previous programs, are omitted 
here.  As well, many aspects of the programs are left out in order to keep this summary brief. 
The federal government’s first foreclosure prevention program was FHASecure, which launched in 
September 2007.  Borrowers with on-time payment histories prior to an interest rate reset of an ARM 
loan were eligible to refinance into a fixed-rate loan, provided that the reset occurred during the 
foreclosure crisis time period (Fields et al., 2010).  These eligibility criteria, coupled with a lack of 
servicer interest due to the write-down requirement,51 resulted in limited success (McCoy, 2010).  By 
November 2008, only 4,212 refinances had been made (of a targeted 80,000); the program was 
discontinued in December 2008 (Gerardi & Li, 2010). 
The Hope Now Alliance, formed in 2007, is a collaborative effort of mortgage companies, counseling 
agencies, and investors, with the U.S. federal government playing a supportive role (Mallach, 2009).  
In many ways the Hope Now effort was a public information campaign, with mailers and 
advertisements encouraging homeowners to call a toll-free number to receive credit counseling (Fields 
et al., 2010; Immergluck et al., 2011).  The campaign also included efforts to get borrowers into a 
repayment plan, a “streamlined” voluntary loan modification (Immergluck, 2013), and the “Teaser 
Freezer” plan, which encouraged servicers to freeze the introductory rate for five years, applicable to 
a small subset of subprime mortgagors (Gerardi & Li, 2010). Though nearly 4.4 million loan workouts 
occurred in just under a two year period, two-thirds during the first year consisted of repayment plans, 
                                                          
51 A write-down is an industry term for the negative revaluation of assets.  For example, under the FHASecure 
plan, servicers were required to write-down the value of a refinanced loan by 3% or 10%, depending on the 
specific borrower.  Servicers must report write-downs as losses, and are thus wary to make them, regardless of 
the current market value of an asset. 
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which resulted in increased, rather than decreased, debt obligations for homeowners. During the 
second year about half the workouts were loan modifications, however, these modifications also rarely 
reduced the monthly payment or the principal of the loan (U.S. Department of Housing & Urban 
Development, 2010). 
As a part of the Hope Now Alliance effort, Congress approved funding for NeighborWorks America, a 
nonprofit organization, for foreclosure prevention counseling.  NeighborWorks America then passed 
funding along to states, who funded local agencies to carry out the counseling (Mallach, 2009).  This 
effort was referred to as the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program (NFMC).  Through 
2011, the program had been granted $500 million in funds (Immergluck, 2013).  Funds continue to be 
disbursed, with seventh round funding for $70.1 million announced in April 2013.  
The HOPE for Homeowners (H4H) was launched with the passing of the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, which allocated it $300 billion.  H4H was intended to help 400,000 
homeowners by refinancing them into 30- or 40-year fixed rate FHA loans (Fields et al., 2010; Gerardi 
& Li, 2010; Mallach, 2009).  However, its complexity, stringent eligibility requirements, write-down 
requirements for servicers, and the program’s inability to deal with the claims of junior lien holders52 
caused it to be an abject failure (U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2010; Gerardi & 
Li, 2010; Immergluck, 2013; Immergluck et al., 2011; McCoy, 2010).  Seven months into the program it 
had received only 752 applications and had resulted in one mortgage modification (Fields et al., 2010). 
The FDIC53 Loan Modification Program, or “Mod in a Box,” began in August 2008.  This program 
modified loans of borrowers at least sixty days delinquent to a 38% debt-to-income (DTI) ratio by 
following a set series of steps including arrears capitalization, interest rate reduction, term extension, 
and finally principal reduction. Each subsequent step was only invoked if the DTI remained above 38%.  
Servicers received $1000 for each loan modification.  While this program was relatively effective, it 
had narrow terms of eligibility and thus had a limited impact (Gerardi & Li, 2010; McCoy, 2010).  The 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) initiated a similar program in 2008, the Homeownership 
Preservation Policy, which had larger coverage but did not apply to private loans, which most subprime 
loans are (Gerardi & Li, 2010; McCoy, 2010).  Both programs were criticized for applying only to 
seriously delinquent mortgages and ignoring underwater loans (McCoy, 2010).  
TARP, the Troubled Assets Relief Program, was authorized in October 2008.  It included provisions that 
would allow funds to be allocated to assist troubled homeowners, i.e. through foreclosure prevention 
counseling, but the funds were not used to do so by the Bush administration.  Though the Obama 
administration did use some of the second disbursement for foreclosure prevention counseling, much 
of this had not be spent by mid-2012 (Immergluck, 2013).   
Announced in February 2009, the Obama administration’s Making Home Affordable (MHA) program 
includes several foreclosure prevention components.  The Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) 
sought to offer refinancing to four to five million homeowners, while the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) was intended to offer modifications to three to four million 
                                                          
52 Junior lien holders hold second or third mortgages (junior mortgages) on a property.  In order for a loan to be 
refinanced or modified, junior lien holders must agree as well.  Many nontraditional mortgages originated leading 
up to the foreclosure crisis included second or third mortgages.  H4H was not designed to be able to handle these 
mortgages (Immergluck, Alexander, Balthrop, Schaeffing, & Clark, 2011). 
53 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
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homeowners (Immergluck, 2010b; Immergluck, 2013).  HARP increased the loan-to-value ceiling for 
GSE refinancing, allowing underwater homeowners to refinance into low interest rates, a problem not 
well addressed by previous federal foreclosure prevention efforts (U.S. Department of Housing & 
Urban Development, 2010; Immergluck, 2013).  As of May 2012, 1.3 million HARP refinances had 
occurred, much less than the targeted number, though the program will run through 2015 (Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, 2012).   
HAMP encouraged mortgage modifications by offering servicers incentives to modify a loan to a 
maximum of a 31% DTI.  Borrowers who were current on their mortgage were eligible for a trial 
modification lasting three to six months; after a successful trial modification they would receive a 
permanent modification with a reduced interest rate for five years.  Additionally or alternatively, 
borrowers could receive a term extension or a principal reduction, though interest rate reductions 
were most common (U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2010; Gerardi & Li, 2010).  
This program provided a protocol for loan modifications, with the intention of speeding up the process 
(Immergluck et al., 2011).  Though the program included “mandatory” modification triggers, in practice 
servicers had many possible avenues to avoid these (Immergluck, 2013).  As well, reports of servicer 
noncompliance were routinely ignored (Barofsky, 2012).  Despite these issues, a study released in 2012 
found that HAMP modifications redefaulted significantly less than non-HAMP modifications.  By 
quarter, HAMP 12-month redefault rates ranged from approximately 17% to 20%, while non-HAMP 
12-month redefault rates ranged from approximately 31% to 36%.  A major reason for these 
differences is that HAMP modifications decrease monthly mortgage payments by $300 more per 
month, on average, than non-HAMP modifications (Walsh, 2012). 
Additional programs were later added to MHA in encourage other loan workout solutions:  the second 
lien modification program (2MP), to modify junior loans; Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives 
(HAFA), to encourage short sales and deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure; the Home Affordable 
Unemployment Program (UP), to address unemployment as a foreclosure trigger through forbearance; 
and the Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA), to encourage principal reduction on modifications 
(Immergluck, 2013). 
It was hoped that HAMP would result in three to four million permanent mortgage modifications.  
However, only 59% of trial modifications became permanent modifications, and many HAMP-eligible 
loans did not receive modifications in the first place (Agarwal et al., 2012).  As of April 2013, 
approximately 1.19 million permanent modifications had been achieved (of slightly over two million 
trial modifications), well short of the stated goal (Fannie Mae, 2013).  However, this is unsurprising 
when one considers the program’s structure, which put the modification decision in the hands of 
servicers.  Servicers, who do not own the loan, earn money by administering the loan—from collecting 
payments and late fees, as well as from foreclosing.  Thus, servicers could maximize profit by collecting 
payments from borrowers during a trial modification, then denying a permanent modification, after 
which they could collect late fees and past-due payments that accrued during the trial period; and 
finally by foreclosing on the property (Barofsky, 2012). 
The Hardest Hit Fund (HHF) is a series of funding rounds available to states most deeply affected by 
the foreclosure and economic crises.  The first round (HHF1) of $1.5 billion was awarded in February 
of 2010.  It went to the five states with housing price index drops of over 20%:  Arizona, California, 
Florida, Michigan, and Nevada.  The second round (HHF2), awarded an additional $600 million in March 
of 2010, focused on aiding states impacted most by unemployment:  all of the HH1 states plus North 
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Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Carolina (Immergluck, 2010b).  The third round (HHF3) 
also focused on assisting states with high unemployment, amounted to $2 billion.  It went to states 
with unemployment rates above the national average (17 states and the District of Columbia, including 
all previous awardees other than Arizona) and was designed to assist unemployed homeowners make 
their mortgage payments (Immergluck, 2013).  The fourth round (HHF4) consisted of $3.5 billion in 
funding to all states which received funding in any of the previous rounds. HHF4 allowed more flexible 
funding, including any programs funded in HHF1 or HHF2 (Immergluck, 2010b). 
HHF money was first disbursed to state Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs), who then could further 
distribute the funds.  HFAs were chosen due to their experience with designing and implementing 
home financing programs.  Additionally, HFAs are well-connected with lenders, CDCs (Community 
Development Corporations), and counseling organizations (Immergluck, 2010b). 
The HHF guidelines allowed six possible types of programs to be funded:  (1) mortgage modifications, 
(2) mortgage modifications with principal forbearance, (3) short sales or deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, 
(4) principal reduction programs for borrowers with severe negative equity, (5) unemployment 
programs, and (6) second lien reductions (Immergluck, 2010b, p.5)54  The guidelines were designed to 
allow for flexibility, giving states the ability to tailor programs “in a manner that is consistent with local 
economic conditions, the local drivers of foreclosure problems, and the likely feasibility and efficacy of 
various interventions in a state’s local economies and communities” (Immergluckb, 2010, p.4).  The 
funds could also be geographically focused (Immergluck, 2010b). 
This CDBG55-like funding approach and the level of discretion given to the Treasury Department, which 
administered the program, were intended to stimulate innovative localized solutions.  However, in 
practice this flexibility was mostly absent:  proposals to fund legal assistance to borrowers were 
rejected, and the Treasury Department made little effort to push servicers to participate in principal 
reduction programs (Immergluck, 2013). 
A particularly important regulatory change that would greatly aid foreclosure prevention efforts is 
allowing bankruptcy courts to modify the mortgage terms of creditors.  These changes, which could 
include reducing the principal, changing the interest rate, and adjusting the term length, are referred 
to as mortgage cramdowns.  Cramdown legislation would push servicers to modify loans to the current 
market value of the property on their own accord; otherwise this was likely to occur outside of their 
control in bankruptcy proceedings (Immergluck et al., 2011).  The expected effect is that many more 
homeowners would be able to remain in their homes and continue making mortgage payments (U.S. 
Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2010).  Senator Durbin proposed cramdown legislation 
in October 2007, but the financial industry blocked it through lobbying efforts (Immergluck, 2013).  
With the introduction of HAMP, cramdown legislation was reintroduced, which would provide a ‘stick’ 
to complement the ‘carrots’ ensconced in the HAMP incentive payments.  However, the legislation 
was again blocked.   
                                                          
54 In June 2013, the Treasury Department announced that states could also use a portion of their HHF for blight 
clearance. 
55 Community Development Block Grant.  The CDBG Program is a major federal community development 
program. 
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Federal Foreclosure Mitigation Efforts 
The federal government has also created one program, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), 
to aid local governments and organizations in combating the negative neighborhood effects of 
foreclosures.  A second program was developed to aid in the implementation of NSP, referred to as 
the National First Look program.  Finally, the federal government made one foray into the foreclosure 
process itself with tenant protections that may partially alleviate vacancy problems.  A brief 
introduction to these programs is given here; some examples of specific implementations are 
discussed later in Section 2.4.3, Local-level Responses. 
HERA included $3.92 million in funding for NSP, which allocated funds to states to address the 
neighborhood impacts of the foreclosure crisis (Immergluck, 2013).    States then could use some funds 
directly themselves, or distribute the funds to counties, local governments, and nonprofits.  Other 
funds went directly to municipalities (Immergluck, 2009b).  In 2009 an additional round of $2 billion in 
NSP (NSP2) funding was included in the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA). In 
September 2010 another $1 billion in funding was allocated for NSP (NSP3) (Joice, 2011).  NSP was 
particularly important, as it was the first serious commitment by the federal government “explicitly for 
property acquisition and demolition and for the creation and operation of land banks” (Mallach, 2008, 
p.6).   
The three NSP rounds allow the use of funds for the following purposes:  (1) financing mechanisms, 
such as downpayment assistance of shared-equity loans; (2) acquisition and rehabilitation of 
abandoned or foreclosed homes; (3) land banking; (4) demolition of blighted structures; and (5) 
redevelopment of demolished or vacant properties (Joice, 2011, p.138).  The program used Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) rules and jurisdictions for administering the program, which made 
the implementation of NSP much easier than had a new set of rules and jurisdictions been created 
(Joice, 2011). 
NSP1 and NSP3 funds were allocated using a need-based formula accounting for foreclosure impacts.  
This approach is problematic, as it granted funds to grantees lacking the necessary governmental and 
CDC infrastructure to carry out the program effectively (Immergluck, 2013; Joice, 2011; Mallach, 2008; 
Mallach, 2009).  In contrast, NSP2 funds were awarded on a competitive basis, in which “an applicant 
had to understand its particular problems, describe an appropriate stabilization strategy, and 
demonstrate the capacity to carry out that strategy” (Joice, 2011, p.139).  NSP2 and NSP3 also required 
grantees to target their awards in the most highly impacted Census tracts—a practice which Joice 
(2011) likens to using a defillabrator rather than spreading funds everywhere like peanut butter.  These 
two aspects increase the likely effectiveness of the program. 
The program included some other components that made it unwieldy to administer.  Though in 
comparison to federal foreclosure prevention efforts NSP is much more flexible and adaptable to local 
conditions, the requirements often proved unwieldy, such as restricting redevelopment to housing 
(NSP2), when many communities need to add commercial amenities to increase the desirability and 
sustainability of their neighborhoods (Immergluck, 2009b).  Another example is the program rules 
requirement that former tenants of vacant properties be contacted (Mayer & Temkin, 2009).  
Additionally, departing from successful vacant property initiatives, the federal government required 
any profit from property resale be returned, rather than allowing cross-subsidizing through the use of 
profits to continue neighborhood stabilization efforts (Immergluck, 2009b).  The program was also 
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hastily designed and administered, resulting both in problems with its design and in recipients being 
unable to commit their funds before the deadline or having to change stabilization strategies in order 
to commit funds on time (Immergluck, 2013).  Despite these limitations, Ergungor & Nelson (2012) 
found that in the case of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, REO vacancy rates in census tracts that received 
NSP1 funding were lower than those that did not, but only in the case of purchases by individuals.  
Vacancy rates for REO properties purchased by investors and non-profits were not affected by the 
presence of NSP1 dollars.  For NSP2 money, no significant differences in REO vacancy rates were found, 
but the authors caution that the measurements may have been made too early to capture the impact 
of NSP2 funding. 
In 2010, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the National Community 
Stabilization Trust (NCST), a national nonprofit, sponsored the National First Look program, which is 
designed to assist NSP recipients in REO acquisition.  The program gives housing nonprofits and CDCs 
24 to 48 hours to express interest in an REO property in an NSP area if it is being put up for sale by a 
GSE, the FHA, or certain other large banks before it is for sale to the general public.  If interest is 
expressed, there is a twelve to fifteen day period during which NSP-required evaluations and 
estimations can occur, by the end of which the interested organization may purchase the property. If 
not, the property is released for sale on the real estate market (Immergluck, 2013).  This program 
combats the problem of investors quickly purchasing properties before local organizations, helping to 
further NSP plans and community stabilization efforts. 
Finally, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 included protections for tenants residing in 
foreclosed properties, namely guaranteeing 90 days post-foreclosure notice before eviction can occur.  
This law marked the federal government’s first direct intervention in the foreclosure process 
(Immergluck et al., 2011).  This protection both protects vulnerable parties who were not involved with 
the mortgage transaction at all and reduces the problem of foreclosure-induced vacancies, at least 
temporarily. 
Critique of the Federal Response 
The federal response to the foreclosure crisis is considered inadequate by many. Refinance and 
modification programs reached far too few homeowners and the redefault rate has been high.  
Funding programs have been far too small to address the need for both foreclosure prevention and 
foreclosure mitigation in communities.  Regulatory change has been limited and repeatedly watered 
down. 
With respect to foreclosure prevention, “Federal foreclosure prevention programs have generally 
exhibited a pattern of repeated inefficacy” (Fields et al., 2010, p.668). The federal government 
continually rolled out new programs, with different conditions, eligibility criteria, and servicer 
requirements and incentives.  Immergluck (2013) described them as “often tentative, incremental and 
marginal . . . [that] often did not accumulate to a sizeable response” (p.33).  They have been reactive, 
addressing a particular issue after it has occurred, never proactive or forward-looking (Fields et al., 
2010).  Servicers, who are not inclined to write down asset values, have shied from voluntary 
modification programs requiring principal reduction (McCoy, 2010).  As of January 2010, the State 
Foreclosure Prevention Working Group assessed that only 4 out of every 10 delinquent loans had 
entered loss mitigation and that modifications resulted in payment reductions but rarely principal 
reductions.  In fact, over 70% of modifications resulted in principal increases (State Foreclosure 
69 
 
Prevention Working Group, 2010) —despite the fact that principal reductions reduce the likelihood of 
redefault significantly (Haughwout, Okah, & Tracy, 2009; Quercia & Ding, 2009).  As well, many 
modified loans redefault:  Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2009) determined that 50% of modified loans 
redefault, and in the case of subprime loans the rate is nearly 70%. 
Agarwal et al. (2012) point to servicer factors as a major reason for low modification rates.  They found 
that a few large servicers modified at half the rate of other servicers, substantially reducing the reach 
of the HAMP program.  Examining servicer-specific factors, they determined that a low number of full-
time servicing staff, a low number of training hours, and less efficient phone handling (dropped calls 
and waiting time) are correlated with low servicer modification rates.  Though servicers were obviously 
and understandably underequipped to deal with the crisis’ sudden rash of foreclosures, over time they 
had the possibility to expand their workout departments, as many did.  Others did not, indicating a 
disinterest in foreclosure alternatives.  Federal cramdown legislation would have made a considerable 
difference in this context. 
Federal foreclosure mitigation efforts have delivered much needed funds to states and localities facing 
severe foreclosure-related problems.  They have allowed states and localities to tailor programs to 
local needs.  This increased flexibility has resulted in more effective programming than larger, national 
level programs such as HAMP have been able to achieve (Immergluck, 2010b). 
However, the funds have fallen far short of the need.  Mallach (2009) remarks that the original NSP 
funding—a crisis response—was approximately equivalent to an average federal CDBG appropriation 
in recent years (making the total NSP appropriation equivalent to less than two years’ CDBG funding).  
It also pales in comparison to the financial sector bailouts (Fields et al., 2010; Mallach, 2009).  
Examining the level of NSP funding for eleven cities, Goldstein (2010) found that the NSP1 awards were 
sufficient to acquire no more than 3.6% of a city’s vacant residential properties.  For example, Detroit 
had over 78,000 vacant properties at the time and its NSP1 award was sufficient to acquire fewer than 
2,600 properties.  Philadelphia estimated it had approximately 22,000 properties vacant for more than 
one year; its NSP1 funds were sufficient to acquire fewer than 200 and its NSP2 funds were large 
enough to address less than 1,000 more (Goldstein, 2010). 
Additionally, these funding efforts have occurred as “single shot” attempts at addressing the problem.  
Though many programs had multiple rounds, it was clear that none were developed in a 
comprehensive fashion; rather additional funding was disbursed haphazardly as it became available, 
reducing the ability of local actors to strategically plan their responses (Immergluck, 2009b; 
Immergluck, 2013; Mallach, 2009).  
Federal regulatory responses, introduced in Section 1.1.4, have also fallen far short of what’s needed 
to address the effects of this crisis on homeowners, neighborhoods, and communities, and to prevent 
a similar occurrence in the future.   
McCoy (2010) divides federal foreclosure prevention efforts into three possible categories, in 
increasing degree of intervention.  The first is to intervene by coordinating private industry, such as 
the Hope Now Alliance.  This approach was seen to be unsuccessful.  The second approach is to offer 
incentives to servicers—“carrots”—to modify or refinance mortgages, as exemplified by HAMP.  This 
approach has seen more success, but is hampered by servicer resistance to write downs.  Finally, the 
government can increase the cost of pursuing foreclosures—“sticks.”  This would entail regulatory 
change, such as bankruptcy cramdown legislation or mandatory modifications.  However, “the hard 
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steps that would help homeowners, such as enforced loan modifications and write down of the 
mortgage value to reflect current conditions, have not occurred.” (Fields et al., 2010, p.688).  In fact, 
the federal approach to servicers has been “little carrots and no stick”—with incentives too small to 
attract significant participation and no penalties for non-participation (Immergluck, 2013, p.215).  
Furthermore, federal policies refused to recognize that the servicing industry is set up to facilitate 
foreclosure, not modifications; it is a volume- and speed-based industry, into which the detailed 
process of working out mortgage modifications does not easily fit.  Ignoring the structure of the 
industry resulted in solutions that could not accomplish the desired results (Immergluck, 2013). 
Why has the federal response been generally inadequate?  If one looks at the federal response as an 
effort to aid homeowners and reduce negative impacts on communities, the response has been mostly 
a failure.  However, if one examines the response as an effort to aid lenders and servicers deal with 
the onslaught of foreclosures, it has been much more successful.  Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the 
Treasury at the time, famously said “We estimate [the banks] can handle ten million foreclosures, over 
time.  This program will help foam the runway for them,” revealing that, in his mind, the purpose of 
HAMP was to aid banks and financial institutions, not borrowers (Barofsky, 2012, p.156).  This is also 
evidenced by reports that states were told by Treasury to obtain servicer “buy in” before requesting 
HHF funds for a particular program from Treasury (Immergluck, 2010b).  Servicer lobbying and 
arguments invoking increased “ruthless” default (default by choice) and moral hazard (tacitly 
encouraging borrowers to take risky loans), paired with public resistance to aiding “undeserving” 
homeowners who had intentionally or knowingly taken bad loans, facilitated this approach (Fields et 
al., 2010; HUD, 2010; Immergluck, 2013). 
Thus, the onus of prevention and mitigating foreclosures fell to states, and moreover, local 
governments and organizations.  These lower levels of government have reduced leverage and 
resources, but do have better knowledge of on-the-ground conditions and local networks and 
experience to draw on.  The next two subsections introduce efforts introduced by state and local 
actors. 
2.4.2 State-level Responses 
In addition to the federal government, many states have made efforts to address both the causes and 
the effects of the foreclosure problem. Rather than attempting to exhaustively cover the efforts of all 
fifty states, a general introduction to state efforts is given here.  The two main types of state-level 
efforts have been anti-predatory lending laws and mediation programs, both of which are discussed 
below.  Additionally, in some cases states have passed laws instituting minor changes to foreclosure 
law and have initiated and won lawsuits against particular servicers.  As well, the State Foreclosure 
Prevention Working Group made efforts to counteract foreclosures and to improve data on 
foreclosures and modifications (Renuart, Williamson, & Benson, 2009). 
Many states have anti-predatory lending laws that far predate the decline in lending stringency that 
led up to the foreclosure crisis.  Beginning in 1999, many states began adopting mini-HOEPA laws, 
which were patterned after the federal Homeownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), 
but with more stringent restrictions on APR, loan points, and fees. As of January 2007, only six states 
lacked mini-HOEPA laws aimed at regulating the subprime market (Bostic, Engel, McCoy, Pennington-
Cross, & Wachter, 2008).  Bostic et al. (2008) found that mini-HOEPA laws reduced both subprime loan 
applications and originations. 
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However, in many cases the federal government preempted56 state anti-predatory lending laws.  In 
particular, the OTS preempted the anti-predatory lending laws of Georgia and New York in 2003.  The 
OCC did the same for Georgia’s law later in that year, warning it would likewise preempt any similar 
state laws that passed.  Meanwhile the federal government made no efforts to pass strengthened 
lending legislation until 2007, in which case the bill was quite weak (Immergluck, 2009b).  These actions 
sent strong signals to lenders while discouraging states from taking regulatory steps to prevent 
foreclosure problems. 
In contrast to state efforts to reduce predatory lending, states were able to successfully initiate 
foreclosure mediation programs (Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2010). Though the first mediation program 
began in 2008, as of 2013 25 states and the District of Columbia (as well as many counties and 
municipalities) had programs (National Consumer Law Center, n.d.[a]). Foreclosure mediation is a 
process in which a neutral mediatory works with both the borrower and servicer in an attempt to arrive 
at a mutually agreeable alternative to foreclosure.  Foreclosure mediation generally occurs at the 
behest of the borrower, at which point the servicer is required to participate before the foreclosure 
suit is allowed to proceed (Hagerott, 2010).  Additional information on the workings of foreclosure 
mediation and information on its efficacy will be provided in Section 2.4.3. 
Though some evidence indicates the arriving at a mutually agreeable solution ought to be frequently 
possible,57 in practice servicers often avoid mediation and/or the workouts they entail.  This is due to 
a variety of reasons, including institutional culture and capacity and incentive structures that 
encourage servicers to assess fees and foreclose.  Despite this, states have generally not fully exercised 
their police power to compel servicers to fully participate in mediation.  In order to have a chance at 
successful foreclosure mediation, states must require that servicers engage in negotiations in good 
faith; bring the necessary documents, such as the note showing ownership of the mortgage; engage in 
net present value (NPV) calculations to determine if a modification is mutually financially 
advantageous; grant modifications when they meet HAMP requirements; and that representatives 
engaging in mediation have the ability to modify the loan (Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2010; Walsh, 2012).  
More recently some states, such as Nevada, have strengthened their foreclosure mediation programs 
(Walsh, 2012). 
Some states, in particular Michigan and Ohio, have pushed for more funding for blight removal 
(demolitions), in particular to use a portion of the HHF for this purpose.  The objective was to 
strategically demolish abandoned structures in “tipping point” neighborhoods—that is, where a small 
number of blighted properties are exerting negative pressure on surrounding well-maintained 
properties.  However, the Treasury did not approve any diversion of these funds until recently—in June 
2013 the Treasury Department approved a waiver for Michigan; later it announced that states in 
general could use a portion of the HHF for blight removal (Koff, 2013b; Rokakis, 2013).  In August 2013, 
Ohio received permission to use up to $60 million of its HHF for demolition (Koff, 2013a).  This, 
combined with the Ohio Attorney General’s 2012 announcement of a $75 million fund for blight 
                                                          
56 Preemption is the overriding of a lower level jurisdiction’s law by a higher level jurisdiction, in this case state 
law by federal law.  Federal preemption is explicitly provided for in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution; 
in general state constitutions give them preemption powers over their lower level governments as well. 
57 For example, in November 2008 servicers were losing an average of $124,000, or 57% of their investment, on 
each completed foreclosure (White, 2009).   
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removal that was funded by the proceeds of the “robo-signing”settlement (Ohio Attorney General, 
2010), brought the total to $135 million. 
Another example of a state-level response is Ohio’s House Resolution 294.  The state law allows for an 
accelerated foreclosure process for properties that are both tax-delinquent and abandoned.  The law 
is designed to reduce the length of time that vacant properties sit abandoned, and thus their negative 
effects on neighborhoods and communities as well (Swanstrom et al., 2009).   
2.4.3 Local-level Responses 
In general, the federal and state efforts discussed above facilitate and set the parameters for local 
action, rather than directly combating the foreclosure problem themselves.  Local governments and 
nonprofits then determine the specific implementation of the programs in their areas.  For example, 
NSP, HHF, and counseling programs use federal pass-through funds, but are designed and 
implemented on the local level.  This is necessary as the foreclosure problem and its impacts play out 
differently in different localities, and thus must be tailored to the local context.  This often entails 
leveraging additional funds, collaborating with other organizations, and prioritizing target areas, 
among other strategies.   
This section begins with a discussion of how local context and resources shape local foreclosure 
responses and their chances of success.  This is followed by an introduction of various strategies 
recommended to communities by experts to fight the negative impacts of the foreclosure crisis.  Next, 
types of local foreclosure responses are introduced and discussed.  These responses include 
collaboration, organizing and advocacy, foreclosure prevention counseling and foreclosure mediation, 
property acquisition strategies, landbanking, targeting, and legal responses.  It should be kept in mind 
that this section aims to give an overview of local foreclosure responses.  Though illustrative examples 
will be used in some cases, this section does not attempt to catalogue an exhaustive list of local 
foreclosure responses. 
Local Context & Resources 
The ability of local governments and organizations to respond to the foreclosure crisis is greatly 
dependent on the local context and local resources.  These affect both what can be done as well as 
what should be done—i.e. which responses are most likely to be effective in a particular locality.  This 
section briefly introduces several factors that (should) influence a locality’s foreclosure response and 
its potential efficacy:  the strength of the region’s housing market, the type of foreclosure process 
(judicial v. non-judicial), the structure and resources of local government, and local housing nonprofit 
experience and infrastructure. 
The importance of the housing market type has already been discussed in reference to the varying 
impacts of the foreclosure crisis (see Section 2.2.3).  Prior to the foreclosure crisis, weak market regions 
had stagnant or mildly increasing house prices.  As well, regions with weak housing markets tended to 
have elevated REO and vacancy levels, which were then only exacerbated when the crisis struck.  In 
contrast, strong housing market regions saw large price increases and high housing demand prior to 
the crisis, coupled with low REO and vacancy levels.  It should be noted that strong and weak housing 
markets can exist in close proximity to one another; for example Cleveland’s outer suburbs have 
enjoyed strong demand, while the city and many inner suburbs are characterized by weak market 
conditions (Swanstrom et al., 2009).   
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Swanstrom et al. (2009) point out the impact of housing market type on potential foreclosure 
interventions.  They argue that preventing foreclosures in weak market areas is easier, relative to 
strong market cities.  This is because the housing bubble inflated to a much lesser degree in weak 
market areas.  Thus, when the bubble popped, prices dropped less in weak market areas, resulting in 
fewer underwater mortgages and lower mortgage debt levels.  In contrast, they argue that 
neighborhood stabilization is easier in strong market areas, because demand remains comparably high, 
reducing the potential REO and vacancy problems in these areas.  Weak market areas are likely to see 
significant neighborhood blight as the result of their elevated REO and vacancy levels (Swanstrom et 
al., 2009).  However, weak and strong market cities are generally discussed on the regional level. 
The type of foreclosure process also affects the opportunities for foreclosure intervention.  Judicial 
foreclosure states tend to have longer periods between the initial foreclosure suit filing and the 
completion of the foreclosure than non-judicial, or statutory, foreclosure states.  A longer foreclosure 
process provides more time for possible interventions; however it also allows properties to sit vacant 
for longer periods of time between the original filing and the foreclosure sale, exacerbating vacancy 
problems (Swanstrom et al., 2009).  Cutts & Merrill (2008) remark that overly long foreclosure 
timelines can “tip the balance from the threat of imminent home loss  . . . towards the benefit of ‘free’ 
rent for the duration of the process” (p.5). 
The characteristics of local government play a role in foreclosure intervention as well.  In many areas 
of the U.S., local government is highly fragmented, with responsibilities and resources being split 
between a wide variety of counties, municipalities, unincorporated areas, districts, wards, agencies, 
precincts, and other governmental units.   This fragmentation compounds the difficulty of addressing 
the foreclosure problem, as many organizations need to agree on and coordinate priorities, strategies, 
and actions (Swanstrom et al., 2009).  A second important constraint on foreclosure responses relates 
to the local government’s fiscal base, and thus its ability to commit funds to prevention and mitigation 
programs (Swanstrom et al., 2009).  The economic crisis increased service needs and decreased tax 
revenue for local governments, reducing their financial capacity.  In the case of central cities, such as 
Cleveland, this simply added to long-term fiscal strain. 
Finally, local capacity is a major constraint on local foreclosure response.  For example, it was 
mentioned previously that a flaw in NSP1 funding was that localities with little to no housing and 
neighborhood development infrastructure received funds, but were unable to efficiently use them.  
Housing and neighborhood development nonprofits tend to be relatively agile organizations with a 
history of inter-organizational cooperation and leveraging funds, both of which are important 
components of foreclosure response efforts.  Some regions have also been benefitted by the presence 
of developed and vocal policy advocacy and applied research organizations, which have helped to 
quantify and publicize foreclosure problems.  In this respect, central cities have some advantage, as 
housing non-profits tend to be located in cities than suburbs. CDBG areas also have an advantage with 
respect to foreclosure mitigation, as these areas have a history of developing and implementing 
neighborhood stabilization efforts (Swanstrom et al., 2009).   
Local Foreclosure Response Strategies 
A number of researchers and advocates have identified strategies for local foreclosure responses 
(NeighborWorks America, 2007; Gass, 2008; Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010; Swanstrom et al., 2009).  
Some of these reports focus primarily on pre-foreclosure interventions and others on post-foreclosure 
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interventions.  However, the strategies suggested by these reports mostly apply to the entire 
foreclosure response effort.  Later, in Chapter Chapter 6, the extent to which Cuyahoga County utilized 
these strategies will be assessed. 
I have divided these leading local foreclosure intervention strategies into three large categories, 
problem definition and scoping; capturing and leveraging resources; and response-specific best 
practices.  Each is introduced below, followed by a table listing which of these best practices were 
employed in a variety of foreclosure response case studies undertaken by Gass (2008).    
Problem Definition & Scoping 
In order to appropriately respond to a specific foreclosure problem, it is first necessary to gain 
understanding of the problem and its impacts.  Only then it is possible to tailor a response to the 
problem in a given location.  Furthermore, the foreclosure problem should not be considered in a 
vacuum; rather the crisis should be taken as an opportunity to reassess housing policies and plan for 
the community’s future needs.  Thus, two strategies should be employed in this stage: 
 Assess the problem 
Swanstrom & Brooks (2010) identify the need to assess the problem, including the nature of the 
problem, who is most impacted, and what responses are most likely to be effective.  This includes 
considering aspects of the local context, as described previously (Section 2.2.2), and continual 
reassessment of the problem as it develops and changes over time. 
 
 Create a strategic vision 
Swanstrom & Brooks (2010) stress the importance of not viewing the foreclosure crisis as a temporary 
problem, but rather a shift in overall conditions.  Thus, the foreclosure crisis should be used as a chance 
to develop new housing and neighborhood strategies.   Gass (2008) stresses the effectiveness of 
coordinating interventions with neighborhood planning and residents. 
Capture & Leverage Resources 
A key issue in responding to the foreclosure crisis has been a general lack of resources.  Though there 
has been a variety of federal responses to the foreclosure crisis (see Section 2.4.1), it is generally 
agreed that the financial resources allocated have fallen far short of those needed.  In addition, 
municipalities and regions have lost revenue as a result of the foreclosure crisis and the economic 
recession.  A particular focus of these strategies is collaboration and resource-sharing.  These strategies 
also include human resource development. 
 Build leadership 
Swanstrom & Brooks (2010) focus on the need for effective leadership in undertaking foreclosure 
responses.  In particular, in order to facilitate collaborative efforts (see below), leaders who are seen 
as neutral and who garner respect are necessary to act as conveners.  Additionally, local foreclosure 
responses need charismatic leaders who can draw attention to the foreclosure problem and efforts to 
counteract it. 
 
 Capture attention of public and policy elites 
Drawing attention to the foreclosure problem, its effects, and efforts to counteract it is necessary to 
attract funding and support.  Local governments and organizations need to publicize their problems 
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and efforts through the media, applied research studies, and by lobbying state and federal politicians 
(NeighborWorks America, 2007; Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010; Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
 
 Redirect resources and mobilize new ones 
Given the limited federal response and the scope of the foreclosure problem, it is necessary to leverage 
additional resources to apply to foreclosure responses.  Swanstrom & Brooks (2010) recommend 
taking advantage of public pressure on banks, servicers, and mortgage companies by soliciting 
contributions.  In particular, local banks are more likely to contribute, as their mortgages are locally 
concentrated and thus the region and local communities play a larger role in their business.  They list 
private foundations and redirecting federal funds, such as CDBG money, are other possible funding 
sources. 
 
 Develop intra-local collaborations 
Collaboration among government departments can aid in effective foreclosure responses.  For 
example, Code Enforcement can be used as a strategic invention with vacant properties, and local 
courts can assist in steering borrowers and servicers into mediation.  Local governments can 
collaborate to fill in gaps in one another’s resource and skill bases, and avoid duplicating efforts.  
Working with servicers can facilitate smoother loan modifications.  Collaborating with community 
groups can enhance community stabilization efforts (NeighborWorks America, 2007; Gass, 2008; 
Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010). 
 
 Develop a regional data system 
Creating a regional data system to track foreclosures and related factors enables communities to track 
the problem and its effects, allowing strategies to be adjusted in real-time.  This is especially important 
because foreclosure hotspots have varied as the crisis continues (NeighborWorks America, 2007; 
Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010). In addition, a well-developed data system can be used to create maps 
and reports that aid in publicizing the issue (Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010). 
 
 Engage in continual staff and organizational development 
The foreclosure crisis has consistently changed throughout its course.  In addition to monitoring the 
problem, organizations need to engage in continual staff and organization development to keep up 
with the problem.  CDCs, which are generally relatively small organizations, tend to be able to quickly 
alter organizational routines and foci (NeighborWorks America, 2007; Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010; 
Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
 
 Target outreach 
Targeted outreach can aid in reaching target groups and in using resources efficiently.  Public 
awareness campaigns, such as placing ads on the side of busses in areas with large concentrations of 
foreclosure risk and radio ads can reach borrowers in trouble early in the foreclosure process, or even 
before it begins.  Avoiding the “peanutbutter” strategy, outreach such as doorknocking and 
concentrated demolition and rehabilitation can increase the chances of stabilization in targeted 
neighborhoods (NeighborWorks America, 2007; Gass, 2008). 
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Response-Specific Best Practices 
The final group is that of response-specific best practices.  These strategies have already shown their 
effectiveness and are advocated as best practices.  
 Offer rescue funds 
A report prepared for NeighborWorks America (2007) identifies the use of short-term loans and grants, 
referred to as “rescue funds,” as a best practice in foreclosure prevention.  These funding offers are 
often sufficient to get homeowners current on their mortgages, and attract borrowers in trouble to 
counseling services. 
 
 Offer borrower services extending beyond troubled loans 
Successful foreclosure prevention agencies offer services to borrowers beyond foreclosure counseling.  
Borrowers in trouble face general financial distress and high levels of uncertainty and stress.  Additional 
services, such as personal finance education, home maintenance education, transition assistance, and 
programs focusing on the needs of families in foreclosure, strengthen homeowners’ ability to manage 
their situations, whether it is retaining the home or transitioning to new housing (NeighborWorks 
America, 2007; Gass, 2008). 
 
 Invest in bulk acquisition of distressed and REO property 
When possible, community organizations should negotiate bulk acquisition of distressed and REO 
property that fit into the strategic vision and/or targeting plans.  This can save organizations both 
money and time, while larger tracts of land facilitate larger redevelopment projects (Gass, 2008). 
 
Table 2.2, below, is based on the fourteen case studies described in Gass (2008).58  This report is 
focused on post-foreclosure strategies; for this reason the foreclosure response strategy of offering 
rescue funds, which pertains only to foreclosure prevention situations, has been omitted from the 
table. The table lists twelve local organizations (primarily CDCs)59 and which of these strategies each 
of them has used in their foreclosure responses. Later, in the remainder of Section 2.4.3, some of these 
cases and strategies will be described when introducing specific local foreclosure responses. 
Two of the columns merit further discussion.  First, the strategy of assessing the problem is checked 
for all twelve cases.  This is due to the fact that the cases in Gass’ report are examples of leading 
responses to the foreclosure crisis; that is, these are examples of organizations that have best analyzed 
the local foreclosure problem and strategically devised responses that fit the local context.  Secondly, 
the engage in continual staff and organizational development column has been left grey because Gass’ 
report did not address this strategy explicitly.  Given that these are leading foreclosure responses, it is 
likely most or all of these organizations engage in continual development—if not, it is unlikely they 
would have developed appropriate and successful responses.  However, I have left this column blank 
rather than assert the use of the strategy with no basis. 
                                                          
58 The table is my reading of Gass’ report; any errors or misinterpretations are my own.  It is important to keep 
in mind that the case studies in Gass’ report focused on one particular strategy for each case study.  Thus, it is 
possible that some organizations used strategies that are listed in Table 2.2 despite the fact that the table 
contents state otherwise.   
59 I have excluded one case study, Self Help, which operates on the national scale, and have combined two others 
that are carried out by the same organization in the same location (Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago). 
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Likewise, I have checked strategies for each organization only where Gass makes explicit mention of it.  
For several of the strategies, such as building leadership, it is likely additional organizations have 
employed this strategy but are not listed as doing so in Table 2.2.  This is also especially possible for 
the strategy of offering borrower services beyond troubled loans, due to the fact that the report 
focuses on post-foreclosure interventions and borrower services are associated with foreclosure 
prevention. 
The most commonly used strategies (excluding assessing the problem) are:  redirect resources and 
mobilize new ones (10 organizations); target outreach (10 organizations); invest in bulk acquisition of 
distressed and REO property (8 organizations); and develop intra-local collaboration (8 organizations).  
All other strategies were utilized by five or fewer of the organizations.  That CDCs commonly use the 
strategy of redirection and mobilization of resources is unsurprising; in their role as housing 
developers, CDCs very commonly put together complex financing from varied sources.  This skill is 
highly-developed for CDCs, but the application to the foreclosure crisis is different from the traditional 
bricks-and-mortar applications.  The frequency of targeting outreach is also unsurprising, as resources 
fall far below needs in the foreclosure crisis.  Targeting is thus a logical way to make an impact with 
limited resources, though not all organizations have embraced it.  Many organizations have recognized 
that bulk REO purchasing is necessary to compete with speculative investors, but fewer have been able 
to accomplish it.  The organizations featured in Gass’ report have been particularly successful and 
demonstrate several possible solutions to this problem.  Finally, collaboration is a common strategy in 
foreclosure responses due to the widespread nature of the problem, the large number of stakeholders 
involved, and the variety and quantity of resources needed to address it. 
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Table 2.2:  Foreclosure Response Strategies Employed by Local Organizations   
Source:  Fleischman (2010), Gass (2008), Simon (2010) 
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Beyond Housing (MO) X X X   X       X X   
Chelsea Neighborhood 
Developers (MA) X X   X X X     X     
City First Enterprises 
(Washington, D.C.) X       X       X   X 
Columbus Housing 
Partnership (OH) X X     X X     X     
Dayton's Bluff (MN) X       X X         X 
HANDS Inc./CAPC (NJ) X         X     X    X 
Los Angeles Neighborhood 
Housing Services (CA) X         X X   X X   
Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Chicago (IL) X   X X X X     X   X 
Neighborhood Housing 
Services of Phoenix (AZ) X       X           X 
Neighborhood Progress, Inc. 
(OH) X X   X X X X   X   X 
St. Ambrose Housing Aid 
Center (MD) X       X       X   X 
United Housing (TN) X X X X X X X   X X X 
Total 12 5 3 4 10 8 3 - 10 3 8 
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Collaboration 
Collaboration was mentioned above as a key strategy for local foreclosure interventions.  It is 
mentioned again here to stress its importance and to highlight its role in many of the efforts described 
below.  In many areas with particularly successful foreclosure responses, large-scale inter-agency 
collaboration has occurred.  This can encompass many municipal and county departments, the courts 
system, counseling and advocacy organizations, legal aid organizations, lenders and servicers, CDCs, 
and community groups, among others.   For example, the foreclosure responses of Philadelphia 
(Pennsylvania), St. Louis (Missouri), Allegheny County (Pennsylvania), and Cuyahoga County include a 
large number of stakeholders and require extensive collaborative effort to successfully design, modify, 
and implement their efforts (NeighborWorks America, 2007; Fitzpatrick IV & Ott, 2010; Goldstein, 
Weidig, & Boateng, 2013; Swanstrom et al., 2009; Weinstein et al., 2006).   
In many cases, inter-organizational collaboration is a prerequisite to an effective foreclosure response; 
too many players are involved and have control over specific portions of the process for players moving 
unilaterally to make significant impacts.  Individual parties and organizations often have specialized 
knowledge concerning a particular aspect of the foreclosure crisis, but it is rare for any organization to 
have all the pieces of the puzzle, due to resource and personnel limitations.  Some aspects of the 
foreclosure problem can be tackled much more efficiently when organizations coordinate and 
collaborate; for example, sellers of REOs prefer to sell in bulk.  Working together, CDCs can improve 
their ability to acquire properties as well as gain the opportunity to reap economies of scale when 
demolishing, rehabilitating, or re-selling the properties (Living Cities, 2011).   
Responding to the foreclosure crisis has changed the way many CDCs work.  Traditionally, CDCs have 
been very locally focused, working at the block, street, or neighborhood level.  More recently CDC 
attention has moved outside the immediate service area.  Living Cities reports that ninety percent of 
their pilot sites report joining a new partnership or coalition in the course of responding to the 
foreclosure crisis (Living Cities, 2011).  CDCs have also sometimes competed for resources and funds.  
However, with the advent of the foreclosure crisis, many have recognized that the need for 
intervention is so great and capacity so limited, that only by working together is there a chance to 
make a lasting difference (Living Cities, 2011).   
The Contra Costa Housing Equity Preservation Alliance was created to reduce the duplication of efforts 
by various organizations involved in addressing the foreclosure crisis, as well as to find strategies to 
address the crisis more effectively.  The alliance includes the county, several cities, and non-profits 
offering foreclosure prevention counseling and/or legal assistance.  The alliance offers foreclosure 
prevention workshops, financial counseling, and legal services to distressed borrowers.  However, the 
collaboration is not without difficulties.  For example, the City of Richmond offered to host the 
alliance’s website and found that city webpage rules forced it to use the city’s logo as opposed to a 
logo representing the alliance.  The entire process took approximately a year.  The alliance also appears 
to be rather insular, with limited knowledge of it outside the organization itself.  Others argue that the 
organization is “wasting time . . . to get more leverage in funding” rather than addressing issues directly 
by pressuring lenders (Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
HANDS-CAPC (Orange, New Jersey) is a non-profit corporation developed to address the negative 
effects of foreclosures on the community that has partnered with six CDCs.  HANDS-CAPC purchases 
pools of foreclosed property or notes.  Sellers are generally more amenable to bulk transactions, 
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allowing them to efficiently sell properties and to package in undesirable properties.  HANDS-CAPC 
uses it expertise in to clear titles and then sells the properties to the CDC where they are located.  
During this period, the CDCs assist in monitoring, maintaining, and securing the properties.  After 
purchase, the CDCs rehabilitate the properties in their coverage areas (Simon, 2010).  This 
collaboration is especially noteworthy, as it solves the issue of property acquisition faced by many 
CDCs who are unable to purchase properties in the volume desired by many sellers.  The specifics of 
the effort will be discussed more in the Property Acquisition & Landbanking section, below. 
In Memphis, Tennessee, United Housing coordinates housing activities.  The organization was the 
logical choice as convener, given that it is the only city-wide organization with the ability to work with 
multiple partners.  Decision-making is data-driven, and a network of local organizations is charged with 
implementing solutions in a way that is conscious of the neighborhood context (Gass, 2008). 
Another example of a collaborative effort is that of the Neighborhood Stabilization Committee of St. 
Louis, Missouri.  The committee serves primarily as a network to share information, with a focus on 
researching the ownership of foreclosed properties (Swanstrom et al., 2009).  
As a final example of collaboration, the Red Team in the Inland Empire (California) includes private 
businesses and associations in addition to governmental and non-profit actors.  According to 
Swanstrom et al. (2009), the most active members include the building industry, the real estate trade 
association, Bank of America, a local credit union, and cities located near Riverside, whose mayor 
formed the organization along with the County Supervisor.  The group is united by a shared belief that 
the region’s economy is far too dependent on single family housing construction, though opinions on 
the cause of the foreclosure crisis vary.  The team advocates for “three pillars of recovery”:  keeping 
people in their homes; education and counseling for homeowners; and the pooling of resources to 
facilitate bulk purchasing and reselling of homes by the municipalities (Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
Organizing & Advocacy 
Community organizing and advocacy efforts have been used at the community level to gain attention 
and leverage in fighting the foreclosure problem.   One of the best-known community organizing 
efforts in the wake of the foreclosure crisis has been Empowering & Strengthening Ohio’s People, or 
ESOP.  ESOP, which is based in Cleveland, has embraced Saul Alinsky-style organizing tactics to garner 
public and political attention and to increase their leverage with lenders and servicers.  As a result of 
their efforts, ESOP was able to form agreements with approximately twenty lenders and servicers that 
committed them to policies and practices beneficial to homeowners.  ESOP and its practices will be 
covered in detail in Section 5.2.2. 
Chelsea Neighborhood Developers, a CDC in the small city of Chelsea located outside Boston, hoped 
to reach out to and engage residents, particularly in the lower income neighborhoods.  To do so, the 
NeighborCircle model was used.  A “NeighborCircle” consists of eight to ten neighborhood participants, 
who attend three facilitated dinners.  The first dinner is devoted to socializing and getting to know one 
another.  In the second, the residents discuss their concerns for their neighborhood.  In the final 
meeting, the discussion focuses on what, if anything, to do about the concerns brought up in the 
second meeting.  The meetings have led to neighborhood events, such as clean-ups, neighborhood 
watches, and block parties, as well as aiding in property acquisition decision-making.  For example, the 
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CDC targets the acquisition of REO properties in areas with a concentration of active homeowners that 
will support and improve the neighborhood (Gass, 2008). 
Another example of organizing activities is that of NHS-Chicago.  NHS-Chicago partnered with the 
Southwest Organizing Project with the goal of organizing residents of the Chicago-Lawn/Gage Park 
neighborhood around the issue of foreclosures.  In addition to meeting with community leaders and 
visiting residents door-to-door, the organizers also engaged St. Nicholas Church, a 90-year-old 
community institution.  The group approached the pastor to assist in raising awareness of the issue in 
the parish, who worked the issue into services and the church newsletter.  Though the organization 
has expanded its counseling services and community awareness of the issue has increased, it is unclear 
what direction the organizing effort will take and whether it will be primarily an organizing or a social 
service effort.  “As long as we treat it as a counseling issue, the blame will remain with the homeowner 
and those responsible will not be held accountable” (Gass, 2008). 
A third example is that of CCISCO, a Bay Area (California) community network based in twenty-five 
congregations.  The organization carries out listening campaigns to identify issues and potential leaders 
in the community.  CCISCO, like ESOP, is a proponent of confrontational, Saul Alinsky-style organizing 
tactics.  With a goal of creating national modification agreements with six lenders (chosen based on 
member concerns), the organization staged a variety of high profile events, such as picketing lenders 
with local branches, large town hall meetings, and a march to Washington.  CCISCO has certainly gained 
media attention, but there is question surrounding the true impacts of the organization’s efforts.  For 
example, lenders state that their cooperation with CCISCO is due to the importance of the 
congregations’ influence on their customers, not because of the organizing tactics (though what 
practical difference this makes is unclear).  Others criticize that the organization, despite its 
agreements with lenders, has not been able to increase the number of mortgage modifications made.  
Finally, due to a model that fully blames lenders and omits issues of personal responsibility, important 
services such as financial literacy and financial planning courses are neglected (Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
In addition to organizing efforts, the media plays an important advocacy role.  In an analysis of 
foreclosure responses in six metropolitan areas, Swanstrom et al. (2009) found that the number of 
local newspaper articles devoted to foreclosures greatly influenced public and political awareness of 
the issue.  An analysis of Cleveland’s Plain Dealer and St. Louis’ Post-Dispatch between 2000 and 2008 
showed not only that the Cleveland paper covered foreclosure issues much more frequently, but that 
the paper also included more local articles (as opposed to newsfeed articles) on the crisis, as well as 
more front-page and editorial articles.   Newspaper reports on foreclosure research such as a report 
quantifying the community costs of foreclosures in Ohio have also drawn the attention of politicians 
and policymakers (Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
Foreclosure Prevention Counseling & Foreclosure Mediation 
The best known foreclosure prevention strategies are foreclosure prevention counseling and the 
related, but distinct, strategy of foreclosure mediation.  The two share the same goal—to find a 
satisfactory solution for both the homeowner and servicer when the borrower is in default—and use 
the same approach in attempts to bring this about—the reduction of information asymmetry between 
borrower and servicer.  Though some policy papers group the two together (e.g. Walsh (2009)), there 
are important differences between the two. 
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In theory, foreclosure prevention counseling and foreclosure mediation should be attractive to both 
the homeowner and the holder of the mortgage (either a financial institution or a group of investors).  
For example, a 2008 study found that the average loss a lender incurred on a foreclosure was $124,000, 
which equated to a loss of 57% of investment value (White, 2009).  However, servicers are charged 
with the decision to initiate foreclosure proceedings when a loan is in default; their payment schedules 
favor the (relatively) quick and simple proceedings of a foreclosure over the more complex 
modification negotiation (Walsh, 2009).  Thus, while the overall benefit of a modification is in many 
cases greater than that of a foreclosure, the incentives of servicers, who determine which course to 
take, favor foreclosures over modifications. 
Among the best known programs are the Homeownership Preservation Initiative (HOPI), located in 
Chicago, Illinois, and the Philadelphia Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Program.60  The first, 
HOPI, is a counseling program, while the Philadelphia program is a mediation program.  All of these, 
and counseling and mediation efforts in general, rely heavily on inter-organizational collaboration, 
including “community development organizations, credit counseling agencies, legal aid groups, and 
local government (especially housing or neighborhood planning agencies), as well as banks, lenders, 
and loan servicers” (Immergluck, 2008, p.8).  HOPI “involves a partnership of Neighborhood Housing 
Services . . . of Chicago, the Chicago Department of Housing, 22 financial institutions, and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago” (Immergluck, 2008, p.9), while the Philadelphia diversion program 
“represents the collective efforts of . . . the Philadephia Court of Common Pleas, the City of 
Philadelphia’s Office of Housing and Community Development, attorneys representing homeowners 
and lenders/servicers and housing counselors” (p.233) as well as several city-funded nonprofit 
agencies and legal aid organizations (Goldstein et al., 2013). 
Foreclosure prevention counseling is a relatively new practice.  Previously, pre-purchase counseling 
programs existed in order to assist low-income first-time homebuyers in making a prudent purchase.  
With the progression of the foreclosure crisis, many of these organizations that specialized in pre-
purchase counseling changed their focus to post-purchase, or foreclosure prevention, counseling in 
order to help homeowners remain in their homes (Cutts & Merrill, 2008).  The preferred foreclosure 
prevention counseling outcome is a sustainable mortgage modification, though in some cases a 
“dignified exit”—that is, a deed-in-lieu or short sale—is the best case outcome for a homeowner.  Some 
counseling organizations also offer emergency loans, usually about $3,000, to bring a mortgage current 
(Immergluck, 2008). 
In foreclosure prevention counseling, the counselor takes the role of an advocate for the homeowner.  
Counseling always occurs at the borrower’s behest, and is provided by HUD-approved housing 
counseling nonprofits.  Candidates for counseling are reached through public awareness campaigns, 
mailers triggered by foreclosure suits and other events, and word of mouth.  Though many counseling 
clients are facing foreclosure when counseling is sought, foreclosure prevention counseling can occur 
at any point in the process leading up to a foreclosure, including before the client has missed any 
mortgage payments.   
Foreclosure prevention counseling can be carried out in-person, by phone, or in some cases, online.  
In the case of in-person counseling, borrowers seeking counseling often first take part in a group intake 
                                                          
60 The Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program (CCFPP) is arguably the best known foreclosure 
prevention counseling program in the country.  A description is omitted here as it is discussed in depth in Chapter 
5. 
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session, where they are introduced to the counseling process, what it can and cannot do, and what 
paperwork and files are necessary to initiate the process (Harris, April 27, 2011; Immergluck, 2008).  
One or more individual counseling sessions follow this.  Participation of the lender or servicer depends 
on the amenability of the lender or servicer, and the contacts of the foreclosure prevention counselor.   
Foreclosure prevention counseling also provides an opportunity for holistic debt management for 
clients.  Homeowners who are unable to make mortgage payments likely have other financial issues.  
If a homeowner initiates counseling in an effort to save his or her house, the counselor has an 
opportunity to look at his or her overall financial situation and manage additional issues (Cutts & 
Merrill, 2008).  Some counseling agencies offer holistic services extending even beyond financial issues, 
such as Neighborhood Housing Services of Los Angeles, which offers services to help homeowners who 
have lost their properties transition to new housing.  They work with the county property owners 
association to negotiate discounted rents for transitioning families and make efforts to keep families 
in the same neighborhood and school district when possible (Gass, 2008). 
In many cases, foreclosure prevention counseling has been funded by the HHF, as well as by various 
grants and the redirection of state and local funds.  In 2007, the federal government passed legislation 
to fund foreclosure prevention counselors through the NFMC program (Immergluck et al., 2011).  
However, funding for counseling has come in standalone pieces, each time without information as to 
whether additional federal or other funding will become available in the future.  Applying for funding 
is also administratively challenging, with different requirements for applying and reporting from each 
funder (Hylands, 2013). 
Foreclosure mediation programs, a form of alternative dispute resolution, are run through the court 
system.  In contrast to a foreclosure prevention counselor, the mediator is a neutral party, whose role 
it is to facilitate communication and, if possible, a mutually agreeable settlement between the parties.  
In general, the foreclosure suit is paused while the mediation process is pending.  Mediation does not 
require settlement as an outcome, nor can mediators force an outcomes (Cohen & Jakabovics, 2010).  
Candidates for mediation are those against whom a foreclosure suit has already been filed (Cohen & 
Jakabovics, 2010; Collins & Urban, 2012; Hammel & Shetty, 2013).  As of 2010, jurisdictions in twenty-
one states had mediation programs, some of which are mandatory for all foreclosure suits, and others 
which are opt-in at the behest of the defendant (the borrower) (Cohen & Jakabovics, 2010). 
Foreclosure mediation programs can be either opt-in or mandatory.  Opt-in programs are those where 
the homeowner against whom the foreclosure suit has been filed has the option to request mediation, 
which is then generally mandatory for the plaintiff (the lender or servicer).  Mandatory programs 
automatically assign all foreclosure cases to mediation, without any action from the homeowner.  In 
both cases, cases are then screened to ensure they are appropriate for mediation.  Advocates of 
mandatory mediation programs point to higher participation rates, which are approximately 75% for 
mandatory programs, while the highest participation estimate for opt-in programs is 21% (Cohen & 
Jakabovics, 2010).  On the other hand, proponents of opt-in programs argue that the process of 
requesting mediation screens out non-cooperative defendants, increasing the program’s efficiency 
(Fitzpatrick IV & Ott, 2010).  However, opt-in programs do require additional administrative work not 
required by mandatory programs, primarily in the form of mailings and response processing.  Data has 
shown that mandatory mediation programs fare at least at well as opt-in programs, with settlement 
rates for opt-in programs ranging from 3% (New York) to 75% (Connecticut).  Connecticut switched 
from an opt-in to a mandatory program and saw no changes in its settlement rate (Cohen & Jakabovics, 
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2010).  However, Collins & Urban (2012) undertook a difference-in-difference model to investigate the 
impact of mandatory v. opt-in mediation programs in MSAs61 containing both.  They found that in one 
study area, Philadelphia, the area with mandatory mediation resulted in an increase of 1% to 1.5% in 
modifications, relative to a base rate of 1.8% modified for the opt-in program.  In Florida, where four 
MSAs were examined, the settlement rate increased .87% for the mandatory programs relative to the 
opt-in rate of 7.6% (Collins & Urban, 2012). 
Although mediation cannot force either party into a settlement, it often carries consequences for non-
cooperation.  In the case of non-cooperative borrowers, the case leaves mediation and the foreclosure 
suit proceeds.  In the case of non-cooperative lenders or servicers, the foreclosure case may be 
dismissed.  The extent to which mediation programs compel lenders and servicers to participate in 
good faith varies.  Many programs require that the lender or servicer representative have the authority 
to modify the mortgage; otherwise the case is dismissed (Fitzpatrick IV & Ott, 2010).  As of 2009, only 
one program (Maine) required the servicer or lender to provide a copy of a net present value test (NPV) 
and modification analysis (Walsh, 2009).  This calculation is key, as the sharing of this information 
provides all parties with equal knowledge about the financial situation on the lender or servicer’s side 
regarding the mortgage and ensures the lender or servicer actually carries out an NPV test.  In contrast, 
all homeowners are required to provide detailed information on their financial situation (Walsh, 2010).  
Any homeowner who cannot show an income stream is immediately ineligible for a modification; one 
who refuses to provide financial data would be considered uncooperative and the case would proceed 
to the foreclosure hearing. 
Some mediation programs assist defendants (borrowers) in procuring legal representation (Hammel & 
Shetty, 2013).  Many homeowners also use foreclosure prevention counseling services in concert with 
mediation; for example, in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the defendant may bring someone with him or her 
to mediation, possibly a counselor.  Counselors are also on-site certain days to assist defendants 
(Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011). 
Foreclosure mediation programs are often self-funded by fees assessed by the court on each 
foreclosure suit.  These fees range from $50 to $400 (Walsh, 2012).  Others assemble funds and 
resources from a variety of sources, but this makes scaling the program up very difficult (Fitzpatrick IV 
& Ott, 2010). 
The main benefit of counseling and mediation is improved communication (Goldstein et al., 2013; 
Walsh, 2009).  “ . . . Mediation helps homeowners communicate with their lender, including facilitating 
transfer of documents, setting time frames for borrowers sending documents and lenders responding, 
and staying [the] sale while diversion is active” (Collins & Urban, 2012, p.15).  Housing counselors and 
mediators are familiar with the terminology and practices of servicers and lenders, as well as the legal 
framework relevant to a foreclosure action.  In many cases they also have contacts with servicers and 
lenders, which can facilitate negotiation. 
A second benefit of mediation is that of time.  The mediation process effectively pauses the foreclosure 
process, giving the homeowner, attorney, and housing counselor “room to breathe” and prepare all 
necessary documentation, as well as to negotiate with the servicer or lender (Goldstein et al., 2013; 
Walsh, 2009).   
                                                          
61 Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
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Counseling and mediation face several difficulties in assisting homeowners.  First, servicers have 
engaged in a process of “calculated chaos,” in which many HAMP rules were violated in the process of 
denying modifications.  These behaviors included “losing documents; failing to follow promised time 
frames; failing to notify homeowners of reasons for servicers’ actions; giving invalid or blatantly false 
reasons for denials; providing ineffective review of decisions; and foreclosing while reviewing for a 
modification or while the borrow was complying with a trial modification” (Walsh, 2012. p.5). This 
occurred for a variety of reasons, but essentially, making a good faith modification effort would require 
“mortgage companies to do the work that should have been completed at the time of origination” 
(Fields et al., 2010, p.676)—that is, to do proper underwriting. Unfortunately the federal government 
never enforced the HAMP rules with any stringency, and while states have the police power to impose 
sanctions on lenders and servicers who do not act in good faith in the mediation procedure, many do 
not.   Some states attempted to require HAMP rules be met in their mediation processes, but these 
requirements were removed as the result of lobbying efforts (Walsh, 2012).   
A second issue has been poor quality modifications (Immergluck, 2008; Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2012).  
According to an Office of the Comptroller report, 58% of the loan modifications made in 2008 either 
increased monthly payments or left them the same (Walsh, 2009).  Unsurprisingly, only slightly over a 
quarter of these modifications remained current at the beginning of 2010.  However, modification 
affordability has increased:  by late 2011, less than ten percent of all modifications increased or left 
the payment the same.  The redefault rate of modified loans made in 2010 was approximately one half 
that of modifications made in 2008 (Walsh, 2012). 
A problem facing foreclosure prevention counseling has been counselor retention.  Counselors receive 
relatively poor pay for stressful work. Counselors often face staff shortages, heavy training 
requirements, intensive reporting and data entry requirements, and the frustration of attracting 
borrowers too late into the foreclosure process (Hylands, 2013). As well, counselors experience 
additional stress from the emotional work of working with clients who are often desperate and 
frightened. 
A variety of studies have examined foreclosure prevention counseling success rates.  These studies 
show similar results, though the percentages and magnitudes vary by study and by study sample.  They 
also examine different aspects, so a one-to-one comparison is often not possible.   
For example, a study of nearly 26,000 loans made to low-to-moderate-income borrowers found 50% 
higher cure odds for homeowners who participated in counseling.  The authors also found no 
difference in results between in-person and telephone counseling.  They did, however, find that timing 
plays a role and that counseling has the best results when undertaken during an active delinquency 
situation (Ding, Quercia, & Ratcliffe, 2008). 
Collins & Schmeiser (2012) found that the likelihood of losing a home to foreclosure drops after 
counseling by two to four percent.  They also found that borrowers are more likely to miss payments 
after receiving counseling, and attributed this to the fact that counseling does not change one’s 
financial situation and that homeowners initiate counseling when they realize they cannot sustain their 
mortgages and also to the fact that some negative selection for counseling was also observed (i.e. 
there is a tendency for those in more distressing financial situations to initiate counseling.  This may, 
in some cases, be a strategic decision, due to the fact that many lenders and servicers informed 
homeowners they should only contact them after they had missed payments.  Collins & Schmeiser also 
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found that receiving a mortgage modification is related to counseling, and that, particularly for 
minority homeowners, counseling increased the likelihood of receiving a lower interest rate and/or 
lower monthly payments (2012). 
The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMC), which funded foreclosure 
prevention counseling via federal appropriation, undertook an analysis of nearly 61,000 loans to 
examine the effects of the program during its first year.  The authors found that the NFMC counseling 
helped 880 homeowners from entering foreclosure, a reduction of approximately 18% from the 
number expected without counseling.  This equates to a cost-savings of $33 million.  They also found 
that homeowners receiving counseling were 1.6 times more likely to cure a foreclosure than those 
who did not participate in counseling.  Likewise, those who participated in counseling and received a 
modification had, on average, mortgage payments $454 less per month than those who received a 
modification without participating in counseling (Mayer, Tatian, Temkin, & Calhoun, 2009). 
Several studies have also examined the redefault rates of those who participated in counseling.  For 
example, a report on Freddie Mac loans and counseling reported a 26.4% contact rate and a contact-
to-cure rate of 54.5%, for a total of 6,099 foreclosure avoidances.  Using 60-day delinquency as a 
redefault measure, 18.67% of these mortgages redefaulted, in comparison to 25% of cures that did 
not participate in counseling (Cutts & Merrill, 2008). 
Winter & Swanstrom (2010) examined 1,460 instances of counseling between January 2008 and 
September 2009 that occurred in St. Louis, Missouri.  They reported on the demographics of those 
receiving counseling, who on average were lower income, more African American, more single-parent 
households, and more female than the MSA overall.  As well, about half the loans were subprime or 
exotic.  Of these homeowners, 87% were delinquent when they entered counseling.  Thirteen percent 
received a modification, and another 13% brought the mortgage current by some other means.  At the 
end of the study period, 84% remained the legal owner of the home, though this represents a 
maximum of 21 months post-counseling and in many cases the elapsed time after counseling is only a 
few months.  It also does not capture any homeowners currently delinquent or in default (Winter & 
Swanstrom, 2010).   
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development commissioned a study on counseling 
outcomes.  The study examined 824 homeowners who participated in counseling, spread over twenty-
four counseling agencies.  Like the Winter & Swanstrom (2010) sample, the demographics of those 
receiving counseling were lower income, more African American, more female, and younger than the 
U.S. average.  Of these, 39% received a temporary or permanent modification and an additional 32% 
received a repayment or forbearance plan.  The status of the homeowners was examined again 
eighteen months after enrollment.  Fifty-six percent were current and residing in the house; 28% were 
delinquent and residing in the house; and 16% had lost the home.  The researchers also found timing 
to be important:  of those who participated in counseling before entering delinquency, 70% were 
current at follow-up eighteen months later.  Of those who were six months or more behind on 
mortgage payments when they entered counseling, only 30% were current at follow-up.  The study 
also found somewhat better outcomes for telephone counseling as compared to in-person counseling, 
but the authors hypothesized that clients with greater needs participated in in-person counseling more 
often, making the results not directly comparable (Jefferson, Spader, Turnham, & Moulton, 2012). 
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Several studies of mediation outcomes have been undertaken as well.  Cohen & Jakabovics (2010) 
report on state-based mediation programs provides outcome statistics for a variety of programs.  For 
example, Connecticut, a state with mandatory mediation, reports a 74% settlement rate (i.e. an 
agreement is reached between the two parties and the foreclosure suit is dropped) and that 60% of 
homeowners remain in their home at the end of the process.  This 60% is comprised of 42% who 
receive a modification, 12% that receive a forebearance plan, and 6% that receive a reinstatement or 
partial claim.  New Jersey, which has an opt-in mediation program, reports a 50% settlement rate, 70% 
of which remain in the home (Cohen & Jakabovics, 2010). 
Goldstein et al.’s (2013) study examined the Philadelphia Residential Mortgage Diversion Program and 
found that the program pertains to over 60% of the city’s foreclosure filings; approximately 70% of 
eligible homeowners participated; 35% of those participants reached a settlement; and that for cases 
settled in the first year of the program (2008), 85% were still current twenty months later.  The authors 
also found that the mediation program did not extend the foreclosure process:  the average case spent 
53 days in mediation while the typical non-mediated foreclosure suit lasted ten months (Goldstein et 
al., 2013). 
Property Acquisition 
Given the aftereffects of the foreclosure crisis on neighborhoods and communities, the problem of 
cleaning up vacant and abandoned foreclosed properties is an extensive and difficult one.  Putting 
aside the issues of scale and funds, several aspects of the foreclosure crisis cause particular difficulties 
to CDCs and other local organizations working to acquire and reuse foreclosed properties.  First of all, 
the issue of timing is important.  Vacant houses are often vandalized within days of dis-occupancy, 
resulting in a property that has negative equity (i.e. it would cost more to repair the house than it 
would be worth) that is valueless to all but speculators.  Servicers often attempt to “donate” properties 
in poor condition to municipalities and other local organizations, but the acceptance rate is low due to 
the expectation from servicers that all fines and liens will be waived and that the city foot the cost of 
demolition (Living Cities, 2011).  Short sales are at first an appealing option—they would assist 
borrowers in trouble make a “dignified exit” while transferring title before the property becomes 
vacant and unsecured; however, two difficulties arise.  First, servicer payment schedules make 
foreclosures more lucrative than short sales.  Although the net loss for all parties is higher with a 
foreclosure, servicers generally have decision-making authority and naturally work to maximize their 
own profits.  Second, it is difficult to locate homeowners who are potentially amenable to a short sale 
(Fleischman, 2010).  Another problem in property acquisition is the issue of securitized mortgages, 
where it is unclear who has the authority to make a sale or transfer.  Similarly, in the case of bank 
walkaways, it is often impossible to identify the owner of record, leaving the property in limbo.  Finally, 
given the volatility in the housing market, it is simply difficult to properly value properties.  CDCs in 
particular work with tight margins and complex funding, often with several sets of external constraints 
on affordability and other aspects (Living Cities, 2011). 
One strategy to deal with and minimize these issues is bulk acquisition.  As Fleischman (2010) writes: 
Strategies that involve bulk purchases of REO properties enable both lenders and purchasers 
to avoid the inefficiencies and higher costs associated with piecemeal, retail-level REO sales.  
Through a bulk purchase, the nonprofit may get a discounted sale price on a portfolio of 
properties while acquiring a critical mass for redevelopment.  This strategy may also enable 
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the purchase to subsidize the rehabilitation of deteriorated homes with profits generated from 
sales of more intact homes” p.109.  
This is not to say that bulk acquisition strategies are a cure-all—given the need to target interventions, 
as discussed previously, bulk acquisition has the possibility to squander CDC resources if properties are 
acquired in a haphazard manner.  Thus, many successful bulk acquisition strategies are built on 
collaborative efforts that combine entities working at a larger geographic level with CDCs or other local 
organizations. 
NCST, introduced in Section 2.4.1, is a national-level effort to address the issue of property acquisition.  
The organization coordinates lenders, servicers, and GSEs, including the country’s eight largest 
servicers, with state, county, and municipal governments in order to facilitate negotiations on REO 
properties (Gass, 2008; Living Cities, 2011). 
Some communities have enrolled in HUD’s Asset Control Area (ACA) program to buy properties within 
a specified area for a 50% discount.  However, the program’s guidelines cause difficulties.  HUD places 
restrictions on the sale price of rehabilitated properties which restricts the pool of potential buyers 
and sometimes results in properties sitting on the market for longer periods of time.  Secondly, the 
ACA program requires the participating organization to take all REO properties within the program 
area, regardless of condition.  Columbus Housing Partnership (CHP) of Columbus, Ohio, originally 
participated in the program but changed strategies when it became apparent that many of the ACA 
REOs were too deteriorated or located on streets with very low levels of homeownership.  Instead, 
they began working with the City of Columbus, which is able to purchase FHA foreclosures for $1 and 
then re-sell the properties to the housing partnership.  This arrangement allows CHP to select 
properties in targeted areas and strategically stabilize neighborhoods (Gass, 2008). 
HANDS-CAPC, which was also discussed as an example of collaboration, made an offer to purchase 47 
loans that were involved in a real estate fraud and bankruptcy case (Simon, 2010).  To do so, the 
organization “conducted title searches and performed comprehensive physical inspections to 
determine rehabilitation costs; worked closely with a local real estate firm to develop market 
assessments and analyses to determine current ‘as-is’ values and resale values after rehabilitation; and 
evaluated the costs of carrying and managing the properties through foreclosure as well as all costs 
related to executing the foreclosures” (Simon, 2010, p.125).  Based on this work, each property was 
assigned one of five exit strategies (Fleischman, 2010).  HANDS-CAPC then sent an offer to the 
properties’ asset manager.  REO asset managers often have no familiarity with the communities where 
their properties are located, as well as no experience working with a CDC.  This made it necessary for 
HANDS-CAPC to back up its low offers with photographic evidence of the housing and neighborhood 
conditions before negotiations could move forward (Gass, 2008). 
It should be noted that this strategy is risky, due to the time and resources involved in researching the 
properties with no guarantee of a successful deal.  As well, this strategy worked well for HANDS-CAPC 
due to the fact that the mortgages were all connected to a lending scam and were not securitized 
(Fleischman, 2010).  Another key piece of this strategy was HANDS-CAPC’s collaboration with six local 
CDCs, each of which agreed to purchase and rehabilitate the properties located in their service area 
(Simon, 2010). 
Other property acquisition strategies used in response to the foreclosure crisis include the use of 
receivership in Chicago, which has allowed the demolition of blighted properties without the difficulty 
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of a years-long court process, and the exploration of purchasing promissory notes for entire 
subdivisions in Phoenix, which would allow foreclosure and redevelopment of the whole subdivision 
(Gass, 2008). 
Landbanking 
The purpose of a traditional land bank is to “acquire and hold large amounts of property for 
redevelopment as a way to encourage development consistent with municipalities’ long-term plans” 
(Fitzpatrick IV, 2010, p.145).  Traditional land banks are programs housed in municipal governments, 
and thus depend on local governments for funding and resources, which may become politicized.  Since 
they are municipal programs, traditional land banks have limited geographic scope, which results in 
several difficulties when dealing with properties impacted by foreclosure (Fitzpatrick IV, 2010).  Some 
traditional land banks, such as those in Ohio, obtain properties only passively; that is, when the 
property has not sold at two consecutive public auctions.  Since they are not independent legal entities, 
traditional land banks cannot purchase property or enter into contracts for the upkeep or demolition 
of vacant properties, essentially limiting traditional land banks to possession of vacant lots (Fitzpatrick 
IV, 2009). 
In contrast, a modern land bank is an independent entity with a statutorily defined mission.  Thus, 
modern land banks have dedicated staff and funding streams, freeing them of dependence on 
municipal departments and politicking and allowing for long-term planning.  The purpose of a modern 
land bank is also much broader than that of a traditional land bank—to “assist public and private 
redevelopment by actively identifying and strategically acquiring parcels otherwise unattractive or 
unobtainable by public or private markets, clearing their titles, and, where necessary, deciding how to 
remediate the property to make it attractive for future investment” (Fitzpatrick IV, 2010, p.146).  
Modern land banks are also not limited to a single municipality—in the case of Ohio they are organized 
on the county level.  As a result, they achieve economies of scale that municipal land banks generally 
can’t, are able to spread risk in ways smaller municipalities can’t, and can facilitate redevelopment 
efforts across municipal boundaries (Fitzpatrick IV, 2010; Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
Traditional land banks face several difficulties in attempting to acquire REO and other abandoned 
property.  First, REO sellers (financial institutions) hold large numbers of properties, which are spread 
out across the region and not confined to a particular municipality.  REO sellers also generally prefer 
to sell in bulk, which is not possible for a traditional land bank authorized to acquire properties only in 
its own municipality and only interested in properties that are part of preexisting development plans.  
For these reasons, traditional land banks often have trouble getting REO sellers to the bargaining table.  
Second, traditional land banks often face a shortage of funds, particularly as local government tax 
bases shrink (Fitzpatrick IV, 2010). 
In contrast, modern land banks have several advantages.  The fact that they serve larger geographic 
areas allows them to purchase in bulk and achieve economies of scale.  Secondly, their dedicated 
funding streams allow long-term planning and flexibility. Due to their size and dedicated funding, they 
are also able to store, demolish, and renovate properties to a greater extent than traditional land banks 
(Fitzpatrick IV, 2010).  They are also able to eliminate tax and other liens, as well as to avoid accruing 
additional liens (Immergluck, 2008).  As a dedicated entity, land banks can hold properties awaiting 
redevelopment for longer periods of time without accruing property taxes (Fleischman, 2010; 
Immergluck, 2008). 
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The state of Michigan has led the way with modern landbanking.  In 2009, ten Michigan counties had 
set up land bank authorities, in addition to the state land bank which held over 8,000 properties at 
that time.  Of the county land banks, the Genesee County Land Bank (GCLB) is the best known.  
Between 2003 and 2009, GCLB had demolished nearly one thousand properties, rehabilitated ninety 
affordable rental units and eighty single family homes, and sold seven hundred sidelots to adjacent 
property owners.  Between 2002 and 2005, GCLB leveraged over $112 million in benefits for the city 
of Flint using an expenditure of $3.5 million.  Combining three revenue sources,62 the land bank has an 
$8 million self-sustaining land revitalization fund (Schilling, 2009). 
Targeting 
The targeting of neighborhood stabilization efforts has been a common response to the negative 
spillover effects of the foreclosure crisis.  Given the extent of the problem it simply isn’t feasible for 
most CDCs and jurisdictions to address all foreclosed and/or blighted properties in their service areas.  
According to Immergluck (2008): 
For example, if an initiative is able to purchase only 25 percent of the vacant properties in a 
small area—which might be a sizeable number of homes—it may be difficult to make the 
acquired houses marketable either for purchase or for rental given the remaining vacancies in 
the area.  In neighborhoods with many vacant properties, ‘onesey-twosey’ market-based 
approaches, where investors or developers may come in and pick up a few properties here 
and there, are likely to be very difficult.  High concentrations of foreclosure of vacant homes 
may limit ‘free market’ responses in some neighborhoods (p.14).   
Becca Goldstein, quoted in Communities at Risk (2011), states “If we have a block with 10 foreclosures 
and can only acquire 2, we’re not doing the block” (p.28). 
Targeting strategies generally look for relatively intact neighborhoods that are being negatively 
affected by foreclosure but can be stabilized with strategic intervention.  Though he was referring 
specifically to the targeting of NSP money, Goldstein’s statements apply to targeting in general:  “NSP 
funds will make the most impact when invested in areas where objective and systematic data show 
the housing market is functioning reasonably well . . . Targeting places where the problem is 
manageable and the surrounding markets have strength is critical to success” (2010, p.73).  The 
Reinvestment Fund, a non-profit community development institution located in Philadelphia, 
developed a “market valuation” approach that uses neighborhood-level data to determine where the 
purchase of vacant foreclosed properties will have the greatest impact.  The goal is to identify “areas 
where foreclosure-related vacancies are a potentially destabilizing force and not heavily compounded 
on top of earlier vacancies, high crime rates, and other preexisting conditions that make 
redevelopment extremely difficult even if foreclosed properties are directly addressed” (Immergluck, 
2008, p.15). 
In addition to underlying housing market conditions, CDCs and local governments look to community 
assets as a base upon which to stabilize neighborhoods.  The idea is to start with a strong street or 
block, strengthen it, and continue to stabilize outward:  “Model blocks is really the next wave.  We’re 
going to make this street strong and have it ripple out and then target another street” (Marie Kittridge, 
                                                          
62 The revenue sources are the state Board of Revisions foreclosure fee, the proceeds of land sales, and revenue 
from TIF bonds issued by the land bank. 
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quoted in Living Cities, 2011, p.28).  CDCs and other organizations look for public and private 
investment, institutional uses such as universities and hospitals, schools, employment opportunities, 
commercial corridors, and other anchors when determining areas to target for stabilization (Gass, 
2008; Living Cities, 2011). 
Resident input and participation is another key factor to consider when making targeting decisions.  
For example, the City of Chicago and Mercy Housing, a non-profit housing developer, partnered for 
the implementation of the city’s NSP program.  Two guiding principles were used to select stabilization 
areas:  (1) geographically target activities to begin with, with the expectation to expand citywide in the 
future; and (2) provide a defensive position in areas where the city has made strategic investments in 
the past, where the neighborhood would be doing well if not for foreclosures, and where there is 
substantial community awareness and organization with respect to foreclosures (Swanstrom et al., 
2009).  Other organizations use the homeownership rate, the presence of clusters of households 
committed to neighborhood improvement, and evidence of community attention and concern, such 
as the frequency of calls to the police or city services, to assist in targeting decisions (Gass, 2008; Simon, 
2010).   Resident input is also important to ensure that neighborhood stabilization efforts do not take 
on the feel of top-down, Urban Renewal-type activities (Living Cities, 2011). 
In addition to changing acquisition strategies, many CDCs have also found it necessary to shift their 
thinking on the reuse of these properties.  Traditionally, CDCs have been in the business of building 
and rehabilitating affordable housing.  But the foreclosure crisis has forced this policy to be 
reevaluated, due to rampant vandalism and undermaintenance of foreclosed homes, the tightening of 
the credit market, and, especially in weak market areas, a housing market already grappling with the 
issue of oversupply. 
Many CDCs have scaled down or halted their rehabilitation work in the wake of the crisis.  Living Cities 
reports that two-thirds of the pilot programs it funds scaled back on rehabilitation work.  CDCs cite the 
increased cost of rehabilitating a vacant, abandoned, and possibly stripped house, as well as the need 
to act quickly to stabilize neighborhoods as reasons.  In many cases, CDCs have lowered their 
rehabilitation standards for the houses they do renovate.  In the past, CDC-rehabbed houses often 
included attractive amenities, but now many have scaled back—“We’re doing triage.  We need major 
systems working, code compliance, no safety hazards, fresh coat of paint, then sell it” (Tracey-
McAreavey citied in Living Cities, 2011, p.21).  However, not all CDCs have adopted this tack.  For 
example, in Cleveland, Ohio, “the major problems [the] target neighborhoods are facing are low values 
and unmarketable housing.  Creating decent but not exciting for-sale products won’t help.  Instead, in 
a bid to raise the value of the neighborhoods by creating housing products that are competitive, [the 
CDC] is raising rehab levels, specifically emphasizing green retrofits” (Living Cities, 2011, p.21).  Some 
CDCs also use strategies such as homebuyer assistance programs and community marketing to 
increase the marketability of their for-sale offerings (Fleischman, 2010). 
In place of rehabilitations, many CDCs have begun strategically demolishing properties in targeted 
neighborhoods.  One reason for this is financial:  demolition costs much less per property than 
rehabilitation, and funds are scarce.  In addition, adding rehabilitated properties to the housing market 
in many weak market cities would only increase the downward pressure on prices, possibly spurring 
additional foreclosures or more underwater homeowners (Immergluck, 2008).  Leaving abandoned 
properties to sit can negatively affect nearby intact properties as well.  In Communities at Risk (Livin 
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Cities, 2011), one CDC shared the story of three new, top-quality homes that weren’t selling due to 
several nearby foreclosed homes in poor condition.   
The devastation of already poor and outdated housing stock combined with decades of population 
decline and disinvestment have opened to door to conversations about shrinking cities in the Rust Belt.  
“In cities like Detroit and Cleveland, which have lost roughly half their populations in the last half 
century, the mismatch of housing supply to population had been a taboo topic” (Living Cities, 2011, 
p.23).  Many cities faced with a permanently reduced population and oversupply of housing are 
working to plan for the future and align demolitions and other neighborhood stabilization efforts with 
these plans.  Many are envisioning cities with more green, open spaces.  It was suggested that Detroit 
remodel itself as a series of urban villages surrounded by greenspace and connected by transit (Living 
Cities, 2011).  Some communities choose to see the foreclosure crisis as an opportunity to redesign 
their communities, adding amenities such as greenspace, pocket parks, green infrastructure, urban 
agriculture, trailways, reconstructed wetlands, and community gardens, among others (Fleischman, 
2010; Gass, 2008; Living Cities, 2011). 
Legal Responses 
As the effects of the foreclosure crisis have spread, some municipalities have worked to increase the 
cost of holding vacant and abandoned properties and to encourage higher standards of maintenance.  
The motivations for this are at least threefold:  (1) to increase safety for its residents by discouraging 
the holding of derelict and unsafe properties; (2) to discourage additional foreclosures by increasing 
the holding costs to financial institutions; and (3) to require the owners of vacant and abandoned 
properties to pay for maintenance costs, rather than allowing the costs of un- and under-maintained 
properties to be paid by the community through lower property values, increased service costs, and 
reduced safety (Immergluck, 2008).   
One way municipalities have done this is by making changes to the judicial process.  For example, some 
cities have increased court fees for foreclosure filings.  Cuyahoga County has done so and uses the 
proceeds to fund its foreclosure mediation program.  Louisville, Kentucky now taxes properties with 
code violations at a higher rate (Immergluck, 2008).  Freeport, Illinois increased its fee for filing a 
foreclosure case from $317 to $367 for lenders and servicers filing in low volumes, and from $317 to 
$867 for those filing in large volumes.  Though the city saw a drop in filings (19% from the previous 
month, and 40% year-over-year), foreclosure filings had already been dropping and some speculated 
that lenders and servicers had hurried to file before the change, which, if true, would have exaggerated 
the apparent effect (Gary, 2013).  The city of St. Louis created a Problem Property Court to deal 
exclusively with blighted properties.  The court has been successful, with more than 8,900 properties 
brought up to code and nearly a million dollars in fines paid between 2002 and 2007.  The court has 
also placed liens on another 990 properties for a total of $2.7 million in maintenance services carried 
out by the city.  When these are not paid, the city has the right to foreclose on the properties and then 
transfer the property to the city land bank (Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
Some cities have also passed receivership laws, which provide an avenue to get control of a problem 
property.  In the case of a blighted property with an unresponsive owner, the city can place a lien on 
the property and appoint a receiver to carry out necessary rehabilitation work.  The city can then 
instigate a foreclosure and gain control of the property if the owner does not pay the lien.  The property 
is then likely to be passed on to a local CDC or land bank (Fleischman, 2010). 
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Municipalities have also worked to achieve these ends by passing new or stronger property 
maintenance laws, or by increasing the enforcement of those already on the books.  In cases where 
penalties have been increased, the extra revenue often goes to funding foreclosure prevention 
programs (Immergluck, 2008).  There are three main types of these laws:  vacant property ordinances, 
point of sale ordinances, and escrow requirements. 
The first of these three types, the vacant property ordinance,63 requires owners of vacant properties 
to register them with the municipality, usually accompanied by a registration fee, and submit to 
periodic inspections of the property.  Buyers then receive the most recent inspection report before 
purchasing the home.  This should reduce “as is” transactions, in which uninformed purchasers often 
buy properties with serious code violations and/or delinquent property taxes unaware (Fitzpatrick IV, 
Nelson, Richter, & Whitaker, 2013).  Many cities passed these ordinances once it became apparent 
that banks and other financial institutions were rapidly divesting of low-value properties in 2007 and 
2008.  Many of these REOs were then sold to large investors, who left their properties vacant about 
twice as often as properties owned by individuals (Fitzpatrick IV et al., 2013).   
Schilling (2009) listed the following as key aspects of effective vacant property ordinances: 
 The ordinance should apply to a wide variety of structures and uses, rather than being 
restricted to residential housing. 
 The ordinance should clearly state the security and maintenance standards and consider 
requiring liability insurance for the owners of vacant properties. 
 A local point of contact should be required in order that the municipality can enforce code 
violations. 
 The registration fee should be large enough to cover the costs of the program’s administration 
and implementation.  Fee schedules that increase as the length of vacancy increases should 
be considered. 
 The ordinance should allow municipalities to assess unpaid fees and/or fines as municipal liens, 
which allows the city to file a foreclosure on the non-complaint property. 
An example of a city that passed a strong vacant property ordinance is Wilmington, Delaware.  Prior 
to 2003, the city’s vacant property registration fee was $25 per year, which was insufficient to 
disincentivize the holding of vacant properties and often went uncollected.  This changed with the 
enactment of a new ordinance in 2003.  Applying to any property that has been vacant for over one 
year, the registration fee ranges from $500 (for one year of vacancy) to $5,000 for properties that have 
been vacant for ten years (plus an additional $500 for each additional year).  Changes in ownership do 
not affect the clock on the years of vacancy; only a period of occupancy would restart the vacancy 
clock.64  Waivers are available to those who can provide evidence of renovation or demolition plans, 
or who plan to reoccupy or sell within a year.  The city can foreclose on the property when the fees 
remain unpaid; ideally the property will then be purchased at auction and brought into productive 
reuse (Schilling, 2009). 
The effects of Wilmington’s ordinance are substantial.  In 2003, prior to passing the ordinance, the city 
collected a total of $7,875 in registration fees from 950 eligible properties.  By 2007, the city collected 
                                                          
63 Some municipalities have passed foreclosed property ordinances, which function in the same manner as vacant 
property ordinances but apply to foreclosed properties rather than vacant properties. 
64 The ordinance does not state how long an occupancy period must be for the vacancy clock to be reset. 
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$1,050,000 in fees for 603 properties.  The number of vacant properties decreased by 22% during this 
time, and the valuation of building permits for vacant structures increased from $6.8 million in 2005 
to $20.8 million in 2007 (Schilling, 2009). 
Similarly, Cincinnati, Ohio updated its Vacated Building Maintenance License program in 2006, 
changing the licensing fee from $300 per property to a sliding scale, with fees ranging from $900 to 
$3,500, depending on how long the property has been vacant.  The program also requires $300,000 in 
liability insurance for vacant residential properties.  In the year prior to the fee increase, the program 
collected $53,100 in fees from 175 licenses; during the year following the increase, the city collected 
$265,500 for 290 licenses.  In cases where the property becomes occupied during the year for which 
the fee was paid, owners are reimbursed the licensing fee (Schilling, 2009). 
A third example is that of Chula Vista, California.  Chula Vista’s ordinance applies to properties in 
foreclosure, rather than to vacant structures.  The registration fee is only $70, but the ordinance 
requires weekly property inspections and a twenty-four hour point of contact.  Non-compliance 
penalties can reach $1,000 per violation per day; criminal prosecution is also possible and punishable 
by a maximum fine of $1,000 and up to six months in jail (Schilling, 2009). 
The second type of ordinance is the point of sale ordinance, which requires a property inspection 
immediately prior to sale.  The expectation is that these inspections will reduce the number of “as is” 
transactions, and particularly those involving inexperienced and uninformed buyers. The third type is 
an escrow requirement.  Escrow requirements require that the owner of record to put a specified 
amount of money in an escrow account, which can then be used to pay for property upkeep and fines 
if the owner does not keep the property properly maintained.  For example, Springfield 
(Massachusetts) and Albany (New York) require $10,000 in escrow for each foreclosure, while 
Worchester (Massachusetts) requires $5,000.  This type of ordinance effectively adds five to ten 
thousand dollars to the cost of each foreclosure for the lender or servicer, though it is possibly 
recuperable.  The expected effect is that lenders and servicers will foreclose less on low-value 
properties where they have little chance of recovering the escrow money (Fitzpatrick IV et al., 2013). 
Fitzpatrick et al. (2012; 2013) have researched the impacts of vacant property registration ordinances, 
point of sale ordinances, and escrow requirements in two papers.  They found that both point of sale 
inspections and vacancy registrations reduced the likelihood that a house would be flipped, defined in 
the paper as resold within two years.  They also found evidence that vacancy rates are reduced when 
vacancy registration ordinances are in effect.  However, the results were in general mixed and the 
researchers concluded that these ordinances did not reduce or prevent housing blight during the 
foreclosure crisis (Fitzpatrick IV, Nelson, Richter, & Whitaker, 2012). 
The 2013 paper examined the impacts of property ordinances on loans as well.  The authors found 
little evidence that these ordinances reduce the incidence of risky loans, though the combination of a 
point of sale ordinance with an escrow requirement does slightly reduce the likelihood that a loan will 
eventually go to foreclosure slightly.  However, they did find evidence that the ordinances reduce the 
likelihood that a property is tax-delinquent, which is a proxy for housing condition.  In particular, they 
found that escrow requirements have a positive effect on properties:  in comparison to municipalities 
where escrow was not required, properties were less likely to be tax-delinquent post sale, only slightly 
less likely to transition from delinquent to current, and less likely to transition from current to 
delinquent (Fitzpatrick IV et al., 2013).  However, in some cases escrow requirements have hurt 
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struggling homeowners:  a Worchester paper reported that banks simply added escrow costs to the 
amount owed by homeowners, making it even more difficult to get a mortgage back on track 
(Caywood, 2013). 
Though Fitzpatrick et al. found no clear impact on underwriting decisions and property transactions, 
and only found significant impacts on property condition in the case of escrow requirements, these 
legal changes can still benefit municipalities.  These ordinances facilitate the tracking and monitoring 
of vacant and problem properties, as well as create a revenue stream that can be used to counteract 
the negative municipal and community impacts of these properties.   
2.5 Summary 
Before embarking on the research itself, the extant academic literature and policy research has been 
catalogued, reviewed, and criticized in order to build upon what is known and to situate the research 
within both the scientific and the policy context.  
An important aspect of this is to define key terms used in the research, for example neighborhood.65  
Perusing the literature, it becomes clear that there is no clearly-bounded and generally accepted 
definition of neighborhood.  Rather a range of definitions exist, ranging from the idiosyncratic and 
resident-defined (i.e. neighborhoods are defined relative to individuals and thus vary from person to 
person) to externally defined boundaries used primarily due to data availability (such as U.S. Census 
tracts).  For this research I have chosen to use Suttles’ (1972) four-level hierarchy of neighborhood. 
The term neighborhood used in this research is equivalent to Suttles’ ‘local network and the face-block’ 
or ‘home area,’ which is individual-specific and encompasses approximately the area reachable within 
a five to ten minute walk from the individual’s residence.  Though this term is subjectively defined, one 
can assume there is sufficient overlap that residents discussing their ‘neighborhood’ will be referencing 
approximately the same geographic area.  The term community refers to Suttles’ term ‘defending 
neighborhood,’ which is the smallest geographic entity generally recognized by both residents and 
outsiders; it contains local businesses and institutions, such as churches.  In this research communities 
are approximated as Census tracts.  Finally, the term locality, which plays a smaller role in this research, 
is defined as Suttles’ ‘community of limited liability’ or ‘locality.’  Locality refers to a level of spatial 
aggregration more commonly used by external agents, such as city traffic and planning divisions and 
commercial interests.  Here localities are approximated as SPAs (Statistical Planning Areas). 
To ground the choice of analysis level (the neighborhood and the community), the research was 
situated within an array of research concerning the importance of geographic clustering for many 
educational, economic, and health outcomes, otherwise known as neighborhood effects research.  
Dietz (2002) listed three types of neighborhood effects:  endogeneous effects, where the aggregate 
behavior of neighbors influence individuals’ behavior; correlated effects, where neighborhood 
outcome patterns are the result of self-sorting into homogeneous neighborhoods; and exogeneous 
effects, where neighborhood patterns are the result of outside influences, such as housing 
discrimination.  In all likelihood, observed neighborhood effects are the result of a combination of all 
three potential sources. 
                                                          
65 Community is another key term in this research.  However, the term community is even less well-defined than 
the term neighborhood within the city & regional planning and geography literature. 
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Due primarily to methodological issues, a large gap exists between neighborhood effects’ theory and 
empirics.  These issues include spatial and temporal uncertainties (At what level of aggregation does a 
phenomenon occur?  Is there a temporal lag involved?), ignoring neighborhood sorting and parental 
effects, and the reflection problem, where the individuals whose qualities are under investigation are 
also those whose qualities are used to characterize the neighborhood.  All of these issues potentially 
lead to model misspecification, which can result in the detection of neighborhood effects where there 
are none, or determining that none exist when in fact they do. 
This research assumes neighborhood effects are present.  Though I do not attempt to discover whether 
these effects are endogeneous, correlated, or exogeneous, the research questions, the framing of the 
research, and the methods used imply both endogeneous and exogeneous neighborhood effects. 
Next foreclosure, the repossession of a loan’s collateral (in this case the house) by a bank or financial 
institution upon lack of payment by the borrower, was introduced. The process, entry and exit points 
of foreclosure, and possible alternatives were described.  This was followed by a discussion of 
foreclosure patterns according to loan and borrower characteristics as well as environmental or spatial 
clustering.  With respect to traditional loan indicators, lower quality and more expensive loans have 
higher rates of default.  Loan characteristics including high loan-to-value ratios, no doc loans, increased 
interest rates, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, loans classified as subprime, and ARMs are 
associated with increased default risk. In contrast, lender localness is associated with reduced default 
risk.  With respect to borrower characteristics, the two main features associated with delinquency and 
default are the existence of a triggering event, such as divorce or job loss, and race.  Both black and 
Hispanic borrowers are significantly much more likely to default than white borrowers; however, this 
appears to be primarily due to discrimination, since minority borrowers receive high cost loans much 
more often than white borrowers, even when they qualify for prime loans.   
There is also clear evidence that foreclosures are not evenly distributed, from the national level to 
within individual neighborhoods.  In particular, minority and low-income neighborhoods and 
communities are likely to see concentrated foreclosures in weak market areas.  Factors that are 
associated with increased foreclosure rates in a neighborhood or community include increased 
metropolitan black-white segregation, higher shares of black residents, lower median income, higher 
poverty rates, higher unemployment rates, increased housing stock age, inner city location, and a weak 
local housing market.  Foreclosure rates are also influenced by the state and local regulatory 
environment.  For example, in Ohio, one can expect higher rates of REOs given the longer foreclosure 
process than in neighboring Pennsylvania (Richter, 2008). 
The existing research provides strong evidence for the high costs of concentrated foreclosures to 
neighborhoods and communities, including property devaluation, increased blight, and increased 
crime, as well as the psychological effects of living in such an environment.  Municipal service needs 
increase as the result of foreclosures as well.  Apgar & Duda (2005) estimated municipal costs ranging 
from $430 to $34,199 per property under five post-foreclosure scenarios.  Several public health studies 
have shown the negative effects of concentrated foreclosures on health measures, including increased 
rates of depression, insomnia, and emergency room visits as well as an increase in West Nile virus 
infections that likely resulted from unmaintained swimming pools of foreclosed properties. 
Like the term neighborhood itself, the term neighborhood change is nebulously defined. Within 
neighborhood change research, the concept itself is rarely defined.  Rather, a particular indicator is 
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chosen as the focus, and changes in said indicator result in changes in another neighborhood indicator 
reveal whether said indicator is related to neighborhood change.  Researchers tend to use a dependent 
indicator that is common in their fields—for example, in this research I use property value, which is a 
common choice within the economics literature.  There are a wide variety of neighborhood change 
theories, including ecological models, based on invasion-succession models from ecology; subcultural 
models, which focus on the role of human agency in neighborhood change; and political economy 
models, which situates neighborhood change as occurring as the result of larger political and economic 
forces.  Synthetic models integrate components of the previous three types.  Finally, tipping models fit 
with any of the above theories, but hypothesize a non-linear relationship between changes in 
indicators and neighborhood change.  That is, beyond some threshold value of an indicator, more rapid 
(and perhaps unstoppable) neighborhood change will be triggered. 
More limited research indicates that foreclosures and neighborhood change are tied together, with 
evidence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between the two.  Research also shows that the 
neighborhood change resulting from concentrated foreclosures tends to increase racial segregation 
and income segmentation. 
A wide variety of foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have been used in the wake of the 
foreclosure crisis.  On the federal level, responses have been generally ineffective and highly influenced 
by the financial industry, avoiding more onerous responses that would allocate shared responsibility 
to banks and other lenders.  States have attempted to create and enforce anti-predatory lending laws, 
but generally those with any teeth have been pre-empted by the federal government.  Responses on 
the local level span a wide variety of strategies, including collaboration, organizing and advocacy, 
foreclosure prevention counseling and mediation programs, property acquisition strategies, 
landbanking, targeted intervention, and legal changes.  These responses occur on a variety of levels 
and are often interdependent, such as the need for legal changes in order to develop effective property 
acquisition strategies. 
The effect of foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses on neighborhood stability is unknown.  
In theory, mortgage modifications and the use of foreclosure alternatives should increase 
neighborhood stability as it reduces resident turnover and potential vacancies in the neighborhood.  
Post-foreclosure responses are also designed with the intent of increasing neighborhood stability and 
well-being.  For example, targeted demolitions of blighted and abandoned structures are intended to 
reduce and remove visible physical decay from neighborhoods.  However, up to this point in time no 
studies have examined the effects of foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts on the 
neighborhood level and whether these efforts, individually or concurrently, make a difference with 
respect to neighborhood stability.  Thus this research works to fill this knowledge gap. 
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Chapter 3 Research Design, Methods, and Data 
Now that the general problem context and the existing research have been introduced and analyzed, 
this chapter presents and discusses the research design, case selection, methods, and data used in this 
research.  It explains the decisions made concerning the research design, as well as the existing 
research, assumptions, and facts underlying these decisions.  The advantages and disadvantages of 
these decisions and the data used are also discussed.  The research questions are reprinted here for 
reference: 
Do foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an impact on neighborhood well-
being?   
 Under what political, social, and financial constraints do foreclosure responses in 
Cuyahoga County operate, and how do these constraints impact their operation and 
impacts? 
 What foreclosure responses have been implemented in Cuyahoga County?  How have 
these responses been created and developed? 
 To what extent are these foreclosure responses implemented and/or utilized?   
 What distribution of outcomes is seen?  Do these vary among neighborhoods and 
communities? 
 What strategies have been used in the foreclosure responses observed in Cuyahoga 
County? 
 What neighborhood and community impacts are observed? Are these physical, 
economic, social, and/or political?   
 Do these impacts vary according to certain neighborhood and community 
characteristics? 
 
The geographical terminology used is also reproduced below for reference: 
Table 3.1:  Geographical Concepts used in this Research 
Term used in this 
research 
Suttles (1972) term External Definition 
Neighborhood Local network and the face-
block/Home area 
Resident-defined 
neighborhoods 
Community 
 
Defending neighborhood Census tract (2010 boundaries) 
Locality Community of limited 
liability/Locality 
Statistical Planning Area (SPA) 
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3.1 Research Design 
This research uses a mixed methods case study to examine the impacts of foreclosure prevention and 
mitigation responses on neighborhood change.  This section first briefly introduces the overall research 
design.  It then addresses and discusses aspects informing the choice of research design and methods:  
the epistemology, theoretical perspective, and methodology.  After establishing this foundation, the 
choice of research design, case study, is introduced and discussed.  Following this the choice of a mixed 
methods design is discussed.  Finally the concept of triangulation is introduced. 
3.1.1 Overview 
In order to answer the research questions concerning the impact of foreclosure prevention and 
mitigation efforts on neighborhood stability, a mixed methods case study was undertaken.   A case 
study was chosen for deeper, more focused investigation, due to the limited previous research in this 
area. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where the city of Cleveland is located, was selected for the case study 
because of the highly developed foreclosure responses in the county, making it an exemplary test case 
for this research.  While the choice of a case study means that this research can not be freely 
generalized to other contexts, it provides starting points for additional research on foreclosure 
responses and other instances of sudden neighborhood change, particularly in other weak market 
regions. 
One component of the case study centered on qualitative inquiry, specifically by employing semi-
structured interviewing during two fieldwork trips to Cuyahoga County, Ohio in April and May 2011 
and October 2012.  The quantitative component of the research used quantile regression to 
numerically model possible impacts of various programs on neighborhood property value changes.  
Though the qualitative and quantitative components were independent of one another until the 
analysis stage, in some cases the results of the quantitative investigation opened new perspectives 
through which to further analyze the qualitative data, and vice versa.  Follow-up interviews were done 
in instances where gaps remained in the qualitative data, primarily in October 2012. The mixed method 
approach facilitated checking various data and results from the two components against one another, 
thereby strengthening the conclusions in some cases, and in others indicating areas where further 
investigation is required.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the research design graphically. 
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Figure 3.1:  Graphical representation of the research design 
3.1.2 Epistemology, Theoretical Perspective, and Methodology 
All research is supported by fundamental ideas about the nature of knowledge, what can and cannot 
be known, and how knowledge can be created or discovered. Using the layered framework of 
epistemology, theoretical perspective, and methodology, as laid out by Crotty (2003), I attempt to 
clarify these concepts with respect to this research. 
Though it is often considered sufficient to provide a presentation of the methods used and nothing 
more when describing a research design, there is much to gain by considering and describing what lies 
behind the choice of research design.  Rather than leaving these aspects implicit, making them explicit 
mayprevent inconsistencies, resulting in a stronger research design. 
In this section I briefly introduce the epistemology, followed by the theoretical perspective, and finally 
the methodology used in this research.  In describing each, I attempt to link these more abstract ideas 
to their impact on the research design and approach. 
Constructionism 
Epistemology, or the theory of the origin, nature, and limits of knowledge, provides a foundation for 
what types of research are undertaken, and in what manners.  The current research falls into the 
category of constructionism; that is, underlying this research is the philosophy that knowledge is 
constructed—not discovered—by humans.  Crotty defines constructionism as “the view that all 
knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being 
constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and 
transmitted within an essentially social context” (Crotty, 2003, p.42): 
It follows that different individuals can construct knowledge differently, resulting in a multiplicity of 
meanings (Crotty, 2003). Crotty gives the example of the concept of ‘tree’ having very different 
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meanings in a logging town, an artists’ settlement, and a bare inner city area (2003, p. 43).  Thus, when 
situated in a constructionistic epistemology, the researcher must attempt to see the world from the 
perspective of those being studied (Flick, 2009). 
Constructionism posits that meaning making is an inherently social process.  Thus, social aspects, or 
more simply culture, influences meaning making:  what is seen, how things are seen, what meanings 
they have, and moreover, what is not seen (Crotty, 2003). Cultural systems of meaning both shed light 
on and obscure the creation of knowledge—all knowledge is constructed by a process of selecting and 
structuring (Flick, 2009).  Thus, though there is often a social “truth,” this is in fact a consensus 
constructed by a larger group of people, not truth in any objective sense (Patton, 2002).  Patton 
illustrates this by means of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which posited scientific 
progress as a succession of paradigms governed by power struggles, rather than a steady progression 
toward scientific truth. 
Crotty (2003) states that constructionism fosters critical inquiry by calling attention to the social 
construction of “truths” and “facts” found imbedded in social existence.   By examining the meanings 
constructed and used by dominant groups and actors, researchers bring attention to the perspectives 
of others who hold less power (Patton, 2002). 
How does a constructionist epistemology affect research questions and research design?  Patton 
(2002) lists the following foundational questions of constructionism: 
 “How have the people in this setting constructed reality? 
 What are their reported perceptions, ‘truths,’ explanations, beliefs, and worldview? 
 What are the consequences of their constructions for their behaviors and for those 
with whom they interact?” (p.96)66 
Thus, research in the constructionist tradition could, for example, examine various stakeholders’ and 
participants’ ideas, experiences, and perceptions, then consider how these meanings affect what 
participants do and how they interpret reality.  For example, the research reported here examines the 
effects of foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs.  Depending on how one sees reality, which 
responses to the foreclosure crisis are appropriate and likely to be effective will differ.  Some 
respondents will see a program as following a certain mechanism, based on their worldview, while 
others will have a differing worldview and conclusion.  In particular, what is considered “right” or “fair” 
will differ among individuals depending on how each sees the world and why he or she believes it is 
the way it is.  The introduction to the foreclosure crisis and contextual factors (see Sections 1.1.1 and 
5.1) touches on this:  how dominant narratives of the foreclosure crisis, its causes, and appropriate 
responses are both created and reinforced by how individuals see the world. 
It is not as obvious how the constructionist tradition fits with quantitative methods—at first glance 
these methods “objectively” uncover mathematical relationships between various factors.  However, 
underlying these methods and models are many assumptions and simplifications:  For which indicators 
are data available?  Which are used?  How are these indicators operationalized?  How is data cleaning 
and outlier analysis undertaken?  What causality is assumed in the model?  The answers to these 
questions and many others reflect the views and beliefs of the researcher and greatly influence the 
                                                          
66 A suggested fourth question:  How does the researcher’s constructed reality differ or mirror that of the people 
in the setting and what is the impact of that on the research? 
 103 
 
research.  For example, in this research I use a purely economic measure for the dependent variable 
in the quantitative model.  This choice limits what is investigated; by using a purely economic measure 
to approximate neighborhood well-being I am making a strong statement—desired or not—about 
what I consider important (and measurable) about neighborhoods.67 
Interpretivism & Symbolic Interactionism 
Crotty (2003) describes a theoretical perspective as the philosophical stance, or a way of looking at 
and making sense of the world, that supports a research methodology (pp.7-8).  By clarifying one’s 
theoretical perspective, one should make clear what assumptions and context frame the research. 
This research uses symbolic interactionism, one subtype of interpretivism, as its theoretical 
perspective.  Interpretivism is linked to Weber’s contrast of verstehen (interpreting, understanding) 
and erklären (explaining).  Verstehen is often linked to social science and/or qualitative research, and 
erklären to natural science and/or quantitative research, though the distinctions are better considered 
to be tendencies, not strict rules.   
Symbolic interactionism is rooted in the philosophy of pragmatism.  Quite simply, symbolic 
interactionism is a theoretical perspective that bases inquiry around the symbolic meanings individuals 
bestow on ideas and things, and how they interact with and are shaped by these.  Blumer (1969) 
provides three well-cited assumptions of symbolic interactionism: 
 “that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that these things have 
for them,” 
 “that the meaning of such things is derived from, and arises out of, the social interaction 
that one has with one’s fellows,” 
 and “that these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretive process 
used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters” (p.2, qtd. in Flick, 2009, p.58). 
A clear consequence of these assumptions is that symbolic interactionist research must consider 
strongly the point of view and meanings held by the actors involved in the research (Crotty, 2003).  
Clearly a risk here is misunderstanding the worldview of the actors. 
It is easy to see that symbolic interactionism fits well within a constructionist epistemology.  The two 
share a strong focus on the construction of meaning, and place importance on the viewpoint and 
understandings of the actor.  Both also recognize the centrality of social interactions in the creation of 
meaning. 
Phronetic Research 
A research methodology is the strategy used to determine the research design and choice of methods.  
This research uses phronetic research as a methodology to frame the study. 
Phronetic research is a methodological orientation advocated for by Flyvbjerg and derived from the 
philosophy of Aristotle, Foucault, Habermas, and Nietzsche.  Aristotelian philosophy includes three 
types of knowledge:  episteme, or “knowledge,” which deals with universals and is best applied to the 
                                                          
67 This choice is substantially driven by data availability and ease of quantification.  However, the use of mixed 
methods is strongly informed by these limitations and is an attempt to (partially) overcome them. 
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natural sciences; techne, “craft,” or “art,” which is production oriented—such as technological 
research; and phronesis, or “ethics,” or “values,” which is context-dependent and Flyvbjerg argues is 
most appropriate, and in fact necessary, in social science applications.  He criticizes much social science 
research for aspiring toward the discovery of epistemic knowledge, which is a poor fit for the context-
dependent reality of the social world.  Due to the necessity of judgment, values, and context to 
understanding social reality, Flyvbjerg considers reliance on episteme to be the failure of social science, 
and a shift to phronesis as its solution (B. Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
Thus, rather than searching for general laws, phronetic research frames social research with four 
questions concerning the phenomenon under investigation: 
1. Where are we going?  
2. Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power? 
    3. Is this development desirable? 
    4. What, if anything, should we do about it? (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.145). 
 
Phronetic research aims to “provide in-depth narratives of how power works and with what 
consequences, and to suggest how power might be changed and work with other consequences. The 
result of phronetic research is an account of the possibilities, problems, and risks we face in specific 
domains of social action” (Flyvbjerg, 2009).   
Flyvbjerg presents a conception of power that combines aspects of both Nietzschean-Foucauldian and 
Weberian-Dahlian interpretations of power, resulting in the following six characteristics of power: 
1. Power is seen as productive and positive and not only as restrictive and negative. 
2. Power is viewed as a dense net of omnipresent relations and not only as localized in 
‘centers’ and institutions, or as an entity one can ‘possess.’ 
3. The concept of power is seen as ultradynamic; power is not only something one 
appropriates, but also something one reappropriates and exercises in a constant back-
and-forth movement in relations of strength, tactics, and strategies. 
4. Knowledge and power, truth and power, rationality and power are analytically 
inseparable from each other; power produces knowledge and knowledge produces 
power. 
5. The central question is how power is exercised, and not only who has power, and why 
they have it; the focus is on process in addition to structure. 
6. Power is studied with a point of departure in small questions, ‘flat and empirical,’ not 
only, nor primarily, with a point of departure in ‘big questions.’” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 
pp.131-2). 
I would like to draw special attention to the fourth characteristic, which pronounces knowledge, truth, 
rationality, and power to be inseparable from one another—that is, knowledge, truth, and rationality 
are expressions and mechanisms of power rather than entities separate from power.  For example, in 
the context of foreclosure mediation, servicers have refused to share their net present value (NPV) 
calculations that are used to determine how a delinquent mortgage should be handled.  By keeping 
this information private, servicers are able to dictate the range of options available—whether or not 
there are in fact other possibilities—and thus are defining what exists and does not exist.  I attempt to 
illustrate this with respect to the foreclosure crisis and its consequences in this research. 
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Applying this conception of power to the research question stimulates the probing of assumptions, 
rationalities, and rationalizations present in the problem context.  For example, the examination of 
how power defines truth and rationality in the foreclosure context leads to an understanding of how 
power shapes the possibility field for foreclosure responses.  Examining the development and 
implementation of foreclosure responses while recognizing the role of power can illuminate the 
appropriation and reappropriation of power, and by what methods, by various stakeholder groups 
invested in the foreclosure crisis. 
Flyvbjerg (2001) includes several methodological guidelines for doing phronetic research in Making 
Social Science Matter.  These include focusing on values, placing power at the core of analysis, looking 
at practice before discourse, study cases and contexts, asking “How?” by doing narrative analysis, 
joining agency and structure, and dialoguing with a polyphony of voices—that is, “to produce input to 
the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in society, rather than to generate ultimate, unequivocally 
verified knowledge” (p.139). 
A phronetic research methodology is well-aligned with constructionist epistemology and a symbolic 
interactionist theoretical perspective.   All three place a focus on the social construction of meaning 
and power, and all three recognize the necessity of context and specifics in social science research.  All 
acknowledge the role of the researcher’s background and perspective in shaping the research.  
Examining the research question and subquestions of this research in relation to the four questions 
listed above, one can see that the questions chosen are suitable for a phronetic research methodology.  
For example, the attention to the problem context allows exploration of the role of power in shaping 
foreclosure responses and their implementation.   As well, the case study research design and in 
particular the qualitative method (see Section 3.3) are well-suited to a phronetic research 
methodology, as they both prioritize detailed and in-depth examination of the phenomena at hand.  
The case study supports the investigation of practice, is inherently a study of cases and contexts, uses 
narrative analysis to understand how things come to pass and how they function, enables one to 
investigate both agency and structure and to examine the links between them,68 and leaves room for 
dialogue and interpretation by presenting rich detail to allow the reader to make his or her own 
conclusions concerning the phenomenon and the research. 
In this research the four phronetic research questions play the role of an undercurrent or framework 
in which the research is embedded, rather than claiming priority over or equivalence with the research 
questions introduced in Chapter 1 and at the beginning of this chapter.  In writing the literature review 
and case study description, one of my objectives has been to clarify aspects relating to power that are 
embedded in the case context.  Ideally this will facilitate the reader’s drawing his or her own 
conclusions with respect to the role of power in the research setting. 
3.1.3 Case Study Approach 
A case study is defined by the choice of the research object used—an individual case, which may be a 
person, location, event, organization, or other boundable instance (Stake, 2005).69  Many scholars 
                                                          
68 In fact I would argue that agency and structure are two ends of a continuum, rather than separate concepts.  
However the use of the two terms aids in analysis and interpretation.  Flyvbjerg (2001) makes this argument as 
well. 
69 Please note that multiple (comparative) and nested case studies are possible and common.  Nested case 
studies will be discussed later in this section. 
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argue that rather than being a method, as it is sometimes described, case study is an approach or 
analysis process (Patton, 2002; Stake, 2005; Stark & Torrance, 2005).  Various methods are then 
applied in the use of the case study approach.  Interviews, participant observation, document analysis, 
and field studies are particularly common (Patton, 2002; Stark & Torrance, 2005), though case studies 
are by no means limited to qualitative analysis methods. 
After choosing the research questions and determining that a case study best suits the research 
objectives, the researcher must then select the case.  This decision is based on several considerations 
that are discussed in the Sampling Methods section below. Next, data are collected.  These data are 
then assembled and processed to the extent necessary.  In more complex cases, an intermediate step 
of creating a case record can be carried out.  In this step the case data are further organized, 
condensed, and classified.  During and after this phase, the data are analyzed.70  Finally, the case study 
narrative is written. This can be organized in various ways, for example chronologically or thematically.  
The goal is “a holistic portrayal, presented with any context necessary for understanding the case” 
(Patton, 2002, p.450). 
Purpose & Approach 
The purpose of a case study is to focus in-depth on a particular case; to systematically collect 
comprehensive, rich data on a particular subject and then carefully analyze meanings within the 
context of the case (Mukhija, 2010; Patton, 2002; Stake, 2005).  Stake stresses “the case researcher 
digs into meanings, working to relate them to contexts and experience.  In each instance, the work is 
reflective” (2005, p.450).  Researchers also stress that “depth, detail, and richness” of data (also 
referred to as thick description, among other names) is the key to strong case study research and 
provides a mechanism for internal validity (Mukhija, 2010, p.419).  
The case study approach “assumes that ‘social reality’ is created through social interaction, albeit 
situated in particular contexts and histories, and seeks to identify and describe before trying to analyse 
and theorize. It assumes that things may not be as they seem” (Stark & Torrance, 2005, p.33).  Thus 
the case study approach fits clearly into the interpretivist theoretical perspective and constructionist 
epistemology within which this research is situated.  Stark and Torrance go on to state that case study 
is “particular, descriptive, inductive, and ultimately heuristic—it seeks to ‘illuminate’ the readers’ 
understanding of an issue” (p.33).  Case study researchers teach both by sharing what they have 
learned, as well as by presenting material to readers, thus facilitating the construction of knowledge 
by the reader (Stake, 2005). 
Data Collection 
Given that case studies focus on a particular instance in-depth, it is unsurprising that many types of 
data need to be collected in the case study process.  Stake lists six categories of data, pertaining to:  
the nature of the case; the case’s historical background; the physical setting; economic, legal, political, 
and other contexts; other cases with similarities to the case of interest; and informants (2005).  Patton 
lists method-linked data categories:  interview data, observations, documents, and statistical 
information, among others (2002).  These data can be used to reconstruct the case, illuminate different 
                                                          
70 The nature of the analysis depends on the methods employed.  The specific methods used in this research are 
discussed in Section 3.3.   
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understandings of the phenomena at hand, and identify changes in values and objectives of individuals 
or programs over time. 
A particularly difficult aspect of data collection is determining the boundaries of the case.   Given that 
various contexts and their interplay are key to quality case research, it is easy to see the difficulty in 
bounding the case—too small and important connections are lost; too large and the case’s larger 
environs subsume the case.  Stark and Torrance (2005) caution against the automatic use of physical 
boundaries of the case location, giving the example of investigating schooling and excluding the role 
of parents, were the school itself used to bound the case.  They also provide an example of an 
alternative bounding, taking a vertical ‘core’ from the central policy-maker, down to the ground-level 
implementation  in the example of a policy case study (Stark & Torrance, 2005, p.35). 
Sampling Methods 
Case studies often use purposive (also known as purposeful or theoretical) sampling, often associated 
with qualitative methods, in contrast to random sampling, which is often used with quantitative 
methods.  The strength of analysis based on purposive sampling is not linked to the number of samples, 
as it is in random sampling, where a sufficiently high number of samples is required to show statistical 
significance.  To the contrary, the strength of purposive sampling comes from the selection of an 
information-rich case appropriate to answering the research questions (Patton, 2002).  While the 
strength of random sampling comes from the researcher not influencing the cases selected, in 
purposive sampling the researcher’s choice of appropriate case(s) can determine the strength of the 
study before any data collection or analysis is carried out.  That is, if a researcher selects individuals or 
groups who have deeper experience or understanding of the problem of interest, the research will be 
stronger than had he or she attempted to randomly sample individuals (who may or may not have the 
necessary knowledge and experience). 
Purposive sampling does of course have shortcomings:  the voices and perspectives of individuals and 
groups that are underrepresented, intentionally or not, may be left out of the research.  In the case of 
exploratory research, such as this, important parties may be excluded due to the inherent ambiguity 
of an exploratory approach. 
Stake (2005) divides case studies into three types:  intrinsic, instrumental, and multiple or collective 
case studies.  Intrinsic case studies are those undertaken to better understand the case itself.  This is 
in contrast to instrumental cases, which are studied in order to investigate the concerns of 
researchers—that is, to develop or test theory.  Multiple or collective case studies are instrumental 
case studies extended to multiple cases.  In my opinion, intrinsic case studies are an ideal, but non-
existent, type, since all researchers select their cases for some reason, in order to investigate some 
understanding or lack of understanding of the world. 
Both Stake (2005) and Patton (2002) advocate case selection on the basis of the opportunity to learn 
and develop knowledge.  Patton (2002) details sixteen purposive sampling strategies, each with its 
own purpose.  The rationales vary:  extreme or deviant case sampling examines unusual cases of a 
phenomenon; typical case sampling investigates the ‘normal’ instance of a phenomenon.71  
Opportunistic sampling makes use of flexibility and emergent circumstances, while political 
                                                          
71 Or at least what the researcher believes is a “normal” or “typical” case of the phenomenon of interest. 
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importance-based sampling is used to attract attention to the study.  Clearly, the scientific credibility 
of sampling methods varies. 
Both Patton (2002) and Flyvbjerg (2006) draw attention to the possibility of a case fulfilling multiple 
sampling selection strategies.  In these cases the researcher may be able to analyze the case from 
multiple perspectives (Flyvbjerg, 2006)). 
Cases generally include smaller units within them: people, places, events, and policies, for example.  
These are referred to as layered, nested, embedded, or mini cases (Patton, 2002; Stake, 2005).  Some 
authors advise collecting data on the lowest reasonable level, as aggregation is always possible but 
disaggregation is not (Patton, 2002).   Nested cases can take interesting forms; for example, Mukhija 
(2010) suggests creating subcases based on different perspectives; in his example, those of for-profit 
housing developers, non-profit housing developers, and community cooperatives. 
Generalizability 
The inability to generalize statistically from a case study to a population is considered the major 
weakness of case study research (Stark & Torrance, 2005).  Some argue that case study research efforts 
can be small steps toward generalization (Stake, 2005), while a more traditional view considers case 
study research to be appropriate only for hypothesis generation, and thus appropriate for under-
researched and weakly developed areas of research. 
Others argue for the generalizability of case studies.  These arguments fall into two groups.  The first 
is based around Popper’s falsification test, in which a scientific statement can be falsified through one 
counter example.  A falsification of a theory would certainly be generalizable.  The selection of critical 
cases, those in which it can be said “if it happens there, it will happen anywhere” or “if it doesn’t 
happen there, it won’t happen anywhere” (Patton, 2002, p.236), is ideal in case study research designs 
investigating theory falsification (Ruddin, 2006).   
The second argument for the generalizability of case studies is referred to as “naturalistic 
generalization” (Stake & Trumbull, 1982).  Here generalization is considered transferability, meaning 
that the researcher provides detail rich description that facilitates each reader making an individual 
judgment on whether a case is generalizable or not (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Ruddin, 2006; Stark & 
Torrance, 2005).  This is the argument I make for this research.  My intention is to provide sufficient 
detail and depth of description so that, in addition to my conclusions, readers can judge for themselves 
in which ways the work is generalizable.  I provide some direction, such as restricting the discussion to 
weak market regions, but leave the task of making generalizability decisions to the reader on a case-
by-case basis.  Of course, I intend for this research to generate hypotheses that can be tested in later 
research as well. 
3.1.4 Mixed Methods 
This research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods.  The intention of this mixed methods 
approach is to combine the strengths of each method to better support the results and analysis than 
would be possible when relying on one method alone.  For example, while a quantitative analysis of 
neighborhood change can explain much about what happens given various permutations of 
neighborhood characteristics, foreclosure indicators, and foreclosure-related programs, only 
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qualitative analysis can aim to understand why these phenomena occur.  From the opposite 
perspective, qualitative inquiry alone risks the possibility of being overly influenced by the biases and 
assumptions of those producing the data, in this case interviewees.  That is, interviewees may omit (or 
include) information that is important to (or unrelated to) the research question.  What is important 
or obvious to interviewees may be less critical from another viewpoint, and what is assumed 
unimportant may in fact be essential.  In these cases, quantitative analysis can highlight relationships 
that could otherwise be obscured. In essence, the qualitative and quantitative components of the 
research represent two competing constructions of reality—one defined by the informants and one 
defined by the available quantitative data and myself as a researcher.  These two “viewpoints” are 
examined and analyzed separately (but concurrently), and then synthesized to the extent possible to 
answer the research question from multiple angles. 
The examples above highlight that what is quantitatively seen—for example, how targeted demolitions 
affect a neighborhood under certain conditions—and what is believed or endorsed by the institutions 
involved—the qualitative impact of the program—may or may not agree.  Discrepancies that emerge 
encourage additional investigation and highlight weak points.  In this technique, the quantitative and 
qualitative methods complement one another, resulting in a stronger and more thorough 
understanding of the study phenomenon (Flick, 2009).  The mixed methods approach also encourages 
iterative investigation, allowing for circulation between levels of analysis to extend and fine tune 
understanding.  
In this research the qualitative and quantitative components do not investigate the same thing.  The 
quantitative component examines the relationships between various foreclosure responses and the 
percent change in residential property value on the community level, while the qualitative component 
examines the impact of these responses on community and neighborhood well-being, as defined in 
Section 1.3.1.  This means that the two research components are not directly comparable; however, 
because percent change in residential property value approximates one component of community and 
neighborhood well-being—specifically the community or neighborhood degree of socioeconomic 
stability—the two have sufficient overlap to allow for comparison.   
The choice of mixed methods is also a pragmatic one.  While I believe that qualitative research, when 
properly carried out, provides significantly more information about social phenomena, how they occur, 
and what structures are embedded within their workings—that is, qualitative research provides 
greater opportunity for verstehen—quantitative research is often more persuasive and attractive to 
policymakers.  The allure of quantitative research is of course that it appears to provide objectivity and 
certainty in complex environments, while qualitative research often brings the ‘messiness’ of reality 
into greater focus.  It is a natural human tendency to prefer concreteness and certainty over context-
dependency and multiple, often irreconcilable, viewpoints.  Thus, a quantitative research component 
makes this research and its outcomes more attractive and palatable to politicians and practitioners 
than a purely qualitative effort would be. 
Moreover, property value measures are routinely used as a measure of neighborhood and/or 
community well-being.  For example, the Strategic Investment Initiative, one of the foreclosure 
responses undertaken in Cuyahoga County, uses changes in property values as one of its metrics to 
determine the success of the program.72  Comparing the results of the qualitative and quantitative 
                                                          
72 The other metrics are the occupancy and homeowner rates and private investment. 
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components will provide some evidence as to whether using property values and/or changes in 
property values are a suitable metric for assessing neighborhood and community well-being.  This 
research cannot conclusively state whether or not that is the case; however it can provide evidence 
for or against this within the limited scope of this research, and may point to further research 
concerning this question. 
A final reason for using mixed methods is that this research is situated in an under-researched field of 
study.  Thus, the research design incorporates a strong exploratory aspect.  Using mixed methods 
increases the breadth, scope, and variety of data considered for the analysis.  Aspects of the 
relationships between local foreclosure responses and neighborhood change that were not initially 
apparent may be captured in these data.  For example, the role and importance of neighborhood-level 
responses (e.g. activities undertaken by block clubs and neighborhood associations) was not an 
obvious avenue for investigation—to me—when the fieldwork was carried out.  The key nature of 
these responses only became clear to me during the data analysis.  I collected a large body of data 
relating to these responses only because I used mixed methods, in particular the use of semi-structured 
interviews, which allowed respondents to volunteer potentially important information on topics I had 
not explicitly asked about. 
Purpose & Approach 
Greene defines mixed methods approaches as “the planned use of two or more different kinds of data 
gathering and analysis techniques, and more rarely different kinds of inquiry designs within the same 
study or project” (Greene, Kreider, & Mayer, 2005, p.274).  She gives the classic mixed methods design 
as one incorporating numerical data and analysis with text data and analysis.  Although it is not 
necessarily so, mixed methods research is generally thought of and comprised of one or more 
quantitative methods and one or more qualitative methods. 
Greene lists four purposes for mixed methods research:  (1) understanding more defensibly; (2) 
understanding more comprehensively; (3) understanding more insightfully; and (4) understanding with 
greater value consciousness and with greater diversity of values, which underlie the methods 
themselves (Greene et al., 2005, p.275).  Clearly these four purposes are not sharply delineated, and 
many researchers are motivated by more than one of these intentions.   
The origin of mixed methods research is triangulation, which is discussed in more detail following this 
section.  In brief, triangulation uses multiple methods to investigate the same phenomenon and thus 
increase confidence in the findings.  Though qualitative and quantitative methods are rooted in very 
different epistemologies and theoretical perspectives, both have histories of triangulation.  This 
common history aided in the advancement of mixed methods research, though the mixing of 
epistemological and theoretical assumptions can be an issue in itself, one which researchers have 
handled in various ways (Greene et al., 2005). 
Mixed Methods Research Design 
In designing a mixed methods research inquiry, additional aspects must be considered relative to a 
study employing a single method.  Though Onwuegbuzie and Combs (2010) list thirteen criteria that 
can be used to typologize mixed methods, many authors use simpler typologies that contain two or 
three criteria.  Morgan (2006) uses a two-dimensional typology:  priority and sequence.  The priority 
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criterion concerns which of the two methods73 is dominant, and which is secondary.  The sequence 
criterion concerns the order in which the two methods are used (and thus which informs the other).  
He lists a quantitatively focused study in which the quantitative phase is preceded by an exploratory 
qualitative phase as the most common of the four priority-sequence combinations (Morgan, 2006).  
According to Morgan’s typology, the research reported in this document would most closely fall under 
the category of QUAL-quant, where the focus is on the qualitative component of the research with the 
qualitative component (technically) preceding the quantitative component. 
Greene (2005) details a similar typology, but with a third dimension and additional flexibility in the 
priority and sequence dimensions.  Under her typology, the quantitative and qualitative methods may 
be of equal importance, and the two methods may be implemented simultaneously, as well as 
sequentially.  She includes a third dimension, that of integrated or component design.  In an integrated 
design, transfer occurs iteratively between the two methods throughout the research, and the results 
of the two methods are combined in the analysis.  Component design keeps the two methods separate, 
and concurrence is sought in the analysis, rather than a full integration between the two (Greene et 
al., 2005).  Following Greene’s typology, this research is simultaneous component74 design with a 
qualitative focus informed by a quantitative component.   
3.1.5 Triangulation 
An analysis method important in both case study and mixed methods research is that of triangulation, 
also referred to as confirmation or convergence (Morgan, 2006).  Triangulation is “a process of using 
multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” 
(Stake, 2005, p.454).   
Denzin (1970) discusses four types of triangulation:  data, investigator, theory, and methodological.  In 
the case of data triangulation, data are collected from multiple sources, varying across time, space, 
and individuals (Flick, 2009).  Redundant data are collected from many sources in order to avoid bias 
and separate fact from opinion and preference, or alternatively, to identify different ways the 
phenomenon is perceived and experienced (Mukhija, 2010; Patton, 2002; Stake, 2005).   
Investigator triangulation refers to the use of multiple investigators and systematic investigation of the 
impacts of various investigators on the research.  In the case of theory triangulation, one approaches 
the research question from multiple theoretical perspectives with multiple hypotheses, and then 
compares the research results with those predicted by the various theoretical perspectives (Flick, 
2009).  While an interesting approach, such a research design is often difficult to create, since different 
theories often lead to different questions concerning the phenomenon of interest.  The 
implementation of this sort of design would likely be unwieldy in many cases, and perhaps also 
impossible to make comparisons between, depending on the degree of theoretical difference.   
                                                          
73 The authors of these typologies simplify to a mixed methods design using one qualitative and one quantitative 
method.  One can easily extend the typologies to other combinations of methods. 
74 I categorized this research as a component research design because the qualitative and quantitative aspects 
were undertaken mostly in parallel.  I did initiate the qualitative component before the quantitative component, 
and findings from one component did sometimes influence the other.  However, as the two components did 
require any integration prior to the analysis, I believe this research has more of a component than an integrated 
design. 
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Triangulation is useful in addressing internal validity concerns (Mukhija, 2010). Some researchers 
consider this type of triangulation to be, in reality, two different studies, each using a different method, 
where the researcher expects or hopes for results consistent across both studies (Morgan, 2006, citing 
Denzin, 1970).  This is the fourth type of triangulation referred to by Denzin, methodological 
triangulation. Within-method triangulation is also possible; in this case one could, for example, use 
multiple quantitative model specifications and compare results.  Methodological triangulation will, 
ideally, allow the researcher to demonstrate that findings are robust, and not simply due to an 
idiosyncrasy of a particular method or dataset. 
This research uses between-method triangulation by comparing the results of the quantitative and 
qualitative components of the research design.  While many aspects of the quantitative and qualitative 
results in this study are not directly comparable, the results and analysis of two components can be 
compared to determine if they corroborate one another.  In this research the quantitative component 
examines what occurs on the county level, while the qualitative component examines the county level 
as well as community and neighborhood levels.  Moreover, the quantitative component uses change 
in residential property value as the outcome of interest, while the qualitative component uses 
community or neighbourhood well-being.  By triangulating the results, it is possible to determine if the 
results align cohesively.  That is, do the patterns and relationships observed quantitatively on the 
county level support those observed qualitatively and vice versa?  Do responses that are positively 
related to change in residential property value also have a positive association with neighborhood and 
community well-being?  Or do the results of the two components contain contradictions, casting doubt 
on the validity of the findings and/or indicating that part of the puzzle is missing? 
3.2 Case Study Selection 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, located in northeastern Ohio (see Figure 3.2), was selected as the case study 
through which to examine whether foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an impact 
on neighborhood stability and decline.  As of 2010, Cuyahoga County was the 29th most populous U.S.-
American county.  It includes the City of Cleveland, the 45th most populous U.S.-American city (U.S. 
Census, 2012a). The larger Cleveland-Akron-Elyria Combined Statistical Area (CSA) is the United States’ 
sixteenth largest CSA (U.S. Census, 2011).  
Including the City of Cleveland, Cuyahoga County includes 59 municipalities and townships and is 
divided into 96 Statistical Planning Areas (SPAs), commonly referred to within the county by officials, 
planners, and local CDCs as neighborhoods.  However, I do not use the term neighborhood to refer to 
SPAs, I use the term locality.  This is to avoid confusion with other uses of the term neighborhood (see 
Section 1.3.1).  The quantitative component of this research uses Census tracts as the unit of analysis; 
I use the term community to refer to Census tracts.  Census tracts usually have between 2,500 and 
8,000 inhabitants, and are designed to have relatively homogeneous populations and property 
characteristics (NEO CANDO, n.d.). Cuyahoga County contains 443 Census tracts, excluding Lake Erie, 
as of the 2010 Census.  Cuyahoga County municipalities and their constituent neighborhoods 
encompass a wide variety of socioeconomic conditions and have been impacted in various ways by the 
foreclosure crisis, both in timing and severity.   
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Figure 3.2:  Location of Cuyahoga County 
 
The choice of Cuyahoga County is an instance of purposive sampling, in this case choosing a case from 
the “inside” of the problem—that is, a particularly developed instance of the phenomenon of interest 
(Patton, 2002).  As mentioned by Flyvbjerg (2006), multiple case selection strategies can be used 
simultaneously.  In this instance, Cuyahoga County is considered both an extreme case and a critical 
case of foreclosure prevention and mitigation strategies in weak housing market cities. 
 
Due to the early impact of foreclosures in Ohio, compared to other hard-hit areas such as Florida and 
California, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County are an ideal study area.  While many states have severe 
foreclosure problems related to the U.S. housing bubble, Ohio’s problems were initially due to 
predatory lending75 combining with weak state consumer protection laws.  By the time Ohio was 
affected by consequences of the housing bubble, its foreclosure problems had already been growing 
for nearly a decade (Rothstein, 2010).  Despite this difference, the effects on borrowers, 
neighborhoods, and municipalities are not significantly different from the effects seen nationally.  
Foreclosure rates in Ohio quadrupled from 1995 to 2009, finally exhibiting a small decrease in 2010 
that has continued through to the present time.  In 2009, one in 56 housing units in the state was 
foreclosed upon (Rothstein, 2010).  The depth, breadth, and early impact of foreclosures and related 
                                                          
75 The definition of the term predatory lending continues to be contentious.  Fannie Mae uses a definition that 
requires at least one of three specific characteristics be met: “targeted marketing to households on the basis of 
their race, ethnicity, age or gender or other personal characteristics unrelated to creditworthiness; unreasonable 
and unjustifiable loan terms; and outright fraudulent behavior that maximizes the destructive financial impact 
on consumers of inappropriate marketing strategies and loan provisions” (Carr & Kolluri, 2001, p.2). 
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problems are indicative of an extreme case.  As well, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County have been able 
to develop responses over a longer period of time than many other areas hit by foreclosures.  Thus, 
the combination of an earlier onset—and thus a longer time to develop responses—but similar impacts 
to those seen nationally provides for a particularly interesting and informative case study. 
 
Cleveland’s existing housing advocacy network (Swanstrom, Chapple, & Immergluck, 2009) and the 
slower foreclosure process in Ohio have aided stakeholders in crafting responses, building networks, 
and shifting organizational resources to deal with the crisis.  Combined with the earlier onset of the 
foreclosure problem, the strategies used in Cleveland are often at the forefront of national foreclosure 
mitigation efforts and as such are considered to be a model response by municipalities and regions 
struggling to deal with similar problems.  For example, the Cuyahoga County Land Bank, along with the 
Genessee County Land Bank (Flint, Michigan), are considered the models for landbanking programs 
(Ford, October 12, 2012).  A New York Times journalist, Alex Kotlowicz, who wrote the New York Times 
Magazine article “All Boarded Up” on the foreclosure crisis in Slavic Village, a Cleveland neighborhood, 
said he chose Cleveland to profile because it was “the one place in the county where I saw people 
pushing back . . . You’ve seen things, you’ve heard things, and you’ve felt things that most of us haven’t 
. . .  it is incumbent on you to share [that] with the rest of the country.  In your hands is not the future 
of one house or one block or even one city.  You need to be the guides. I urge you to give voice to what 
you’ve seen” (Alex Kotlowicz, qtd. in Coulton et al., 2010a).  These aspects are indicative of a critical 
case—one where it can be said “if it doesn’t work here, it (probably) won’t work anywhere.”76   
 
Finally, Cuyahoga County also offers considerable data resources related to the foreclosure crisis and 
interventions.  For example, the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program (CCFPP) has 
undertaken multiple program evaluations, in 2006, 2007, and 2009, which contain both qualitative and 
quantitative data concerning the program’s operation and impact.  Two internal reports, written in 
2007 and 2009, were also available.  Additionally, Cuyahoga County provides mapping shapefiles and 
parcel data, and Case Western Reserve University’s NEO CANDO (Northeast Ohio Community and 
Neighborhood Data for Organizing) provides a wide variety of pre-cleaned and -aggregated data at 
various resolutions, including loan origination information and foreclosure information at the parcel 
level.  This level of data collection and availability both aids in the continued development of the 
foreclosure response efforts in the county as well as provides a quantitatively data-rich case. 
 
3.3 Methods 
As introduced in Section 3.1.1, the research follows a simultaneous component design with a 
qualitative focus to investigate the impacts of foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs on 
neighborhood change.   The qualitative component employed the method of semi-structured 
interviewing, while the quantitative phase used the method of quantile regression. Through the two 
components were chiefly independent of one another, the data and preliminary analysis of the two 
methods did in some cases inform one another, sometimes leading to additional avenues of 
investigation.  
                                                          
7676 Please note that this assertion does not imply that if foreclosure responses in this case are effective, that 
foreclosure responses will work everywhere else—rather, it states that if in such a developed instance of 
foreclosure responses there is no (positive) impact on neighborhood stability, it is highly unlikely that less 
developed foreclosure response will work elsewhere. 
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This section details both the reasoning for the choice of methods, and the specifics of the qualitative 
and quantitative methods themselves. Each method is introduced and the selection criteria of the 
sample are discussed. Given that (1) the qualitative component of the research commenced before 
the quantitative component and (2) the quantitative component was influenced by the qualitative 
results to a greater extent than vice versa, the qualitative method (interviewing) and data are 
introduced first.  The analysis section will follow this pattern as well.  
 
3.3.1 Qualitative Method:  Semi-Structured Interviews 
The first phase of this research uses semi-structured interviews to generate data concerning 
foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs, their functioning, and their relationships to 
neighborhood stability and change.  The results of the analysis of thesedata are then used to inform 
the quantitative model; that is, to generate hypotheses concerning possible relationships between 
these programs and neighborhood change.  Data from this phase are also joined with the results of 
the quantitative model to add depth to explanations and fill in areas that cannot be captured by the 
model. 
This section outlines the purpose and approach of interviews; types of interviews in general and the 
specific type used in this research; the interview guide and preparatory steps; sampling approaches, 
including the sampling choice used in this research; and the method of textual data generation used 
to produce analyzable data from the oral data produced in the interview process. 
Purpose & Approach 
Flick writes, “a goal of interviews in general is to reveal existing knowledge in a way that can be 
expressed in the form of answers and so become accessible to interpretation” (2009, p.160, italics 
added). Researchers who use interviews seek to gather information that is not directly observable.  
Instead it is contained in the knowledge and experience of the individuals being interviewed.  Further, 
within the qualitative research tradition, interviewing is frequently seen as a method empowering to 
the informants:  interviews “provide a framework within which respondents can express their own 
understandings in their own terms;” “interviewing . . . allows you to discover what is relevant to the 
informants” (Patton, 2002, p.348, italics original; Dunn, 2005, p.80). 
Dunn lists four strengths of interviewing:  (1) filling a knowledge gap inaccessible using other methods, 
(2) investigating complex phenomena and motives, (3) collecting diverse perspectives and experiences, 
and (4) respecting and empowering those providing the data (2005, p.80).  All of these advantages 
pertain to nearly all research designs utilizing interviews; though the relative importance of each 
varies.  Each plays a role in the decision to use interviewing in this research, however the first 
strength—accessibility of knowledge—is the primary motivation for this choice.  The research topic is 
situated in an under-researched and rather new area of study; because of this it was necessary to 
collect a broad array of data for the qualitative component of the research.  In addition, the 
relationships between local foreclosure responses and neighborhood change are clearly context-
dependent, requiring a multi-faceted investigation of the phenomena. 
Important weaknesses of interviewing are the possibilities of bias and omission.  Interviewees 
contribute their experiences and understandings in the interview process; other experiences and 
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understandings can be omitted if care is not taken to incorporate a variety of informants with varied 
perspectives and backgrounds.  Interviewees also bring their personal and professional biases with 
them, intentionally or not.  This influences perspectives, how relationships between different 
phenomena are seen, and what is considered important.  Individuals can leave out aspects that are 
uncomfortable or that do not align with their worldview when responding to an interviewer’s 
questions.  For example, in this research, interviewees invested in foreclosure prevention and 
mitigation programs may omit experiences and concerns that indicate the programs or aspects of the 
programs may not be effective.  Again, this omission can be intentional or an instance of cognitive 
blindness.  Finally, interview data may be impacted by the interviewer, for example in the case of an 
interviewee trying to “help” an interviewer by providing the “right” responses. 
Interview Types 
Most authors writing on interviewing as a method divide it into three types:  structured, semi-
structured, and unstructured (Barbour & Schostak, 2005; Dunn, 2005; Patton, 2002).  In truth, these 
are three categories extracted from a continuum, from highly to weakly structured. Thus it is 
unsurprising that various interview types can be combined in a particular interview (Patton, 2002).  
Other authors categorize interviews by participant type or topic approach.  Examples of these include 
expert interviews, focus group interviews, focused interviews, problem-centered interviews, and 
ethnographic interviews (Flick, 2009).   
Structured, or standardized, interviews are comprised of a carefully developed list of questions that 
the interviewer asks the interviewee.  Each interviewee hears and responds to the same questions, in 
the same order (Dunn, 2005).  The advantages of structured interviews include: (1) the interview 
instrument is available for inspection; (2) variation between and within interviewers is minimized; (3) 
the interview is highly focused; and (4) the difficulty of analysis is reduced due to the ease of 
comparison of responses (Patton, 2002).  On the other hand, interviewers cannot pursue interesting, 
but unexpected, topics and themes that emerge during the interview and structured interviews are 
likely to reduce the variety of experiences and opinions uncovered by the interviewer(s) (Patton, 2002).  
Referring back to the strengths of interviews, one can see that structured interviews do not empower 
and respect informants, and their diversity of experience, to the extent that many researchers may 
wish and many research topics may require.  Barbour and Schostak (2005) refer to this interview type 
as impositional, and state that such interviews “reinforce the power of the interviewer over that of the 
interviewee” (p.42). 
Located at the opposite end of the structure spectrum are unstructured, or informal conversational, 
interviews.  This type is most often used to collect oral histories, narratives, and life histories, where 
the focus is on the interviewee rather than the questions (Dunn, 2005).  In these interviews the 
researcher constructs questions as the interview progresses, depending on the directions the 
interviewee takes (Turner, 2010).  Unstructured interviews provide exceptionally rich data; however 
they are extremely time intensive to conduct and even more so to analyze.   
Finally, located between structured and unstructured interviews are semi-structured interviews.  Semi-
structured interviews are content-focused, rather than question or informant focused (Dunn, 2005).  
In this case, the researcher prepares an interview guide (to be discussed in detail later in this section), 
which lists questions for the interviewee but is more flexible than the strictly worded and ordered 
structured interview.  The researcher has a stronger role in steering the interview than in unstructured 
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interviewing, and intervenes to keep the interview on topic while allowing for new themes and topics 
to arise and be investigated.   
In this research, semi-structured interviewing is used in order to focus the interview on the research 
questions while remaining open to new topics and themes that arise over the course of the interview.  
Since the interview portion of the research is more exploratory in nature, allowing for and including 
new information and perspectives is essential to understanding the relationships between 
foreclosures, mitigation and prevention programs, and neighborhoods.  A stricter, structured interview 
style would not suit this research phase; it turned out that much of the ‘extra’ information interviewees 
provided was central to the analysis.  Additionally, semi-structured interviews meet my ethical 
expectations of giving voice to informants and their various perspectives during the research process. 
Interview Guide & Preparation 
Semi-structured interviewers often prepare and use an interview guide, also referred to as an 
interview protocol.  Interview guides range from a list of topics to cover to a listing of specific questions 
that can be flexibly adjusted as the interview takes place.  Interview guides help ensure that interview 
time is used efficiently and that important topics and questions are covered, while providing sufficient 
flexibility to the interviewer to be open to and explore various perspectives and experiences. Thus 
interview guides help balance comprehensiveness and openness (Dunn, 2005; Patton, 2002).  An 
additional advantage of the interview guide is to jog the memory of the researcher and serve as a 
fallback as needed. 
An interview guide was developed and used for all interviews undertaken during the first fieldwork 
trip.  A copy of the interview guide can be found in Appendix A:  Interview Materials.  The interview 
guide began with introductory statements to be said by the interviewer to the interviewee.  This 
section introduced the interviewer, the research project’s purpose and goals, the length and format of 
the interview, and information regarding confidentiality practices.  The interviewee was then asked if 
he or she has any questions, and if he or she was willing to participate.  The consent form was then 
shared with the interviewee (see Appendix A:  Interview Materials). 
The main body of the interview guide is comprised of a set of four introductory questions referring to 
the occupational or community role of the interviewee; interview questions organized into six 
categories; and two closing questions asking for any additional comments deemed pertinent to the 
interview topics by the interviewee, and suggestions for additional interviewees to contact.  This last 
question was integral to the success of the sampling strategy used, which is discussed later. 
Finally, the closing section of the interview guide once again asked for any additional input from the 
interviewee, instructed the interviewee what will be done with the interview data, referred again to 
the location of my contact information, and thanked the interviewee.   An offer was also made to share 
the research results with each interviewee if interested. 
Interview guides may also be amended as necessary throughout the research process—questions may 
be added, dropped, reformulated and/or reordered as experience accrues and strengths and 
weaknesses of the interview plan become apparent (Dunn, 2005).  In this research, the question 
concerning servicer decision-making was dropped after it became apparent that answers to these 
questions weren’t accessible.  Interviewees felt this information was outside their experience, and at 
best would offer speculation, while servicers and others working with these decisions were unwilling 
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to participate.  The interview guide initially contained three questions referring to the impact of 
modifications on neighborhoods; when it became clear that respondents generally believed 
themselves to be insufficiently knowledgeable to answer these questions, two of the three were 
dropped. Interviewees were then asked about their impression of the impacts of modifications on 
neighborhoods, but not about timing or re-default aspects.  In the case that a respondent had more to 
say on these relationships, it remained possible to ask follow-up questions. 
Creating an interview guide requires transforming the research questions into interview questions.  
This at first may appear to be a simple task; however, one must remember that often both the framing 
and the vocabulary of scientific work are inaccessible to those outside that particular scientific niche.  
Spickard (2005) offers a strategy to translate from research questions to an interview guide.  In the 
first step, break the central research question into theory-based questions.  In this case, I used the sub-
questions in place of developing specific theory-based questions.  Then, break these questions into 
interview questions, which collectively will answer the theory-based questions.   
In the second step, one adjusts and reorders the interview questions to create an interview guide that 
engages informants while remaining logical and clear.  In some cases questions may have some 
overlap; in these cases questions can be consolidated or divided more clearly.  The requirement is only 
that all research questions are covered and can be fully answered by the answers to the interview 
questions.  This can be checked by creating a matrix with the theory and interview questions along one 
side, and the interview guide along the other, then checking that each theory and interview question 
is covered in the interview guide (Spickard, 2005). 
Spickard notes the importance of flow in an interview, but does not go into detail on various question-
ordering possibilities.  Dunn (2005), however, discusses three possible ordering strategies.  The first he 
refers to as funneling, where the interview begins with general issues, gradually zeroing in on more 
specific questions closer to the interviewee’s experience.  The main advantage of this approach is that 
by delaying possibly sensitive questions until the end, interviewers can build rapport with 
interviewees, increasing their comfort level.  As well, in the case that an interviewee does decide to 
end the interview when sensitive questions come up, the interviewer has already collected data on 
more general topics. 
The second strategy Dunn provides is the pyramid structure.  In this strategy, a researcher begins the 
interview with specific questions and gradually opens up the questions to broader topics and themes. 
In this case the strategy is to first ask the interviewee questions that are close to home, such as what 
their job duties are or how they are involved in a program.  Later in the interview the interviewer 
moves to questions that are broader or more abstract, which require more reflection (Dunn, 2005).  
This is the strategy used in structuring interviews for this research. 
Dunn’s third question-ordering strategy is a hybrid of the funneling and pyramid structures.  With this 
strategy it may be possible to capture the advantages of both:  starting with specific, but non-sensitive 
questions, moving to broader themes, and finally asking more specific and sensitive questions (Dunn, 
2005).   
Researchers writing on interviewing categorize question types in many different ways. Dunn (2005) 
first divides interview questions into primary and secondary questions, and then lists types of each.  
Primary question types include descriptive or knowledge questions, storytelling questions, opinion 
questions, structural questions (these investigate assumptions and ideologies), contrast or 
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hypothetical questions, and devil’s advocate questions. Secondary question types include formal 
secondary questions, which expand upon the primary question; clarification questions; nudging (to 
continue the interviewee’s line of conversation); summarizing questions; and receptive cues 
(encouraging the informant to continue) (Dunn, 2005).  What Dunn categorizes as secondary questions 
are often referred to as probes by other authors. 
Applying Dunn’s interview question categorization to the questions used in this research, all questions 
contained in the interview guide are primary questions. Most questions can be best categorized as 
descriptive/knowledge questions, opinion questions, or a hybrid of the two.  Some can be categorized 
as structural questions, particularly questions a4 and f1 (see Appendix A:  Interview Materials).  
Questions Dunn would categorize as secondary questions were used frequently, but as probes rather 
than pre-planned questions.  In some cases contrast/hypothetical and devil’s advocate questions were 
used as unscripted follow-up questions. 
Flick (2009) divides interview questions into three types:  open questions; theory-driven, hypotheses-
directed questions; and confrontational questions.  Open questions ask the interviewee to share his or 
her immediate knowledge.  Theory-driven, hypotheses-directed questions relate to theoretical 
presumptions of the researcher or scientific literature, and are “designed as an offer to the 
interviewees, which they might take up or refused according to whether they correspond to their 
subjective theories or not” (Flick, 2009, p.157).  Finally, confrontational questions refer back to and 
challenge the proposals and relationships interviewees have presented to the researcher, in order to 
prompt the interviewee to reexamine his or her ideas in comparison with alternative theories or 
explanations (Flick, 2009). 
Using Flick’s interview question typology, most interview questions used in this research were open 
questions.  Some questions could be categorized as theory-driven, hypotheses-directed questions (e.g. 
questions c3, d2, and d3).  However, given that the interview guide is itself derived from theory-based 
questions, nearly all of the interview questions could be considered theory-driven.  Confrontational 
questions were rare, and when used were unscripted follow-up questions. 
While there are many approaches to categorizing interview questions, there is no need to choose 
between them.  Both typologies above offer insight to the researcher creating an interview guide, as 
do many others (Brenner, Brown, & Canter, 1985; Patton, 2002; Silverman, 2001; Turner, 2010, to give 
some examples).  Many or all can be used together as a basis for creating an interview both 
scientifically useful and interesting to the interviewee. 
A final aspect of interviewing important to consider is preparing for the interview itself.  McNamara 
(2009) describes eight considerations, listed in Turner (2010, p.757):   
(1) choose a setting with little distraction; 
(2) explain the purpose of the interview; 
(3) address terms of confidentiality; 
(4) explain the format of the interview; 
(5) indicate how long the interview usually takes; 
(6) tell them how to get in touch with you later if they want to; 
(7) ask them if they have any questions before you both get started with the interview; and 
(8) don’t count on your memory to recall their answers. 
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These aspects were addressed in the following manners: 
(1) Interviewees selected locations themselves which they were comfortable with.  In many 
cases this was a coffee shop.  While there were sometimes distractions and ambient noise 
this did not obviously impact the interview quality. 
(2) The purpose was explained orally and on the copy of the consent form given to 
interviewees. 
(3) Interviewees were provided a consent form where they could select whether they gave 
permission to be recorded, named, and quoted, with or without pre-clearance of the 
specific quotes to be used in this document. 
(4) The interview format was briefly presented to interviewees and incorporated into the 
interview guide.   
(5) Interviewees were told the interviews generally take sixty to ninety minutes, but that their 
time constraints could be accommodated. This information was also included on the 
consent form given to interviewees. 
(6) The consent form included short- and long-term phone numbers, and a permanent email 
address with which to contact me. 
(7) Interviewees were asked after the consent form and overview of the interview were 
presented if they had additional questions.   
(8) Interviews were digitally recorded in all instances but one.  Notes were taken during all 
interviews. 
Items (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) were explicitly included in the introduction section of the interview 
guide (Appendix A:  Interview Materials) to ensure each aspect was introduced in each interview.  Item 
(1), the interview location, was determined over the phone or via email prior to each interview.   
Permission to digitally record the interview was requested from each participant, and a written record 
of each participant’s decision was recorded on the consent form.  Notetaking was explicitly mentioned 
during the introductory phase of the interview, and included in the interview guide. 
Information concerning items (2), (3), (5), and (6) was included in the consent form given to each 
participant (Appendix A:  Interview Materials), and the introductory email received by some 
participants77 contained information pertaining to items (2), (3), (4), and (5).  The template for the 
introductory email is found in Appendix A:  Interview Materials. 
Sampling  
The sampling methods discussed previously in the Case Study Approach section can also be used for 
interview sampling.  Rather than reviewing them, a few points related to sampling for interviews will 
be discussed here. 
Barbour (2005) suggests purposive sampling based on a key list of people, identified by how each 
relates to the other.  This strategy is designed to enable triangulation, as well as to help determine the 
extent to which one can generalize findings.  Related to this, she suggests snowball or chain sampling 
when the researcher is not necessarily aware at the outset of all the key persons involved (Barbour & 
Schostak, 2005).  This sampling approach is also extremely useful in instances where access to key 
                                                          
77 Participants received an introductory email in cases where an email address for the participant was known 
prior to the interview.  This occurred in 21 of 23 cases. 
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persons may be restricted.  Informants who are connected to other, less-accessible informants may be 
willing and able to bridge the gap for the researcher (Patton, 2002). However, in some instances 
snowball sampling may exclude groups who are not well-connected to others, do not wish to 
participate, or do not have a voice in a particular process—i.e. self-selection issues can arise. 
Snowball sampling proved advantageous in this research.  First, given that this was an exploratory 
research project, I was not aware of all the main players involved.  Snowball sampling expanded the 
breadth of interviewees and helped clarify relationships between different individuals, organizations, 
and programs in Cuyahoga County.  Without using snowball sampling, several important interviews 
would have been missed.  Secondly, snowball sampling was key in obtaining access to several 
interviewees, in particular those who were in high demand for interviews from researchers and 
reporters.  Moreover, the use of snowball sampling resulted in my gaining access to several 
quantitative data sources, some of which I had failed to successfully negotiate access to using other 
avenues. 
Patton (2002) cites Lincoln and Guba (1985) in recommending continuing purposive sampling until data 
redundancy is achieved.  In the case of interviewing, a researcher should continue selecting and 
interviewing informants until no significant new information is produced from the interviews.  In my 
case, no longer hearing new names suggested as potential interviewees by participants was also an 
indicator that data ‘saturation’ had been achieved. 
From Tape to Text 
The generation of a textual record, referred to as transcription,78 is a key process in the analysis of 
interview data.  Some researchers consider transcription itself an analysis process, while others 
consider it a preparatory step that then allows one to analyze the interview data (Davidson, 2009).  
Despite the many choices and considerations that occur before and during the transcription process, 
the vast majority of research articles refer simply to ‘transcription,’ or perhaps ‘full’ or ‘verbatim’ 
transcription, without defining or clarifying the terms (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006).  This lack of 
explanation evidences the naturalizing of an interpretive process by many researchers—that is, the 
treatment of a transcript as objective data rather than an inherently selective process that reflects the 
researcher’s and/or transcriber’s objectives and view of the word (Davidson, 2009; Halcomb & 
Davidson, 2006; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Lapadat, 2000; Müller & Damico, 2002). After all, a transcript 
“represents an audiotaped or videotaped record, and the record itself represents an interactive event” 
(Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999, p.81).  Thus, a written record of an interview is twice abstracted from the 
interview event itself.  This is a necessary concession, as abstraction makes analysis possible, stripping 
data seen as unnecessary out of an endlessly rich data source. 
Müller and Damico (2002) describe transcription as a translation of data through an interpretive 
framework that is determined by one’s theoretical orientation, rather than simply being a transfer of 
media from the tape to the page. Lapadat (2000) examines three views of transcription.  To one 
extreme is the positivistic view, where one objectively transcribes audio data in a manner believed to 
be transparent. The second type she refers to as “muddle in the middle,” which is essentially the 
pragmatic decision-making that must occur when the realities of interview data run into an idealized 
                                                          
78 Interpretations of the term transcription vary.  In this document, transcription is considered to mean any 
distillation of oral data into textual data, ranging from interview field notes to the highly annotated and codified 
transcriptions used in conversation analysis. 
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framework for transcribing. For example, does one transcribe “um” and other filler words?  Are pauses 
and their duration recorded?  At other extreme is the interpretivistic view, where transcripts are 
considered context-situated theoretical constructions.  This is view endorsed in this research; what I 
have distilled from interview recordings is certainly not the same as what all other researchers would, 
particularly if they had other research goals in mind. 
Given an interpretivistic view of the transcription process, it is unsurprising that many authors 
advocate a transcription practice that is developed for each particular research process. They suggest 
careful thought in developing a transcription process that is guided by principles and suited to the 
research methodology (Davidson, 2009; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999; Lapadat, 
2000; Müller & Damico, 2002).   Oliver et al. (2005) place transcribing practices on a naturalism-
denaturalism continuum.  Naturalistic transcription attempts to capture all parts of the interaction, 
such as pauses, stutters, and intonations.  Denaturalized transcription removes these elements and 
translates the spoken record into text meeting (or partially meeting) the standards of writing (Oliver, 
Serovich, & Mason, 2005). If one views this spectrum as one of abstraction, with naturalism having low 
levels of abstraction and denaturalism having higher levels of abstraction, other methods of text 
generation, such as interview field notes, can be placed further along the abstraction spectrum.  
This expanded spectrum concept can be used to support arguments against ‘full’ transcription. For 
example, Halcomb and Davidson (2006) argue that analysis techniques such as thematic and content 
analysis do not require verbatim transcripts.  Research that seeks to uncover values, beliefs, and 
feelings of informants requires the retention of more detail from the oral data. 
Since many research questions do look at data more readily apparent at the ‘surface’ level of 
interviews, alternate, non-verbatim transcription methods are needed.  One possibility would be the 
use of interview field notes and post-interview memos.  Another possibility is suggested by Halcomb 
and Davidson (2006). Their approach entails six steps: (1) audiotaping and notetaking during the 
interview; (2) creating reflective memos immediately after the interview; (3) listening to the recorded 
interview and adjusting notes as necessary; (4) preliminary content analysis to discover primary 
themes; (5) secondary content analysis done by a different researcher; and (6) thematic review to 
identify key examples in the audio recordings that express meanings from the interviewee’s point of 
view (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006, pp.41-42). 
This research utilizes a variation on the approach put forth by Halcomb and Davidson.  In step (3), the 
recorded interview was annotated with key topics and illustrative quotes highlighted.  This annotation 
was then compared with field notes.  Additionally, step (5) was omitted due to resource constraints. 
3.3.2 Household Sorting & Hedonic Pricing 
As described in Section 2.3.1, a common way to proxy neighborhood quality or health in neighborhood 
change research is by using economic indicators, such as property value or the change in property 
value.   Underlying this choice is the Hedonic Pricing Model, which asserts that the values of non-
separable housing features (such as an additional bedroom or which school district the property 
belongs to) are capitalized into the price of the property.   
This section will briefly outline hedonic pricing theory.  It begins with an introduction to household 
sorting theory, which is presupposed by hedonic price theory.  Hedonic pricing theory is introduced 
next, as well as a short discussion of potential modeling issues and possible solutions. 
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Household Sorting 
Household sorting is the tendency for individuals (or households) to divide themselves into 
homogeneous communities.  These “communities” are usually envisioned at the neighborhood or 
municipal scale.  There are two major models of household sorting as advanced by Tiebout (1956) and 
Alonso (1964). 
The Tiebout hypothesis of household sorting is based upon households “voting with their feet” to 
choose their preferred household location. They choose the community that offers the mix of public 
goods and taxes that best fits their preferences (Tiebout, 1956). This model presupposes that 
homebuyers are (perfectly) mobile, have perfect information, have a choice of communities 
characterized by various combinations of public goods and taxes, and can recognize the differences 
between them (Fischel, 2001). 
A wide array of econometric studies providing evidence to support the Tiebout model have been 
carried out, beginning with Oates’ 1969 study of New Jersey communities.  These studies measure 
capitalization79 of various local services into home values.  A survey of the various empirical studies of 
Tiebout capitalization can be found in Dowding, John, and Biggs’ 1994 article.  The article refers to 
several studies which have shown evidence for household sorting by race, homeownership, population 
density, income and age.   
The second theory of urban household sorting is Alonso’s (1964) generalization of Von Thünen’s (1826) 
locational theory, which posits that bid-rent functions can be used to determine household locations 
as a function of income. The original model assumes a monocentric city which contains all employment 
in its central business district and has consistent transportation costs for all households (Alonso, 1964).  
Hanushek and Yilmaz’s 2007 article lists an array of empirical studies that support Alonso’s hypothesis. 
While most empirical studies have examined either the Tiebout or the Alonso model of household 
location, Hanushek and Yilmaz incorporate both.   Contrary to the Tiebout model, which bases location 
choice on household preference, as well as to Alonso’s assertion that locations are determined by 
income, real jurisdictions are determined by mixtures of income and preferences.  Hanushek and 
Yilmaz constructed a theoretical model, which contained high and low income households, each of 
which had either high or low valuation of education. It was seen that the two theories complement 
one another and have results that are more consistent with what is observed empirically (Hanushek & 
Yilmaz, 2007).  De Bartolome and Ross also created a monocentric model with two jurisdictions that 
showed both jurisdictional and transportational differences to be incorporated into house values, 
explaining empirical intrajurisdictional income mixing (2003). 
These models, and extensions thereof, posit that households move to communities that best satisfy 
their preference mix.  A large number of empirical studies lend strong support to this theory (see 
Dowding et al., 1994 and Hanushek & Yilmaz, 2007 for examples).  It should be noted, however, that 
these models are based on assumptions of perfect mobility and perfect information, among others.  
Any deviations from these assumptions must be taken into account when constructing models and 
interpreting results.   
                                                          
79 Capitalization is the incorporation of the value of local services and amenities (and other factors) into the value 
of the product—in this case the house. 
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Hedonic Pricing 
Hedonic pricing, a type of regression analysis, is often used to determine the effect of specific 
characteristics on housing values.  Said another way, housing can be conceptualized as a “bundle of 
attributes” (Rosen, 1974).  Hedonic pricing is then used to infer the marginal value (price) of individual 
attributes of properties in specific real estate markets.  Hedonic pricing models are constructed by 
estimating a regression with purchase price or assessed value as the dependent variable.  This 
dependent variable is regressed on a set of independent variables that represent the attributes that 
comprise the whole, as well as a term representing the time of the valuation if necessary (Meese & 
Wallace, 1997).   By regressing various amenity and disamenity levels on prices, one can determine the 
marginal willingness to pay for these amenities. 
This subsection describes the theoretical origins of hedonic pricing, discusses the specifics for hedonics 
applied to housing, introduces the model’s functional form, and reviews common methodological 
issues and ways to remedy them. 
Economic theory states that the value of future costs and benefits associated with an asset will be 
reflected in the value of that asset; in other words, projected future values are capitalized into the 
present value (Fischel, 2001). The concept of capitalization is closely related to hedonic pricing theory, 
in that for any factor capitalized into the price of a property, one can determine the implicit price of 
the capitalized factor using a hedonic pricing model, given that sufficient data are available. 
Development of the hedonic pricing method is generally attributed to Griliches (1967) and Rosen 
(1974), while the first housing capitalization study was done by Oates (1969).   Oates tested Tiebout’s 
hypothesis of household sorting against empirical evidence drawn from New Jersey communities and 
found that the tax rate was negatively capitalized into home values while the public school expenditure 
rate per student (a proxy for school quality) was positively capitalized (Oates, 1969).  Since then 
hedonic pricing models have been used to investigate the implicit prices of a wide variety of 
phenomena, including, for example, tax rates (Palmon & Smith, 1998), school quality (Black, 1999; 
Brasington & Haurin, 2006; Goodman & Thibodeau, 1998; Jud & Watts, 1981), crime (Tita, Petras, & 
Greenbaum, 2006), land scarcity (Jud & Winkler, 2002), expected future economic growth (Smith, 
2006), and noise pollution from airports (Püschel & Evangelinos, 2012) 
Applied to housing, the attribute (independent) variables include can be divided into four categories:  
(1) structural qualities that vary from house to house, such as age, lot size, and the number of 
bathrooms; (2) socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding area, such as poverty rate, race, and 
education levels; (3) jurisdictional characteristics such as school quality and the local property tax rate; 
and (4) locational characteristics such as promixity to the central business district, major transportation 
routes, and environmental amenities and disamenties (e.g. landfills, waterfront location, heavy 
industry) (Bowen et al., 2001; Li & Morrow-Jones, 2010).  Many researchers include change variables, 
such as the change in poverty rate, to capture neighborhood change in the recent past and the possible 
impacts of policy interventions, both of which may influence housing price (Li & Morrow-Jones, 2010).  
When the model includes observations across multiple years, a time variable can be included to 
account for inflation and market trends in house prices over time. 
A major advantage of hedonic pricing models is the ability to determine the marginal willingness to 
pay for various housing and community attributes.  For example, it is likely difficult to determine the 
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disamenity value of living in a community affected by airport noise pollution.  One possibility would be 
to ask residents how much they would need to be compensated to move there.  But this process would 
be highly labor-intensive, and in many cases people do not actually know what avoiding this disamenity 
is worth to them. A simpler and cleaner solution is to create a hedonic pricing model using real market 
data instead of hypothetical statements by respondents that includes both properties affected and 
unaffected by airport noise pollution, and examine the significance and magnitude of the noise 
pollution coefficient.  To do so, one needs only data on home values, whether a property is affected 
by noise pollution or not, and the appropriate control variables. 
The basic functional form of a hedonic pricing model is shown in Equation (3.1), where P represents 
the price or value, and f is a function of S, structural characteristics of the property; E, socioeconomic 
characteristics of the surrounding area; J, jurisdictional characteristics; and L, locational characteristics.  
From this function, the price of any characteristic of the property can be determined by taking the 
partial derivative of the equation with respect to the characteristic.  Equation (3.2) shows Equation 
(3.1) translated into standard econometric form, where 𝛽
0
 represents the intercept, and 𝑋𝑠, 𝑋𝐸, 𝑋𝐽, 
and 𝑋𝐿 represent vectors of structural, socioeconomic, jurisdictional, and locational characteristics, 
respectively.  𝛽
𝑠
, 𝛽
𝐸
, 𝛽
𝐽
, and 𝛽
𝐿
 represent the implicit marginal prices of the aforementioned vectors 
of characteristics—that is, the regression coefficients—and µ represents the error term. 
 𝑃 = 𝑓(𝑆, 𝐸, 𝐽, 𝐿) (3.1) 
 
 𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑋𝑠 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝐸 + 𝛽𝐽𝑋𝐽 + 𝛽𝐿𝑋𝐿 + 𝜇 (3.2) 
 
Despite the inclusion of locational characteristics, there may be additional spatial determinants of 
house prices that are not included in the model.  There are two spatial concepts necessary to 
understanding these.  The first is spatial heterogeneity, where there may be variation in price due to 
the absolute location of a property within the study area.  This is evidenced by variation in the mean, 
variance, or covariance across the study area (Bowen et al., 2001).  An example of spatial heterogeneity 
would be a study area where older properties in one area have high prices while older properties in 
another area, perhaps more isolated from the central city or of a less desirable architectural style, have 
lower prices.  In this case an indicator for the age of the house would not capture this dependency. 
The second concept is spatial dependence, where the interdependence of prices is due to the relative 
locations of properties.  That is, spatial dependence occurs where prices “follow” the prices of nearby 
properties, with the result being a spatially correlated error term (Bowen et al., 2001).  A simple 
example of spatial dependence is the use of comparables in real estate pricing; that is, properties are 
priced based on the prices of similar, nearby properties.  Thus, real estate prices are likely to “follow” 
one another, but due to a reason that is not incorporated in the model represented in Equations (3.1) 
and (3.2). 
To address possible spatial heterogeneity and spatial dependence, it is possible to add a spatial 
congruity matrix, W, to Equation (3.2).  The matrix includes wjk elements, where j and k index all 
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observations in a pairwise fashion, and wjk represents the spatial relationship between observation j 
and observation k.80  W can be incorporated into the hedonic pricing model as shown in Equation (3.3): 
 𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑠𝑋𝑠 + 𝛽𝐸𝑋𝐸 + 𝛽𝐽𝑋𝐽 + 𝛽𝐿𝑋𝐿 + 𝜌W𝑃 + 𝜇 (3.3) 
where W𝑃 represents the spatial relationships between observations and ρ is the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient.  If ρ is significantly different from zero, it indicates the spatial relationship 
specified in W accounts for some variation in property prices and thus must be included in the model 
to prevent underspecification.81   
When spatial correlation is present, but not accounted for in the model, it is incorporated into the 
error term, µ, resulting in an improperly specified µ.  The impacts of this are manifold: marginal price 
estimates may be biased; the intercept estimate will be biased; error terms may be severely 
misestimated; and the estimate of the standard error of marginal price estimates will be biased.  
Together, the result is that the confidence intervals and hypothesis tests based on the model’s 
estimates will be misleading (Bowen et al., 2001).  
Several diagnostic tools exist for determining whether spatial autocorrelation is an issue, including the 
use of variograms, the Moran’s I measure, and the Geary’s C measure.  The results of these diagnostics 
determine whether a specific model requires the incorporation of spatial variables. 
In addition to deviations from the model’s assumptions, there are some important methodological 
issues to consider when developing a hedonic pricing model.  These include the choice of indicators, 
multicollinearity, and selection bias.  These issues are discussed in the remainder of this subsection. 
Roback states, “theory does not tell us which attributes are goods; theory only tells us how people 
behave with respect to goods” (1982).  That is, hedonic pricing theory itself does not provide any 
guidance as to which characteristics to include in a hedonic pricing model; rather, the theory simply 
requires a fully-specified model.  That is, all characteristics that have a significant effect on prices must 
be included in the model.  As it is not possible to know which characteristics are significant a priori, the 
researcher depends on previous research, experience, and to some extent luck when it comes to 
selecting characteristics for a hedonic pricing model (Bowen et al., 2001; Roback, 1982).  Of course, 
data availability plays a role in model specification as well. 
A second issue in variable selection is multicollinearity, or when variables are highly correlated with 
one another.  When variables displaying a high degree of multicollinearity are included in a regression, 
small changes in the indicator values can result in drastic changes to the coefficient estimates for these 
indicators.  Thus, while many indicators may influence the asset price (the dependent variable in 
hedonic regressions), in many cases it is not possible to include all of them due to these issues.  For 
example, in this research, the female-headed household rate and the poverty rate are highly 
correlated.  Thus only one may be included in the hedonic model without casting significant doubt on 
the interpretability of the coefficient estimates. 
                                                          
80 There are several ways to specify this spatial relationship; see Bowen, Mikelbank, & Prestegaard, 2001. 
81 It is important to note that ρ only indicates whether the W chosen is significant, not whether there is any form 
of significant spatial dependence in the model.  See Bowen et al., 2001 for more discussion of this. 
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Gatzlaff and Haurin describe the problem of sample selection bias in property hedonic pricing models, 
demonstrating that in many instances the set of homes that are sold cannot be presumed random 
(1998).   For example, during the foreclosure crisis, foreclosed homes often cycled through many 
transactions, while activity in the traditional residential market slowed well below normal levels.  A 
solution, the censored regression technique, is outlined where data for unsold properties is used to 
determine the probability of a sale, resulting in a selection bias correction variable that is incorporated 
to generate an unbiased estimate (Gatzlaff & Haurin, 1998). 
Extension to the Community Level 
This research investigates the effects of policy interventions on neighborhoods and communities, 
rather than the effects on individual households or properties.  Thus, the quantitative model used in 
this research examines the effects of policy interventions in the real estate submarkets found in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  To do so, a hedonic pricing model is created at the Census Tract level, a proxy 
for communities, rather than at the property level.  This means that the dependent variable is based 
on the total residential property value at the Census tract level, instead of using the values of individual 
properties.  This extension is not problematic as the underlying theory is the same, where supply and 
demand determine prices and the slope of the demand curve reveals marginal willingness to pay.  For 
examples of research using this approach, see Buettner & Ebertz (2009), Roback (1982), and Rosen 
(1979). 
General Equilibrium 
General equilibrium is a theoretical economics concept, which asserts that there exists a set of stable 
prices in an economy that results in a stable equilibrium; that is, a situation where prices and demand 
levels are stable.  Further, economic theory asserts that in cases of non-general equilibrium, market 
forces will, in the absence of external shocks, move prices and demand levels toward general 
equilibrium. 
General equilibrium is an ideal state, rather than a true representation of real markets.  Thus, all 
applications of econometric models deviate from the abstraction of general equilibrium to some 
extent.  What is important is to consider the extent of the deviations and their impact on model results. 
To meet the requirements of general equilibrium, prices and demand levels must be stable.  In the 
case of the foreclosure crisis, which is examined in this research, the assertion that prices and demand 
levels for housing are stable is clearly false.  However, one can assert that even during times of market 
instability, the market is moving toward general equilibrium. 
In particular, three assumptions of hedonic pricing theory are violated in the model used in this 
research:  (1) perfect mobility, (2) perfect information, and (3) land scarcity.  The first asserts that 
residents have perfect mobility—that is, no moving costs—when determining their housing location.  
This assumption can obviously never be met, but in the case of the foreclosure crisis mobility was more 
greatly restricted. In 2013, Jim Rokakis estimated that 40% of Cuyahoga County homeowners owed 
more on their mortgages than the value of the property (Pagonakis, 2013a), meaning that these 
homeowners were essentially immobile.  Secondly, the perfect information assumption means that all 
homeowners and homesellers have perfect information on all houses, with no cost of attaining this 
information.  Again, this assumption is clearly an ideal that is not achieved in reality.  In the case of this 
research, the deviation is greater than that typically seen on the real estate market.  As will be 
 128 
 
discussed in Section 4.2.3, the housing market in Cuyahoga County was essentially comprised of two 
separate markets during and after the foreclosure crisis:  a sluggish market with “normal” property 
prices and a more active market for properties affected by foreclosure, sold at immense discounts.  In 
the foreclosure-impacted market in particular, potential purchasers have particularly poor 
information, resulting in market distortions.  Finally, the third assumption states that land is a scarce 
good.  In the case of Cuyahoga County, there is an oversupply of land—in 2013 there were over 26,000 
vacant properties (Pagonakis, 2013b).  This weakens the assumption substantially.  
This research examines a weak market city during a recession, which implies that hedonic estimates 
will be lower than those seen in strong market cities and during boom times.  Despite this, these 
depressed prices do accurately reflect amenity values in Cuyahoga County during the study period.  
The caveat is that these estimates cannot be expected to hold during other parts of the housing and 
economic cycles, nor in strong market cities.  A second caveat is based on Mikelbank et al.’s (2008) 
article The Sky Isn’t Falling Everywhere, which provides strong evidence for the existence of two 
submarkets in Cuyahoga County:  one dominated by the impacts of foreclosures and a much smaller 
submarket consisting of properties (relatively) untouched by the foreclosure crisis.  It was not possible 
to create two quantitative models to separately represent each of these markets.  Instead, one 
quantitative model is used that incorporates the median sale prices of all residential properties in the 
county.  The use of quantile regression does, however, allow for specific segments of the dependent 
variable’s distribution to be examined.  Assuming properties in the “untouched” submarket are 
spatially clustered just as those in the “foreclosure” submarket are—refer to Section 2.2.2 for a review 
of the evidence concerning the clustering of  foreclosures and properties affected by foreclosures—
the use of quantile regression will allow examination of the approximate submarkets separately. 
Endogeneity 
Roughly stated, endogeneity occurs in a regression model when (1) there is a feedback loop present 
between independent and dependent variables, (2) measurement error is present, or (3) control 
variables are correlated with the error term, indicating an omitted variable problem.  When 
endogeneity is present and not controlled for, regression coefficients can be biased and inconsistent.  
An unbiased estimator reflects the true value of the true value being estimated, while a consistent 
estimator is one that converges in probability to the population parameter (i.e. the true value) as the 
number of observations approaches infinity  (Wooldridge, 2002).82  Thus, the presence of endogeneity 
in the model can result in estimators that do not reflect the true population values.  Another important 
consequence of endogeneity is that the results provide only evidence of correlations, not causality.  
Thus, the conclusions that can be drawn from the results are much weaker. 
The presence of endogeneity in the relationships between key variables and dependent variable have 
the largest impact on the research, as these estimators are of greatest interest.  When they are biased 
and inconsistent, the strength and credibility of the results is reduced.  One way to address this is to 
use instrumental variables.  An ideal instrumental variable is one that has a causal effect on the 
independent variable of interest, but does not affect the dependent variable (other than indirectly 
through the independent variable).  Ideal instruments are in practice difficult to find, both conceptually 
and with respect to data availability.  Using a weak instrument—one that is only weakly correlated 
                                                          
82 Wooldridge notes that while bias and inconsistency are not the same, the two can be viewed as being the same 
for practical purposes. 
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with the endogenous independent variable—can result in more problems than it solves, including bias, 
inconsistency, and incorrect confidence interval estimates (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995).  The issue 
of endogeneity in the model will be discussed further in Section 0 after the model is introduced. 
3.3.3 Quantitative Method:  Quantile Regression 
The second stage of the research utilized quantile regression in a hedonic pricing model to examine 
the relationships between various foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses and neighborhood 
change, with neighborhood change proxied in the model by percent change in residential property 
value.  Recall that Section 2.2.3 detailed existing research that found strong links between foreclosures 
and property values.  Thus, one way of determining if foreclosure responses have an impact on the 
community level is to examine the relationships between their use and changes and property value. 
Quantile regression, in contrast to ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, can be used to examine the 
relationships between various independent variables and the dependent variable and how it might 
differ across the entire dependent variable distribution.  That is, with quantile regression it is possible 
to examine these relationships along the dependent variable distribution to determine if the 
relationships vary across the distribution.  This allows the investigation and analysis of specific ranges 
of interest of the dependent variable, rather than an investigation limited to the range surrounding 
the average value of the dependent variable, as occurs with OLS regression (Buchinsky, 1998; Hao & 
Naiman, 2007; Mosteller & Tukey, 1977; Schulze, 2004).   
This is especially important given the role of context in determining suitable foreclosure responses.  By 
using quantile regression, it is possible to examine the relationships between foreclosure responses 
and groups of communities that have been affected to different extents by the foreclosure crisis.  That 
is, it is important to know if the relationship between a particular foreclosure response is the same for 
those communities most negatively affected by the crisis as it is for those only moderately affected, 
and so on. 
This section first details the purpose and general approach of regression, then compares the quantile 
regression method with OLS regression, and finally details the specifics of the method’s 
implementation and the interpretation of results.  The development and implementation of quantile 
regression using the hedonic pricing model specifically for this research will be introduced in Section 
0. 
Purpose & Approach 
Quantile regression, like all types of regression, quantitatively investigates the relationship between 
one or more independent variables and a dependent variable.  For each independent variable in a 
regression analysis, the apparent effect of a one unit change of an independent variable on the 
dependent variable is determined (numerically captured by the regression coefficient), as well as the 
level of certainty associated with this relationship (numerically captured by the confidence level and 
interval).  Though regression results are often presented as evidence for a causal relationship between 
the independent and dependent variable, in reality regression results are evidence only for a 
relationship or association between the variables; an experimental or quasi-experimental research 
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design would be necessary to show casuality.83  The causal aspect is based on the researcher’s 
theoretical hypotheses concerning the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables.  Affirmative regression results give support, but not proof, for the hypothesized causal 
relationships. 
In regression, variables can take a variety of forms, including continuous (ranging from negative infinity 
to positive infinity, with an infinite number of values in between), discrete (with only specific values 
possible, such as a population count, which must be a positive whole number), and binary (with 
possible values of 0 (false) and 1 (true)).  In this research application, the dependent variable is 
continuous, and the independent variables are comprised of continuous, discrete, and binary variables. 
A simplified explanation of regression follows here to give a general idea of the method.  First, the 
researcher hypothesizes relationships that may exist in the area of interest.  These hypotheses may 
draw from theory or observation (which itself is a less formal sort of theory).  A key point here is the 
operationalizing of these hypotheses—that is, translating the verbal hypotheses into quantitatively 
testable hypotheses.  Matching hypotheses to actual, existing and available data is a particularly 
important and challenging aspect.  The use of sloppy or imprecise proxies, for example using data 
simply because it is available, and not because it fits the hypothesis particularly well, can easily result 
in false or misleading regression results.  In cases where this is necessitated by limited options, the 
researcher should account for this in the analysis by examining the possible effects of data limitations 
on the results. 
Secondly, one collects data which includes sufficient variation among the variables of interest (both 
independent and dependent).  The more observations present in the regression analysis, the more 
easily the regression model can detect a relationship, if it is present. A limitation here is that all 
observations must have data for all variables included in the regression analysis.  Any observations 
containing missing data are excluded from the model. 
Thirdly, one runs the regression model using statistical software (in this research I used STATA Version 
11).  The regression works by comparing the values of the dependent variable for various values of the 
input variable, while controlling for the influence of the other independent variables.  The results of 
this complicated calculation are coefficients, standard errors, confidence levels, and confidence 
intervals for each of the independent variables, which are then interpreted by the researcher.  More 
simply stated, the results capture whether and how the dependent variable changes in response to a 
change in an independent variable. These results provide support or indicate lack of support for the 
researcher’s hypotheses. 
Comparison with OLS Regression 
The most important difference between quantile and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is that 
quantile regression can be used to look at the effect of an independent variable on a dependent 
variable at any location along the dependent variable’s distribution, while with OLS regression one is 
restricted to investigating this relationship at the mean of the dependent variable’s distribution 
                                                          
83 There are cases where regression models can provide evidence for causality and not only for relationships 
between variables.  This requires truly exogenous independent variables (or instrumental variables), which are 
often hard to come by in social science research, or an experimental or quasi-experimental research design, 
which is rarely feasible. 
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(Buchinsky, 1998; Hao & Naiman, 2007; Mosteller & Tukey, 1977; Schulze, 2004).  This means that one 
can identify whether the relationship between an independent and dependent variable changes over 
the distribution of the dependent variable.  For example, it may be that a particular program has a 
weak effect on the low end of dependent variable distribution, and a stronger effect on the high end 
of the distribution.  Alternatively, an independent variable may have no statistically significant effect 
in some areas of the distribution, and a significant effect elsewhere.  Likewise, the effect may change 
from positive to negative, or vice versa, as one moves along the dependent variable distribution.  This 
is particularly important when a researcher is interested in the tails of the dependent variable 
distribution—for example, the impacts of a program on those living in poverty.  It should be noted that 
there are interpretation issues at the very extreme ends of the tails when using quantile regression.  
See Koenker & Hallock (2001) for an explanation.  
Quoting Mosteller & Tukey (1977), “Just as the mean gives an incomplete picture of a single 
distribution, so the [OLS] regression curve gives a correspondingly incomplete picture for a set of 
distributions.” For this reason, quantile regression has grown and continues to grow in popularity for 
a variety of research fields.  For example, Hao & Naiman (2007) make the case for the use of quantile 
regression in inequality studies.  Rather than simply giving an incomplete picture, OLS regression 
coefficients can sometimes give a false picture of the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables.  For instance, an OLS regression may produce a non-significant coefficient for an 
independent variable (i.e. the results indicate that one can have very little confidence that the effect 
is other than zero on the dependent variable).  However, using the same independent and dependent 
variables in a quantile regression could show a positive significant effect below the mean and a 
negative significant effect above the mean, or some other permutation of significance in specific 
ranges of the dependent variable that a focus on the mean overlooks. 
A second important advantage of quantile regression is the ability to detect distributional shape shifts 
in addition to the mean and scale shifts that can be detected by OLS regression (Buhai, 2005; Hao & 
Naiman, 2007).  What this means is that changes in the skewness of a distribution (how much to one 
tail or the other it is weighted) can be identified as well.  This is important because two distributions 
can have the same mean and the same standard deviation, but different skewnesses and thus different 
shapes.  If these two distributions are in response to various levels of an independent variable, the 
shape shift indicates a relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable.  
Ordinary least squares regression would not detect this, but quantile regression could. 
Buhai (2005) provides a hypothetical example of a shape shift in the dependent variable distribution 
that could be captured by quantile regression but would be overlooked when using OLS regression.  In 
the case of a job training program for the unemployed, it is possible that the shortest periods of 
unemployment would be longer as a result of participation and that longest periods of unemployment 
would shorten due to the benefit of the training.  It is possible in this situation that the mean and 
standard deviation of the dependent variable would not change, in which case an OLS regression would 
not capture the effect of the treatment—the change in the shape of the distribution—but a quantile 
regression would. 
Additionally, quantile regression is more robust across a wide variety of non-Gaussian (non-normal) 
distributions (Buhai, 2005; Hao & Naiman, 2007; R. Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  Non-normal 
distributions are common, particularly in the social sciences.  In OLS regression a few extreme data 
points can substantially influence the parameter estimates, resulting in distortions.  This increased 
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robustness to dependent variable non-normality allows researchers to use regression with a wider 
variety of datasets, and/or have increased confidence in their results because their data deviates less 
from the method’s assumptions.  Using quantile regression, researchers fit the model to the data, 
instead of fitting the data to the model, as often occurs when OLS regression is used with social science 
data samples. 
This advantage is significant:  in OLS regression, one often must categorize certain observations as 
outliers and delete them in order to have a Gaussian, or normal, distribution and avoid their 
deleterious effects on OLS hypothesis testing.84  This is problematic for two reasons.  First, this 
approach amounts to shoehorning an observed distribution into an ideal distribution for the sake of 
elegance.  Rather than accepting that empirically observed distributions are often, in fact, not normally 
distributed, by using OLS regression and removing outliers, many insist that the ideal case must be the 
true case and attribute deviations from this ideal as errors in the data.  Secondly, as Hao & Naiman 
(2007) write, “outliers and their relative positions to those of the majority are important aspects of 
social inquiry” (p.25).  Thus, their removal assures not only a misspecification but also a loss of 
information that may be particularly informative about certain phenomena. 
Other advantages85 of quantile regression include that the model can be estimated using linear 
programming, and that the estimates are more statistically efficient than OLS estimators in the case of 
non-normal error terms, and similarly efficient in the case of normally-distributed error terms 
(Buchinsky, 1998). The use of linear programming means that the coefficient estimates can be 
calculated relatively quickly by software algorithms.  As well, for any linear programming problem, the 
optimal solution can be determined, if one in fact exists. A brief description of how one linear 
programming algorithm works is included in the next section. 
As a result of these advantages, quantile regression has been implemented in a variety of research 
areas, first in the mid-1990s in economics applications and since the mid-2000s in other fields.  The 
roots of quantile regression go back to the 18th century, when it was recognized that an estimator more 
robust than the sample mean was needed.  Many authors suggested using the minimization of 
absolute deviations (the technique used in quantile regression) rather than the minimization of 
squared deviations (the technique used in OLS regression) when some samples have potentially 
unreliable values—in other words, in the presence of outliers (R. Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  However, 
quantile regression as an econometric method was not introduced until Koenker & Bassett’s seminal 
1978 paper.  This was possible because Koenker & Bassett determined a new method to determine 
the quantile, by optimizing (determining a minimum or maximum) instead of by sorting (Schulze, 
2004). 
Beginning in the mid-1990’s a variety of empirical economics papers used quantile regression, 
particularly in labor economics (R. Koenker & Hallock, 2001).  Other scientific research areas using 
quantile regression include ecology (Cade & Noon, 2003), building factors (Borgoni, 2011), productivity 
                                                          
84 Additionally, it should be noted that identifying outliers in the regression context is neither a simple nor a 
straightforward process. See Huber (1973). 
85 Quantile regression does have a few disadvantages:  (1) it is not as well known as OLS regression, which may 
have the effect of restricting understanding and effective criticism of the results; (2) not all statistical properties 
have been thoroughly explored;  (3) quantile regression requires significantly more computing power that OLS 
(though this is only problematic for very large datasets; and (4) quantile regression software is not as widely 
available as software for OLS regression—however it is available for SAS, STATA, and R (Olsen, Clark, Thomas, & 
Cook, 2012).  Likewise, quantile regression software often has limited diagnostic capabilities. 
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(Powell & Wagner, 2011), and mortality (Yang, Chen, Shoff, & Matthews, 2012).  Again, all of these 
studies have found that quantile regression provides additional information concerning relationships 
between variables than possible using OLS regression. 
A second area of interest where quantile regression has been used is neighborhood effects research.  
Sastry & Pebley (2003) examined neighborhood effects on children’s health outcomes in Los Angeles 
County and found that neighborhood effects were generally small, but that the concentration of 
immigrants in a neighborhood is linked to higher levels of overweight and obese children, and the 
effect is stronger at the bottom half of the distribution. Another study used quantile regression to 
examine the relationship between neighborhood and income trajectories; in this case little evidence 
was found indicating a relationship between the two despite the examination of multiple quantiles 
(Bolster et al., 2007).  Carrillo & Yezer (2009) determined that homeownership gaps between white 
and minority neighborhoods in the U.S. are small and statistically insignificant at the high end and both 
highly significant and large at the low end of the homeownership rate distribution.  While these studies 
investigate a different type of dependent variable, they investigate effects on a similar scale (the 
neighborhood level) and use many of the same predictor variables (socioeconomic indicators at the 
neighborhood level) as used in this research. 
As of this writing, only one paper examines foreclosures using quantile regression.  In a 2011 Cleveland 
Federal Reserve working paper, Richter examined 2007 foreclosure rates on the neighborhood level, 
defined as the Census tract, in three weak market counties, Franklin County (Columbus, Ohio), 
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland, Ohio), and Allegheny County (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). She used a 
decomposition technique and found that foreclosure rates above the median in Ohio were mostly 
explained by differences in neighborhood characteristics, while differences between states (Franklin 
and Cuyahoga counties in Ohio, Allegheny County in Pennsylvania) were due mostly to parameter 
differences—i.e. state level differences, which Richter hypothesizes are differences in the regulatory 
environments. Credit score in 2006 and high cost loans in 2005 were found to influence foreclosure 
rates across the entire distribution, and for all three counties.  Vacancy rates in 2000 were significant 
predictors of foreclosure rates only in the two Ohio counties, and the proportion of African Americans 
in the tract in 2000 was a significant predictor only in Cuyahoga County.  She found significant evidence 
of varying associations between independent variables along the dependent variable quantiles, such 
as vacancies, the percentage of high cost loans, and the percentage of low credit scores (Richter & Seo, 
2011).  As with the neighborhood effects research, Richter’s analysis level and many predictor variables 
overlap with this research.   
While the use of quantile regression to study neighborhood change is new, the studies described above 
indicate that this extension is a reasonable one.  The studies listed and described above share 
dependent variable specifications, independent variable specifications, and combinations thereof with 
those used in this research.  Both neighborhood effects literature and Richter’s study of foreclosure 
determinants model a dependent variable on the neighborhood level using quantile regression, as 
done in this research.  In fact, Richter (2011) and Sastry & Pebley (2003) use the Census tract level for 
analysis.  Hedonic analyses of house prices in the economics literature use models very similar to that 
used here, with the main differences being the unit of analysis and the addition of foreclosure-related 
variables and programs in this study.  In addition, the distribution of the dependent variable is non-
normal and the local context appears to play a strong role in how effective specific foreclosure 
responses work in a community.  Thus the use of quantile regression to study neighborhood change is 
a logical and, I hope, illuminating addition to the literature. 
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Implementation & Interpretation 
This section briefly introduces the mathematics behind quantile regression.  Again, this topic is 
introduced by beginning with OLS regression and illustrating how quantile regression differs from it.  
After the mathematical theory and computation techniques are introduced, the interpretation of 
results is discussed. 
This introduction draws significantly from Hao & Naiman’s book Quantile Regression (2007), and the 
equations used in this section are directly reproduced from their book.  Both Koenker & Hallock (1978) 
and Schulze (2004) provide thorough introductions to the mathematics behind quantile regression as 
well.   
To introduce the mathematics of quantile regression, a simplified bivariate regression model will be 
used; that is, the case where one independent variable is regressed on a dependent variable.  To 
extend this model to multivariate regression models, one need only add additional terms to represent 
the additional independent variables; the mathematics are the same. 
An ordinary least squares regression model is characterized by Equation (3.4), where 𝑦𝑖  is the 
dependent variable value for observation 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 is the independent variable value for observation 𝑖, 𝛽0 
is the regression constant, 𝛽1 is the estimated regression coefficient for the independent variable 𝑥𝑖, 
and 𝜀𝑖  is the value of the error term—the portion of the observed 𝑦𝑖  value that cannot be explained—
for observation 𝑖.  The mathematics underlying OLS regression requires that the assumption of an 
identically, independently, and normally distributed error term, 𝜀, with a mean of zero, be met.  If this 
assumption is violated, as it routinely is in social science research, the results of hypothesis testing may 
be invalid. 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (3.4) 
 
A second implication of the zero mean requirement of the error term is that the function 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 
will be fitted to the conditional mean of 𝑦 given 𝑥.  For a normal distribution, this is quite useful; 
however for a skewed distribution, or perhaps even a multi-modal distribution, the mean is often not 
a good representation of the distribution’s central tendency.  In these cases, the median is a better 
representation of the distribution’s central tendency.  Or researchers may be interested specifically in 
other quantiles.  The equation for median regression is a particular case of the equation for quantile 
regression, represented in Equation (3.5). Here the superscript 𝑝 indicates the specific quantile of 
interest. The value would be .5 in the case of the median.  
 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0
𝑝 + 𝛽1
𝑝𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑝
 (3.5) 
 
Equations (3.4)  and (3.5) represent the models for OLS and quantile regression, respectively.  The 
equations have quite similar forms, but the important difference is that the first, the OLS model, 
estimates a coefficient fitted to the mean of the distribution, while the second, the quantile model, 
estimates a coefficient fitted to a particular quantile, 𝑝; that is, at any specified point along the 
distribution. 
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Ordinary least squares regression estimates independent variable coefficients by minimizing the sum 
of the squared residuals, which are the differences between the observed values and the values 
estimated by the model. Said differently, the residuals are the remaining part of the observed value 
above or below the value predicted by the model. This minimization equation is shown in Equation 
(3.6), where 𝑦
𝑖
 is the observed value and 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 is the predicted value.  The minimization is then 
solved by taking the partial derivatives with respect to 𝛽0 and 𝛽1, which generates two equations with 
two unknown values; this system of equations is then solved to determine 𝛽0 and 𝛽1. 
 min ∑(𝑦𝑖 − (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖))
2
𝑖  
 (3.6) 
In contrast, median regression estimates independent variable coefficients by minimizing the sum of 
the absolute values of the residuals, not the sum of the squared residuals.  Equation (3.7) shows this 
minimization problem: 
 min ∑|𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑥𝑖|
𝑖  
 (3.7) 
This is the median case, or the 50th quantile.  Extending this equation to other quantiles requires the 
introduction of weighting, where data points above the 𝑝𝑡ℎquantile of the dependent variable 
distribution are weighted by 𝑝 and data points below the 𝑝𝑡ℎquantile are weighted by 1 − 𝑝. This 
results in Equation (3.8). Setting 𝑝 equal to .5, one can see the equation will provide the same solution 
as Equation (3.7).  For any quantile 𝑝, the proportion of data points above the quantile regression line 
will be 𝑝, and the proportion of data points below the quantile regression line will be 1 − 𝑝. 
 
min (𝑝 ( ∑ |𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽0
𝑝 − 𝛽1
𝑝𝑥𝑖|
𝑦𝑖≥𝛽0
𝑝
+𝛽1
𝑝
𝑥𝑖
)
+ (1 − 𝑝) ( ∑ |𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽0
𝑝 − 𝛽1
𝑝𝑥𝑖|
𝑦𝑖<𝛽0
𝑝
+𝛽1
𝑝
𝑥𝑖
)) 
(3.8) 
 
To solve Equation (3.8), linear programming is used.  Linear programming is a method to solve 
maximization problems.  In quantile regression we are trying to find a minimum, not a maximum; 
however, any minimization problem can be re-specified as a maximization problem (referred to in 
linear programming as the dual).  Linear programming is implemented using different iterated 
algorithms by different software packages. One such algorithm is the simplex method, which selects a 
vertex in the mathematical space bounding the problem, then moves in the positive direction along an 
edge to another vertex, and continues until moving in the positive direction is no longer possible.  The 
final vertex will be the maximum. 
 
The previous section discussed quantile regression’s reduced sensitivity to outliers, in comparison to 
OLS regression.  This increased robustness is due to the form of the objective function in Equation 
(3.8).  The explanation is stated by Hao & Naiman (2007), “if we modify values of the response variable 
without changing the sign of the residual, the fitted line remains the same. In this way . . . the influence 
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of outliers is quite limited” (p.41). Schulze (2004) and Buhai (2005) give similar explanations.  The value 
of the minimization problem will change as outlier values are modified; that is, the value of the error 
term and the fit of the model at that quantile will change.  However, the values of the parameter 
estimates will not—it will not be possible to better optimize Equation (3.8) unless an observation value 
is moved from one side of the fitted line value to the other. 
 
On occasion, OLS regression over truncated ranges of the dependent variable has been suggested (and 
undertaken) as a method to achieve the same result as that desired in quantile regression. It is 
important to note that this model specification is not a valid alternative.  Truncating the dependent 
variable range above and/or below an area of interest introduces severe sample bias (for a more 
detailed investigation, see Heckman, 1979).  Referring back to Equation (3.8) it is clear that quantile 
regression uses the entire sample to determine the quantile regression fit and thus avoids potential 
sample selection problems (Koenker & Bassett, 1978; Schulze, 2004). 
 
The calculation of standard errors, and thus the confidence intervals, is less straightforward than in 
OLS regression.  There are two main ways to calculate standard errors, using either asymptotics or 
bootstrapping techniques.  Each of these two categories contains many specific implementation 
possibilities.  A third possibility is robust quantile regression.  All three possibilities, and their relevant 
assumptions, are introduced and discussed here. However, Koenker & Hallock (2001) noted that the 
differences between standard error values calculated using different techniques are relatively small 
and that inference in quantile regression is more robust than econometric inference in general.   
The sparsity method is an asymptotic method of determining standard errors that requires identically, 
independently distributed (i.i.d.) errors (Chen, n.d.; Koenker & Hallock, 2001; Machado & Santos Silver, 
2011)).  Identically distributed errors means the errors are homoskedastic; that is, the distribution 
exhibits constant variance among the errors across the entire sample.  Independently distributed 
errors means that each error value is determined independently of all other error values; alternatively 
formulated, the error value for one observation has no influence on the error value of any other 
observation.  STATA’s qreg function to implement quantile regression provides a variety of sparsity 
estimation possibilities.  The sparsity method is the most direct and least computationally expensive 
way to determine standard error estimates (Chen, n.d.).  However, several authors have noted that 
the case of i.i.d. errors is unlikely (as well as generally uninteresting86) in many applications of quantile 
regression, and thus the assumption is too restrictive (Hao & Naiman, 2007; Koenker & Hallock, 2001; 
Schulze, 2004).  The errors in this application are not i.i.d distributed, and thus the sparsity method is 
not appropriate here. 
Other asymptotic methods require independently, but not identically, distributed error functions.  This 
is a much more reasonable assumption for the error term resulting from quantile regression models.  
These methods include the Huber-Ecker-White sandwich, the rank test, and the kernel approach, 
among others (Buchinsky, 1998; Chen, n.d.; Koenker & Hallock, 2001; Schulze, 2004). However, these 
methods are not easily implemented in STATA at this time. 
                                                          
86 Quantile regression was originally used primarily as a method to get a robust estimate of a distribution’s central 
tendency by using the median.  Later it became apparent that quantile regression has broader useful 
applications, which, in general, do not have i.i.d. errors as a result of non-constant relationships between the 
regressors and the regressand (Machado & Santos Silver, 2011). 
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Bootstrapping techniques, originally developed by Efron (1979), require no assumptions concerning 
the error term; however they become computationally expensive with large datasets (Machado & 
Santos Silver, 2011).  There are many different implementations of bootstrapping; Shulze (2004) gives 
a good overview.  The fundamental idea is that of simulating the population distribution by re-sampling 
the sample distribution.  This is done repeatedly, generating many bootstrap samples; these bootstrap 
samples are then used as the datasets for quantile regression and standard errors are derived from 
the aggregated results (Shalizi, 2012).  The strength of bootstrapping is that it can generate standard 
errors without any presuppositions about the distribution of the error term.  However, bootstrapping 
requires long computation times and with large datasets this requirement can become prohibitive. 
Though the dataset used here is relatively small, it is not necessary to discuss various bootstrapping 
implementations in detail here; this is because in this research a 100% sample was available—i.e. the 
entire population.  Thus the idea of re-sampling the entire population in an attempt to simulate the 
entire population is obviously nonsensical. 
A third option for determining standard errors is that of robust quantile regression.  Using robust 
quantile regression, one can determine valid standard error estimates even in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and model misspecification (Machado & Santos Silver, 2011). Machado & Santos 
Silver (2011) introduced a STATA command (qreg2) which calculates robust quantile regression 
estimates.  It also includes a test for heteroskedasticity (the Machado-Santos Silver (MSS) test). This 
test compares the residual distribution to a homoskedastic distribution using a Chi-square test; the 
result provides the researcher information as to whether robust quantile regression is needed, and as 
to whether the error distributions vary across quantiles.  Examining the error distributions here, the 
MSS tests showed that the error distributions vary from one another, and at most quantiles they are 
decidedly not homoskedastic.87 
The interpretation of quantile regression results is analogous to the interpretation of OLS regression 
results, with the difference being that quantile regression results are interpretable at specific 
quantiles.  Thus the interpretation of an independent variable coefficient depends on the particular 
quantile (Buchinsky, 1998; Buhai, 2005).  Schulze (2004) phrases the interpretation as a question: “how 
does the τ-th conditional quantile of y react to a (ceteris paribus) change of xk” (p.32). Buhai (2005) 
cautions that an observation may change quantiles if the independent variable value is changed, i.e. 
the marginal change does not stay constant; with each change the observation is likely to move into a 
different quantile of the distribution. 
Like OLS regression, quantile regression has a goodness-of-fit statistic. This statistic is similar to R2, in 
STATA it is referred to as the “pseudo-R2;” that terminology is used here as well. The difference is that 
OLS regression’s R2 is a global goodness-of-fit measure, while for quantile regression it is a local 
goodness-of-fit value.  Like the interpretation of independent variable coefficients, at each quantile 
there is a different pseudo-R2 value (Hao & Naiman, 2007; Schulze, 2004). 
3.4 Data 
This section introduces the specific data used in the analysis of the case study.  First, the qualitative 
data are introduced and discussed, followed by an introduction and discussion of the quantitative data. 
                                                          
87 Significance levels ranged from .000 to .114, averaging .039.  
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3.4.1 Qualitative Data 
As introduced and discussed previously, semi-structured interviews were carried out to generate 
qualitative data for the initial phase of the research.  The interview data are introduced in this section, 
by characterizing the interviews:  who was interviewed; where, when, and how the interviews took 
place; what the interview topics were; and circumstances that may have affected the interviews and 
resulting data. 
This section also briefly introduces additional, non-interview interactions that occurred during the first 
fieldwork trip in the form of meetings and telephone discussions.  Follow-up interviews that occurred 
between the first and second fieldwork trips and during the second fieldwork trip are also briefly 
discussed. 
The Interviews 
During the first fieldwork trip to Cuyahoga County, I undertook 23 interviews.  Twenty-two of the 
interviews were in person, one occurred over the telephone.88  Twenty-two of the interviews occurred 
between the interviewer and one participant; one interview had two participants.89  Thirteen 
interviews took place in the interviewee’s office and nine took place in a coffee shop (in addition to 
the phone interview). All interviews took place in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, with the majority occurring 
in downtown Cleveland or the Buckeye-Shaker neighborhood on the east side of the city of Cleveland.  
Interviews also took place in other parts of Cleveland and in an inner suburb of Cleveland (the City of 
South Euclid).  
All interviews took place between April 26th and May 25th, 2011.  Interviews ranged in duration from 
under twenty minutes (the telephone interview) to over two and a half hours.  The average duration 
was approximately one hour and ten minutes.  Up to three interviews occurred per day. 
All interviews but one were recorded; notes were taken during all interviews.  Whenever possible, 
notes were typed up immediately after an interview, and additional thoughts, reflections, and 
questions added to the document.  Due to the frequency of interviews, in some cases interview notes 
were not written up and added to until one to two days after the interview occurred.  Efforts were 
made to decrease the time between interviews and their write-ups as much as possible. 
As mentioned in the methods section, all interviewees were given a consent form. Each interviewee 
determined whether he or she consented to being recorded, having his or her name and title used, 
and whether quotes could be used.  Several participants requested that I clear quotes with them 
before using them.  This information was noted and signed on the consent form, and both the 
interviewee and I kept a copy. In recorded interviews, permission was again asked for orally and 
confirmed at the beginning of the recording. 
During the second fieldwork trip, I engaged in three unstructured follow-up interviews, all of which 
occurred during the first half of October 2012.  The purpose of these interviews was to follow up on 
the foreclosure response programs discussed in the first fieldwork trip and to gather additional data 
                                                          
88 Interview of James Sassano, attorney at Carlisle McNellie Rini Kramer & Ulrich Co., LPA. 
89 Interview of South Euclid Mayor Georgine Welo and Sally Martin, South Euclid Housing Manager. 
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as needed, based on the intermediate results of the research.  The second purpose was to further 
negotiate quantitative data access. 
Interview Participants 
Interview participants were located using snowball sampling.  To begin the process, actors whose 
names were familiar to me from my background research were contacted.  Others were selected by 
calling an agency or organization known to be involved with foreclosure prevention efforts and ask if 
there was an appropriate person who was willing to be interviewed.    Once initial interviews were 
scheduled, the snowball sampling process proceeded forward quite easily.   
Not all suggested contacts were interviewed.  In some cases the contact person’s expertise was beyond 
the scope of the research.  In other instances, an individual was contacted, but for informational or 
data access purposes.  Lastly, some potential interviewees refused an interview, particularly those 
employed by or representing banks and servicers.  Twenty individuals in this category were contacted, 
with only two agreeing to an interview.  As a result of this, as mentioned in Section 3.4.1, the bank and 
servicer decision-making component of the research was dropped due to my inability to gain access to 
the information I felt necessary to carry out the research. 
Table 3.2 lists the interview participants by category of employment or role (in the case of the 
neighborhood representative category).   Many respondents could fit into multiple categories, 
generally governmental and neighborhood/community (e.g. City Councilman) or non-profit/advocacy 
and neighborhood/community (e.g. ESOP).  In these cases I have assigned participants first by 
employment sector and to the category of neighborhood representative only when that is their 
primary role. This results in a neighborhood representative count that is somewhat low. 
Table 3.2:  Interviews by Category 
Category Interviews 
Governmental 8 
Non-Profit/Advocacy90 11 
Financial 2 
Neighborhood/Community Representative 2 
Total91 23 
 
Excluding the two respondents categorized as neighborhood representatives, all interviewees were 
interviewed in their current (19 participants) or former (2 participants) professional roles. 
In addition, I participated in several additional meetings and calls (4 meetings and 8 calls), which were 
essential to the research process but were not interviews.  The purposes of these were either to discuss 
data availability and related issues, or were informational calls that merited notetaking.  Many of these 
were part of the effort to locate interview partners in the financial category.    
                                                          
90 One individual assigned to the non-profit/advocacy category is a clinical professor and assistant director at the 
Cleveland Marshall Scholl of Law at Cleveland State University.  However, the interview focused on his role as 
part of the Neighborhood Stabilization Team, which is categorized as non-profit/advocacy here. 
91 Of the three unstructured interviews undertaken in the second fieldwork trip, one worked in the non-
profit/advocacy sector and two worked in the government sector.  (These interviews are not counted in Table 
3.2.)  
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Table 3.3:  Meetings and Calls by Category 
Category Meetings/Calls 
Governmental 4 
Financial 5 
Neighborhood Representative 1 
Academic/Research 2 
Total 12 
 
As well, I undertook several follow-up interviews either between the two fieldwork trips or during the 
second fieldwork trip.  I selected interviewees who were particularly well-connected, informative, and 
receptive to my questions for follow-up interviews.  I was also strategic in my selection of follow-up 
interview respondents, in order to cover some of the aspects that at the time remained unclear in my 
research. 
Interview Topics 
As discussed in the Methods section, an interview guide was developed and used to conduct the 
interviews.  It can be found in Appendix A:  Interview Materials.  In addition to introduction and closing 
sections bracketing the questions, the interview guide was comprised of eight question groupings.  The 
interviewing portion began with introductory questions about the individual’s role and involvement (4 
questions); it ended with closing questions to wrap up the interview and enable snowball sampling (2 
questions). 
The six remaining groups of questions were each organized around a summary question: 
(1) How does the program92 work? (4 questions) 
(2) What are the homeowner-level outcomes of the program? (2 questions) 
(3) What are the neighborhood-level outcomes of the program? (3 questions) 
(4) What are the specific impacts of modifications on neighborhoods? (3 questions) 
(5) Do previous foreclosures and modifications affect servicer decisions? (1 question) 
(6) What are the impacts of the larger economic and policy context on the program? (1 
question) 
It was often not necessary to ask all of the questions in a particular group.  Respondents would often 
give a more expansive answer and cover additional questions before they were asked.  The first group 
of questions was tailored to each interviewee, depending on that interviewee’s role with respect to 
foreclosure prevention and mitigation. As experience using the interview guide accumulated, two of 
the three questions in the fourth grouping were later dropped, as respondents were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to confidently respond.  The fifth group, on servicer decision-making, was dropped 
when it became apparent that respondents were unable to answer this question, and individuals with 
knowledge to answer this question were unwilling to be interviewed. 
                                                          
92 I use the term “program” here as a generic term.  I replaced program with the appropriate term for each 
interview, be it program, organization, or neighborhood effort. 
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Reliability & Validity 
In interpersonal situations many factors can affect the interaction.  Among these are the participants; 
their roles, experiences, and values; the interviewer and his or her roles, experiences, and values; the 
location of the interaction; and objectives the participants bring with them.  It can only be expected 
that these factors will affect the interview process, and thus the resulting data.  I have made an effort 
here to consider these aspects—myself and my role, the interviewees and their roles, and the 
environment in which the interactions occurred.  Acknowledging these factors and their potential 
impact on the research process assists me in my analysis of the case, and helps others make their own 
conclusions concerning the reliability and validity of my analysis. 
First I consider my potential impacts on the interview interactions.  As a former long-term resident of 
Ohio with an education in city and regional planning, I was familiar with the foreclosure problem in 
general and more so with the situation in Ohio.  I am also familiar with much of the specialized 
vocabulary associated with foreclosures.  These aspects helped me to build rapport with respondents, 
and, in my opinion, increased their confidence in my sincerity and expertise. Additionally, in some 
cases I believe my status as an academic—a PhD candidate—afforded me trust and status in the eyes 
of my interview partners.  I believe my appearance and demeanor—which includes being female, 
white, and a native English speaker—are frequently perceived as non-threatening, well-intentioned 
and interested during interviews; this likely increased many interviewees’ willingness to respond and 
was evident from the willingness of interviewees to connect me to additional potential interviewees. 
During the interviews, I was aware that I was asking experts to share their information and opinions.  I 
believe this was apparent and aided the process.  
Respondents were generally highly invested in reducing the impacts of the foreclosure crisis through 
their jobs or roles as neighborhood representatives.  Many respondents were clearly motivated by a 
sense of unfairness and a need to work to right a wrong.  Given these factors, many of the interviewees 
have an incentive to look positively at foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts and their 
outcomes.  As a result, respondents may have a conscious or unconscious positive cognitive bias 
toward these efforts.  It must be said, however, that a range of pessimistic and optimistic outlooks 
were encountered. 
Many interviewees were excited that someone from outside the problem was interested.  They are 
passionate about the problem, and enthusiastic about spreading awareness.  Many of the interviewees 
held occupations or roles where “getting the message out” is critical—advocates, politicians, 
community activists.  Others were keenly aware of the constant funding predicament of foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation programs, and were interested to see if the results of this study could help 
to garner more resources to continue the programs. Some respondents told me they were glad I was 
helping.  Though not made explicit, it is clear respondents bring their own hopes, and expectations of 
me, to the interview process.  I worked to clarify what I would be doing and limitations thereof; that I 
was happy to share the results of my work when completed but pointed out that the research was 
unlikely to have any practical effect on the situation of any of the respondents.   
Most respondents interact directly or indirectly with the public in their job or role.  This undoubtedly 
caused them to be more willing to participate in an interview with me.  The participants had experience 
speaking publicly and semi-publicly, and likely had confidence in their abilities to communicate 
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effectively and appropriately.  This is evidenced by the high percentage of informants who were 
comfortable being recorded, named and quoted.  Their experience was also evidenced by the 
significant number of participants (eight) who wished me to screen quotes with them before I use 
them publicly. 
Finally, the interview locations may have affected the interviews.  Excluding the phone interview, all 
interviews occurred in either a coffee shop or the interviewee’s office—I asked participants to choose 
a location they preferred; surprisingly enough one particular coffee shop was suggested many times.   
In the case of coffee shops, the interviews took place in a relaxed environment, with significant 
ambient noise.  In the case of interviewee offices, the interaction took place in an environment familiar 
to the interviewee. In my opinion, both of these settings made respondents more relaxed, 
comfortable, and conversational.  
3.4.2 Quantitative Data 
The second stage of this research utilized a quantitative model to examine the effects of different 
foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs on neighborhood property value stability.  As well, 
this method was used to serve as a complement to the qualitative component of semi-structured 
interviews.  This section details the quantitative data sources and describes the variables used in the 
quantitative model.  Variable definitions and calculations can be found in Appendix B:  Variable 
Definitions. 
Sources 
Quantitative data were gathered from a variety of sources and joined to build the quantile regression 
model used in this research.  This section outlines the sources used and their accessibility.  The sources 
of each variable and/or component variable used to calculate a regression variable are listed in the 
variable definitions section in Appendix B:  Variable Definitions. 
U.S. Census/s4 
Data from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 U.S. Censuses were used in the quantitative model.  With the 
exception of property value per housing unit (2000), all general control variables either come directly 
from, or are calculated from, U.S. Census data. 
Up through the 2000 Census, the U.S. Census used both a shortform (sf1) and longform (sf3) to gather 
data.  The short form approximates a 100% sample of U.S. households. The U.S. decennial Census long 
form, which employed a one-time 1-in-6 sampling, was discontinued after the 2000 Census.  Very 
similar information is now gathered using the American Community Survey (ACS), which is collected 
continuously and reported for one, three, and five year periods. The ACS employs a 1 in 40 sample, 
and as a result all estimates include a margin-of-error at the 90% confidence level.  The 2006-2010 ACS 
value is the average of median values 2006-2010.  The only ACS data used in this research is the median 
monthly contract rent for 2010, as approximated by the U.S. Census 2006-2010 ACS median monthly 
contract rent. 
U.S. Census data are publicly available, either from the U.S. Census website (census.gov) or, as in this 
case, from the s4 database hosted by Brown University (www.s4.brown.edu/us2010).  The advantage 
of the s4 database is its inclusion of the Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB) and crosswalk files.  The 
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LTDB makes it possible to bridge data across different Census years, a task that is often difficult due to 
changes in Census tract apportionments over time.  The LTDB contains data on the tracts for each 
Census year, while the crosswalk files contain the reapportionment information for tracts over the 
years.  Using the crosswalk files with STATA crosswalk code provided by s4 allows one to convert 
between different Census year boundaries.  In this research all Census data were transformed to 2010 
boundaries.  Without the s4 crosswalk database, any tracts where boundaries had changed between 
1990 and 2010 would have been dropped from the analysis.  That is, only 328 of 442 tracts,93 or 74% 
of tracts would be included in the model without s4; with it it was possible to include 95% (421) of the 
tracts, greatly increasing the degree to which the sample population (tracts for which sufficient data is 
available) accurately represents the actual population (all tracts in Cuyahoga County). 
NEO CANDO 
The Northeast Ohio Community and Neighborhood Data for Organizing, NEO CANDO, contains 
demographic, socioeconomic, and property data for the northeast Ohio area (neocando.case.edu). It 
is hosted by Case Western Reserve University.  A strength of the NEO CANDO database, which is 
publicly available, is that data from many different sources, such as the U.S. Census, the County 
Auditor, the police department, and many others is unified and aggregated at various levels, making 
the job of interested citizens and researchers much easier.  NEO CANDO provided the data for median 
home sale prices, civil foreclosure filings, Sheriff’s sales, vacant and no-stat addresses, and Board of 
Revisions foreclosures. 
Kathy Hexter, Cleveland State University & Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Agencies 
Kathy Hexter of Cleveland State University (CSU), with the permission of four agencies participating in 
foreclosure prevention counseling,94 provided data on counseling outcomes, used to generate the 
counseling intensity and counseling outcomes key variables.   
This data are not publicly available; instead access was negotiated by informing the counseling 
agencies of the purpose of my work and guaranteeing that no individual homeowners would be 
identifiable in this research.  Frank Ford, of Neighborhood Progress, Inc. was essential in negotiating 
access. 
Neighborhood Progress, Inc. 
Neighborhood Progress, Inc., a local community development funding intermediary located in 
Cleveland, Ohio (www.npi-cle-org), provided demolition data for Cuyahoga County and assisted 
significantly in negotiating additional data access, particularly in the case of foreclosure prevention 
counseling outcomes.  
While technically available to the public, the demolition data are not directly publicly accessible in a 
convenient, aggregated form.  Fortunately Frank Ford of Neighborhood Progress Incorported (NPI) was 
very helpful in assisting me in getting access to the data. 
                                                          
93 The tract that covers Lake Erie is excluded from this count and the quantitative model. 
94 The four counseling agencies are:  the Cleveland Housing Network (CHN), Community Housing Solutions (CHS), 
Empowering & Strengthening Ohio’s People (ESOP), and Neighborhood Housing Services of Greater Cleveland 
(NHS). 
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Cuyahoga County 
Cuyahoga County’s Department of Development (development.cuyahogacounty.us) provides publicly 
accessible maps for NSP2 target areas, which were used to assign values for the NSP2 variable. 
Level of Analysis 
The quantitative model investigates the relationships between foreclosure responses and change in 
residential property value on the Census tract level.  A Census tract typically contains a population of 
2,500 to 8,000 people.  In Cuyahoga County Census tract populations run on the small side, with an 
average value of approximately 1,400 residents.  The minimum tract population is just over one 
hundred, and the maximum tract population is less than 4,200.  Census tracts were originally 
designated using population size guidelines while attempting to respect established local community 
boundaries such as thoroughfares, highways, rivers, and other demarcations accepted and used by the 
local population.  
The Census tract was chosen as the unit of analysis both because it is a reasonable approximation of 
communities (or ‘defending neighorhood’ according to Suttles’ (1972) hierarchy of neighborhoods) 
and due to data availability—much of the data used in this research simply was not available at a finer 
level of resolution than the Census tract.  However, since Census tracts are an approximation for 
communities, this approximation may result in problems—for example, there may be a MAUP 
present—that is, the level of spatial aggregation used in the model may be incorrect for the 
phenomena of interest and could result in biased model estimates. 
Cuyahoga County contains 443 Census tracts, one of which covers Lake Erie and has no population and 
no land mass.  Of these tracts, 22 were missing data and thus not eligible for the quantitative model.   
Eight missing tracts are located on the east side of Cleveland, one on the west side of Cleveland, one 
in the inner suburbs, and twelve in the outer suburbs.  For more on the four Cuyahoga County 
subareas, see Section 4.1.3 and Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas. 
Dependent Variable 
Residential Property Value, Percent Change (2000-2010) 
The dependent variable, percent change in residential property value between 2000 and 2010, is a 
proxy for change in community well-being.  Though an ideal indicator for community well-being would 
include many other dimensions in addition to an economic measurement—incorporating social, 
cultural, and political aspects—data availability and measurement limitations necessitate the use of a 
simpler measure.  However, in both research and practice, property value is in fact frequently used as 
an indicator for neighborhood health (e.g. Rosenthal, 2008; Zielenbach, 2000; see Section 2.3.1).  In 
addition, economic considerations are one component of community well-being; thus, though the two 
are not wholly comparable, they are also not wholly unrelated and unsuitable for comparison.  In fact, 
Section 2.2.3 provides strong evidence that foreclosures impact property values, supporting the choice 
of dependent variable.   
Moreover, foreclosures have been shown to be strongly connected to property value depreciation 
(refer back to Section 2.2.3).  Not only do foreclosures negatively impact the price of the property 
affected by the foreclosure, they have also been found to exert downward pressure on nearby 
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property values, with the effect increasing over time.  Thus, examining the relationships between 
foreclosure responses and change in property value provides insight as to whether these responses 
can prevent or mitigate some of the negative impacts of foreclosures in communities. 
In contrast to many studies, rental property value is included in addition to owner-occupied property 
value in this model.  Though homeowners tend to be more concerned about property values than 
renters, the object of this component of the study is to determine the impacts of foreclosure 
interventions and mitigations on percent change in residential property value, including those with 
larger proportions of rental property.  
Percent change in residential property value between 2000 and 2010 was chosen as the dependent 
variable because of the strong links between foreclosures and property values.  A large body of 
research has shown that foreclosures not only depress the property value of the foreclosure property 
itself, they exert significant negative property value spillover effects on nearby properties (see Section 
2.2.3, Property Value Impacts).  Though it is not entirely clear whether foreclosures negatively affect 
nearby property values through a supply, valuation, or disamenity effect, the relationship is clear.   As 
well, though vacant and abandoned properties, rather than foreclosures per se, may be causing 
property value spillover effects, the proximate cause of the surge in vacant and abandoned properties 
itself is the foreclosure crisis.   Thus, if foreclosure responses are able to prevent or mitigate the 
negative effects of foreclosures (and the highly related issues of vacancy and abandonment), these 
relationships should show up in the quantitative model, assuming the model is well-specified. 
In creating the model, there were two possible specifications of the dependent variable—one using 
Census data and one using Cuyahoga County Recorder data to determine owner-occupied property 
value.  Both options had advantages and shortcomings:   in the case of Census data the property value 
is self-reported by homeowners and thus prone to estimation error.  For example, a homeowner may 
report the purchase price of the home as its value, though the purchase may have occurred ten or 
twenty years ago.  The County Recorder data does not suffer from this, as it includes only the actual 
sale prices of homes sold in a particular year.  On the other hand, the number of single family home 
sales found in the County Recorder data may be too low in some tracts to be considered a sufficient 
sample from which to apply a statistic to the entire population of single family properties.  The Census 
data avoid this shortcoming as a one-in-six sample of the population was used to gather the data.  After 
weighing these concerns, the County Recorder data was selected as the accuracy concern outweighed 
the sample count concern. 
Only Census data were available to determine rental property value; however this was not problematic 
as renters pay rent monthly and are thus unlikely to “misestimate” their monthly payment.  To 
determine property value for rental properties the income approach calculation method was used.  
For calculation specifics, see Appendix B:  Variable Definitions. 
It should be kept in mind that the use of the Census tract as the level of aggregation for the model is 
not guaranteed to capture any neighborhood-level effects of foreclosure responses.  The choice is a 
pragmatic one, primarily determined by data availability.  Thus, the multiple areal unit problem 
(MAUP) may be present, with the implication that there may be spatially-based effects present that 
are not captured at the level of geographic aggregation used. 
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Independent Variables 
The independent variables are grouped into three subcategories: general, foreclosure-related, and key 
variables.  The variables are separated into these groups for clarity purposes; the three groups are 
treated identically within the model.  Table 3.4 lists the independent variables by category below. 
“General” independent variables are those which are commonly included in quantitative models of 
neighborhood change; they control for factors previously shown to be related to neighborhood change 
and allow the researcher to isolate the influence of variables of interest.    They also help to reduce 
endogeneity problems in the model.95  They include demographic, socioeconomic, and property 
indicators. 
Table 3.4:  Independent variables 
General Independent Variables 
Property value per housing unit (2000) Percent change in property value (1990-2000) 
Proportion multi-unit housing (2000) Proportion rental units (2000) 
Per capita income (2000) Poverty rate (2000) 
Proportion under age 18 (2000) Proportion age 60 or over (2000) 
Average household size (2000) Marriage rate (2000) 
Female-headed household rate (2000) Proportion with HS degree or less (2000) 
Proportion with college degree (2000) Unemployment rate (2000) 
Proportion employed in manufacturing (2000) Proportion professionally employed (2000) 
Proportion Asian (2000) Proportion Hispanic (2000) 
Proportion non-Hispanic Black (2000) Proportion non-Hispanic White (2000) 
Proportion residential structures 30+ years old 
(2000) 
Proportion in residence 10 years or less (2000) 
Foreclosure-related Independent Variables 
Civil foreclosure filing intensity (2006-2010) Sheriff’s sale intensity (2006-2010) 
East side of Cleveland (binary variable) West side of Cleveland (binary variable) 
Inner suburb (binary variable) Outer suburb (binary variable) 
Maximum vacancy rate (2007-2010)  
Key Variables 
Counseling intensity (2006-2010) Kept house outcome (2006-2010) 
Lost house foreclosure outcome (2006-2010) Unknown outcome (2006-2010) 
Lost house non-foreclosure outcome (2006-
2010) 
Board of Revisions foreclosure intensity (2006-
2010) 
Landbanked parcels (2005-2010) Demolitions (2005-2010) 
Strategic Investment Initiative area  Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 area 
 
The second group, “foreclosure-related” independent variables, are those usually included in models 
of foreclosures and neighborhood change, but not in neighborhood change models in general.  Here 
they are included in order to control for differences in the extent and type of impacts of the foreclosure 
crisis across the county. 
                                                          
95 The issue of endogeneity is discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
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The final group, “key variables,” are the variables of interest specific to this research.  These are 
indicators for pre- and post-foreclosure interventions.  These variables are included in order to 
estimate the impacts of these interventions on the neighborhood (tract) level. 
These general independent variables can be classified according to the categorization of hedonic 
pricing variables discussed in Section 3.3.2 (page 125):  structural characteristics of the property (S), 
socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding area (E), jurisdictional characteristics (J), and 
locational characteristics (L).  The vast majority of the general independent variables are 
socioeconomic indicators, though there are three structural indicators (proportion multi-unit housing, 
proportion rental units, and proportion residential structures over 30 years olds) and two indicators 
that represent the capitalized value of structural, socioeconomic, jurisdictional, and locational 
characteristics on the property level (property value per housing unit and percent change in property 
value per housing unit).  Four locational variables (east, west, inner, and outer) are included in the 
foreclosure-related independent variables category. 
General Control Variables 
As stated above, the general control variables group contains independent variables that are 
commonly included in quantitative studies of neighborhood change.  Many of these variables are 
indicators for similar aspects of a neighborhood.  As a result, not all of these variables are included in 
the final model; this will be discussed in the next chapter (Section 0). 
The variables in this category are subdivided into seven thematic groups. Each group and the indicators 
it contains is described in this section, followed by a brief explanation of each indicator’s purpose and 
the reasoning behind its inclusion. The specifics concerning data sources and calculations are found in 
Appendix B:  Variable Definitions, while descriptive statistics are covered in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.  
In general, these variables are included in order to control for characteristics that may be associated 
with the foreclosure crisis. For example the percentage of African Americans in a tract may be 
associated with more negative property value change, as a result of disproportionate predatory 
lending in these areas. 
Property Characteristics 
The first group of general control variables are those that describe the property itself.  Four variables 
make up this category:  property value per housing unit in 2000, the percent change in property value 
during the previous period (1990-2000), the proportion of dwelling units in multi-unit housing 
structures, and the proportion of structures built thirty or more years ago as of 2000.   
The first two of these variables are included in order to account for neighborhood conditions prior to 
the period of interest.  Property value per housing unit in 2000 controls for neighborhood property 
values at the beginning of the period of interest. This is important because the “starting point” of the 
neighborhood may be related to its percent change in residential property value.  Similarly, the percent 
change in residential property value during the previous period (1990-2000) controls for the direction 
property values in the neighborhood were already headed, which could influence the direction of 
change during the observation period. 
The proportion of dwelling units in multi-unit structures may capture differences resulting from larger 
apartment complexes in a neighborhood, which are not eligible for foreclosure prevention programs 
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in Cuyahoga County.  Thus neighborhoods containing a significant proportion of housing units in these 
structures could see lower foreclosure prevention program impacts.  As well, the character of these 
neighborhoods likely differs from others. However, the proportion of multi-unit housing statistic does 
include smaller multi-unit housing (2- to 4-unit housing), which is eligible for foreclosure prevention 
programs if also the client’s primary residence.   
The final indicator in this subcategory, proportion residential structures built thirty or more years ago 
(as of 2000), is a proxy for the age of the neighborhood. In general, older structures are less valuable 
than newer ones in the U.S.; an exception is in historical areas where the housing stock is significantly 
older but in better condition or architecturally interesting. 
Income & Poverty 
The second group of general control variables capture income. The first is per capita income in 2000, 
which is the average income per person in the geography (as opposed to average household income). 
The second variable is the poverty rate, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Both variables are 
controlled for because they are measures of financial well-being that may influence the degree of 
neighborhood change that occurs.   
Age Distribution 
This group of general control variables includes two variables, proportion under 18 years of age and 
proportion 60 and older (both as of 2000), that roughly describe the age distribution of the Census 
tract.  The age distribution of a neighborhood can be an indicator for the direction the neighborhood 
is headed, be it growing, shrinking, or maintaining.  Thus controlling for the age distribution may 
partially account for the trajectory a Census tract was already on in 2000 in the quantile regression 
model. As well, there is evidence that the elderly were often targets of predatory lending. 
Household Characteristics 
The household characteristics control group includes the average household size, the marriage rate, 
and the proportion of female-headed households in the tract in 2000.  These variables describe the 
distribution of the tract’s population into households, and can control for additional socioeconomic 
aspects of a neighborhood that may be linked to the foreclosure problem. 
Education & Employment 
The education and employment category consists of five variables.  Two deal with educational 
attainment:  the proportion of the population with a high school degree or less,96 and the proportion 
of the population with at least a 4-year college degree.  The other three are employment indicators:  
the unemployment rate, the proportion of the population employed in manufacturing, and the 
proportion of the population professionally employed—that is, those who reported their occupation 
to the Census as being in the category of “Management, professional, and related occupations.”  All 
variables are based on 2000 data.  These variables may be associated with the change in property value 
                                                          
96 While there is likely a substantive difference in the employment and earning prospects of those who have a 
high school degree and those who have not completed high school, the U.S. Census collects data at this level of 
aggregation and for this reason these two levels of educational attainment are treated as one group in the model. 
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as a result of certain educational levels and job sectors being hit more or less significantly by 
unemployment. 
Race 
The race category of general control variables includes the proportions of Asian, Hispanic, non-Hispanic 
Black, and non-Hispanic White residents in each tract.  Other racial designations such as Native 
American and Hawaiian are left out as they represent very small portions of the population in 
Cuyahoga County.97  As mentioned above, African Americans were targeted more frequently by 
predatory lending, and highly African American tracts may, as a result, see more negative change in 
property value. 
Tenure 
The final general control variables category, tenure, has to do with the type and length of stay of tract 
residents.  It includes the proportion of rental units and the proportion of residents who have been in 
their current residence for less than ten years, both measured in 2000.  Neighborhood resident stability 
is an important component (and often indicator) of neighborhood change.  Neighborhoods that were 
already seeing high degrees of turnover in 2000 may have been especially hard hit by the foreclosure 
crisis.  The impacts of foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts may be different in neighborhoods 
containing a large proportion of rental property, particularly because many programs do not apply to 
renters. 
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables 
The second group of control variables are foreclosure-related variables.  These measure, both directly 
and indirectly, the intensity of the foreclosure problem.  These variables are included in order to 
control for variations in the extent and impacts of foreclosures within Cuyahoga County.   
The first two variables, civil foreclosure filing intensity and Sheriff’s sale intensity, control for the extent 
to which foreclosures were begun and finished, respectively, in each Census tract.  The locational 
dummy variables are intended to control for the progression of the foreclosure problem through the 
County—beginning on the east side of Cleveland, progressing to the west side of Cleveland, then 
outward, first to the inner suburbs and finally to the outer suburbs.  Finally, vacancy rate is used to 
capture an important, visible, and often lasting impact of foreclosures.   Each variable and its reason 
for inclusion are described below.  Again, data sources and calculation specifics can be found in 
Appendix B:  Variable Definitions, while descriptive statistics can be found in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
Civil Foreclosure Filing Intensity (2000-2009) 
A civil foreclosure is a foreclosure initiated by the lender or servicer as a consequence of the loan terms 
being violated; that is, generally due to non-payment of the loan.  This is the type of foreclosure 
referred to when speaking of the foreclosure problem or crisis. A civil foreclosure filing is the first step 
in the foreclosure process.  Thus this measure captures to what extent foreclosures are initiated in an 
area.  For more detailed information on civil foreclosures in the State of Ohio, see Section 2.2.1. 
                                                          
97 Persons of Native American and Hawaiian races, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, make up .35% and 
.006% of Cuyahoga County residents, respectively.  The Census Bureau includes Pacific Islander in its Asian racial 
category. 
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Sheriff’s Sale Intensity (2000-2010) 
Sheriff’s sales indicate a completed foreclosure.  During this step of the process, the property is sold 
at auction to the highest bidder.  More detailed information on Sheriff’s Sales can be found in Section 
2.2.1. 
Locational Dummy Variables 
Four dummy, or binary, variables are used to designate location:  east side of Cleveland, west side of 
Cleveland, inner suburb, and outer suburb.  Each of these variables can have a value of either zero or 
one, and each tract can have a value of one for only one of the four dummy variables.  These variables 
are included in order to control for the geographical progression of the foreclosure problem in 
Cuyahoga County.  Problems began on the east side of Cleveland, moved westward to the west side of 
the city, and later moved outward through the inner and later the outer suburbs of Cuyahoga County.   
Abbreviations for the four binary variables are shown in the table below.  See Appendix C:  Cuyahoga 
County Subareas for a listing of neighborhoods in each category.  In regressions, Outer is used as the 
reference category. 
Table 3.5:  Locational dummy variables 
Variable Description 
East City of Cleveland, east of Cuyahoga River 
West City of Cleveland, west of Cuyahoga River 
Inner Inner suburbs of Cuyahoga County 
Outer Outer suburbs of Cuyahoga County (reference category) 
 
Vacancy Rate (2007-2010) 
Vacancy rates are calculated using United States Postal Service (USPS) vacancy data, which is updated 
quarterly and therefore more up to date than Census vacancy data, collected only once every ten 
years.  USPS workers collect information on two types of vacancies:  vacant addresses and no-stat 
addresses.  Vacant addresses are those on urban routes where the mail has not been collected for at 
least 90 days.  No-stat addresses can be designated as such for several reasons.  These include a rural 
address where mail has not been collected for at least 90 days, an address under construction, and an 
address in an urban area being identified as “not likely to be active for some time”—e.g. a house being 
demolished and replaced (NEO CANDO, 2013).  Michael Schramm, of NEO CANDO, suggested 
combining vacant and no-stat addresses to get the most accurate vacancy rates possible (2011). 
The vacancy rate indicator used here is the maximum value of the quarterly total vacancy rate (vacancy 
rate plus no-stat rate) from 2007-2010. 
Key Variables 
The final group of independent variables are those that measure or proxy foreclosure prevention and 
mitigation efforts in order to identify their impact on residential property value change.  The key 
variables can be broken into three groups:  pre-foreclosure responses (counseling intensity and 
outcomes), post-foreclosure responses (Board of Revisions foreclosure intensity, landbanked parcels, 
and demolitions), and targeting (SII and NSP2 areas).  Foreclosure mediation, a pre-foreclosure effort, 
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is not included due to data inaccessibility. As well, there is a large overlap in individuals receiving 
foreclosure counseling and those receiving foreclosure mediation. A more detailed explanation can be 
found in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. 
Each key variable and its reasons for inclusion are described.   Variable abbreviations, sources, and 
calculation equations can be found in Appendix B:  Variable Definitions , while descriptive statistics are 
found in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.   With the exception of the landbanking data, the data for the key 
variables is available from 2005 or 2006 through 2010.  This is because these foreclosure responses 
began in either 2005 or 2006, and not due to data limitations.   
Counseling Intensity (2006-2010) 
The counseling intensity variable is intended to capture the impact of counseling in itself—that is, if 
homeowners in trouble getting counseling, regardless of outcome, slows or stops property 
devaluation.  Though positive counseling outcomes (e.g. keeping the home) are most likely to result in 
neighborhood improvement, or retardation of neighborhood degradation, counseling in itself may 
have a positive effect by making homeowners more aware of their options and thereby increasing the 
likelihood of a less negative outcome (e.g. moving out of the house on the first notice of foreclosure 
filing).  On the other hand, counseling in general may result in better outcomes for homeowners (e.g. 
a deed-in-lieu or short sale), but not have a positive effect on the neighborhood. 
Because it was necessary to code the Census tract in ArcMap by hand for each counseling outcome 
observation, a random sample was used.  Four thousand of the 11,327 observations were randomly 
drawn and coded in ArcMap.98  This means that the true foreclosure counseling rates are 
approximately 2.8 times greater than those reflected by the counseling outcome variables. 
Counseling Outcomes (2006-2010) 
Examining each category of foreclosure prevention outcome separately is another method to identify 
the impact of foreclosure prevention counseling.  Foreclosure counseling outcomes have been divided 
into four categories:  Kept House, Lost House to Foreclosure, Lost House Non-Foreclosure, and 
Unknown. 
Outcomes classified as “Kept House” are expected to positively impact neighborhoods, because 
homeowners will stay in the neighborhood, keeping the neighborhood and property values more 
stable.  “Lost House to Foreclosure” outcomes are expected to negatively impact neighborhoods, as 
homeowners then leave the neighborhood and the likelihood that the property remains vacant and 
deteriorates is high. The impact of “Lost House to Non-Foreclosure” outcomes is unclear—while this 
outcome is generally preferable to a homeowner in comparison to foreclosure, the impact on the 
neighborhood may not significantly differ, as the home is still likely to be sold at a distressed price or 
held as an REO by the financial institution.  Both of these situations are ones in which vacancy and 
deterioration are likely.  Finally, the impact of “Unknown Outcomes” is unknown as well.  At first glance 
one would expect unknown outcomes to have little or no effect; however some of these may have left 
                                                          
98 Of these, 617 observations were removed because they were obvious duplicates or address data was missing, 
incomplete, referred to a location outside of the county, or was sufficiently ambiguous that the proper Census 
tract assignment could not be determined. 
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the counseling track and reached an outcome elsewhere, such as through foreclosure mediation or 
Legal Aid. 
Appendix B:  Variable Definitions lists the outcome codes assigned to each outcome category.  
Counseling outcome variables are calculated as percentages of the number of housing units in the 
Census tract. 
Board of Revisions Foreclosure Intensity (2006-2010) 
Board of Revisions (BR) foreclosures are foreclosures initiated by the Cuyahoga County Auditor for tax 
delinquency.  Assuming no response to the foreclosure filing is made, the County Auditor carries out 
the foreclosure and then transfers the property to the Cleveland City Land Reutilization Program (the 
county landbank).  These foreclosures are a tool used to demolish dangerous structures, and bring the 
land back into use through the County.  The County may hold the property in the land bank, create a 
community park or garden, or sell the property to a responsible investor to redevelop.  Thus Board of 
Revisions foreclosure intensity is used as an indicator for post-foreclosure interventions. 
Landbanked Parcels (2000-2010)  
Cuyahoga County has two landbanks, the city landbank (City of Cleveland Land Bank/City Land 
Reutilization Program) and the county landbank (Cuyahoga Land Bank/Cuyahoga County Land 
Reutilization Corporation).  While the county land bank obtains vacant and abandoned property 
through tax delinquencies, the city land bank receives properties only passively—that is, when land is 
donated.  Both attempt to reuse the properties as parks, gardens, yard expansions, and redevelopment 
efforts.  As a post-foreclosure response, the County has been especially active with landbanking as an 
effort to clean up properties, either to add amenities to a neighborhood or to market properties for 
redevelopment. 
Parcels going into a landbank could be an indicator of cleaning up a neighborhood, while parcels 
coming out of a landbank could be an indicator of a neighborhood moving forward with beautification 
and redevelopment.  Unfortunately, data on landbanking for Cuyahoga County is limited to snapshot 
counts of the number and percentage of parcels in a tract in the two landbanks for each year between 
2000 and 2010.  The maximum percentage of landbanked parcels between 2000 and 2010 for each 
tract is used here to proxy the effect of landbanking on neighborhood property value change. 
Demolitions (2005-2010) 
Demolitions are another post-foreclosure response used to reduce the negative impacts of 
foreclosures on a neighborhood.  In March of 2013, Cuyahoga County was estimated to have over 
26,000 vacant homes, with more than 15,700 of them within the City of Cleveland (Pagonakis, 2013b).  
Many of these have deteriorated to the point that they are condemnable, meaning they are clearly a 
blight on the neighborhood and in unsafe condition.  By demolishing a dangerous vacant property, the 
City or County can removed a hazard and prepare a site for reuse. 
To investigate the relationship between demolitions and residential property value change, a variable 
was created that represents the proportion of structures in a Census tract that have been demolished 
between 2005 and 2010. 
Strategic Investment Initiative Area (SII) 
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Strategic Investment Initiative areas (SII) are six areas selected by Neighborhood Progress, Inc. to be 
focused on for foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts.  See Section 5.3 for more information. 
Tracts comprised substantially or entirely of SII areas are marked with a value of one for the variable 
SII while all other tracts have an SII value of zero. 
NSP2 Area 
The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 (NSP2) provided funds to selected neighborhoods 
that saw significant damage due to the negative impacts of foreclosures.  The NSP2 program is 
described in more detail in Section 2.4.1, and its implementation in Cuyahoga County is discussed in 
Section 5.4.5.  Data for NSP rounds 1 and 3 are not included in the model due to the fact that 
geographical data was only available for NSP round 2.  Tracts containing areas designated for NSP2 
funds are marked with a value of one for the NSP2 variable, while all other tracts have an NSP2 value 
of zero.  
3.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced the research design:  a mixed methods case study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio.  
The qualitative method is that of semi-structured interviews, while the quantitative method is quantile 
regression.  Grounding these choices are a constructionist epistemology and a symbolic interactionist 
theoretical perspective.  Taken together, this means that as a researcher I believe that the creation of 
knowledge is an inherently social process in which people understand the world through overelapping 
symbolic meanings applied to ideas and things.  That is, context matters, and the meanings, values, 
and points of view that arise from it shape reality and truth.  Further, the research is situated in a 
phronetic research methodology, which places power as center to analysis.  Thus it is necessary to 
interrogate assumptions, discourses, rationalities, and rationalizations in order to locate power and its 
role in knowledge production. 
The case study approach was chosen due to the fact that the neighborhood and community impacts 
of foreclosure responses is a highly underresearched area.  Thus, rather than building off theory and 
empirical work directly related to the topic, I investigated closely related areas of research to guide the 
research design; I also selected an open-ended research design that allows for (in fact requires) 
detailed investigation and data gathering and in-depth analysis that is intended to provide 
understanding (verstehen) to the researcher and reader.  Case study research often raises 
generalizability concerns.  However, one can argue for “naturalistic generalization” (Stake, 1982).  This 
concept refers to providing sufficiently rich detail (or “thick description”) that the reader is able to 
draw conclusions regarding generalizability his- or herself. 
The research investigates Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where the city of Cleveland is located.  The two are 
located in northwest Ohio, adjacent to Lake Erie.  In 2010, Cleveland was the 45th most populous city 
in the U.S., with the larger metro area the sixteenth largest in the country. The county contains 59 
municipalities and townships and a high degree of socioeconomic variation. Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
was chosen as the case due to its being a highly developed instance of the phenomenon at hand—
foreclosure responses.  Cuyahoga County is known within the U.S. as a leader in responding to 
foreclosures at both government and policy levels.  A second advantage of Cuyahoga County for this 
research is that Cleveland and the county were hit heavily and early by the foreclosure crisis.  Thus, 
there has been more time to develop, implement, and adjust responses.  Other aspects of the county 
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that aided in the crafting of foreclosure responses are its responsive housing advocacy network and 
the Ohio’s slower judicial foreclosure process.  Lastly, the social, economic, and property data publicly 
available for Cuyahoga County through NEO CANDO far surpasses that of most municipalities in the 
U.S. 
A mixed methods approach was chosen to take advantage of the different strengths of different 
measures, thus allowing the results of the two to supplement one another and for triangulation 
between the two.  In this research the qualitative component, semi-structured expert interviews, is 
the focus, with the quantitative method, quantile regression, providing supplementary results.  The 
combination of the two methods allows one to ‘check’ the results against one another, albeit not 
directly in this case. 
Semi-structured expert interviews were chosen as the primary method in order to gather detailed data 
to generate “thick description” and to facilitate the exploratory nature of this research.  That is, “a goal 
of interviews in general is to reveal existing knowledge in a way that can expressed in theform of 
answers and so become accessible to interpretation” (Flick, 2009, italics added).  Moreover, interviews 
allow participants to provide their views and understandings of the issue(s) and is thus frequently seen 
as an empowering research method.  Snowball sampling was used to find participants, beginning with 
some individuals known to work with foreclosure responses, such as counseling agency employees and 
the director of the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative, and continuing based on referrals until no 
new names came up as referrals.  This sampling method does have potential shortcomings, namely 
that portions of the population of interest can be omitted due to a lack of connections or voice in the 
phenomenon of interest. 
An interview guide was developed and used to guide the interviews, but participants were encouraged 
to branch off to what they considered relevant topics.  This had the effect of exposing additional 
aspects of the case to me that I may have otherwise missed.  A consent form was provided to each 
participant, requesting permission to record the interview, to name the participant and/or refer to him 
or her by his or her job title, and to use quotations in the final work.99  The recordings of the interviews 
were then annotated and in specific sections transcribed. 
This was supplemented by the quantitative component, which used quantile regression.  Quantile 
regression can be understood at being similar to OLS regression, but rather than estimating the impact 
of an indicator at the mean, as with OLS regression, quantile regression allows the estimation of the 
impact of an indicator at any location along the dependent variable distribution.  This means that it is 
possible, for example, to estimate the impact of landbanking for communities with low, medium, and 
high levels of property appreciation100 and determine if these estimates vary in significance or 
magnitude based on the location along the dependent variable distribution.  Several aspects that can 
cause problems include undetected spatial dependence, multicollinearity, selection bias, violating 
general equilibrium, and endogeneity.  Of these, the main concerns in the model used in this research 
are the violation of general equilibrium assumptions—that is, houses are not scarce in Cuyahoga 
County during the study period—and endogenity—the existence of a bidirectional relationship 
between the dependent and independent variable(s) and/or correlation between the error term and 
                                                          
99 The vast majority of participants responded affirmatively to these requests; some required quotations to be 
reviewed before officially allowing their use. 
100 Though in fact the vast majority of communities in Cuyahoga County experienced property depreciation 
between 2000 and 2010. 
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independent variable(s).  The first issue, concerning scarcity, is not addressed; however, the violation 
of assumptions in econometric models does not immediately disqualify them from usefulness.  The 
second, endogeneity, is dealt with by using robust quantile regression, which provides valid standard 
error estimates even under misspecification. 
The quantitative model itself is based in hedonics, or the estimation of the value of components that 
are inseperable from the whole—for example, to estimate the value of an additional bedroom in a 
house.  The bedroom cannot be purchased a la carte, but clearly the bedroom itself has economic 
value.  Another example is the local tax rate, which cannot be separated from the property but does 
affect property value.  Hedonics allows the estimation of this value.  In this case a hedonic pricing 
model was extended to the Census tract level, or the aggregation of all the houses in a community.  
Independent variables were included that represent structural, socioeconomic, jurisdictional, and 
locational characteristics of the tract.  Foreclosure-related variables were added to the model to 
capture the effects of the foreclosure crisis, and key variables indicating foreclosure responses were 
added as well.  Thus, the model allows the estimation of the economic impact of foreclosure responses 
on the community level.  The quantile regression method further allows these impacts to be estimated 
along the distribution of residential property value appreciation observed in Cuyahoga County 
between 2000 and 2010. 
The qualitative data consists of 23 interviews from the first fieldwork trip (22 of these recorded) and 3 
interviews from the second fieldwork trip (none recorded).  One interview from the first fieldwork trip 
had two participants; all others had one participant.  All took place in either the interviewee’s office or 
a coffee shop.  The interviews averaged 70 minutes and ranged from a low of twenty minutes to over 
two and a half hours.  The interviewees worked in four focus areas:  government, non-profit or 
advocacy work, the financial sector, and as neighborhood leaders.  Participants were heavily 
represented in the government and non-profit sectors.  Several meetings and calls supplemented the 
interviews, focusing on contacting participants and negotiating data access.  The interview questions 
can be found in Appendix A:  Interview Materials. 
Cuyahoga County contains 443 Census tracts, excluding Lake Erie.  Complete data was available for 421 
of these. The data came from a variety of sources, most of it publicly available.  Foreclosure prevention 
counseling outcomes data were not publicly available, but it was possible to gain access by ensuring 
that no data identifying individuals be made available.  The dependent variable is the percent change 
in residential property value between 2000 and 2010, including both owner-occupied and rental 
property.  Though approximating neighborhood change by a purely economic measure is a great 
oversimplication, this danger is avoided by treating the quantitative model and results as 
supplementary to the qualitative results and analysis. In addition, this indicator offers the advantages 
of measurability and that the quantitative results likely speak more to policymakers than more 
descriptive qualitative results.   
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Chapter 4 The Foreclosure Problem in Cuyahoga County 
This chapter begins with an introduction of Cuyahoga County.  This includes historical information to 
provide context for the County’s situation, as well as a look at more recent neighborhood change 
statistics.  Attention is given to the roles municipal fragmentation and CDCs play in the county. Second, 
the foreclosure problem in Cuyahoga County, which began in the mid-1990s, is discussed.  Third, a 
quantitative description of the foreclosure problem is presented, as well as implications for the 
quantitative model.  The model itself and the reasoning behind the choices made and the model’s 
structure are then introduced.  Finally, two example localities, Slavic Village and South Euclid, are 
presented in order to give more specific information as to how the foreclosure problem and 
foreclosure responses play out in specific localities and communities. 
4.1 Characterization of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
Cuyahoga County is located in northeastern Ohio, and is the central county of the five-county 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor Metropolitan Statistical Area (here referred to as the Cleveland MSA or simply 
as the MSA).101 It has an area of 458.49 square miles (1,187.5 square kilometers), and a population of 
1.28 million as of 2010 (U.S. Census, 2013).  It contains the City of Cleveland, and 58 other, smaller 
municipalities and townships—see Figure 4.1, below.  In 2010 the City of Cleveland was the 45th largest 
city in the U.S., while the larger MSA was the 28th largest in the U.S. (U.S. Census, 2012a). 
4.1.1 History of Cuyahoga County 
A brief history of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County is given here in order to contextualize the situation 
today.  This history, particularly from the 1970s onward, aids in understanding the city and county 
during the study period of 2000 to 2010.  This includes the spatial layout and distribution of the 
neighborhoods, the demographic characteristics of the population, the advocacy culture, and the 
responses and reactions of residents, leaders, and organizations. 
Founding & Boom Years 
Downtown Cleveland is centered at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River, and was founded in 1796.  Its 
first major growth period occurred around 1833, with the construction of the Ohio River-Lake Erie 
Canal, though in 1860 it still had less than fifty thousand residents (Griffin, 1981).  Between 1860 and 
1920, it grew substantially, due to the manufacturing of durable goods—in particular steel, an industry 
which grew rapidly in Cleveland in the 1870s and 1880s—and an influx of Eastern European and Italian 
immigrants (Griffin, 1981; Warf & Holly, 1997).This period laid the foundation of the city—the street 
network, the ethnic neighborhoods and churches, and a large proportion of the houses still 
characteristic of the city today (Griffin, 1981).  The speed of population growth was astounding:  
Cleveland added 100,000 residents between 1890 and 1900, another 200,000 between 1900 and 1910, 
and 261,000 more between 1910 and 1920 (Griffin, 1981)—see Table 4.2. 
                                                          
101 A Metropolitan Statistical Area is the name used by the U.S. Census to denote a geographical region comprised 
of “at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of 
social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties” (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2003, p.2).  The smallest unit of inclusion for a Metropolitan Statistical Areas is the county, and as of 
2003, approximately 83% of the U.S. population lived in MSAs. 
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Figure 4.1:  Cuyahoga County Municipalities & Townships 
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Cleveland connected two industrial centers, Buffalo (New York) and Detroit (Michigan), and became 
an industrial center in itself during this period, growing substantially in terms of wealth and technology.  
At one point, Shaker Heights, a Cleveland suburb, had the highest per capita income in the United 
States (Warf & Holly, 1997).  In 1920 and 1930, Cleveland was the 5th-largest city in the nation.  World 
War II and the subsequent post-war boom further strengthened Cleveland’s manufacturing sector.  
During this period, large numbers of Appalachian whites and Southern blacks immigrated to Cleveland, 
further increasing the population.  Manufacturing continued to thrive, with the St. Lawrence Seaway 
allowing Cleveland to become an international port, particularly for steel.  Manufacturing employment 
peaked in 1967 at 306,700 (Warf & Holly, 1997).  Strong unions and the manufacturing boom 
generated strong wages and benefits for these workers.  As Warf & Holly (1997) write, “Cleveland was 
born and matured during the classic period of Fordism, the epoch of production characterized largely 
by mass markets, mass production, homogeneous goods, vertically integrated firms, oligopolistic 
market structure, and semiskilled labor” (p.210). 
Cleveland’s Decline 
Unfortunately for Cleveland, and most of the nation’s manufacturing belt, American manufacturing 
went into decline in the 1970s.  During this time the appellations for the larger region changed from 
names such as the Manufacturing Belt and the Steel Belt to the Rust Belt, and Cleveland in particular 
was bestowed the moniker of ‘The Mistake on the Lake.’  Warf & Holly’s 1997 paper connects global 
economic conditions to socioeconomic impacts on the populace:  during the 1970s, the U.S.’s 
economic hegemony faded, and the global economic restructuring “permanently disemboweled” 
Cleveland—petroleum shocks, competition from abroad and the southern United States, and 
deindustrialization resulted in plant closures, employment losses, and increasing unemployment (Warf 
& Holly, 1997, p.211).  These changes began gradually in the early 1970s, but 1979 marked a sudden 
economic shock for the region (Chow & Coulton, 1998). 
Cleveland lost 13% of its total private employment between 1979 and 1993, but 40% of its 
manufacturing employment (Warf & Holly, 1997).  The region also lost 14% of its annualized earnings 
between 1979 and 1983 (Hill & Bier, 1989).  During the 1970s, real median income dropped 11%, a 
strong reversal from the 22% increase seen in the 1960s (Warf & Holly, 1997).  Employment gradually 
recovered, but not wages.  The sectoral distribution of employment had changed:  by 1990, 
employment in industries producing goods had decreased 22% from 1979, while service industry 
employment increased 16% (Chow & Coulton, 1998).  Employment in the retail trade and FIRE (finance, 
insurance, and real estate) sectors increased during this time as well (Hill & Bier, 1989).  These patterns 
continue today:  during the ten year period of 1998 to 2008, 25% of manufacturing jobs lost in the U.S. 
have been lost in Ohio (Simon, 2008). 
4.1.2 Uneven Impacts 
These changes affected not only Cleveland as a whole, but individual neighborhoods as well.  Hill & 
Bier (1989) wrote, “The economy of old-order Cleveland rested on blue-collar occupations.  
Neighborhoods developed to meet the demands of this class of residents, which in turn formed a 
complex and long-lasting pattern of social relationships, which were thrown out of kilter when old-
order Cleveland suddenly passed away” (p.125).  They continue to note that new-order Cleveland is 
characterized by lower wages and increased income inequality, due to middle-wage manufacturing 
jobs disappearing and low-wage service jobs replacing them.  Due to Cleveland’s relatively 
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homogenous neighborhoods—in terms of income, occupation, and race—the impacts of economic 
restructuring can often be clearly seen at the neighborhood level (Hill & Bier, 1989). 
Given this homogeneity (which is in fact observable in many American neighborhoods), as workers in 
specific sectors lose their jobs and job prospects, or see a reduction in wages, their neighborhoods 
begin to decline.  Poverty increases and homes no longer appreciate in value.  Both of these affect the 
neighborhood, not only the individuals directly affected by economic restructuring.  The neighborhood 
impacts are widespread but unevenly distributed across the region.  When recovery occurs, it tends to 
be uneven as well. Thus economic restructuring impacts neighborhoods via the mechanism of 
residents’ occupational fortunes.   In their study of Cleveland, Hill & Bier (1989) mapped the changes 
in housing value appreciation, poverty rate, and sector of employment, making clear the uneven 
effects of the decline in manufacturing on Cleveland neighborhoods.  The primarily black, blue collar 
east side was particularly negatively impacted in comparison to the west side and suburbs.  This 
pattern was later borne out again in the foreclosure crisis. 
These uneven effects can be easily seen in the differences in the changes that occurred in the City of 
Cleveland and the suburbs surrounding it as American manufacturing declined.  These changes 
continue to affect the region today.  Table 4.1 provides a comparison of various characteristics of the 
City of Cleveland, the Cleveland MSA, and the Cleveland MSA excluding the City of Cleveland in order 
to illustrate these disparities.  One can quickly ascertain substantial differences between the two:  the 
unemployment rate and poverty rate in the City of Cleveland are both well over twice that observed 
in the remainder of the MSA; the proportion of African Americans in Cleveland is over four times the 
rate elsewhere in the MSA; and the percentage of the housing stock built prior to 1940 in Cleveland is 
over three times the proportion observed outside of the city.  Though there is no value available for 
the median housing value for the MSA excluding Cleveland, comparing the city value to the MSA value 
one can deduce that property values are much higher outside of Cleveland.  Finally, and most extreme, 
is the difference in the violent crime rate in Cleveland in comparison to the remainder of the MSA:  
Cleveland’s violent crime rate is over eighty times that of the remainder of the MSA. 
Many of these changes began in the 1970s, as manufacturing declined and the political climate became 
more conservative, while some began even earlier.  Between 1979 and 1985, the City of Cleveland lost 
27% of its manufacturing jobs, while the surrounding suburbs lost only 4%.  Between 1985 and 1990, 
Cleveland lost an additional 7%, while the suburbs experienced a small increase of 1% (Chow & 
Coulton, 1998).  Looking at jobs across all employment sectors, the city lost 130,000 jobs between 
1958 and 1977, while the metropolitan region added 210,000 jobs during that same period. Examining 
unemployment, the regional average was 5.9% in 1977—just over a percent below the national 
average of 7.0%—while Cleveland’s unemployment rate was 11.5%, and for young blacks in Cleveland 
the rate was 38.8%.  Per capita income in 1973 was 14% above the national average in the Cleveland 
region (excluding the City of Cleveland), but 37% less than the national average in the city itself 
(Krumholz, 1986).  As of 2011, the unemployment rate in the City of Cleveland was 19.5%; in the 
greater MSA, excluding the City of Cleveland, it was 8.6%, a figure much closer to the nationwide 
unemployment rate of approximately 9% (U.S. Census, 2013).  Figure 4.2 clearly shows the 
concentration of unemployment in the City of Cleveland, with much lower rates in the surrounding 
county. 
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Table 4.1:  Descriptive Statistics of Cleveland and its Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Sources:  American FactFinder 1-year & 5-year estimates (2013), Federal Bureau of Investigation (2012a, 2012b) 
  City of 
Cleveland 
Cleveland MSA MSA excluding 
Cleveland 
Population 393,804 2,068,283 1,674,479 
Median Income 32,201 48,871 - 
Unemployment Rate 19.5% 10.7% 8.6% 
Poverty Rate 34.3% 16.0% 11.9% 
Proportion African American 51.6% 19.7% 12.2% 
Median Housing Value102 76,600 138,000 - 
Proportion Housing Stock Built Prior to 1940 50.9% 22.7% 15.5% 
Violent Crime Rate (per 100,000 residents) 1366.4 404.6 16.9 
 
 
Figure 4.2:  Unemployment Rate by Census Tract in Cuyahoga County (2000) 
Several secondary impacts followed the changes in employment:  population loss, increased poverty, 
increased segregation, decreased housing values, increased crime, and increased service demands for 
the City of Cleveland.  The City of Cleveland began losing population before the decline in 
                                                          
102 Please note that the median housing value from the U.S. Census should be interpreted with caution.  
Homeowners are asked to state the value of their house, which may or may not align well with its current 
appraisal value.  Later in this work, the median sales value of single family properties sold is used.  This value 
better represents the market value of properties; on the other hand, the number of properties included in the 
sample is limited, as only those that have been sold in a particular year are included in determining the median. 
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manufacturing, but between 1970 and 1980 this shift resulted in the city’s largest decadal population 
loss (see Table 4.2).  As manufacturing declined, the city lost 39,000 residents during the 1950s, 
125,000 during the 1960s, and 180,000 during the 1970s (Krumholz, 1986).  By 1990, Cleveland’s 
population was 506,000, only 55% of its peak in 1950 (Chow & Coulton, 1998).  The region experienced 
uneven population shifts as well; during the 1970s Cleveland lost 24% of its population while the metro 
area lost only 8%.  Much of this population loss moved to the surrounding counties, which after 1970 
saw the greatest growth (Borchert, 1998).  In general, those who could leave did, leaving 
overconcentrations of the elderly, the poor, and the structurally unemployed and marginally employed 
(Warf & Holly, 1997).  For example, during the 1960s Cleveland lost 25% of its population of families 
with incomes over the county median (Krumholz, 1986).  As a result, the poverty rate in the City of 
Cleveland rose swiftly, from 27% in 1980 to 40% in 1987 (Warf & Holly, 1997). As well, persons in 
poverty became twice as likely to live in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty (over 40% of 
neighborhood residents in poverty) between 1970 and 1990 (Chow & Coulton, 1998).  Cleveland’s 
poverty rate is somewhat lower today, at 34.3% in 2011, though the MSA poverty rate (excluding the 
City of Cleveland) stood at 11.9%, indicative of the continued disparities between the city and 
surrounding suburbs (U.S. Census, 2013).  Figure 4.3, below, illustrates the disparity in poverty rates 
between the city and surrounding county. 
Table 4.2:  Decennial Population Counts for Cleveland & Cuyahoga County. 
Source:  Case Western Reserve University (2012) 
Year 
City of 
Cleveland 
Decadal Growth 
Rate 
Cuyahoga 
County 
Proportion in City 
of Cleveland 
1820 606 - 6,328 9.58% 
1830 1,075 77.39% 10,373 10.36% 
1840 6,071 464.74% 26,506 22.90% 
1850 17,034 180.58% 48,099 35.41% 
1860 43,417 154.88% 178,033 24.39% 
1870 92,829 113.81% 132,010 70.32% 
1880 160,146 72.52% 196,943 81.32% 
1890 261,353 63.20% 309,970 84.32% 
1900 381,768 46.07% 439,120 86.94% 
1910 560,663 46.86% 637,425 87.96% 
1920 796,841 42.12% 943,495 84.46% 
1930 900,429 13.00% 1,201,455 74.94% 
1940 878,366 -2.45% 1,217,250 72.16% 
1950 914,808 4.15% 1,389,532 65.84% 
1960 876,050 -4.24% 1,647,895 53.16% 
1970 750,879 -14.29% 1,720,835 43.63% 
1980 573,822 -23.58% 1,498,400 38.30% 
1990 505,616 -11.89% 1,412,140 35.80% 
2000 478,403 -5.38% 1,393,848 34.32% 
2010 396,815 -17.05% 1,280,122 31.00% 
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Figure 4.3:  Poverty Rate by Census Tract in Cuyahoga County (2000) 
Cleveland’s proportion of African Americans increased greatly between 1950 and 1980, from 16% to 
44%, resulting from Southern Blacks migrating northward and selective outmigration of whites from 
the city (Krumholz, 1986).  Cleveland was and is highly racially segregated:  in 1980 the Cleveland MSA 
was second only to Chicago in the dissimilarity index, which measures what proportion of the 
population would need to switch neighborhoods to have a perfectly evenly distributed population by 
race (Chow & Coulton, 1998).  As of the 2010 Census, the Cleveland MSA is the 8th most racially 
segregated MSA in the country, with a dissimilarity index score of 72.6—meaning 72.6% of the 
Cleveland MSA’s residents would need to move to a different neighborhood to create a perfectly 
residentially integrated city (Logan & Stults, 2011).  The City of Cleveland is 51.6% African American, 
while in comparison the MSA, excluding the City of Cleveland, is 12.2% (U.S. Census, 2013).  Figure 4.4 
shows the highly segregated nature of the city, with African Americans highly concentrated on the east 
side of Cleveland. 
This pattern of residential segregation has several historical roots.  For one, many parties (suburbs, 
developers, and federal lenders such as the FHA) required restrictive covenants on property deeds 
which excluded the sale of the property to African Americans during the 1940s and 1950s, limiting the 
housing choice of African Americans to renting in the urban ghetto (Borchert, 1998).  This resulted in 
overcrowding coupled with incredibly poor conditions in black neighborhoods—including high rates of 
substandard housing, high unemployment, poor school quality, and intermittent garbage collection 
(Lackritz, 1968).   
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Figure 4.4:  Percent African American by Census Tract in Cuyahoga County (2000) 
Residential segregation and the inability of African Americans to obtain better housing led to racial 
tension, particularly during the Civil Rights era (1955-1968).  In July of 1966, race riots broke out in the 
Hough neighborhood of Cleveland, considered the worst of the city’s black ghettoes. It left further 
scars on the neighborhood and caused additional deterioration, population loss, and disinvestment.  It 
also prompted flight to the suburbs, both by whites and African Americans who were able to do so. 
Many middle class whites left the city for the suburbs during this time, reducing housing demand in 
the city (Cunningham, 2007).  Sharp property devaluation led to vacancies and abandonment, and 
subsequently residential and commercial blight (Warf & Holly, 1997).  As well, many homeowners and 
landlords were no longer able or willing to pay for housing maintenance and upkeep, as many 
experienced unemployment or regarded investment on a devalued property as financially undesirable 
(or even unaffordable).  This pattern of property devaluation, vacancy, and abandonment occurred 
during the foreclosure crisis as well.   
As the population in Cleveland declined, so did the value of the housing stock.  Over the course of the 
1970s and 1980s, many houses in the inner city lost one-half to two-thirds of their value (Warf & Holly, 
1997).  A significant reason for this was mortgage redlining, and later insurance redlining, 
discriminatory practices where banks refuse to provide loans and insurers refuse to provide home 
insurance to certain geographically defined areas, in particular to black neighborhoods (see Section 
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1.1.1 for more on the history of race and homeownership in the U.S.).   An analogous practice, reverse 
redlining,103 returned to disadvantage African Americans with respect to loan terms during the 2000s.   
As of 2011, the median housing value in the City of Cleveland was $76,600, while the median value for 
the MSA (including Cleveland) was $138,000 (U.S. Census, 2013).  Figure 4.5 shows the median housing 
sale prices by tract in Cuyahoga County in 2000.  It can be seen that the city contains the lowest sale 
prices, but that there is variation within the suburbs as well.  In particular, the predominately black 
suburbs to the east of the City of Cleveland (refer to Figure 4.4) have lower sale prices than the rest of 
the suburbs. It should be kept in mind that not only properties in the City of Cleveland depreciated in 
value during the foreclosure crisis; many suburban municipalities were hit hard as well.  This will be 
discussed in more detail later in Section 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.5: Median Single Family Sale Price by Census Tract in Cuyahoga County (2000) 
Large portions of Cleveland’s housing stock were built before 1940—94% as of 1950, in 1990 still about 
50% (Chow & Coulton, 1998).  These houses were built as housing for blue collar workers, but by the 
second half of the twentieth century were generally less desirable to home purchasers—small, situated 
on small lots, and lacking modern amenities by the standards of the day.  Figure 4.6 shows the 
distribution of housing built more than thirty years ago as of 2000.  
                                                          
103 Reverse redlining is the practice of targeting African Americans and other minorities for subprime and/or 
predatory loans.  Section 2.2.2 discusses some of the research concerning predatory lending to minorities. 
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Figure 4.6: Percent Housing Over 30 Years Old by Census Tract in Cuyahoga County (2000) 
In many city neighborhoods, the same older, less desirable properties again experienced swift and 
significant devaluation and deterioration during the foreclosure crisis. In 2011, the City of Cleveland 
continued to have 50.9% of its housing stock built before 1940, while only 15.5% of the housing stock 
in the MSA (excluding the City of Cleveland) was built before 1940 (U.S. Census, 2013).  Though not all 
older homes are less desirable to today’s homeowners, this is often the case, particularly those found 
in neighborhoods that formerly housed manufacturing employees.  These homes tend to be smaller, 
wood-framed constructions built close to one another. 
A consequence of both housing devaluation and employment loss within the city was the reduction in 
the city’s tax revenues.  Between 1969 and 1974, the assessed housing value base for the city shrank 
5% during a period of inflation marked by a 34.5% increase in the Consumer Price Index.  During this 
time the city’s general operating fund fell by 37% in constant dollars (Krumholz, 1986).  Simultaneously 
federal government contributions to social welfare programs shrank with the advent of conservatism 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and service demands increased, a result of the poorer, older, and more 
frequently unemployed population of the city (Warf & Holly, 1997).  For example, the demands placed 
on the city police force increased substantially:  in 1975 the violent crime rate was 1,730 per 100,000 
residents, a 16% increase from 1970 and 164% over the 1965 rate (Krumholz, 1986).  In 1978 the City 
of Cleveland defaulted on its debt obligations, the first major American city to do so since the Great 
Depression (it emerged from default nine years later in 1987).  So, during this period, the city saw 
increased service needs but decreased revenues with which to fulfill them.  This process has played 
out again during the foreclosure crisis, as will be discussed later in Section 4.2.  
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By 1975 Cleveland was in the country’s top quintile for poverty, unemployment, poor housing, violent 
crime, and municipal debt (Warf & Holly, 1997).  In the late 1990s, the problems discussed above 
generally remained.  Chow & Coulton (1998) found that indicators of urban decay (crime, welfare 
dependency, labor force detachment, and drug trafficking) became more interconnected—that is, 
more highly correlated—at the neighborhood level during the 1980s in Cleveland.  Negative social 
conditions went from being relatively independent in 1980 to more tightly connected in 1990.  Thus, 
neighborhoods experiencing a single adverse social condition in 1980 were likely to be facing a 
confluence of adverse social conditions in 1990 (Chow & Coulton, 1998).  As of 2011, Cleveland has the 
8th highest violent crime rate, 1,366.4 per 100,000 residents, of U.S. cities with a population above 
250,000 (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2012b).  In the same year, the Cleveland MSA as a whole 
had a violent crime rate of 404.6 per 100,000 residents (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2012a).  
Excluding Cleveland, the MSA had a violent crime rate of 16.9 per 100,000 residents—less than one 
eightieth of the violent crime rate in the City of Cleveland. 
Cleveland did see a partial resurgence during the 1990s.  Some reindustrialization occurred, 
particularly in the auto, steel, instruments, and chemicals industries.  High-technology firms and 
services (hospitals, banks, law and accounting firms) grew.  This increased sectoral diversity reduces 
the risk of a major economic shock like that experienced in the 1970s.  However, service sector 
employees received on average 56% of the income of manufacturing employees, and income 
inequality continued to grow.   The city became one of eight federal Empowerment Zones in 1993, 
receiving grants and financing—a boon for the city, but only received due to its distressed situation 
(Warf & Holly, 1997).   In many ways Cleveland remains a troubled city located within a healthier 
metropolis.  Swanstrom et al. (2009) designate Cleveland a weak market city.  Weak market cities are 
characterized by housing markets where supply significantly outstrips demand, resulting in lower price 
appreciation and higher vacancy levels. As a result, weak market cities generally experienced smaller 
housing bubbles and, subsequently, less home value depreciation as the bubbles burst.  More 
specifically, Cleveland can be characterized as a weak central city housing market with a strong urban 
fringe housing market surrounding it.  Considering the metro area’s housing market type influences 
the specific foreclosure problems seen and is an important factor in selecting policy responses.  For 
example, weak housing markets tend to have more serious vacancy and abandonment problems than 
strong markets, and thus policy responses should be more focused on preventing and abating 
abandonment in these areas.  These aspects will be discussed in more detail later in Section 5.1. 
4.1.3 Variation within the County 
Despite the statistics listed above that point out the disparate fortunes of the City of Cleveland and the 
surrounding metropolitan region, it is only one level at which subareas of the region can be compared.  
Restricting the discussion to Cuyahoga County (thus excluding the other four counties in the MSA), we 
see that neither all suburban municipalities nor all parts of the city have fared equally well.  For the 
purposes of this study, Cuyahoga County is divided into four areas:  the east side of the City of 
Cleveland, the west side of the City of Cleveland, the inner ring suburbs, and the outer suburbs.  These 
four areas follow the designations used by city and county residents and by local governments. They 
can be seen in Figure 4.7 below. Though dividing the county into four areas is a simplification that 
inevitably obscures much variation, it adds dimension to the analysis without including an 
unmanageable amount of detail. 
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Figure 4.7:  Census Tracts labeled by Subarea Designation 
The Cuyahoga River divides the City of Cleveland roughly north to south, resulting in clearly identifiable 
east and west sides.  Outside of the city’s municipal boundaries are 37 additional, smaller cities; 19 
villages; and two townships (unincorporated areas).  In this study, all of these, excluding the city itself, 
are referred to as suburbs. Cleveland’s first suburbs, founded and incorporated as villages during the 
1800s, were eventually annexed by the City of Cleveland between 1850 and 1913—though some early 
suburbs, such as East Cleveland and Brooklyn, remain independent municipalities today (Borchert, 
1998).  Later waves of suburbs occurred in two eras:  before or with the advent of streetcars, resulting 
in what are referred to today as the inner (or inner ring) suburbs; and during the era of automobile 
dominance, which created the outer (or outer ring) suburbs, as well as suburbs and exurbs outside of 
Cuyahoga County.104 
The four subareas of the county exhibit significant variation.  This extends to their development, 
historical and current demographics, and the timing and impact of the foreclosure crisis.  Each subarea 
is briefly introduced below in order to provide context for the discussion of the foreclosure problem 
and responses to it, both of which vary across the county.   Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas 
lists the municipalities and townships, SPAs (Statistical Planning Areas), and Census tracts located in 
each of the four subareas. 
The east side includes 20 SPAs and 108 Census tracts—referred to as localities and communities in this 
research, respectively—as of 2010.  It is located entirely within the City of Cleveland and is bounded 
                                                          
104 Of course, not every inner ring suburb is a streetcar suburb, and not every outer ring suburb is an automobile 
suburb.  For example, Brookpark, which is classified as an inner suburb here due to its adjacency to the City of 
Cleveland, is considered an automobile suburb (Borchert, 1998).    
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to the north by Lake Erie, to the west by the Cuyahoga River, and to the south and east by Cleveland’s 
municipal boundaries.  It is predominately black, which can be seen in Figure 4.4 above.  Portions of 
historic ethnic neighborhoods remain, particularly those settled by eastern Europeans employed in 
manufacturing.   Much of the housing on the east side was built for manufacturing workers and their 
families prior to the 1940s.  In comparison to today’s preferences, these houses are small, situated on 
small lots, and lack amenities and modern fixtures.  This is reflected in their market value, which is 
shown in Figure 4.5 (above). The east side of Cleveland also contains the highest poverty and 
unemployment tracts in the County, as well as having the greatest overall poverty and unemployment 
rates (see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, above). As will be discussed in 4.2, the foreclosure problem struck 
first on Cleveland’s east side, as the result of predatory lending, which began particularly early in Ohio. 
In 2010, the west side included 14 SPAs and 67 Census tracts.  It is also located entirely within the City 
of Cleveland.  It is bounded to the north by Lake Erie, to the east by the Cuyahoga River, and to the 
west and south by Cleveland’s municipal boundaries.  Like the east side, the west side has a large 
amount of older housing built for manufacturing employees prior to 1940.  Housing prices are also low 
here, though on average somewhat higher than those of the east side, especially as one moves farther 
west (Figure 4.5).  In contrast to the east side, the west side is predominately white (see Figure 4.4, 
above).  The west side of Cleveland also has relatively high poverty and unemployment rates, but less 
than those seen on the east side (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3).  Again, these rates fall as one moves 
westward. 
In general in the U.S., suburbs have more middle class residents, lower densities, and increased 
homeownership rates than urban areas (Borchert, 1998).  Historically, people with the means moved 
to the suburbs to escape the density and grime of the city, and later moving as a reaction to school 
desegregation and declining city services.  Today, many people cite better school quality and lower 
crime rates as their reasons for moving to the suburbs—though not all suburbs are equal in these 
regards.   
The inner suburbs are the municipalities located just outside the City of Cleveland.105  They are also 
referred to as inner ring suburbs.  Cuyahoga County’s inner suburbs include 22 municipalities, 22 SPAs, 
and 163 Census tracts.  In the case of the inner suburbs, each municipality has boundaries coincident 
with an SPA of the same name.  The inner suburbs were developed mostly between 1860 and 1930. 
Many were built to house manufacturing workers and their families as streetcars made additional 
areas accessible (Borchert, 1998).   
With the advent of the automobile and highway construction, combined with aging infrastructure in 
the inner suburbs, the outer suburbs developed as more affluent residents moved farther from the 
city (Borchert, 1998).  These suburbs are made up of the municipalities and townships between the 
inner ring suburbs and the county boundary.  The outer suburbs of Cuyahoga County are comprised of 
33 municipalities and two townships, 35 SPAs, and 105 Census tracts.  As with the inner suburbs, the 
municipal and township boundaries coincide with the SPA boundaries, resulting in a one-to-one 
relationship.  The outer suburbs developed after 1950, and continue to do so today, though the 
greatest suburban growth in the Cleveland region now occurs in adjacent counties (Borchert, 1998). 
                                                          
105 The Village of North Randall and the City of Parma Heights are also categorized as inner suburbs, due to their 
being nearly surrounded by other inner suburbs. 
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As one moves outward from the City of Cleveland to the county boundary, unemployment and poverty 
rates decrease (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3).  Likewise, the percentage of older housing generally 
decreases (Figure 4.6) and the median sale price generally increases (Figure 4.5).  An exception to the 
increasing housing values can be seen extending from the southeast corner of Cleveland to the 
southeast corner of the county, which closely matches the predominately African American suburbs 
(see Figure 4.4, above). Older suburbs (in this case the inner ring suburbs) are in many cases 
experiencing decline, particularly in the Midwest and South of the U.S.   Researchers have found this 
decline to be most prevalent in suburbs with larger proportions of housing built between 1945 and 
1970 (Lucy & Phillips, 2000; Lucy & Phillips, 2006), which characterizes many of Cuyahoga County’s 
inner suburbs.  This decline was compounded by the foreclosure crisis, and will be discussed in the 
next section. 
This discussion and comparison of various parts of the metropolitan region and county are to illustrate 
the differences found within the Cleveland area.  These differences often make regional efforts difficult 
to design and implement, given the large number of governmental organizations—there are 59 local 
governments in Cuyahoga County alone106—and the often very different constituent groups they 
represent.  The historical context, particularly the shifts that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, provides 
a starting point from which to view the foreclosure crisis, its effects, and its patterns.  Many of these 
patterns have been repeated or continued during the foreclosure crisis.   
4.2 The Foreclosure Problem in Cuyahoga County 
Throughout the foreclosure crisis, Ohio has had one of the highest foreclosure rates in the country.  In 
the first six months of 2013, Ohio remained the state with the fourth-highest foreclosure rate, with 
one foreclosure filing per 104 housing units during that period (or 0.96% of housing units receiving a 
filing).  In contrast, the national average was one foreclosure filing per 164 housing units, or 0.61%.  
Moreover, Cleveland has been both an early victim and an epicenter of the foreclosure crisis 
(Kotlowitz, 2009; Simon, 2008).  The problems began in the late 1990s (see Figure 4.8, below) and still 
continue:  during the first half of 2013, the Cleveland MSA had the 19th highest foreclosure rate in the 
country, with 1.09% of all housing units receiving a foreclosure filing during this time (RealtyTrac Staff, 
2013b).   
This section details Cuyahoga County’s foreclosure problem and its progression and trends as it 
developed.  Vacant and abandoned properties left in the wake of foreclosures are discussed next.  
Finally, the impacts of the foreclosure crisis on the housing market are considered. 
4.2.1 Onset & Progression of the Foreclosure Crisis 
The course of the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga County is roughly represented below in Figure 4.8, 
which charts the yearly number of foreclosure filings for the U.S., Ohio, and Cuyahoga County, in the 
years for which data are available.  Cuyahoga County, as well as Ohio in general, began seeing an 
increase in foreclosure filings in the late 1990s, much earlier than the national foreclosure problem hit 
in 2007.  Between 2000 and 2008, Cuyahoga County experienced 80,000 foreclosure filings spread over 
approximately 450,000 residential parcels, or approximately one foreclosure filing per 5.6 parcels—
                                                          
106 Cuyahoga County includes 38 cities with populations of over 5,000 inhabitants, 19 villages, and two townships.  
In addition, there is the county government, 33 school districts, and over 50 governmental authorities, boards, 
commissions, and special districts (League of Women Voters, 2009). 
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the most per capita in the country at that time (NEO CANDO, 2013; Simon, 2008).  The number of 
foreclosure filings in Cuyahoga County peaked in 2007, two years before the state of Ohio saw its 
foreclosure peak in 2009 and four before the rate for the U.S. as a whole peaked.  As of 2012, Cuyahoga 
County led Ohio in both the foreclosure rate (9 filings per 1,000 residents) and the total number of 
foreclosure filings (11,427), as it has for the previous eight years (Rothstein, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).  
Though foreclosure filing levels are 20 to 25% below peak, it appears likely that pre-crisis levels will 
not be reached for some time. 
 
Figure 4.8:  Foreclosure Filings in Ohio and Cuyahoga County  
Sources:  Supreme Court of Ohio (2009), Rothstein (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), U.S. Census (2013), Policy Matters Ohio (2013) 
Examining Figure 4.9, it is apparent that increases in the foreclosure rate in Cuyahoga County were not 
caused solely by the national-level foreclosure crisis that began in 2006.  In fact, steady yearly growth 
of around 10% is punctuated by years where the increase reaches 20 to 30% (1998, 2002, 2006), and 
only one of these extreme growth years occurred during the foreclosure crisis.  Examining the 
foreclosure problem in Cuyahoga County through the lens of only the national-level housing market 
crash and concomitant foreclosure crisis omits a significant part of its development and impacts. 
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Figure 4.9:  Year-to-Year Percent Change in Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Filings  
Sources:  Rothstein (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Policy Matters Ohio (n.d.) 
Problem Onset 
Councilman Tony Brancatelli began noticing houses selling for inflated prices—being “flipped”—in 
1999.  In many cases, poor quality properties were purchased at low prices, cosmetic repairs were 
made (if any), and the properties were quickly resold at bloated prices (Kotlowitz, 2009).  Former 
Cuyahoga County Treasurer Jim Rokakis recalls noticing a large increase in poor quality loans, those 
that clearly were likely to fail.  Some of these loans went to speculators who would purchase multiple 
properties, enabled by lax underwriting standards, and then flip houses and make a quick profit 
(Simon, 2008).  These types of cases sometimes involved mortgage fraud, as real estate professionals 
have to sign off on various parts of the deal, such as an inflated assessment, for it to work (Kotlowitz, 
2009).  Others were facilitated by non-local lenders who didn’t have the local area knowledge 
necessary to carefully evaluate mortgage loan applications.  The advent of securitization removed the 
need to consider the longevity of the loans as well. 
A second way in which individuals and neighborhoods were exploited through mortgage loans was 
predatory lending.  Both economic decline and the history of mortgage lending discrimination helped 
facilitate this.  People in need of cash were able to withdraw equity from their homes, and people who 
had historically been excluded from the mortgage market were able to obtain loans.  In many cases 
these loans were predatory and/or equity draining.  Mortgage brokers began cold-calling 
homeowners, suggesting they take out a home equity loan to pay off other debts or to make home 
repairs (Kotlowitz, 2009).  Others targeted the elderly and minorities, who had limited or no experience 
with mortgage loans (Simon, 2008).  Several respondents stressed that elderly black women in 
particular were targeted.  Mortgage brokers would build relationships in minority communities, 
attacting additional clients through word of mouth.  Often the loans were “too good to be true” and 
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had conditions the borrowers were not aware of or did not understand, such as increasing payments 
and interest rates after a period of time or a missed payment (Kotlowitz, 2009; Simon, 2008). 
These practices set the stage for the foreclosure problem in Cuyahoga County.  At first, it was isolated 
to the small areas with concentrations of poor quality loans and predatory lending, as seen on the east 
side of Cleveland and some east side suburbs. Early on these areas were limited enough that one does 
not observe an elevated foreclosure rate at the tract level.  However, yearly filing rates of over 1% (one 
foreclosure filing for every one hundred housing units) at the tract level appeared on the east side of 
Cleveland in 2004.107  A few tracts located in the inner suburbs, close to the east side of Cleveland saw 
filing rates above 1% as well.  This can be seen in the top left pane of Figure 4.10. 
By the end of 2005, nearly every tract on the east side had a filing rate of over 1%, the majority had 
rates between 2% and 3.5%, and one was above 5%.  By this time increased foreclosure filings had 
spread beyond the east side:  the inner suburbs to the northeast and southeast of Cleveland contained 
many tracts with rates up to 3.5%.  As well, about half of the Census tracts on the west side of Cleveland 
had filing rates over 1% this year, as shown in the top right pane of Figure 4.10.  Over the course of 
2004 the county began implementing changes in its handling of the foreclosure process (Duda & Apgar, 
2006; Weinstein, Hexter, & Schnoke, 2006); this may have had some short-term impact on the 
foreclosure filing numbers for 2004 and 2005 (see Section 5.2.1). 
ESOP, one of the agencies that offers foreclosure prevention counseling in Cuyahoga County, had also 
noticed the foreclosure problem early, in the spring of 1999, and began championing the issue from 
this time on.  However, at this time few paid attention to the issue.  Between 2000 and 2004, other 
groups gradually took notice of the problem, including fair housing organizations, civil rights 
organizations, and housing counseling organizations.  On the other hand, the city and county, non-
profits, and neighborhood organizations including CDCs remained relatively unaware of the growing 
problem.  This was partially due to the perception that the problem was confined to the poor, 
minorities, and the elderly (Ford, May 5, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).  
                                                          
107 One Garfield Heights tract that borders Cleveland had a filing rate of over 1% in 2002 and 2003; thereafter 
the rate exceeded 1% each year.  No other tracts in Cuyahoga County had a filing rate of over 1% before 2004. 
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Figure 4.10:  Yearly Foreclosure Filings in Cuyahoga County by Tract, 2004 - 2009 
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The city of Cleveland, and moreover Cuyahoga County and the region, had pre-existing urban shrinkage 
issues dating back to the 1960s (see Section 4.1.1).  Though the region saw a long-term outflow of 
residents, new housing construction continued, resulting in oversupply.  Thus, the foreclosure problem 
in Cleveland was layered on top of a pre-existing housing issue that had especially affected the city and 
the inner suburbs.  However, city CDCs had been making progress toward neighborhood recovery.  
Frank Ford of NPI described this using a metaphor: 
For fifty years we’ve had this outmigration of people.  And think of that like a slow moving 
river.  You’re standing in it waist deep, it’s not a raging flood, but it’s moving at a pretty good 
clip.  So even standing in the waist deep water you have a tendency to want to get pushed 
back.  You’ve got to work to even keep your place, let alone trying to work upstream for 
improvement.  That’s been the underlying framework for five decades.  Layer onto that, 
around 2006 or 2007, we get a tsunami wave of foreclosures, layering onto an already existing 
problem . . . if you didn’t have that tsunami of foreclosure filings you would still have the same 
underlying problem.  But that was a problem we were actually managing.  The community 
development system in Cleveland was actually making headway, significant headway in fact, 
up through about ’04.  Probably we were losing ground by ’05 and we didn’t notice it.  But 
clearly by the time we get to ’07 it’s unmistakable . . . Before the foreclosure crisis hit we were 
actually having success in rebuilding neighborhoods, encouraging people to stay, encouraging 
people to move back in.  For about twenty years we were having success (2011). 
A Widespread Problem 
By the end of 2006, it was clear the increase in foreclosures was not an isolated problem.  In fact, 
December 2006 was the peak month for foreclosure filings in Cuyahoga County as a whole (Mikelbank, 
Post, Maric, & Bier, 2008).   Increasing unemployment, combined with housing value depreciation and 
the tightening of credit standards, resulted in the second phase of the foreclosure crisis.  In this second 
phase many foreclosures were triggered by other major life events, such as illness, job loss, and 
divorce.  Again property owners who would normally sell or refinance were not able to due to changes 
in the larger economy.  This is reflected in the spread of increased foreclosure filings into the inner and 
outer suburbs.  Foreclosure filing rates for 2006 are shown in the middle left pane of Figure 4.10. More 
than half of the tracts on the east side of Cleveland had filing rates above 5%, the majority on the west 
side had rates of at least 2%, and many inner and outer suburb tracts had rates above 1% for the first 
time.  The suburban tracts located to the northeast and southeast of the City of Cleveland were 
dominated by tracts with 2% to 5% foreclosure filing rates.   
These patterns continued in 2007 (Figure 4.10, middle right pane), with rates continuing to increase in 
many tracts in the inner and outer suburbs. A Living Cities report pointed out that though in 2007 the 
foreclosure problem in the Cleveland MSA was of overall lesser intensity than some other MSAs, such 
as Detroit and Las Vegas, Cuyahoga County contained fifteen neighborhoods with foreclosure rates 
between 5% and 8%, and forty-six neighborhoods with foreclosure rates above those observed in the 
twenty MSAs hardest-hit by foreclosures (Living Cities, 2011, p.9).108  During 2007, foreclosure filings 
in the suburbs exceeded those in the city for the first time—briefly in May and June, and permanently 
                                                          
108 Though it is not clearly stated in the report, I believe the authors are using the term neighborhoods to refer 
to SPAs—as it is commonly used in policy and planning in the county.  However, in this research the term locality 
is preferred. 
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in December, reflecting the general increase in suburban foreclosures beginning May and a general 
decrease in city foreclosures beginning in September.  Examining foreclosure filing statistics for winter 
2007-8 in more detail, filings on the east side of Cleveland dipped below those on the eastern suburbs, 
while those on the west side of Cleveland and the western suburbs were about equal (Mikelbank et 
al., 2008).  Some respondents attributed the relative decrease in foreclosures in the City of Cleveland, 
and particularly the east side, to a fire that had exhausted its fuel:  “[Foreclosures] have burnt down 
the forest,” leaving little to foreclose upon in devastated neighborhoods (Wertheim, May 4, 2011). 
The lower left pane of Figure 4.10 shows the foreclosure filing rates for 2008.  By this point, the 
foreclosure problem on the east side of Cleveland had begun to “burn itself out” due to the fact that 
so many properties had already been through the cycle of foreclosure and abandonment, leaving fewer 
intact properties to foreclose upon.  This can be seen in the decrease in tracts on the east side with 
filing rates above 5%.  However, the foreclosure problem continued to spread farther out into the 
county and intensify in areas where it hit later.  In 2008, the number of foreclosure filings in the suburbs 
outpaced those in the City of Cleveland for the first time (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
The final pane of Figure 4.10 shows the filing rates in 2009.  By this time, areas that saw the highest 
rates had now mostly returned to rates below 3.5%.  Though the most intense waves of foreclosure 
were past, the incidence of foreclosures remained elevated throughout the county.  As was shown in 
Figure 4.8, the foreclosure problem is receding much more slowly than it arrived.  It should also be 
kept in mind that foreclosure prevention responses may be responsible for a portion of this decreased 
incidence, though it is not possible to say whether these efforts are preventing or simply delaying 
foreclosures. Evidence also indicates that many foreclosures are in the pipeline:  in Ohio as of May 
2013, 2.6% of residential properties with mortgages were in the foreclosure process, and 5.8% were 
seriously delinquent but no foreclosure action had begun (CoreLogic, 2013).  Of this 8.4%, a large 
percentage are likely to end up in foreclosure.  Additionally, as of the end of 2012, a total of thirty 
percent of Ohio home mortgages had negative or near-negative equity.  These underwater (and near 
underwater) borrowers are more likely to default on their mortgages, which are valued higher than 
the properties themselves (Rothstein, 2013).  Thus, the pool of future potential or likely foreclosures 
is quite high, indicating the problem will not dissipate in the near future. 
Though the spread of the foreclosure problem clearly resulted in more damage than a more isolated 
problem would have, the fact that foreclosures have significantly impacted the inner and outer 
suburbs, as well as Cleveland’s west side, increased the overall awareness of the problem.  “’When it 
was only inner-city residents howling, it wasn’t a crisis,’ says Kermit Lind, a law professor at Cleveland 
State University.  ‘There wasn’t a crisis until the suburban mayors recognized it.’” (Living Cities, 2011, 
p.10).  As a result, it was possible to garner more resources and involve more parties in the effort to 
prevent and mitigate foreclosures in the county.  Jimmy Rudyk of ESOP explained: 
The perception [was] that foreclosure is a minority problem, it’s an elderly problem, it’s a low 
income problem.  There’s a pride of people in the suburbs, of white people, that this isn’t me, 
that I didn’t do anything wrong.  And I think that [has] shifted over the past few years 
tremendously, because it’s become mainstream and it’s part of the media (2011). 
This follows one of the major foreclosure narratives in the U.S., that those experiencing default and 
foreclosure were irresponsible and greedy, and thus brought their problems upon themselves.  This is 
of course true in some cases.  But this narrative misses many other factors, such as the cultural 
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importance placed on homeownership in the U.S. (see Section 1.1.1), the structural changes to 
mortgage markets at the national level, the behavior of those involved in property transactions that 
was often ethically questionable or inarguably illegal, the fact that financial institutions were complicit 
in these transactions, and the intentional exploitation of many (first-time) borrowers’ lack of financial 
know-how to push them into more costly mortgage products.  It also ignores the neighborhood, 
community, and municipal level impacts of foreclosures, which affect groups that were not involved 
with these mortgages in any way.  So long as the foreclosure problem was mostly isolated in poorer 
east side communities, this narrative remained convincing for those distanced from these 
communities.  As the problem spread throughout the county, many who were certain they would 
never experience a foreclosure were in fact foreclosed upon.  The gradual recognition that foreclosures 
are not limited to irresponsible borrowers who have brought their problems upon themselves made it 
possible to undertake a concerted and widespread foreclosure response in Cuyahoga County. 
Varied Impacts 
Figure 4.11 shows the cumulative Sheriff’s Sales rate by Census tract, covering the period 2000 to 2010.  
There are large swaths of the city where the ratio of completed foreclosures109 to dwelling units is over 
one in four (red), and very few with a ratio below one in twenty (dark green).  Though the picture is 
generally better outside the City of Cleveland, a large proportion of tracts experienced a completed 
foreclosure rate of 5% to 10% over a ten year period, and many others saw even higher rates. 
 
Figure 4.11:  Cumulative Sheriff’s Sales Rate by Census Tract (2000 - 2009) 
                                                          
109 A Sheriff sale represents a completed foreclosure, as this is the auction where the property is sold.  However, 
this measure does not account for other homeowner exits, such as DIL and short sales. 
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Many of the foreclosure patterns discussed in Section 2.2 can be seen in Cuyahoga County.  Comparing 
the figures in Section 4.1.2 to Figure 4.11, one can identify that foreclosure filings are more 
concentrated in areas with higher unemployment rates, higher poverty rates, and higher minority 
concentrations.  Two studies of Cuyahoga County foreclosures found that subprime loans are a key 
predictor of foreclosures, both on the loan level (Coulton, Chan, & Schramm, 2008a) and the 
neighborhood level (Lee, Rosentraub, & Kobie, 2010).  Coulton et al. (2008a) found that in Cuyahoga 
County, a high cost subprime loan had an 816% higher chance of going into foreclosure than other 
loans.  They also found that high cost subprime loans were held disproportionately by African American 
borrowers and geographically concentrated, resulting in high foreclosure risk areas.  A study of Shaker 
Heights, an east side inner ring suburb, identified all of these patterns as well (Duda & Apgar, 2006). 
Throughout the crisis, the east side of the county (including both the city and suburbs) saw 
approximately twice as many foreclosure filings as the west side did (Mikelbank et al., 2008).  Some 
suburbs were particularly hard hit.  For example, during 2007, 55% of all suburban foreclosure filings 
occurred in only four east side inner suburbs:  Cleveland Heights, Euclid, Maple Heights, and Garfield 
Heights (see Appendix Figure C.1) (Mikelbank et al., 2008).  It should be pointed out that the east side 
of Cleveland and eastern inner suburbs did have pre-existing social, economic, and blight issues.  These 
issues lowered the resistance of these areas to the foreclosure problem, while the west side of 
Cleveland and newer suburbs had the social and physical infrastructure to better weather the storm 
to a certain extent (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
 One continues to see differences as areas are disaggregated.  Duda & Apgar (2006) examined the 
municipality of Shaker Heights and found that the block group110 with the highest foreclosure rate was 
sixty times that of the block group with the lowest. These sorts of stark differences highlight the varied 
spatial impacts of the foreclosure crisis that must be kept in mind when considering prevention and 
mitigation responses. 
In many ways, the patterns established in Figure 4.11 continue to be cemented.  For example, the data 
provided by RealtyTrac for June of 2013 reflects a range of monthly foreclosure filing ratios from 1 in 
205 housing units (Maple Heights, an inner ring suburb located southeast of Cleveland—shown in red 
on Figure 4.11) to 1 in 2110 housing units (Bay Village, an outer ring suburb located in the northwest 
of the county—shown in dark green) (RealtyTrac Staff, 2013a).  Thus, though the foreclosure crisis has 
spread and changed over time, those hit earliest and hardest continue to see disproportionate impacts.  
Section 4.4 will describe two communities, Slavic Village and South Euclid, and their experiences of the 
foreclosure crisis in more detail. 
4.2.2 Vacancies & Abandonment 
As detailed in Section 2.2.3, large numbers of properties touched by foreclosure end up vacant and/or 
abandoned.  This section will discuss the specifics of vacant and abandoned properties in Cuyahoga 
County in light of the foreclosure crisis.  Data on REOs, or real-estate-owned properties, in Cuyahoga 
County is introduced first, followed by a look at vacancy rates.  Finally, several examples of the 
vandalism, stripping, and crime that accompany vacancy and abandonment are provided.   
                                                          
110 A block group is the Census‘ next level of disaggregation below the Census tract.  Block group populations are 
generally between 600 and 3,000 people and a Census tract usually contains four block groups. 
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REOs are properties that have been purchased at a Sheriff’s sale by the bank, mortgage company, 
mortgage servicer, GSE, or other financial institution that financed the mortgage on the property 
(Coulton, Schramm, & Hirsch, 2008c).  In general, an REO property results when the entity that holds 
the mortgage is unsuccessful in selling the property to a private entity at a Sheriff’s sale (Coulton & 
Schramm, 2010). Financial institutions generally neither desire, nor are they institutionally equipped, 
to obtain and hold properties.  As such, rather than occupying, renting, or quickly improving and/or 
selling a property, financial institutions tend to let their properties sit vacant and unmaintained while 
they are processed, before eventually selling them at a discount.  Prior to the foreclosure crisis, though 
an REO might remain vacant for some time before being put on the private market, these properties 
were generally unproblematic for both financial institutions and the neighborhoods where they are 
located due to the overall low level of REOs. 
However, with the onset of the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga County, several aspects related to REOs 
changed:  the number of REO properties increased approximately six fold between 2004 and 2008; the 
median length of time properties remained REO before reentering private ownership doubled 
between 2000 and 2007; and REO sale prices drastically decreased, with 17 times as many REOs selling 
for under $10,000 in 2008 than in 2004 (Coulton & Schramm, 2010).  All of these changes increased 
the impacts of REOs on neighborhoods, resulting in REOs becoming the greatest source of foreclosure-
related neighborhood problems:  vacancies, unsafe conditions, crime, vandalism, fires, and property 
devaluation, which then further spurred foreclosures and disinvestment. 
Examining one-, two-, and three-family properties between 2000 and 2007, Coulton, Mikelbank, & 
Schramm, 2008b) found that 8.8% of the residential parcels in Cleveland were involved in a Sheriff’s 
sale, while 3.0% of those in Cuyahoga County were.  Of these, the percentage that became REO 
changed from 64% in 2000 to 90% in 2007; meanwhile the proportion sold at auction to private 
individuals or real estate companies declined from 36% to 10% (Coulton et al., 2008b).  Recall that 
during this time period, the absolute number of REOs increased greatly.  In fact, more than five and a 
half times as many properties became REO in 2007 than in 2000 (Coulton et al., 2008b).  In February 
2007, approximately 10% of the county’s REO properties had been REO for over fourteen months—
i.e. they were likely neglected and vacant for over a year, greatly reducing the likelihood they could be 
brought back to productive use (Schramm & Coulton, 2007). 
That REOs sell at a discount is a fact that predates the foreclosure crisis.  However, the extent to which 
REO properties in Cuyahoga County were discounted is extreme.  In 2000, REO sales approximated 
three-quarters of the property’s pre-foreclosure estimated value (75% in Cuyahoga County, 74% in the 
suburbs, and 77% in the City of Cleveland).  By 2007, this had changed drastically, to 44% county-wide, 
58% in the suburbs, and only 32% in Cleveland (Coulton et al., 2008b). 
A follow-up report further focused on the transition out of REO in Cuyahoga County between 2005 and 
2008.  This report categorized REOs selling for less than $10,000 as “extremely distressed.”  Between 
2005 and July 2008, 23.16% of REOs sold at extremely distressed prices, but this proportion greatly 
increased over the study period:  extremely distressed sales made up only 3.62% of sales out of REO 
in 2005, at the end of the study period, June 2008, the percentage was 42.26%.  Different parts of the 
county were affected by extremely distressed REO sales to varying degrees.  In 2008, 75% of REO sales 
on the east side of Cleveland were below $10,000, 32% on the west side of Cleveland, 9.47% in the 
inner suburbs, and only 0.57% in the outer suburbs.  Approximately 21% of east inner suburb REO sales 
were extremely distressed, while the west inner suburbs saw a much smaller proportion (Coulton et 
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al., 2008c).  In 2009, the county-wide rate decreased to 35%.  Extremely distressed sales increased 
somewhat in the east inner suburbs and the outer suburbs but decreased in all other areas (Coulton & 
Schramm, 2010).   
Though more than half of the REO properties were held by financial institutions for more than half a 
year before they were sold, nearly half (44%) were resold again within ninety days of their transfer out 
of REO (Coulton et al., 2008c).  On average, these second sales garnered small profits for sellers (on 
average $2,500 within ninety days; $4,208 between ninety and one hundred eighty days).  These 
former REO properties are frequently tax delinquent (Coulton et al., 2008c).  Extremely distressed REO 
sales had the highest rates of vacancy (49%), tax delinquency (56%), and demolition (9%) (Coulton & 
Schramm, 2010). 
Walkaways, which describes the abandonment of a property, also contribute to the foreclosure, 
vacancy, and abandonment problems in Cuyahoga County.  These can be either homeowner 
walkaways or bank walkaways.  Homeowner walkaways occur most often when a homeowner owes 
more on the loan than the property is worth and decides to abandon both the property and the loan.  
This began to occur later in Cuyahoga County as the foreclosure problem progressed into the suburbs; 
homeowner walkaways have been relatively scarce within the City of Cleveland (Ford, October 12, 
2012; Rokakis, May 4, 2011; Wertheim, May 4, 2011).  Bank walkaways occur when a bank files a 
foreclosure suit but never takes possession of the property.  This can occur in cases when the bank 
withdraws the foreclosure suit, but the homeowner has already moved out; after the foreclosure suit 
is judged in the bank’s favor, but the bank does not proceed to the Sheriff’s sale; after the bank wins 
the property at the Sheriff’s sale, but doesn’t actually take legal title to the property; or after the bank 
takes possession of the property but later vacates the foreclosure judgment, which legally returns the 
property to the previous owner.  In all of these cases, the property still legally belongs to the original 
homeowner, but often without the homeowner’s knowledge (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
2013).   These practices are advantageous to financial institutions because they receive the accounting 
benefit of a foreclosure, but evade the responsibilities and costs associated with taking control of the 
property (Ford, 2009).  These properties often are vacant, abandoned, and delinquent on property 
taxes.  Though it is eventually possible to gain control of these properties through a Board of Revisions 
foreclosure (see Section 5.4.3), in the meantime they deteriorate and negatively impact the 
neighborhood.  In poorer neighborhoods, financial institutions often take title to the “best of the 
worst,” leaving the others without clear ownership (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013).  
According to Mark Wiseman, the former director of the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative 
(CCFI),111 the Cuyahoga County Sheriff had approximately one thousand properties not accepted by 
financial institutions (Wiseman, September 17, 2007).  A bill to address bank walkaways was 
introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives in 2009 and passed in 2010, but was never addressed 
by the state Senate and hence did not pass into law (Ohio Sate Legislature, 2010). 
Walkaways are only one contributor to Cuyahoga County’s massive vacant and abandoned property 
problem.   Even before the foreclosure crisis, foreclosures were often the cause of problematic vacant 
and abandoned structures.  Prior to the reforming and streamlining of the county’s handling of 
foreclosure cases, empty structures would sit vacant and deteriorating for years while the foreclosure 
suit sat with a court magistrate (see Section 5.2.1) (Sassano, May 12, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 
2011).  Even after the foreclosure process was improved, it generally took between 15.5 and 23.5 
                                                          
111 The CCFI is introduced in Section 5.2. 
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months for a foreclosure suit from start to end in Cuyahoga County between 2007 and 2012 (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013).  During all or part of this time, houses often sit vacant.  Afterward, 
the average vacant house takes 954 days to sell in Cuyahoga County (Rokakis, May 4, 2011).  Code 
enforcement is an expensive and time intensive tool to manage vacant properties, and in many cases 
it doesn’t work.  For example, financial institutions work to sell the properties they’ve acquired through 
foreclosure as quickly as possible, for prices as low as $500; this practice is referred to as dumping.  
The objective is for an entity to dump a vacant, non-code compliant property faster than code 
enforcement can catch up (Ford, 2009).  It is also possible for a corporation to purchase a property 
without being registered in the state of Ohio; this means it is nearly impossible to pursue code 
violations and the owner can sell the property without paying delinquent taxes or addressing code 
violations (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013).   
An article written by Frank Ford in Shelterforce provides an example of a vacant property trajectory:  
the house was built by the local CDC and sold for $141,000 in 2004.  Two years later, it was foreclosed 
upon by Wells Fargo, which then took possession at the Sheriff’s sale.  During the next two years it sat 
vacant, and was vandalized and stripped.  An investor then purchased the property for $1,200 and 
continued to leave it in its abandoned state (Ford, 2009). 
These abandoned properties have tremendous impacts on the neighborhoods around them, by 
frightening away potential buyers and reducing the value of nearby homes.  With a large enough 
concentration of vacant houses, occupied homes in the vicinity become nearly worthless (Ford, 
October 12, 2012; Rokakis, May 4, 2011).  The safety and security of the neighborhood is also impacted:  
“You can’t have a healthy, vibrant community when half of the homes are vacant.  When you don’t 
feel safe to come out of your house.  When there’s trash all over the place.  When people are looting 
houses next to you” (Rudyk, May 2, 2011). 
Abandoned properties are widespread in Cuyahoga County, and in particular on the east side of 
Cleveland and the older inner suburbs on the east side: 
On the east side of Cleveland, you can count on the fact that most of the houses that go vacant 
are going to get vandalized.  It’s the exception that it’s going to sit there for months and not 
be vandalized or broken into.  Even the ones that when you drive by them they look ok, when 
you go around the back the door is kicked in.  And you can see that all the plumbing has been 
ripped out and the walls have been torn out because people are pulling the toilets and the 
bathroom fixtures out, you can look in the windows and see some of it (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Many of these vacant properties are or will become properties that must be demolished.  They are 
destroyed beyond saving; in many cases the houses weren’t desirable to modern homebuyers before 
they were stripped and vandalized.   
The total number is staggering:  nearly 27,000 vacant properties in Cuyahoga County, with 16,000 of 
them located in Cleveland.  Of the 16,000 in Cleveland, approximately 8,000 are condemnable, or no 
longer fit for habitation.  At approximately $10,000 per demolition, it would cost $80 million in 
Cleveland alone to demolish all non-viable houses (Ford, October 12, 2012).  Using the numbers for 
the numbers of loans in delinquency and default and the current foreclosure backlog, Frank Ford 
estimated approximately $140 million is needed in the next five years to address all current and 
expected abandoned properties (2012).  These estimates include only demolition costs, not the costs 
of preparing the vacant properties for reuse. 
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These properties pose significant problems for neighborhoods.  As Coulton et al. (2008c) wrote: 
The fact that the majority of these properties become tax delinquent and that many are resold 
quickly with only a small price increase suggests that most of the buyers are not improving the 
properties or finding owner occupants or responsible investors who will bring the property 
back to viability in the short run.  Once large numbers of properties enter this type of cycle, 
they present formidable problems for local government and community organizations 
attempting to stabilize neighborhoods (p.12).   
That these properties sit vacant for long periods of time indicates that they will likely be stripped or 
vandalized.  The frequent changing of hands makes it difficult for cities to track down ownership in 
order to enforce code requirements and collect property taxes, while the frequent bundling of 
properties by financial institutions and bulk sellers makes it difficult for CDCs to purchase specific 
properties for rehabilitation or demolition for neighborhood stabilization efforts (Coulton et al., 2008b; 
Coulton & Schramm, 2010). 
The aggregate impact of foreclosures, REOs, and extremely distressed sales is reflected by Figure 4.12, 
below, which shows the change in vacancy rates across Cuyahoga County between 2000 and 2010.  
Though the City of Cleveland, particularly the east side, had significant vacancy problems in 2000, the 
problem greatly intensified and spread by 2010.  The west side of Cleveland in 2010 looks like the east 
side in 2000, and the eastern suburbs in 2010 look like the west side of the city looked in 2000.  The 
data used for these maps comes from the U.S. Census; each provides vacancy data for one point in 
time in 2000 and 2010.  Examining United States Postal Service data, which only became available 
more recently, one can identify nineteen Census tracts with maximum quarterly vacancy rates above 
forty percent, all of them located on the east side of Cleveland or in the east inner suburbs.  These 
extreme vacancy rates clearly will have deep and long-lasting impacts on these neighborhoods. 
According to Tom Bier, absent significant changes, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County will continue down 
this path.  Bier’s projections for the county by 2038 include:  the City of Cleveland and all inner ring 
suburbs will be severely distressed; another 85,000 homes in the county will be abandoned; the county 
will lose another 175,000 residents and $5.5 billion in taxable income; and the value of real property 
will decrease by $1.5 billion, which will have an especially severe impact on school funding. 
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Figure 4.12:  Change in Vacancy Rates, 2000 - 2010 
 184 
 
4.2.3 Housing Market Impact 
The high levels of foreclosures, vacancies, and abandoned homes have significantly impacted 
Cuyahoga County’s housing market.  As discussed in Section 2.2.3, properties near foreclosure-
impacted homes decrease in value.  These reduced prices then affect the valuation of nearby 
properties, through the use of comparables to price houses based on the prices of similar, nearby 
properties.  Reduced valuations then increase the proportion of homeowners owing more on their 
mortgages than the properties are worth, possibly increasing the likelihood of foreclosure through 
ruthless default,112 and certainly reducing the financial well-being of the homeowner.   
 
Figure 4.13:  Percent Change in Residential Property Value by Tract, 2000 - 2010 
Figure 4.13 illustrates the changes in residential property value in Cuyahoga County between 2000 and 
2010.  Looking at the key, one can see that nearly all tracts have experienced a decrease in total 
residential property value over the decade—even the ‘top’ category includes tracts that have 
experienced a decrease of 1% in property values; the other four categories include only tracts that 
have experienced a decrease in property values. 
One can again observe the county’s characteristic pattern, with more negative values concentrated on 
the east side of Cleveland and extending out toward the southeast, where more African Americans 
live, and also, to a lesser extent, to the west side of the City of Cleveland.  Many inner suburbs have 
                                                          
112 Ruthless default is the term of art for the decision to default when the property value reaches the mortgage 
value, rather than continuing to pay as the property value dips below the mortgage value. 
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been negatively affected, but to a lesser degree on the west side of the county.  The outer suburbs 
fared much better. 
Of course, the impact of the foreclosure crisis on housing values has repercussions beyond the housing 
market.  According to Jim Rokakis, the former Cuyahoga County Treasurer, “a single percentage point 
drop in values for Cleveland area homes means that the city brings in $1 million less while the school 
district loses $300,000” (Living Cities, 2011, p.13).  Simultaneously, service demands increase.  As one 
example, the same report cites a 30% increase in the number of homeless students served by Cleveland 
schools over the 2007-8 school year (Living Cities, 2011).  As of late 2013, the 26,725 vacant properties 
in Cuyahoga County had a combined property tax delinquency of over $52.6 million.  Cleveland’s share 
of this is nearly 16,000 vacant properties and over $33 million of the tax delinquency (Ford, October 
22, 2013).  This represents nearly five percent of the city’s 2011 revenue, which hds decreased by 
nearly 15% relative to 2007 (The Pew Charitable Trust, 2013).  Likewise, local governments have lost 
revenue to finance services in general, such as police and fire departments, health and social welfare 
services, animal shelters, courts, and libraries, among others.   In particular, the need for demolition 
has increased and municipalities are nowhere near able to cover these costs. 
Mikelbank et al. (2008) took a closer look at the housing market in Cuyahoga County.  They found 
evidence of a dual housing market operating since foreclosures began reaching critical levels in 
Cuyahoga County in 2004-5.  This dual market is comprised of properties directly affected by 
foreclosure and those not directly affected by it.  Mikelbank et al. (2008) define “directly-impacted 
sales” as sales that were (a) Sheriff’s sales, (b) of a property that was subject to a Sheriff’s sale within 
two years previous, or (c) of a property that had a foreclosure filing within the last two years (p.13).  
By early 2008, 85% of home sales within the City of Cleveland and 58% of sales within the suburbs 
were directly-impacted sales. 
Mikelbank et al. (2008) first investigated the proportion of home sales that were Sheriff’s sales.  Prior 
to 2000, Sheriff’s sales never exceeded 3% of sales for the county as a whole, 5.7% for the City of 
Cleveland, and 2% for the suburbs.  Sheriff’s sales as a percentage of all home sales began to rise after 
that, and experienced large increases each year from 2004 through 2007.  In September 2007, directly-
affected sales outpaced sales not directly affected by foreclosure.  Examining this by area of the county, 
it was found that directly-impacted sales outnumbered traditional sales at different points in time.  
Directly-impacted sales dominated the east side of Cleveland as early as May 2005; as of 2008 the vast 
majority of sales were of the directly-impacted variety.  The west side of Cleveland saw directly-
impacted sales predominate in the end of 2006, while this occurred first in the eastern suburbs in late 
2007.  The western suburbs still had a majority non-directly-impacted sales as of early 2008, but the 
ratio had decreased from 21:1 in 2004 to less than 2:1 at the time of the study. 
Further, the researchers found that decreasing home sale values were largely a function of the 
proportion of directly-impacted sales occurring in an area.  The median sale price on the east side of 
Cleveland dropped most precipitously, as would be expected given the dominance of sales of 
properties impacted by foreclosure.  On the other hand, it took much longer to see an impact on 
median sales prices in the western suburbs, and it remained much more muted in comparison to what 
was seen on the east side of Cleveland.  Mikelbank et al. (2008) found that home sale price to estimated 
market value ratios varied between 1.0 and 1.2 up to 2005, depending on how recently property values 
had been reassessed.  However, these ratios dropped greatly in 2006 and 2007, resulting in ratios of 
0.56 for the east side of Cleveland, 0.73 for the west side of Cleveland, 0.86 for the eastern suburbs, 
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and 0.99 for the western suburbs as of 2007, reflecting the extent of directly-impacted sales in each 
area. 
Mikelbank et al. (2008) also investigated which properties sold before, during, and after the 
foreclosure crisis, by dividing properties into four value quartiles.  County-wide, houses sold evenly 
from the four quartiles.  But beginning in 2007, sales from the lowest quartile rose to 32% of sales, 
while sales from the highest quartile dropped to 25%.  They then examined price discounts, using the 
sale price to estimated value ratio, and found that this varied by location as well.  In the eastern 
suburbs, the lowest quartile of properties had the greatest discount, at a ratio of 0.63, while the 
highest-valued quartile ratio remained at 1.00.  The picture for the east side of Cleveland was quite 
different:  Beginning in 1997, the proportion of sales and the sale price to estimated value ratio rose 
for the lowest-valued quartile.  By 2005, the ratio was 2.31, in comparison to 1.16, 0.90, and 0.99 for 
the other three quartiles.  These ratios all dropped by 2007, to 0.85 for the lowest quartile and to 
around 0.50 for the other three quartiles.  These patterns evidence the onset of flipping113 and 
subprime and predatory lending and the subsequent tidal wave of foreclosures on the east side of 
Cleveland. 
Finally, as reflected in the title of their paper, “The Sky Isn’t Falling Everywhere,” Mikelbank et al. 
(2008) hypothesize that the non-directly-impacted housing market is on hold until the foreclosure 
crisis passes.  This is evidenced by the low volumes of non-directly-impacted sales and by the fact that 
prices have remained stable between 2004 and 2008 for these properties.  However, they worry that 
this market pause, undertaken by those who are able to wait it out, will only add another wave of 
devaluation later (Mikelbank et al., 2008).  Recalling Richter & Seo’s (2011) research on Cuyahoga 
County housing submarkets, neighborhood and city housing market interdependency has increased 
during the foreclosure crisis via a supply effect.  As the traditional market regains strength, it may add 
to the oversupply due to foreclosures, which was added on top of a traditionally oversaturated housing 
market to begin with (Mikelbank et al., 2008).   
4.3 Development of the Quantitative Model 
In addition to the more qualitatively-focused analysis found above in Section 4.2, this section 
investigates the available data concerning the foreclosure problem in Cuyahoga County in order to 
determine trends and patterns that can be of use in understanding the way the foreclosure crisis 
unfolded in Cuyahoga County.  These insights were then used to further develop the research, in 
particular the quantitative model. 
This section first characterizes the data using descriptive statistics, and investigates some possible 
relationships between variables.  Then the development of the quantitative model is described.  
Though the results of the model are not presented until Chapter 6, the results of some diagnostics are 
presented here to provide an idea of the robustness and stability of the model. 
4.3.1 Univariate Statistical Analysis 
Table 4.3 lists the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the final regression model.  It contains 
the number of observations, the average, standard deviation, minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th 
                                                          
113 Flipping is the practice of purchasing a property cheaply, making minimal and/or cosmetic repairs, and quickly 
reselling the property at a high mark up. 
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percentile, and maximum values for each variable.  Though the foreclosure responses used in 
Cuyahoga County have not yet been specifically introduced (see Chapter 5), the variables used to 
represent these efforts and their distributions are presented now.  Please note that fourteen of the 
variables described in Section 3.4.2 are not present in this section; these were removed to avoid 
multicollinearity in the process of developing the quantitative model.   
Table 4.3:  Descriptive Statistics   
Sources:  U.S. Census/s4, NEO CANDO, Kathy Hexter & Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Agencies, NPI, Cuyahoga County 
Department of Development 
 
The descriptive statistics listed above provide information about the distribution of the dependent and 
independent variables.  First, some aspects of these variables that inform the research and 
understanding of the county, its foreclosure problem, and efforts to prevent or mitigate it are pointed 
out.  Then correlations between variables are investigated to provide an initial idea about what 
possible relationships exist between variables. 
Dependent Variable 
First is the dependent variable, percent change in residential property value on the tract level between 
2000 and 2010.  It can be seen overlaid on a map of Cuyahoga County in Figure 4.13.  The mean makes 
clear that, in general, property values have significantly decreased since 2000.  At -0.25, this indicates 
that a typical tract lost 25% of its total residential property value between 2000 and 2010.  While not 
fully due to the foreclosure crisis—recall that Cleveland and the surrounding region have been in 
decline since at least the 1970s—this is a large change over a ten year period.  Even at the 75th 
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum
25th 
Percentile
Median
75th 
Percentile
Maximum
Dependent Variable
Percent Change in Property Value 2000 - 2010 421 -0.25 0.51 -0.93 -0.58 -0.3 -0.06 4.9
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit (in $10k) 421 7.00 5.98 0.20 2.20 6.00 9.68 44.51
PCI 2000 (in $10k) 421 2.3 1.56 0.42 1.56 2.09 2.62 23.50
Poverty Rate 2000 421 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.24 0.72
Professional Employment Rate 2000 421 0.3 0.15 0.03 0.18 0.27 0.39 0.76
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 421 0.33 0.38 0 0.02 0.12 0.68 0.99
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 421 0.81 0.2 0.05 0.74 0.9 0.96 1
Resident <10 Years 2000 421 0.54 0.11 0.26 0.46 0.54 0.61 0.83
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb 421 0.38 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
West side of Cleveland 421 0.16 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
East side of Cleveland 421 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy Rate 421 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.70
Completed Foreclosure Rate 421 0.11 0.09 0 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.39
Foreclosure  Mitigation:  Property Acquisition & Control
Tax Foreclosures Rate 421 0.00706 0.012732 0 0.000643 0.002137 0.007246 0.079754
Demolitions Rate 421 0.010463 0.021157 0 0 0 0.01108 0.13662
Landbanked Parcels Rate 421 0.0255 0.55 0 0 0 0.02 0.42
Foreclosure Mitigation:  Targeting
Strategic Investment Initiative Area 421 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 0 1
NSP2 Area 421 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 1
Foreclosure Prevention:  Counseling Outcomes*
Kept House Rate 421 0.001428 0.001760 0 0 0.00083 0.002122 0.008749
Lost House, non-foreclosure Rate 421 0.000145 0.000336 0 0 0 0 0.002174
Lost House, foreclosure Rate 421 0.000094 0.000296 0 0 0 0 0.002241
Unknown Outcome Rate 421 0.004397 0.004281 0 0.001181 0.002981 0.006699 0.022472
*The counseling outcomes data is an approximately 1 in 2.8 randomly-drawn sample of all counseling instances in Cuyahoga County.
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percentile of the dependent variable distribution, the percent change in property value is negative, at 
-0.06, or a 6% decrease in property value at the tract level.  A few tracts with very high values are areas 
where largescale redevelopment has occurred between 2000 and 2010.   For example, Tract 118800, 
which has a residential property value percent change of 490%, is located in the University Circle area, 
where $1.9 billion in development was invested between 2002 and 2009 (Partnership for Sustainable 
Communities, n.d.).  A boxplot114 (Figure 4.14) provides additional information concerning the 
distribution, where the long right tail is easily observed in the form of outliers. 
 
Figure 4.14:  Boxplot of Dependent Variable Distribution 
Figure 4.15 also shows the distribution of the percent change in residential property value, this time 
as a histogram.  Overlaying a normal distribution (the blue line overlaid on the plot), it is clear that the 
dependent variable’s distribution has a narrower and more pronounced peak and has a much longer 
right tail than a normal distribution.  However, this is not an issue with respect to the model, as 
normality of variables is not required.  
                                                          
114 A note on interpreting the boxplots:  the center blue line represents the median or 50th percentile of the 
distribution, while the upper and lower blue lines of the central rectangles indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles 
of the distribution.  The upper and lower blue lines connected to the rectangles via vertical blue lines or 
“whiskers” represent the 75th percentile plus 1.5 times the interquartile range (IQR, or the difference between 
the 75th and 25th percentiles) and the 25th percentile minus 1.5 times the IQR, respectively.   Dots represent 
outliers. 
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Figure 4.15:  Dependent Variable Histogram 
General Control Variables 
Examining the general control variables, it is clear that all of these indicators have a large range and 
high degree of variation.  Many of the variables have a standard deviation approaching the magnitude 
of the mean—the exceptions being the professional employment rate in 2000, the proportion of 
housing at least thirty years old, and the proportion of residents with tenure in their current residence 
of ten years or less. 
Figure 4.16 displays the boxplots for the value per housing unit and per capita income in 2000.  As with 
the dependent variable, both indicators skew right.  Likewise, the distributions of the poverty rate 
professional employment rate, and proportion of non-Hispanic black residents in 2000 skew right.  The 
first two, poverty rate and professional employment rate indicate the presence of outliers, while the 
proportion non-Hispanic black does not.  In contrast, the proportion of housing 30 or more years old 
skews left with a large number of outliers on the right tail.  Of all the general control variables, the 
housing tenure indicator (that is, the proportion of residents who have lived in their current residence 
for ten years or fewer) has the most normal distribution. 
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Figure 4.16:  Boxplot of Value per Housing Unit (2000) and PCI (2000) 
 
Figure 4.17:  Boxplot of General Control Rate Variables (2000) 
With the exception of the tenure indicator, all of the general control rate variables have a wide range, 
covering 75% to 100% of the possible distribution.  Even the tenure indicator covers about 55% of the 
possible distribution.  This reflects the large degree of variation, and in some cases polarization, in the 
county as was discussed in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. 
One variable bears further investigation, the proportion non-Hispanic black residents.  Examining the 
histogram, as shown in Figure 4.18, it becomes clear that the distribution is highly polarized.  This is 
reflective of the high level of residential segregation present in Cuyahoga County, as mentioned 
previously. 
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Figure 4.18:  Histogram of Proportion Non-Hispanic Black Residents 2000 
Locational Control Variables  
The descriptive statistics do not provide particularly interesting information concerning the locational 
variables, as they are binary variables.  However, one can quickly see that 24% of the Census tracts in 
this analysis fall on the east side of the City of Cleveland, 16% fall on the west side of Cleveland, 38% 
are inner suburbs, and the remaining 22% are outer suburbs. 
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables 
As with many of the general control variables, the two foreclosure-related control variables also skew 
right.  Figure 4.19 displays the distributions of these two variables, both of which exhibit outliers on 
the right tails of the distributions.  Referring back to the descriptive statistics, the impacts of the 
foreclosure crisis are clear:  the mean values for the maximum vacancy rate and cumulative Sheriff’s 
sale rate (cumulative foreclosure rate) are 14% and 11%, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.19:  Boxplot of Foreclosure-Related Control Variables 
 192 
 
Key Variables 
The first group of key variables is the property acquisition and control indicators.  Examining Figure 
4.20, left-skewed distributions are observed for each of the three indicators.  All three show a large 
number of outliers on the right tail as well.  The distributions for the Board of Revisions foreclosure 
rate and the demolition rate are relatively similar; in comparison the landbanked parcels rate has a 
much larger range. 
 
Figure 4.20:  Boxplot of Property Acquisition & Control Variables 
The second group of key variables is the targeting group, which includes indicators for the Strategic 
Investment Initiative (SII) and NSP round 2 funding (NSP2).  Since these are binary variables, no boxplot 
or histogram of the distribution is necessary.  Approximately 5% of the Census tracts in the quantitative 
model are designated as part of the SII, while approximately 3% are designated as receiving NSP2 
funding. 
Finally, the third group of key variables is that of counseling outcomes.  These are divided into four 
categories (see Appendix B:  Variable Definitions for specifics):  Kept House; Lost House, non-
Foreclosure; Lost House, Foreclosure; and Unknown.  Figure 4.21 displays boxplots for these four 
variables, all of which skew left and display outliers on the left tail.  One can see that the outcome 
category Unknown dominates the other outcome categories, followed by the Kept House outcome 
category.  The two lost house categories clearly occur at a much lower frequency than the Kept House 
and Unknown outcomes.  Examining the descriptive statistics for the lost house categories, one 
observes that a large percentage of the observations have a value of zero for both of these indicators.  
In fact, the 75th percentile value for both of these variables is zero—that is, in at least three quarters 
of the Census tracts used in the model, there were no foreclosure prevention counseling outcomes 
resulting in the client losing the property.  However, this should be interpreted cautiously:  certainly 
many of the counseling instances with an unknown outcome were cases where the homeowner lost 
the property, either to foreclosure or a foreclosure alternative. 
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Figure 4.21:  Boxplot of Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Outcome Rates, 2006 – 2010 
Figure 4.22 displays histograms for four foreclosure responses:  the Board of Revisions foreclosure 
rate, the demolition rate, the landbanking rate, and the “Kept House” foreclosure prevention 
counseling outcome rate.  Examining the distributions, it is clear that these responses were not applied 
evenly throughout the county—the tall bars at the left side of each histogram represent tracts where 
zero instances of the response occurred.  This reflects the limited resources available to respond to 
the foreclosure crisis, as well as the use of targeting these limited resources. 
 
Figure 4.22:  Histograms of Selected Foreclosure Responses 
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Referring back to the figures in this subsection, many variables include observations that can be 
categorized as outliers.  It is common to remove outliers, as they tend to have undue influence on 
parameter estimates when using an OLS regression model.  However, as described in Section 3.3.3, 
quantile regression is very robust with respect to outliers.  This is highly advantageous in this research, 
because the objective is to examine how various foreclosure responses are related to percent change 
in residential property value across the entire percent change in residential property value distribution.  
In this case, removing outliers would in many cases be equivalent to removing the ends of the 
distribution—see Figure 4.23, for example. 
4.3.2 Bivariate Statistical Analysis 
Now that the variables in the quantitative model have been examined individually, relationships 
between pairs of variables are investigated.  By observing whether various pairs have exhibit patterns 
or correlations, it is possible to use these apparent relationships as background when developing the 
model.  Examining correlation coefficients and scatter plots may also provide some initial confirmatory 
evidence as to whether the relationships found in the literature are present in this case as well.  In 
addition, potential relationships that were not immediately obvious may be uncovered. 
Correlation Analysis 
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Table 4.4 contains the bivariate correlation coefficients for all pairings of the variables used in the final 
model.  The coefficients are color-coded, using green and red tones to represent positive and negative 
correlation coefficients, respectively, with darker shades representing increasing degrees of 
correlation. 
Examining the correlation table, one first observes many unsurprising relationships.  Per capita income, 
the average value per housing unit, and the proportion of residents working in the professions are 
highly positively correlated with one another.  These three variables exhibit moderate to strong 
negative correlation with the poverty rate, the proportion of non-Hispanic black residents, the 
proportion of housing built thirty or more years ago, the maximum vacancy rate, the east side of 
Cleveland, and the foreclosure rate.  These interrelationships between the general and foreclosure-
related control variables are unsurprising. 
With respect to the dependent variable, the correlations are generally as expected.  The percent 
change in residential property value is positively correlated with per capita income (0.2674), the 
average value per housing unit (0.2271), and the proportion of residents working in the professions 
(0.4033), though relatively weakly.  The dependent variable is weakly to moderately negatively 
correlated with the proportion of non-Hispanic black residents (-0.3749), the proportion of houses 
built thirty or more years ago (-0.3403), the maximum vacancy rate (-0.3448), and the east side of 
Cleveland (-0.2405).  Somewhat surprisingly, the percent change in property value is mildly positively 
correlated with the proportion of residents with housing tenure of less than ten years (0.2177), though 
this may be picking up the fact that newly constructed houses have higher than average values, and of 
course must have newer residents. 
Looking at the foreclosure-related control variables, the strong positive correlation between the 
maximum vacancy rate and the poverty rate stands out, with a value of 0.7658.  It is also highly 
correlated with the proportion of non-Hispanic black residents in the tract (0.6841), and negatively 
correlated with the dependent variable (-0.3448).  Regarding the completed foreclosure rate (Sheriff’s 
sales rate), it is strongly negatively correlated with percent change in residential property value (-
0.5329), the value per housing unit (-0.4629), and the professional employment rate (-0.569), and 
strongly positively correlated with the proportion non-Hispanic black (0.6685), the proportion housing 
over thirty years old (0.4814), and the maximum vacancy rate (0.6139).  Referring back to Section 2.2.2, 
these correlations fit with the relationships found between foreclosures, vacancies, and socioeconomic 
indicators found in the literature.   
Examining the locational control variables, it is clear that being located on the east side of Cleveland is 
negatively correlated with percent change in residential property value (-0.2405), value per housing 
unit (-0.4588), per capita income (-0.2632), and the professional employment rate (-0.454).  The east 
side location is positively correlated with the poverty rate (0.6201), the proportion non-Hispanic black 
residents (0.6838), the maximum vacancy rate (0.6739), and the completed foreclosure rate (0.4833).  
The east side of Cleveland location is also positively correlated with several foreclosure responses, 
namely property acquisition and control responses:  the tax (Board of Revisions) foreclosure rate 
(0.6277), the maximum landbanking rate (0.6161), and the demolition rate (0.6611).  In contrast, the 
inner suburb locational variable is negatively correlated with these three indicators, with correlation 
coefficients of -0.2856, -0.2824, and -0.3819, respectively.  The west side of Cleveland location is not 
significantly correlated with any foreclosure response variables. 
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The correlation coefficients for the dependent variable with foreclosure response variables are not 
particularly interesting, with only the foreclosure prevention counseling outcomes of “Kept House” 
and “Unknown” having moderate negative correlations with the percent change in property value, at 
-0.3451 and -0.3532, respectively.  However, given the importance of these indicators to the research, 
the scatter plots of four foreclosure response variables and the dependent variable are shown in Figure 
4.23.  Looking at these relationships, all four have similar “L” shapes.  Higher percent changes in 
property value are associated with lower use of each foreclosure response, while increased use of the 
responses is associated with lower percent changes in property value.  However, the observations 
“clump” quite a bit, leaving much variation that is not explained by a simple correlation measure. 
Finally, the three property acquisition and control indicators are highly correlated with one another:  
the Board of Revisions foreclosure rate and maximum landbanking rate have a coefficient of 0.9022, 
the Board of Revisions foreclosure rate and demolition rate have a coefficient of 0.8004, and the 
maximum landbanking rate and demolition rate have a coefficient of 0.6755.  These correlations 
indicate that while Board of Revisions foreclosures, landbanking, and demolitions do not have a one-
to-one correlation, there is a very high degree of overlap in the use of these three foreclosure 
responses.  Figure 4.24 displays the three pairwise scatter plots for these three variables below. 
 
 
Figure 4.23:  Scatter Plots of Foreclosure Responses and Percent Change in Residential Property Value 
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Figure 4.24:  Property Acquisition & Control Scatter Plot 
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Table 4.4:  Correlation Coefficients 
 
Percent 
Change in 
Property 
Value 2000 - 
2010
Value/ 
Housing Unit 
2000
PCI 2000 Poverty Rate 
2000
Professional 
Employment 
Rate 2000
Non-Hispanic 
Black 
Proportion 
2000
Housing 30+ 
Years Old 
2000
Resident <10 
Years 2000
Max 
Residential 
Vacancy Rate
Inner West
Percent Change in Property Value 2000 - 2010 1
Value/Housing Unit 2000 0.2271 1
PCI 2000 0.2674 0.718 1
Poverty Rate 2000 -0.1265 -0.6761 -0.3583 1
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.4033 0.7323 0.5851 -0.5915 1
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.3749 -0.5182 -0.2979 0.6009 -0.4416 1
Housing 30+ Years Old 2000 -0.3403 -0.4378 -0.284 0.3008 -0.3577 0.276 1
Resident <10 Years 2000 0.2177 -0.2642 -0.0174 0.2052 0.0895 -0.1154 -0.1613 1
Max Residential Vacancy Rate -0.3448 -0.6006 -0.3639 0.7658 -0.5998 0.6841 0.3377 0.064 1
Inner -0.0855 0.0639 0.0206 -0.318 0.2351 -0.0885 0.2246 -0.041 -0.2442 1
West 0.0507 -0.2385 -0.1305 0.1867 -0.2659 -0.2266 0.2235 0.2205 0.0042 -0.334 1
East -0.2405 -0.4588 -0.2632 0.6201 -0.454 0.6838 0.2138 -0.0854 0.6739 -0.4393 -0.2448
Completed Foreclosure Rate -0.5329 -0.4629 -0.3568 0.3842 -0.569 0.6685 0.4814 -0.253 0.6139 -0.0464 0.0128
Kept House Outcome Rate -0.3451 -0.2358 -0.2773 0.0775 -0.3366 0.3133 0.3088 -0.2089 0.2106 0.0532 0.0142
Lost House, Non-Foreclosure Rate -0.1173 0.0062 -0.0972 -0.0721 -0.0844 0.1018 0.0898 -0.1713 -0.0292 0.0843 -0.0464
Lost House, Foreclosure Rate -0.1208 -0.0825 -0.101 -0.0274 -0.1068 0.1033 0.1484 -0.1159 0.0169 0.032 0.0088
Unknown Outcome Rate -0.3532 -0.193 -0.2862 -0.0172 -0.3031 0.3104 0.3453 -0.2818 0.1519 0.1435 -0.0518
Tax Foreclosures Rate -0.1733 -0.3869 -0.2059 0.6102 -0.4285 0.5397 0.0927 -0.0979 0.6344 -0.2856 -0.0993
Max Landbanked Parcels Rate -0.163 -0.4159 -0.2266 0.6584 -0.4227 0.5652 0.085 -0.0485 0.6233 -0.2824 -0.0776
Demolition Rate -0.2225 -0.4321 -0.2549 0.6442 -0.4656 0.42 0.2085 -0.0251 0.6889 -0.3819 0.033
Strategic Investment Initiative Area 0.1002 -0.2025 -0.0954 0.2693 -0.1535 0.1237 0.0955 0.0611 0.2401 -0.1671 0.1255
NSP2 Area -0.1182 -0.1132 -0.0935 0.0777 -0.145 0.1693 0.114 -0.0328 0.1936 0.0733 -0.0734
East Completed 
Foreclosure 
Rate
Kept House 
Outcome 
Rate
Lost House, 
Non-
Foreclosure 
Rate
Lost House, 
Foreclosure 
Rate
Unknown 
Outcome 
Rate
Tax 
Foreclosures 
Rate
Max 
Landbanked 
Parcels Rate
Demolition 
Rate
Strategic 
Investment 
Initiative 
Area
NSP2 Area
Percent Change in Property Value 2000 - 2010
Value/Housing Unit 2000
PCI 2000
Poverty Rate 2000
Professional Employment Rate 2000
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000
Housing 30+ Years Old 2000
Resident <10 Years 2000
Max Residential Vacancy Rate
Inner
West
East 1
Completed Foreclosure Rate 0.4833 1
Kept House Outcome Rate 0.2372 0.5304 1
Lost House, Non-Foreclosure Rate -0.002 0.1943 0.244 1
Lost House, Foreclosure Rate 0.0879 0.2167 0.2647 0.0022 1
Unknown Outcome Rate 0.1853 0.5909 0.6648 0.2034 0.2734 1
Tax Foreclosures Rate 0.6277 0.3934 0.079 -0.0848 0.0257 0.0334 1
Max Landbanked Parcels Rate 0.6161 0.3111 0.0491 -0.0794 -0.0256 -0.0036 0.9022 1
Demolition Rate 0.6611 0.4588 0.0804 -0.0779 0.0272 0.0341 0.8004 0.6755 1
Strategic Investment Initiative Area 0.1951 0.0668 -0.049 -0.0645 0.009 -0.0256 0.2105 0.2025 0.2963 1
NSP2 Area 0.0686 0.1337 0.1192 -0.0374 0.0267 0.1728 -0.0209 0.0028 -0.0315 -0.0367 1
KKeyKey - Degree of Correlation
Weak +/- .20 - .29
Moderate +/- .30 - .39
Strong +/- .40 - .69
Very Strong +/- .70+
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4.3.3 Model Development 
This section explains the development of the quantitative model and in particular the reasoning behind 
its final form.  The model is then presented, followed by a discussion of endogeneity issues and some 
diagnostics undertaken to ensure its reliability. 
Conceptualization 
In developing a quantitative model for this research, it was first necessary to determine what 
relationships are of interest and how to best represent these relationships in a quantitative model.  
The main research question is whether foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an effect 
on community and neighborhood well-being.  As discussed in Section 1.3.1, community well-being is a 
difficult concept to pin down beyond a broad definition such as “a community’s ability to fulfill the 
economic, social, cultural, and political needs of its residents as well as to replicate itself.”  It is a 
fundamentally subjective and normative term, making it particularly difficult to quantify.  Given this, it 
was necessary to examine only one component of community well-being in the quantitative model.  
Of the components listed in Section 1.3.1,115 only one lends itself easily to quantification—residents’ 
degree of socioeconomic security. 
Recalling the discussion of the importance and meaning of homeownership in the U.S. (Section 1.1.1), 
as well as the fact that the impacts of the foreclosure crisis fell heavily on property values, residential 
property value is used as a measure of the socioeconomic security of community residents in order to 
investigate the relationships between foreclosure responses and (one component of) community well-
being.  To investigate the effects of the foreclosure crisis and local foreclosure responses, it is necessary 
to compare this measure of socioeconomic security over a period of time.  As well, since property 
values vary greatly within Cuyahoga County (refer to Figure 4.5), it is necessary to use a normalized 
measure, percent change, which compares the value of an observation at the end of the period of 
interest to its value at the beginning of the period.  Given the reality of data availability, the period 
from 2000 to 2010 was chosen.  This period covers the time before, during, and after the foreclosure 
crisis relatively well; U.S. Census data, from which the general control variables were drawn, was 
available only in ten year intervals.116 
Next it was necessary to determine what type of model it would be possible to implement.  An ideal 
model would be the use of a controlled experiment; as with much social science research, this was 
obviously not possible in this context.  Next, policy evaluation models were considered, such as 
difference-in-differences modeling and simultaneous equation modeling.  Unfortunately neither of 
these approaches was possible in this case.  A difference-in-differences model would require assigning 
some observations to a treatment group and others to a control group.  This was not possible for a 
host of logistical reasons, not least that the study was undertaken after the fact.  Simultaneous 
equation modeling requires instrumental variables, which were not available for this research (see 
Section 3.3.2).  Thus a spatially-aggregated hedonic pricing model was used. 
                                                          
115 These include residents’ degree of socioeconomic security, the degree of social inclusion, residents’ social 
cohesiveness and solidarity, cultural vitality, the level of autonomy and empowerment of residents, and 
environmental sustainability—and possibly more. 
116 Beginning in 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau began collecting data using the American Community Survey (ACS) 
on a monthly basis, reaching approximately three million households per year.  The ACS was fully implemented 
in 2005, and the first set of estimates became available for the period 2005-2009 in 2010. 
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Regression models can only provide evidence of causality when the relationships modeled are 
unidirectional.   That is, in this research, the regression model will only be predictive if the independent 
variables influence the dependent variable and the dependent variable does not influence the 
independent variables. Another way to say this is that the model contains endogenous variables, or 
independent variables that are affected by other factors in the model.  A simple example would be the 
“vicious circle” of decreasing house prices and increasing foreclosures.   Referring back to the 
literature, both Baxter & Lauria (2000) and Li (2006) found evidence that the relationships between 
foreclosures and neighborhood change are bidirectional.  Other researchers have examined the 
relationships in one direction or the other, with adequate evidence to assert that relationships exist in 
both directionalities.  A simultaneous equation model would address this issue, but as previously 
mentioned, it is not possible in this case.  Thus, given the limitations, one can only assert correlation 
based on the results of the model used in this research, not causation.  
The dependent variable in regression models is commonly transformed, in particular the logarithm of 
the dependent variable is frequently used.  This is done in order to have a more normally-distributed 
dependent variable, which is one of the assumptions of OLS regression.  However, this was not done 
here for two reasons.  First, one of the advantages of quantile regression is that a normal dependent 
variable distribution is not required.  Second, it is not possible to do a log-transform on the dependent 
variable here, due to the fact that the majority of the observations (346 of 421) have a percent change 
in residential property value that is zero or lower, for which the logarithm is undefined.  Pragmatically, 
the interpretation of an unlogged dependent variable is simpler as well. 
Thus, the functional form of the quantitative model is that of a quantile regression model applied to a 
hedonic pricing model.  Equation (4.1), drawn from Equations (3.1) and (3.5), shows this functional 
form, while Equation (4.2) shows the functional form for a linear quantile hedonic pricing model.  Recall 
from Section 3.3.2 that P represents the price or value, and f is a function of S, structural characteristics 
of the property; E, socioeconomic characteristics of the surrounding area; J, jurisdictional 
characteristics; and L, locational characteristics.  In Equation (4.2), 𝛽0
𝑝
represents the intercept at 
quantile p, and 𝑋𝑠, 𝑋𝐸, 𝑋𝐽, and 𝑋𝐿 represent vectors of structural, socioeconomic, jurisdictional, and 
locational characteristics, respectively.  𝛽𝑆
𝑝, 𝛽𝐸
𝑝, 𝛽𝐽
𝑝, and 𝛽𝐿
𝑝 represent the implicit marginal prices at 
quantile p, while 𝜀𝑝represents the error term at quantile p. 
 𝑃 = 𝑓𝑝(𝑆, 𝐸, 𝐽, 𝐿) (4.1) 
 
 %∆𝑃𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽0
𝑝 + 𝛽𝑆
𝑝𝑋𝑆 + 𝛽𝐸
𝑝𝑋𝐸 + 𝛽𝐽
𝑝𝑋𝐽 + 𝛽𝐿
𝑝𝑋𝐿 + 𝜀
𝑝 (4.2) 
 
Initially, a two-period model was attempted.  This was in order to capture the “regulatory shock” that 
occurred during the period; that is, the advent of foreclosure responses beginning in 2005 and 2006.  
A similar process was used to develop this model as is described below for the final one-period model.  
That is, the model was built first using general control variables and removing those that were too 
highly correlated with one another, and then other control variables were added, and finally the key 
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variables were added.117  Eventually the two-period model was abandoned when it became apparent 
that the model was highly unstable, with small changes resulting in inconsistent and drastic changes 
to coefficient estimates and significance.  Thus it was determined that the two-period model was not 
sufficiently robust to use in good conscience and a one-period model was attempted with much more 
success. 
Model Building 
Figure 4.25 shows the regression model schematic.  The pluses and minuses to the left of the 
independent variables indicate the expected signs of the variables.  The symbol ‘+/-‘ indicates that 
some variables in this category are expected to have a positive coefficient while others are expected 
to have a negative coefficient.  One can see that the independent variables are clustered into three 
groupings:  general control variables, foreclosure-related control variables, and key variables.  This 
matches the categorization used in Section 3.4.2, and as previously mentioned is a strategy to increase 
clarity, rather than indicative of a difference between the treatment of the variables in the model. 
 
Figure 4.25:  Quantitative Model Schematic 
The first block on the left-hand side indicates the general control variables.  These include the property 
value per housing unit, averaged over the tract, and a wide array of demographic, socioeconomic, and 
property indicators, also averaged across the tract.  The second block on the left-hand side lists the 
foreclosure-related control variables.  These include the intensity of civil foreclosure filings, which 
represents the rate of foreclosure suit initiation in the tract; the intensity of Sheriff’s Sales, which 
represents the rate of completed foreclosures in the tract;118 the tract’s maximum vacancy rate during 
                                                          
117 This process is described shortly in more detail. 
118 However, foreclosure alternatives which ended in the homeowner losing the house, such as Deed-in-lieu and 
short sales, are not included in this number. 
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the study period, and locational variables, which are used to account for the uneven path and impacts 
of the foreclosure crisis across the county. 
The final block of the left-hand side represents the key variables, those representing foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation efforts undertaken in the county during the study period.  These include the 
counseling outcome rates; dummy variables to indicate whether a neighborhood has been targeted 
by NSP2 or SII; the rate of Board of Revisions foreclosures; the rate of demolitions; and the maximum 
percentage of landbanked parcels during the study period. 
The right-hand side of the schematic represents the dependent variable, the percent change in 
residential property value in the Census tract between 2000 and 2010.  The data for owner-occupied 
units comes from the Cuyahoga County Recorder and the data for rental units comes from the U.S. 
Census. 
The quantitative model was built sequentially, beginning with the general control variables and then 
adding the groups of variables in order of increasing specificity to this research.  This approach was 
used to ensure a stable model.  This was particularly important given the trial and error aspect of 
hedonic pricing models.  Using this method it was possible to build a base model and examine the 
impacts of various types of variables on the model’s robustness—whether signs, significances, and 
magnitudes of the base model estimates (the estimates for the general control variables) remained 
relatively stable as additional indicators were added. 
The model was built and run in STATA version 11.  A base model, which incorporated only the general 
control variables, was developed first using the OLS regression command in STATA, REG.  This was 
done so that multicollinearity, or high degrees of correlation between variables, in the model could be 
mitigated.  To do so, variables were removed one at a time in cases where the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) was ten or greater, starting with the highest VIF value (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2004).  
The regression was re-run, without the variable, and then VIF values were checked again.  This process 
was repeated until all VIF values were less than ten.  For this process it was necessary to use the OLS 
regression command, REG, since a VIF diagnostic capability is not currently available for the quantile 
regression procedure in STATA.   
After the base model was built, the foreclosure-related control variables were added, repeating the 
process described above.  Then the key variables were added, repeating the process again.  As variables 
were added, the robustness of the model was checked by looking for sudden changes in sign, 
significance, or magnitude among the general control variables.   
This model-building process was used to reduce the effects of multicollinearity and avoid 
overspecification.  Many variables initially included in the regression model are highly correlated with 
one or more other variables in the model.  This can result in predictors having incorrect signs and 
coefficients, and being highly sensitive to mild changes in the model data.  While this does not 
negatively impact the reliability of the model taken as a whole, it does make it impossible to interpret 
the effect of any one particular predictor on the dependent variable.  Since the effects of individual 
foreclosure prevention and mitigation strategies are of interest here, minimizing multicollinearity is an 
important concern. 
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Final Model 
In selecting independent variables, I drew primarily on previous neighborhood change research and 
my own previous experience with hedonic property value modeling, mediated of course by data 
availability.  Recall that hedonic theory provides guidance neither as to which attributes are capitalized 
into housing prices, nor as to the functional form of these attributes.  Thus, to determine whether level 
or change variables were appropriate for controls, I iteratively ran OLS hedonic models to assess the 
goodness-of-fit for various combinations of level and change control variables.  Combining both level 
and change indicators resulted in severe multicollinearity problems.  Comparing the predictive power 
in the model, level indicators were more significant and coefficient signs aligned better with previous 
research and theory.  Thus only level variables were used as controls. 
Referring back to Equation (4.2), Table 4.5 lists the general control variables in the final base model.  
Note that no jurisdictional indicators, such as school district quality or crime rates, are included in this 
model.119  This has to do with data limitations, both in the reliability of what indicators are available 
and over what geographies they are available for.  However, this does not pose a problem for the 
model because the indicator property value per housing unit captures these and many other attributes 
that have been capitalized into the house price.120  Please note that locational characteristics are left 
out of the model for the time being because they are conceptualized as a foreclosure-related control 
rather than a general control variable.  This categorization has no impact on the results of the model. 
Table 4.5:  General Control Variables used in Final Quantitative Model 
Structural Indicators 
Property value per housing unit (2000) Proportion houses 30 or more years old (2000) 
Socioeconomic Indicators 
Per capita income (2000) Poverty rate (2000) 
Proportion non-Hispanic black (2000) Proportion residents with tenure ≤10 years (2000) 
Proportion residents employed in the professions (2000) 
 
Foreclosure-related control variables were selected in order to control for the extent of the foreclosure 
crisis in various communities, combined with the constraints of data availability.  It was determined 
that completed foreclosures (Sheriff’s sales) were a better measure of the foreclosure impact than 
initiated foreclosures (civil foreclosure filings), since not all foreclosure filings result in a foreclosure, 
while completed foreclosures by definition do.  Testing both for predictive power bore this logic out.  
The maximum vacancy rate in each tract was included as well, due to the important role that vacancies 
play with respect to community change and property depreciation according to the literature (see 
Section 2.2.3).  Locational dummy variables were included in order to capture the differing timing, 
intensities, and impacts of the foreclosure crisis across the county.  Table 4.6 lists the foreclosure-
related variables included in the final model.  
                                                          
119 Though the two targeting foreclosure response variables could reasonably be categorized as jurisdictional. 
120 This is also the reason why a wide variety of structural attributes are not included in the model, such as the 
number of bedrooms, size of the property, and property condition, among others. 
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Table 4.6:  Foreclosure-Related Control Variables 
Foreclosure-related control variables 
Maximum vacancy rate (2007-2010) Sheriff’s sales rate (2006-2010) 
Locational foreclosure-related control variables 
East side of Cleveland (binary variable) West side of Cleveland (binary variable) 
Inner suburb (binary variable) Outer suburb (binary variable)* 
*Reference variable 
Finally, the foreclosure response variables were selected primarily based on data availability.  Though 
the foreclosure responses that occurred in Cuyahoga County have not yet been introduced (see 
Chapter 5), a comparison between the responses described in Chapter 5 and the key variables 
described in Section 3.4.2 demonstrates that not all foreclosure responses were captured 
quantitatively.  In particular, none of the community- and neighborhood-level responses are available 
in quantitative form.  Several of the response variables included remain in less than optimal form.  For 
example, the three property acquisition and control variables (Board of Revisions foreclosures, 
demolitions, and landbanking) are highly correlated but not related one-to-one.  All three remain in 
the model, but it is necessary to use extra caution when interpreting their coefficients.  The predictive 
power of both rate and count foreclosure response variables was also tested to determine which form 
was most appropriate.  The differences in predictive power were minor, and thus rates were used as 
it allows for easier comparison as to the “intensity” of various responses regardless of the size of the 
community.  Table 4.7 lists the key variables included in the final model. 
Table 4.7:  Key Variables included in Final Model  
Note:  All rates, excluding the landbanked parcels rate, are cumulative over the period listed 
Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Variables (all 2006-2010) 
“Kept house” outcome rate  “Lost house, non-foreclosure” outcome rate 
“Lost house, foreclosure” outcome rate “Unknown” outcome rate 
Property Acquisition & Control Variables 
Board of Revisions foreclosure rate (2006-2010) 
Landbanked parcels rate (max.) (2005-2010) Demolition rate (2005-2010) 
Targeting Variables 
SII NSP2 
 
After creating a stable model using OLS regression, the model was run using the QREG2 command,121 
which generates robust coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-values, significance levels, and 90% 
confidence intervals for each variable in the quantile regression model.122  The command was run for 
all deciles of the dependent variable between 10% and 90%, meaning that the estimates were fitted 
to nine points specified along the dependent variable’s distribution.  This was done to examine the 
impact of various foreclosure responses at different parts of the distribution.  For example, a program 
might be very effective at the middle of the distribution, but much less so at the tails.  Using quantile 
                                                          
121 QREG2 is a procedure that generates robust quantile regression estimates. 
122 I have used 90% confidence intervals in order to capture a wider variety of probable relationships.  Since the 
data in this research is relatively “noisy”—that is, there are many uncaptured influences on the dependent 
variable—I feel that restricting the results to a 95% or 99% confidence interval would unnecessarily limit the 
results.  Of course, one can still examine the p-value to identify instances where an independent variable is 
significant at a more restricted confidence interval. 
 205 
 
regression it is possible to examine the effectiveness at different locations along the distribution of the 
dependent variable.   
A final note on the quantitative model:  though care was taken to develop as robust and accurate 
model as possible given the constraints, there are several outstanding weaknesses that cannot be 
glossed over.  These include the limited operationalization of community well-being as a purely 
financial measure, the presence of endogeneity, imperfect data, and that the interpretation of the 
results must be limited to correlation and cannot be used to assert causation.  Thus, it is important to 
again draw attention to the fact that this research is qualitatively focused, with the quantitative 
component’s purpose being that of providing supplementary and corroborative and/or contradictory 
evidence. 
Endogeneity 
Endogeneity was introduced in Section 3.3.2 as a major problem in econometrics.  In this research, 
there are many opportunities for endogeneity to occur.  The first type, simultaneity or the presence of 
a feedback loop, is the most serious concern in this model.  One can identify likely feedback loops 
within the model—for example, an increased foreclosure rate will negatively affect the change in 
property value, while a decrease in property value is also likely to increase the foreclosure rate.  
Though this is not the case for the general control variables, all of which were measured in 2000 and 
thus cannot be influenced back in time by the change in property values that occurred after 2000.  This 
goes for the locational control variables as well.  However, both the foreclosure-related variables and 
the key variables representing foreclosure responses are likely affected by the changes in property 
value the occurred between 2000 and 2010.  For example, property values likely affect the demolition 
rate in a tract:  the lower a neighborhood’s property values, the more likely it is that the cost of 
rehabilitating a property will exceed its expected rehabilitated sale value and thus be economically 
unfeasible, making demolition a more attractive choice. 
With respect to the measurement of variables, error is always possible, but there is no reason to 
suspect significant measurement error in the data at hand.  The most likely source of measurement 
error is the dependent variable, as the median sales price was used to approximate the total residential 
property value in the tract.  Median sales price may not accurately represent a tract’s typical property 
value, especially since housing sales were depressed during the foreclosure crisis.  Third, the possibility 
of omitted variables is always present; however a Ramsey RESET test of the OLS model rejected 
misspecification at the 0.01% level.  Thus the remaining concern is endogeneity. 
Instrumental variables, or indicators that influence endogenous independent variables, but not the 
dependent variable (other than indirectly via the endogenous independent variables), are often used 
to overcome endogeneity issues. Searching for appropriate instrumental variables for this model 
proved unsuccessful.  A few characteristics that would influence the foreclosure rate in a tract, but not 
directly the change in property value, were considered.  It is known from previous studies that loan 
and borrower characteristics influence foreclosure rates, so data on these characteristics at the tract 
level could serve as instrumental variables.  Similarly, data on servicers’ likelihood to foreclose and 
where the loans they service are located, aggregated at the tract level, would influence foreclosure 
rates but not property values directly.  However, none of these data were available.  Another approach 
is to use lagged indicators for variables with endogeneity problems, e.g. the variable’s values from five 
or ten years prior.  For the foreclosure-related variables, this would be possible in theory but data were 
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not available.  In the case of the key variables, they didn’t exist prior to the study period, with the 
exception of demolitions and Board of Revisions foreclosures, for which there are no data available 
before the study period. 
In the model employed in this research it was not possible to remove all possible endogeneity, nor was 
it possible to use instrumental variables or to determine in what direction coefficients are biased as 
the result of endogeneous relationships.  Thus, endogeneity remains in the model and its estimates 
will be biased and inconsistent.  Though biased estimates are not ideal, the used of biased estimators 
in econometrics is common, most frequently because an unbiased estimator is not available, as is the 
case here. 
Diagnostics 
Because fewer assumptions must be met when using quantile regression (in comparison to OLS 
regression), fewer diagnostics are necessary to test the validity of these assumptions and thus the 
model.   In the case of robust quantile regression, even heteroskedasticity and model misspecification 
are not problematic with respect to determining valid standard error values (Machado & Santos Silver, 
2011).  Thus, residual normality, residual homoscedasticity, and specification diagnostics can are 
unnecessary for the model used in this research.  (Refer back to Section 3.3.3 for further details.) 
This leaves two types of diagnostic tests for the quantitative model used here:  those to detect 
multicollinearity and those to detect spatial autocorrelation. 
As described in the model building section above, multicollinearity diagnostics were used throughout 
the model building process, in particular by examining variance inflation factors (VIFs).  VIFs measure 
the extent to which multicollinearity present in the model inflates a variable’s variance estimate.  Since 
the variance is the square of the variable’s standard error estimate, an inflated variance estimate will 
result in wider confidence intervals for the estimate.   
Table 4.8 below lists the VIF values for the variables remaining in the final model.  All the VIFs are below 
ten, the rule of thumb used in this research.  The largest VIF values are for the Board of Revisions 
foreclosure rate (Board of Revisions foreclosure rate) (9.03) and the maximum landbanked parcels rate 
(7.12).  That these two variables have a high degree of multicollinearity is not surprising—earlier, in 
Section 4.3.2, their high correlation value (0.9022) was mentioned.  Though not ideal, the degree of 
multicollinearity is manageable.  Moreover, these issues could result in overly wide confidence 
intervals and thus lower significance levels.  This means the significance of these variables may be 
underreported rather than overreported.  
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Table 4.8:  Variance Inflation Factors for Variables in the Final Model 
Variable VIF 
Board of Revisions Foreclosure Rate 9.03 
Max Landbanked Parcels Rate 7.12 
Value/Housing Unit 2000 6.69 
East 6.15 
Demolition Rate 5.75 
Poverty Rate 2000 5.26 
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 5.15 
Completed Foreclosure Rate 5.01 
Max Residential Vacancy Rate 4.94 
Professional Employment Rate 2000 3.88 
West 3.46 
Inner 3.45 
PCI 2000 2.58 
Unknown Outcome Rate 2.55 
Housing 30+ Years Old 2000 2.47 
Resident <10 Years 2000 2.1 
Kept House Outcome Rate 2.02 
Strategic Investment Initiative Area 1.19 
NSP2 Area 1.17 
Lost House, Non-Foreclosure Rate 1.16 
Lost House, Foreclosure Rate 1.14 
Mean VIF 3.92 
 
The second type of diagnostic checks for spatial autocorrelation.  Section 3.3.2 described spatial 
dependence and the need to incorporate an independent variable that accounts for spatial 
dependency if it is present.  Using the package sg162,123 a distance-decay spatial weights matrix was 
created and then used to calculate whether spatial dependency is present in the dependent variable. 
Table 4.9:  Spatial Dependency Diagnostics 
Variable Moran’s I p-value Geary’s C p-value 
Percent Change in Residential Property Value 
(2000 – 2010) 
0.008 0.288 1.037 0.473 
Median SF Property Value (2000) .064 0.026** .943 0.242 
Percentage High School Graduates (2000) .105 0.001*** .939 0.133 
Percentage non-Hispanic Black (2000) .165 0.000*** .823 0.000*** 
Error Term (OLS) -0.012 0.327 1.095 0.427 
 
Table 4.9 displays the values of the spatial dependency diagnostics Moran’s I and Geary’s C for several 
variables.  Values in bold indicate significant spatial dependencies for a variable.   The two variables of 
                                                          
123 By Maurizio Pisati, Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Milano Bicocca, Italy.  Contact:  
maurizio.pisati@galactica.it.  Refer to http://www.stata.com/products/stb/journals/stb60.pdf pp.21-37. 
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interest here are the percent change in residential property value (2000 – 2010) and the error term 
from the OLS regression.  Both have insignificant p-values, indicating that spatial dependencies within 
the percent change in residential property value variable are unlikely.   
 
In contrast, the median single family property value in 2000, the percentage of high school graduates 
in 2000, and the percentage of non-Hispanic black residents in 2000 all exhibit likely spatial 
dependency, as measured using the Moran’s I value and its corresponding p-value.  The percentage of 
non-Hispanic black residents also exhibits spatial dependence as measured by Geary’s C and the 
corresponding p-value, indicating that it is highly unlikely that the percentage of non-Hispanic blacks 
in a Census tract is not spatially influenced.  
 
One might question these results, given the stress on spatial relationships found in the foreclosure 
literature (see Sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.2); there is also much evidence that housing prices are spatially 
dependent, as previously argued.  However, the dependent variable, percent change in housing value 
(2000 – 2010), is much less likely to exhibit these spatial dependencies given the fact that housing 
value is first differenced and then divided in order to determine percent change.  This transformation 
appears to greatly reduce spatial dependency.   
 
To examine this visually, one can refer to the county maps for three of the variables found in Table 4.9:  
Percent non-Hispanic Black 2000 (Figure 4.4, page 164); Median Single Family Sale Price 2000 (Figure 
4.5, page 165); and Percent Change in Residential Property Value 2000 – 2010 (Figure 4.13, page 184).  
Though it is simple to identify spatial patterns in all three figures, it is clear that stronger spatial 
patterns correspond with more significant Moran’s I and Geary’s C values. 
 
In summary, diagnostics indicated that the model suffers neither from multicollinearity nor spatial 
autocorrelation problems.  However, though care was taken to develop as robust and accurate model 
as possible given the constraints, there are several outstanding weaknesses that cannot be glossed 
over.  These include the limited operationalization of community well-being as a purely financial 
measure, imperfect data, and the presence of endogeneity, which implies that the estimators will be 
biased and the interpretation of the results must be limited to correlation and cannot be used to assert 
causation.  Despite these limitations, the model can provide supplementary and corroborative and/or 
contradictory evidence to the qualitative component of the research. 
4.4 Neighborhood Profiles:  Slavic Village & South Euclid 
To better illustrate the impact of the foreclosure crisis (and later, in Chapter 5, responses to the 
foreclosure crisis), I have selected two communities to profile.  These are an older, blue-collar 
community on the east side of the City of Cleveland, Slavic Village, and an inner suburb, the City of 
South Euclid, which is located to the east of Cleveland and considered to be a “starter home” 
community.  By describing these communities and the foreclosure problem in each, I hope to lay a 
framework for understanding the different foreclosure responses chosen and implemented in each 
community, which will be investigated later in Chapter 5. 
It should be pointed out that these two communities were selected for their exceptional qualities, 
rather than representing “average” communities or representing the general situation in and around 
Cleveland.  Both have strong reputations for innovation with respect to responding to the foreclosure 
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crisis both within Cuyahoga County and at the national level.  As well, both have charismatic and vocal 
leaders who have drawn attention and resources to their community and the larger crisis both 
regionally and nationally.  Slavic Village also holds the unfortunate record of having the highest 
foreclosure rate in the nation (by zipcode) in the third quarter of 2007, before the foreclosure crisis 
took off in stronger market areas such as California, Florida, and Nevada (Bernanke, 2011).   
For both Slavic Village and South Euclid a demographic and economic overview of the community is 
given, followed by a discussion of the foreclosure problem and its impacts in the community.  Later, in 
Section 5.6, community-level foreclosure responses are discussed.  
4.4.1 Slavic Village 
The location of Slavic Village, also referred to as Broadway-Slavic Village,124 within Cuyahoga County 
can be seen in Appendix Figure C.1 of Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas.  A map of percent 
change in residential property value can also be found in Figure 6.2.  It is a 5.2 square mile (13.5 km2) 
Cleveland neighborhood located east of the Cuyahoga River and with a portion of its borders running 
along the southern edge of the City of Cleveland.  Broadway, the major street that runs from the 
northwest to the southeast of the community, divides the community into two areas (North Broadway 
and South Broadway), although the importance of this distinction has significantly lessened over time.  
Saint Stanislaus, the second largest Catholic church built in the Gothic style in the United States, was 
completed and dedicated in 1891 and remains a focal point of the neighborhood.  Third Federal, a 
regional bank, has its headquarters located on Broadway in Slavic Village. 
Though originally settled by Irish and Welsh, by the early 20th century Slavic Village acquired the Polish, 
Slovak, and Czech residents for which it is named.  The area to the north of Broadway was built out 
first, in the 1800s, with factory homes of eight to nine hundred square feet (74-84 m2).  South 
Broadway was built out in the 1910s and 1920s, with somewhat larger homes of approximately twelve 
hundred to fourteen hundred square feet (110-130 m2).  At that time, there was a “pretty [clear] 
delineation between the types and styles of housing.  Now that’s all kind of gotten blurred” 
(Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  At this time the front house-back house land use pattern (flag lots) that is 
characteristic of the area was established.  A typical lot is twenty feet (6 m) wide.  Infill housing has 
been added over time, especially by Slavic Village Development, the local CDC.  Despite this, the 
housing is predominately old and in many cases beyond its useful life. 
Slavic Village began seeing substantial changes well prior to the foreclosure crisis.  In the 1920s and 
1930s, the area had its peak population, approximately 70,000 people.  Most of the residents worked 
in heavy industry located in the community or nearby.  As a result of the relatively high pay union 
factory workers received at the time and the highway expansion of the 1950s, many households began 
to move out to the suburbs.  This continued with the economic downturn, which hit industry 
particularly hard, and the implementation of bussing125 in the 1970s.  The poorer residents remained, 
and became poorer as the industries that formerly employed Slavic Village residents closed.  
                                                          
124 Broadway-Slavic Village is the most recent SPA name assigned to the area by the City of Cleveland.  Previously, 
the area was comprised of two SPAs, North Broadway and South Broadway, but generally referred to as Slavic 
Village. 
125 Bussing refers to the use of busses to transport children to school to facilitate desegregation. Since 
desegregation was implemented a the school district level, and school districts generally match municipal 
boundaries, many families fearing integration moved to more racially homogeneous suburban municipalities. 
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Depopulation continued with the suburban residential building boom of the 1990s (Brancatelli, May 
13, 2011). 
During the 1960s, new demographic groups began to move to Slavic Village, particularly African 
Americans and Appalachians, resulting in a rather diverse neighborhood.  Meanwhile, the structure of 
the economy began to shift and the average income of Slavic Village residents decreased as more and 
more worked in the service sector.  Thus the economic condition of the community, while never 
particularly high, gradually became that of the working poor (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).   
The name Slavic Village was first applied in 1977, in an effort to attract new residents, particularly 
those with Slavic roots.  Prior to that, the Czech area and Polish area went by different appellations, 
Karlin and Warszawa, respectively.  The area’s major neighborhood organizations have their roots in 
this time period as well.  Slavic Village Development (SVD), the local CDC, has roots going back to 1978.  
SVD follows the classic CDC form, employing a non-confrontational style, working to build alliances 
between businesses and homeowners, and developing neighborhood leadership, with the primarily 
purpose of constructing and rehabbing homes (“brick-and-mortar” activities) (Griffin, 1981).  The 
origins of the community’s neighborhood organizing come from Citizens to Bring Broadway Back 
(CBBB), which was founded in 1977.  This organization operated under the philosophy that pressure is 
required to effect change and used direct action Alinsky-style tactics, which are echoed today by ESOP, 
one of the counseling agencies in Cuyahoga County.  CBBB used consensus-based decision-making, 
had a philosophy of self-empowerment, and aggressive leadership.  Their activities including 
developing and supporting neighborhood block clubs, engaging in neighborhood clean-up efforts, and 
developing leadership.  One of their successful campaigns was preventing the closing of the local fire 
station in the 1970s, resulting in the construction of a new neighborhood station instead (Cunningham, 
2007; Griffin, 1981). 
Demographic & Economic Characteristics 
Examining Table 4.10, one can clearly see the decline experienced in Slavic Village between 2000 and 
2010.  The population decreased by more than a quarter over this time period—well below its 
historical high of 70,000 residents.  Much of this is due to the foreclosure problem in the community, 
which began taking its toll significantly before it became a major issue either in the Cleveland area or 
on the national level.   Meanwhile, the unemployment rate nearly doubled and the poverty rate 
increased by just under thirty percent, reflecting the problems of the general economy in the late 
2000s.  Though the median income rose between 2000 and 2010, adjusting the 2010 value to 2000 
dollars results in a value of approximately $23,700, which lies between the values for North and South 
Broadway in 2000. 
Many of the community’s residents live on fixed incomes, such as social security benefits.  Though 
many own or owned their properties outright, senior citizens in particular often lack the financial 
resources for upkeep and repairs on their properties.  This situation caused them to be especially 
vulnerable to risky and predatory loans (Light, 2014). 
Over this time the community’s proportion of African American residents more than doubled.  Though 
many African American residents moved in over this time period, the change in population 
composition is also due to many of the community’s older residents with Slavic backgrounds dying or 
moving to an assisted living facility (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  The current nearly fifty-fifty 
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distribution of black and white residents makes Slavic Village one of the most racially diverse 
communities in Cleveland.  The violent crime rate has also increased by over forty percent over this 
ten year period, reflecting many of the social problems found in the neighborhood. 
Table 4.10:  Demographic & Economic Characteristics of Slavic Village, 2000 & 2010  
Sources:  NEO CANDO, American FactFinder, City-Data.com 
  
North 
Broadway 
South 
Broadway 
Slavic Village (North & South 
Broadway combined) 
Year 2000 2000 2000 2010 
Population 9,049 21,475 30,524 22,431 
Median Household Income $21,140 $26,090   $29,668* 
Unemployment Rate 17.93% 10.02% 12.36% 23.24% 
Poverty Rate 36.55% 23.45% 27.33% 35.39% 
Proportion African American 39.61% 20.48% 26.15% 53.10% 
Median SF House Sale Price $30,000 $50,000    $8,000/$13,000** 
Proportion Housing Built Pre-1940 60.78% 71.71% 68.59% 85.75% 
Violent Crime Rate (per 100k) 2,044 1,197 1,448 2,046 
Median Age       35 
*    Adjusted to 2000 dollars, this value is approximately $23,700. 
**  This cell contains data for North and South Broadway separately.  $8,000 represents the median sale price in North 
Broadway, while $13,000 is the value for South Broadway. 
Finally, data on the median single family sale price captures the impact of the foreclosure crisis on the 
community’s local real estate market.  The median sale price in both North Broadway and South 
Broadway decreased by nearly three-quarters between 2000 and 2010.   
The Foreclosure Problem in Slavic Village 
Cleveland’s Slavic Village neighborhood was hit hard and early by foreclosures, beginning in the late 
1990s (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  Between 2000 and 2010, 3091 Sheriff’s 
sales occurred—i.e. completed foreclosures.  That some of these certainly occurred on the same 
property notwithstanding, this is approximately one completed foreclosure per 4.3 housing units over 
a ten year period. This immense level of foreclosures was due to a variety of conditions that made the 
neighborhood an ideal target, including an aging population, the national economic downturn, and the 
lack of state consumer protection laws.  In fact, the 44105 zip code, which includes Slavic Village, had 
the highest rate of speculation in the United States (McClelland, 2013). 
Slavic Village has been a poor neighborhood for a long time, ever since the decline of manufacturing 
and the evaporation of blue collar jobs in the neighborhood.  However, Slavic Village was also a very 
stable neighborhood for a long time, with limited residential turnover and a large proportion of 
residents aging in place.  These older homeowners tended to be equity rich and cash poor, meaning 
they had nearly or completely paid off their home mortgages but had few liquid assets (Anderson, May 
9, 2011; Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  Individuals with this financial situation are an ideal target for 
predatory and fraudulent lenders, who promise liquidity for home repairs, retirement income, and 
other uses to borrowers.  Though the practice of drawing down home equity can be a prudent financial 
decision for seniors, such as the appropriate use of a reverse mortgage, it is also ripe for abuse.   In the 
case of Slavic Village, aggressive mortgage brokers drove around the neighborhood, looking for houses 
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in need of repair and then targeting the homeowners.  Others cold called residents and offered credit 
card and other debt consolidation in the form of mortgage refinancing.  These loans often paid 
residents cash up front and began with low interest rates that would increase after a few years (Trahair, 
2012).  Residents could then refinance, continuing to drain equity from their homes, or in cases where 
this was not possible, would often go into foreclosure when the increased payments due to increased 
interest rates were not manageable. 
City councilman Tony Brancatelli, whose ward covers Slavic Village, began noticing fraudulent—or 
“innovative”—loans in Slavic Village in the late 1990s.  Investors were purchasing ten or fifteen homes 
at a time and then “flipping” the houses quickly to make a profit.  In general these properties were not 
in good condition, though buyers were led to believe that they were:   
They bought it in summer and by November they discovered the furnace wasn’t operable, or 
they discovered there there was some wiring done without a permit and they got inspected 
and the whole thing had to be yanked out, or  . . . a hole in the roof that didn’t appear until ice 
jams (Lind, May 19, 2011).   
These investors used the price points Slavic Village Development used for its new construction and 
renovated properties, helping to undermine twenty years of community development progress 
(Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; Kotlowitz, 2009).  Brancatelli and others in the community realized flipping 
was occurring, and residents recognized that the sale prices were clearly inflated (Anderson, May 9, 
2011; Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; Kotlowitz, 2009).  It was also clear that many of the loans made in this 
process were not sustainable:   
We were seeing houses that were selling for a hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars that 
had been bought a year earlier, two years earlier, for five thousand dollars, six thousand 
dollars.  What kind of improvements were they doing on these houses?  And we would go and 
look at the houses and they were nothing.  They were still shells . . . A lot of people would take 
out all the equity, and then just leave the house rotting in the neighborhood (Anderson, May 
9, 2011).   
Despite efforts to bring attention to this issue, Slavic Village had little success, a fact Brancatelli 
attributes to the strong economy during this period.  Disclosure tools were added to real estate 
transactions to discourage and reduce flipping activities, ending the first wave of mortgage fraud in 
Slavic Village. However, as expected, the houses sold in the late nineties began to default in 2001-2 
(Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). 
After the properties flipped in the late nineties went through foreclosure, investors began purchasing 
these same properties again.  Meanwhile, many of the older residents of the community were moving 
in with family members or to retirement homes, or simply passing away, freeing up large numbers of 
properties for sale.  Given the size and spacing of the homes, as well as their non-modern amenities, 
the children of these older residents rarely moved back to the neighborhood.  Thus, these properties 
were available at low cost and investors began purchasing them.  This was accompanied by fraudulent 
lending, as investors bought and sold properties in bulk.  It became known that in Slavic Village, there 
was “cash to squeeze out of empty houses” (McClelland, 2013).  A fraudulent loan might follow the 
following story:   
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When Zajac’s aunt was 89, her son moved her into a nursing home. He put a “PRIVATE SALE” 
sign on her 10-room house, offering it for $40,000. The buyer took out a $90,000 mortgage, 
stating on the purchase agreement that she intended to use the balance for rehab. Instead, 
she split the money with the mortgage broker and the appraiser who had conspired to falsify 
the home’s value (McClelland, 2013). 
Again it was clear to those familiar with the local housing market in Slavic Village that these loans 
would fail.  However, Slavic Village remained unable to draw significant attention to the problem 
(Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  Councilman Brancatelli described this time as a “perfect storm:”  large 
quantities of cheap and available housing, seniors moving out, an aggressive lending market, and the 
economic downturn at the time as the dot-com bubble burst (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). 
Tony Brancatelli described the overwhelming change in foreclosure occurrences in Slavic Village:   
I used to [see] a foreclosure a week when I was first doing non-profit work . . . in the early 
nineties.  So we had fifty to a hundred foreclosures a year, that was a lot.  We could always 
backfill them with the normal new buyers, new immigrants.  At the peak of the foreclosure 
crisis . . . we were averaging two foreclosures a day.  And the majority of those foreclosures 
were what we saw in 2000, 2001, the fraudulent loans that were now going bad . . . We were 
averaging seven hundred to eight hundred foreclosures a year at our peak . . . At the same 
time [we had] absolutely nobody to backfill (2011). 
These numbers are astounding, given that there are approximately 12,000 structures total in Slavic 
Village (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  According to a November 2007 article, one in eleven houses in 
Slavic Village was boarded up, and nearly 14% of all structures were classified as vacant or abandoned 
(Netzel, 2007).  According to Marie Kittredge, the director of SVD, as of fall 2013 Slavic Village 
contained over 3,000 vacant housing units (of 12,000)—more than 25%.  She estimated between three 
and four hundred houses needed to be demolished at that time, in addition to the hundreds of 
structures that had already been demolished (Smith, 2013).  Mahria Harris, a foreclosure counselor at 
NHS, stated that while canvassing—i.e. going door-to-door to speak with residents—the Slavic Village 
neighborhood used to take a full two days, it now takes around two hours to complete (2011).  
A complicating factor in Slavic Village was that mortgage modifications were often not plausible.  Tony 
Brancatelli of Slavic Village reported that reworking an $80,000 loan in his community was not possible 
due to the low underlying value of the properties.  As a result, Slavic Village had additional vacant and 
abandoned properties to deal with than communities with superior housing stock, because many more 
homeowners in trouble had no way to remain in the house (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). 
As lenders and servicers acquired properties as the result of foreclosures, they rarely had the 
infrastructure or expertise to handle them.  In many cases, these institutions simply “dumped” their 
properties—meaning they sold them at low prices, often in bulk, regardless of their condition to 
anyone willing to purchase them.  Some sold foreclosed properties on eBay (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  
HUD and FNMA dumped properties in Slavic Village, selling them for one or two thousand dollars; 
many were stripped and/or condemned.  In the case of HUD, properties were sold to buyers without 
informing them the properties had already been condemned (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; Kotlowitz, 
2009).  Many of these properties should have be demolished rather than returned to the market.   
Instead, they often went through the same process repeatedly, churning through the REO market and 
further deteriorating. 
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Wholesalers would also purchase one or two hundred properties and then dump them on the market, 
often selling to naïve investors sight unseen. Some of these properties were already condemned or 
had large amounts of back taxes owed at the time of sale, though this was often unknown to the 
purchaser.  Alex Kotlowitz gave the example of a property purchased by Luis Jimenez in the New York 
Times.   
[He] had purchased a house in Brancatelli’s ward on eBay and had come to Cleveland to resolve 
some issues with the property. The two-story house has a long rap sheet of bad deals. Since 
2001, it has been foreclosed twice and sold four times, for prices ranging from $87,000 to 
$1,500. Jimenez bought it for $4,000. When Jimenez arrived in Cleveland, he learned that the 
house had been vacant for two years; scavengers had torn apart the walls to get the copper 
piping, ripped the sinks from the walls and removed the boiler from the basement. He also 
learned that the city had condemned the house and would now charge him to demolish it 
(2009). 
Stripping valuable materials from foreclosed properties was endemic in Slavic Village.  During the peak 
of the foreclosure crisis, a building boom was also occurring overseas.  As a result, the price of metals 
increased substantially, creating a market in particular for used copper.  Strippers would enter vacant 
and abandoned properties and rip out any copper components—mainly pipes and wiring.  Thieves also 
stripped furnaces, aluminum siding, sinks, toilets, and anything else with potential resale value.  In 
some cases, thieves even broke into occupied houses to strip materials (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; 
Kotlowitz, 2009; Netzel, 2007).  Tony Brancatelli reported seeing back water bills up to $6,000 as the 
result of the theft of water pipes leaving water running continuously into the house (2011).  Stripping 
destroyed these houses; after being stripped they cost more to demolish than they are worth.   
Frank Ford described the condition of the neighborhood at the time:   
I would drive down many of these streets and they would be awful.  I mean really bad.  Every 
other house was vacant.  And I mean vacant in a very visible way, with the windows knocked 
out and the doors wide open.  Really bad conditions . . . but in fact, every other house there 
was a homeowner, who [was] trying to hold on.  But you didn’t see the fact that the yard had 
a fence and flowers in it.  You didn’t see it because you’re almost blinded by the effect of 
everything else you would see (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
The astounding rate of predatory and fraudulent lending, foreclosures, and vacancies also took a social 
toll on the neighborhood.  “What used to be a very stable neighborhood in terms of length of stay, 
where people moved in, they raised their family, became this constant churning of families in and out 
of distressed properties” (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  Along with this came social problems such as 
increased crime and gang activity, as well as stripping, looting, and other vandalism (Brancatelli, May 
13, 2011).   
In particular, violent crime increased:  between 1990 and 2005, the crime rate increased by 76%, while 
drug arrests increased by 478% during the same period.  Between April and July of 2007, 108 drug 
arrests and 140 arrests for other felonies took place within Slavic Village.  The area saw problems with 
drugs, gangs, and prostitution, all of which were further facilitated by the abundance of available 
empty buildings.  Several attacks on and murders of the elderly occurred, often in their own homes 
and yards (Netzel, 2007).  The unsecured and unmaintained vacant and abandoned properties also 
pose significant risk to those in the neighborhood.  At one point sixty fires occurred in Slavic Village 
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over the course of one year (Kotlowitz, 2009).  This is not to say that Slavic Village’s crime problems 
were entirely caused by the foreclosure problem; rather, these problems were encouraged and 
exacerbated by the availability of unmaintained, unsecured, and deteriorating houses. 
Slavic Village also saw walkaways on the part of both financial institutions and homeowners.  As 
financial institutions realized that taking possession of foreclosed properties was often financially 
detrimental, they began foreclosing but not taking title to the property.126 This left the former 
homeowner responsible for the property, though after losing the foreclosure case many were unaware 
of this.  In the best case, a homeowner could remain in a foreclosed property for which the bank has 
not transferred the title, but the legal standing remains in permanent limbo.  Homeowners walked 
away in many cases when they owed more on the mortgage than the property was worth, and 
especially in cases when they were underwater on their loans and also must make repairs to the 
property.  In this case it is not possible to receive another loan for home repairs, making the 
homeowner’s only options either to remain in the structure and continue paying an overvalued 
mortgage while the home deteriorates, or to simply abandon the property and the loan and walk away 
(Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). 
4.4.2 South Euclid 
The City of South Euclid is a 4.71 square mile (12.2 km2) inner suburb of Cleveland.  It is located to the 
east of the City of Cleveland, as can be seen in Appendix Figure C.3 in Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County 
Subareas.  Figure 6.3 shows the percent change in residential property value in South Euclid.  Its 
primary neighbors are Cleveland Heights, an older and denser inner suburb to the west, and Lyndhurst, 
a more typically suburban municipality to the east.  Its major thoroughfares are Mayfield Road running 
east-west and Green Road running north-south. 
South Euclid has traditionally been and remains primarily a bedroom community, but also hosts light 
industry, small retail businesses, and a local college.  The city saw its greatest growth post-World War 
II, when the population doubled between 1946 and 1950 (South Euclid-Lyndhurst Historical Society, 
2000).  The majority of the city’s housing stock was built in this period, with nearly 71% built between 
1940 and 1960 (U.S. Census, 2013).  It reached its maximum population in the 1970s and began to see 
population loss in the 1980s, as most of the city’s available land had been developed at this point.  In 
comparison to Slavic Village, South Euclid is significantly less dense.  The city generally has single family 
houses built on individual lots, unlike the flag lot pattern seen in Slavic Village.  A typical lot is forty feet 
(12 m) wide, with a bungalow-style house of around 1,500 square feet (140 m2). 
The city is considered a starter home community, though recently the proportion of rental properties 
has increased, with a corresponding drop in homeownership.  The suburb is considered a good place 
to raise a family and has “right-sized” houses, meaning they are affordable, offer relatively modern 
amenities, and fulfill the space requirements of American families today, unlike most properties in 
Slavic Village.  It is a walkable community (at least partially), with a small downtown area and good 
connectivity to Cleveland and the remainder of the county.  The community has several parks. 
While the City of South Euclid has been in the national news much less than Slavic Village, local leaders 
are well known to those in the foreclosure community, both in Cuyahoga County and nationally, 
particularly with respect to the vacant property problem.  For example, South Euclid’s foreclosure 
                                                          
126 Cuyahoga County later made this impossible; see Section 5.2.1. 
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response efforts have been covered by local and regional newspaper and television, as well as by 
Bloomberg News and the major French television stations TF1 and France 2 (The City of South Euclid, 
2011).  This reflects the innovativeness of South Euclid’s foreclosure responses as well as the fact that 
the city is a national forerunner in this area. 
Demographic & Economic Characteristics 
Table 4.11 contains demographic and economic data for the City of South Euclid in 2000 and 2010.  
One can see that the population has modestly decreased (approximately 5%), Adjusting the 2010 
median household income to 2000 dollars, one can see that it has decreased about 9%, from $48,600 
to $44,200.   
Meanwhile the proportion of older housing, the violent crime rate, and the median age have all 
remained quite stable.  However, the city’s Housing Manager, Sally Martin, stated that though the 
crime rate has not increased, there is a perception that it has—and that that perception may be just 
as detrimental to the city and community as an actual rise in crime (2011). 
However, unemployment and poverty have increased substantially—the unemployment rate more 
than tripled, and the poverty rate increased by nearly seventy percent.  Again, both of these statistics 
reflect the larger economic recession of the late 2000s.  During this time period, the proportion of 
African American residents nearly doubled, from 21% to 41%.  South Euclid is considered to be quite 
racially integrated and includes significant populations of Italian Americans, Jews, and immigrants from 
Russia and other former Soviet countries. 
Finally, the median single family house sales price decreased by a third between 2000 and 2010.  While 
much less drastic than that seen in Slavic Village, a 33% drop is very substantial and reflects the impact 
of foreclosures in the community.  The city also saw a significant increase in the percentage of rental 
properties, as opposed to owner-occupied single family homes.  Though there is mixed evidence 
concerning the behavior and impacts of renters in comparison to homeowners (see for example, 
Dreier, 1982; Krueckeberg, 1999; Rohe, Van Zandt, & McCarthy, 2002), many associate renters and 
absentee landlords with increased levels of antisocial behavior and decreased home maintenance.  
Sally Martin, Housing Manager of South Euclid, felt that the increased proportion of rental properties 
is a change that is likely to stay (2011). 
Table 4.11:  Demographic & Economic Characteristics of South Euclid, 2000 & 2010  
Sources:  NEO CANDO, American FactFinder, City-Data.com 
  South Euclid 
Year 2000 2010 
Population 23,535 22,295 
Median Household Income $48,660 $55,399 
Unemployment Rate 3.05% 9.65% 
Poverty Rate 4.55% 7.72% 
Proportion African American 21.45% 40.70% 
Median SF House Sales Price $106,500 $71,000 
Proportion Housing Built Pre-1940 13.25% 13.80% 
Violent Crime Rate (per 100k) 202 198 
Median Age 38 37.9 
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My respondents considered South Euclid to be a diverse community and believe that to be one of its 
strengths.  Diversity in South Euclid comes in the forms of racial heterogeneity, having both singles and 
families as residents, both blue-collar and white-collar workers, and both those with high school 
degrees and college graduates (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Despite this, South Euclid is having some difficulties retaining its residents.  One reason for this is the 
school district is not rated particularly well, due to lower achievement on mandated tests in 
comparison to many other suburban municipalities in the county.  As a result, some families move out 
of the city when their children reach school age.  The community has noticed that white residents in 
particular have been moving out, with some black residents expressing the sentiment that if they had 
wanted to live in an all black neighborhood they would have remained in Cleveland (Martin, October 
15, 2012). 
The Foreclosure Problem in South Euclid 
In contrast to Slavic Village, the City of South Euclid began seeing problematic levels of foreclosures 
and abandoned properties in 2006, though there were lower levels of problematic abandoned 
properties well before that.  Georgine Welo, Mayor of South Euclid, described the first time she 
encountered a visibly foreclosed home.  She had been campaigning for mayor and walking the streets 
to engage residents.  “In walking door to door I noticed these homes in disarray, and the speaking to 
the residents [it] was surprising.  [It] was almost disbelief, disbelief.  Because here it was 2003, I hadn’t 
run for office since just prior to ’98—we have four year terms—it was just surprising” (2011).  The 
visibly deteriorating houses Welo saw were the result of properties getting hung up in the county court 
foreclosure process—see Section 5.2.1 for more on this issue, and Welo’s key role in addressing this 
problem.  These properties caused significant problems in the community, visibly deteriorating and 
pulling nearby property values down.  The city would file code violations, but these cases would not 
be addressed by the courts until existing foreclosure suits were completed, under the legal principle 
of lis pendens.  This was later modified by the courts to address this issue, see Section 5.4.1 for more 
information. 
Between 2000 and 2010, 1,100 foreclosures were completed in South Euclid—approximately one 
foreclosure per 8.8 housing units over the ten year period.   Though the cumulative foreclosure rate in 
South Euclid is about half that seen in Slavic Village it remains well above normal” levels. 
The first wave of foreclosures in South Euclid was the result of landlords purchasing a number of 
properties using non-traditional loans and renting them out to tenants.  These owners collected rent 
from tenants, but did not maintain the property or pay their mortgages.  Sally Martin, the city’s Housing 
Manager, explained that these individuals had the “intention of having a tenant in there and milking 
that property as long as they could before the property was lost.  So buying ten, fifteen, twenty this 
way, allowing them just to fall into foreclosure.  It was devastating” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
As was the case in most of Cuyahoga County, the second wave of foreclosures was driven by the decline 
in the economy and subsequent job loss.  Many residents who lost their jobs also owed more on their 
mortgage than their properties were worth, resulting in large numbers making the strategic decision 
to walk away from the property and mortgage.  As more and more homeowners in Cuyahoga County 
were underwater—as of 2011 50% of county homeowners—more and more homeowner walkaways 
occurred (Martin, November 2, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
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South Euclid also began seeing increased rates of elderly homeowners experiencing foreclosure.  It 
was discovered that many older homeowners had been attempting to rescue the mortgages of their 
children by taking out second and third mortgages on their properties.  Later these people often lost 
their own properties to foreclosure (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  In another example of familial 
efforts to save homes, Welo recounted seeing parents purchasing their children’s foreclosed homes 
when they went up for Sheriff’s sale (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Other homeowners fell for foreclosure rescue scams, in which companies would promise to work out 
defaulted mortgages after the homeowner paid them thousands of dollars.  Generally, these 
companies did nothing other than collect money from unknowing homeowners, often instructing 
homeowners not to talk to their lenders (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Others ended up in limbo 
when banks couldn’t prove their ownership of the loan, as a result of securitization, MERS,127 
robosigning, and general poor recordkeeping. These homeowners can choose to remain, but can never 
have full confidence that they own the property or are able to sell it.  Thus, the incentive to maintain 
or improve the property is significantly lowered.  Or, if they choose to leave, the property deteriorates 
while the city waits for it to be possible to gain control of the property via Board of Revisions 
foreclosure (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
South Euclid also experienced vandalism problems, in particular stripping in the form of ripping out 
copper wiring and pipes, which in many cases resulted in serious water damage.  As in Slavic Village 
and across the county, many of these vandalized and stripped houses are no longer viable:   
It’s a waste, it’s a waste, it’s a waste.  And you lose the confidence of the residents . . .  All 
around you, everybody’s losing their house.  So where’s your level of confidence about your 
neighborhood?  You’ve put money into your house every year, you’ve kept your house up 
great, you have a good job, and all around you, all you see is blight, driving down the value of 
your house.  You completely lose the incentive to put money into your house, you start to think 
it’s not worth investing it, it’s not worth fixing my driveway, because look what’s around me 
(Welo & Martin, May 12, 201, qt. from Martin). 
While South Euclid has had significant foreclosure problems, it is important to stress that what is meant 
by the foreclosure problem in South Euclid and Slavic Village refers to entirely different scales.  Slavic 
Village has streets where one of every three houses has been foreclosed, while a street significantly 
impacted by foreclosures in South Euclid would have two or three foreclosures out of twenty houses 
(Ford, May 5, 2011; Kotlowitz, 2009).  When discussing the problems of vacant and abandoned 
properties in the two communities, the scale is again substantially different.  Frank Ford mentioned 
this when discussing whether there is a “tipping point” in communities when it comes to foreclosure 
impacts, in this case with respect to stripping:   
Are the suburban police departments going to be on top of it enough that it’s such a big risk 
of getting caught [that potential lawbreakers are discouraged], and they probably would be 
prosecuted?  You see in Cleveland, in the City of Cleveland, you can get away with that.  There’s 
so much of it going on.  Hardly anybody bothers to call the police anymore . . . it’s almost 
unheard of to go to a vacant property in Cleveland, at least in the neighborhoods I’m talking 
                                                          
127 The Mortgage Electronic Registration System is a privately held corporation used as a nominee for mortgages.  
In the wake of the foreclosure crisis, MERS would frequently file foreclosures.  Some judges questioned the 
standing of MERS and did not allow the corporation to bring foreclosure suits. 
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about [those heavily impacted by foreclosure] and not find any evidence of a break-in (Ford, 
May 5, 2011). 
This is not to diminish the severity of the problem seen in some of the inner ring suburbs, including 
South Euclid; rather, I wish to clarify that the characteristics of the foreclosure problem and the ways 
it impacts the community are different, both in manner and extent. 
When I interviewed Georgine Welo and Sally Martin in 2011, they expressed their frustration with the 
refusal of lenders and servicers to work with homeowners in trouble.  Welo provided an example of a 
homeowner’s efforts and the behavior of her servicer:   
The reason she stopped paying was because they wouldn’t apply her mortgage payments to 
her mortgage.  They were holding them on an account, keeping her money.  It looked like she 
was in arrears.  So she just decided, I’m not going to pay anymore . . . She had had an 
agreement for four years, a forebearance, to allow her to pay less [due to unemployment].  
Once the four years were over [the mortgage company] . . . just threw her under the bus and 
she didn’t know what to do.  She said I cannot stay here for that amount of money, I don’t 
have it, but I want to keep my house.   
They went on to discuss the servicer’s behavior and how it did not make sense when considering the 
financial implications.  Rather than modifying her mortgage via a principal reduction, they chose to 
foreclose, despite the fact that in comparison this would be a net loss of revenue (Welo & Martin, May 
12, 2011).   
Unsurprisingly, foreclosures affected nearby property values and sale prices.  For example, when South 
Euclid carried out its six-year property value appraisal in 2012, property value drops in the low teen 
thousands (i.e. $10k to $15k) were observed (Martin, October 15, 2012).  Homeowners, seeing their 
decreased property values, ask the county to lower their property taxes accordingly.  This in turn 
reduces the city’s revenue, which comes primarily from property taxes, while the city simultaneously 
experiences an increase in demand for services, such as grass cutting and garbage collection.  As 
residents leave due to foreclosure, the city loses additional revenue in the form of payroll taxes (Welo 
& Martin, May 12, 2011). 
On the other hand, the decline in property values does present some opportunities.  Welo reported 
properties selling for one-third to one-half their true value, in particular to younger homebuyers.  In 
this case, the city doesn’t make up for its lost property tax revenue, but does see its revenue from 
payroll taxes begin to go back up.  Both Welo and Martin pointed out that former REO properties in 
South Euclid sold quickly: 
Martin:  We’re viable, our foreclosures sell very quickly.  But the problem is our market-rate 
housing does not. 
Welo:  The amazing thing for me is that you can walk into a home now, totally looking brand 
new, and you can buy it for like eighty thousand dollars.  With new countertops and new 
cupboards and new bathrooms . . . 
Martin:  The problem is, you know, that it’s not good for existing homeowners.  It’s very bad 
news for them when they paid one ninety or one eighty, one fifty [thousand] for their house.  
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Ten years ago.  . . . But it’s a great opportunity for a buyer.  It’s never been better to be a buyer, 
it’s back to the [nineteen] fifties (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Welo and Martin spoke extensively about the effect of the foreclosure crisis on the people in their 
community.  Welo, who had spearheaded the effort to speed up the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga 
County courts, explained,  
In the beginning it was mostly to get [foreclosures] through quicker . . . Then, what happened 
was the economy started crashing and the foreclosure process started having faces.  Because 
now, with local municipal leaders involved, we now knew who were in the homes and who 
were losing them (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).   
Those hit by foreclosure included several city employees.  “We know these people.  These aren’t 
strangers” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Sally Martin stated that if one went to a party and were in 
a group of ten people, it’s likely that two of them have already or are currently dealing with foreclosure, 
and five of them are underwater (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
They also spoke about the psychological and emotional impact of foreclosure on residents.  Sally 
Martin reported increasing numbers of residents experiencing feelings of desperation and getting 
closer to giving up on their homes—“They are nearly impoverished trying to save their home” (Martin, 
November 2, 2011).  The impact is clear: 
You see the embarrassment—I know these people.  And sometimes they cry, sometimes 
they’re angry, sometimes they just throw their hands up and say ‘I don’t know what I’m going 
to do’ . . . Or you come across a neighbor who says, ‘My neighbors left in the middle of the 
night and I didn’t know it and I haven’t heard from them and I’m worried about the kids . . . 
they would come home from school and I would look after them until mom or dad came home 
and I don’t even know where they are.’  But it’s there—embarrassment (Welo & Martin, May 
12, 2011). 
The embarrassment and shame surrounding a foreclosure and losing one’s home is a significant force.  
Georgine Welo discussed how these feelings hindered response efforts, as residents did not want to 
admit they were having problems:   
But it wasn’t until people were willing to talk about it that we knew how bad and how rampant 
it was.  I don’t know what it would be like to lose your home.  We have friends it has happened 
to, we’ve had neighbors, we’ve had acquaintances, and it’s devastating and they try to hide it 
and that’s the worst thing you can do (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
4.5 Summary 
Cuyahoga County is located in northwest Ohio, bordering Lake Erie.  It is home to the city of Cleveland, 
the 45th largest city in the U.S. and 28th largest MSA, as of 2010.  From the 1830s through the 1970s 
Cleveland, and thus Cuyahoga County, enjoyed a growing population and strong economy, due to its 
position as an international port and an industrial center.  Beginning in the 1970s, the city was hit hard 
by the decline of American industry; today, Cleveland’s population is approximately 43% of its peak in 
the 1970s.  However, over the same period, the total county population dropped to approximately 
75% of it 1970 value, indicative of the abandonment of the inner city by those able to move to nearby 
suburban municipalities.  The city did see some recovery with respect in employment in the 1990s, 
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however most of these jobs were in the less well paid service sector and thus wages did not increase 
back to prior levels. 
As wealthier residents moved out to the suburbs, the city of Cleveland became poorer, blacker, older, 
and more dangerous.  City resources decreased as higher income residents left and property values 
fell.  Generally, socioecomonic indicators such as housing value, employment, PCI, and educational 
attainment increase the farther from the city center one travels (see Figures 4.2 - 4.6).  Within the City 
of Cleveland, indicators are generally more positive on the west side of the city in comparison to the 
east side. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, poor quality and fraudulent loans were observed in some poor, inner city 
areas, particularly on the east side of the city and in older east side suburbs.  Predatory lending activity 
mainly took the form of home equity loans, and older, black residents—often equity rich and cash 
poor—were especially targeted.  Other poor quality and fraudulent loans were used to facilitate 
flipping.  Though some attempted to draw attention and resources to this issue—namely ESOP—for 
the most part it was considered an isolated inner city problem and thus did not particularly concern 
those representing other parts of the city and county.  During the mid-2000s, the foreclosure problem 
intensified and spread, first to the west side of the city and then outward, and by 2006 it was clear to 
all that the county had a major foreclosure problem.   
The city and county experienced a full-fledged foreclosure crisis before the national level crisis 
occurred.  More than simply being an early victim of foreclosures, Cuyahoga County and the east side 
of Cleveland specifically were an epicenter of the foreclosure crisis.  Over the period 2000 – 2008, there 
was a cumulative rate of one foreclosure filing per 5.6 parcels in the county, the highest in the nation 
(NEO CANDO, 2013; Simon, 2008).   
The next wave of foreclosures affected primarily poor quality loans, such as ARMs, which offered 
teaser rates and low payments that abruptly ballooned to unaffordable levels and led to default and 
then foreclosure.  These foreclosures were concentrated in the inner city and older inner suburbs.  This 
second wave then spread to good quality loans as house prices depreciated, due to earlier foreclosures 
and consequent oversupply, as well as national-level credit tightening that occurred with the advent 
of the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 and made refinancing extremely difficult.  In contrast to poor 
quality loans, these defaults and subsequent foreclosures primarily occurred as the result of trigger 
events such as job loss, divorce, illness, and death.  In 2007, the foreclosure rates in the suburbs 
outpaced those in the city, which had the positive effect of motivating responses in the county, 
although to a certain extent city rates decreased simply because foreclosures had burned through the 
housing stock, leaving few remaining properties to foreclose. 
Though the county foreclosure rate peaked in 2007, as of 2012 it continued to lead the state both in 
total foreclosures and foreclosures per capita (Rothstein, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013).  The foreclosure 
rate is receding much more slowly than it appeared, due to a large backlog of defaulted loans for which 
no foreclosure suit has yet been filed as well as a large build up of underwater loans, many of which 
may land in foreclosure. 
Generally, cumulative foreclosure rates were highest on the east side of Cleveland and some older, 
predominantly African American suburbs, followed by the west side of Cleveland, then the inner 
suburbs and finally the outer suburbs.  Higher foreclosure concentrations tended to occur in areas that 
were socioeconomically weak prior to the foreclosure crisis.  In addition to broad variation within the 
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county, the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga County is also characterized by very local variation, with 
adjacent blocks experiencing greatly different levels of foreclosure. 
A major effect of the foreclosure crisis is the phenomenon of vacancy and abandonment.  Cuyahoga 
County, and particularly the City of Cleveland, had a preexisting oversupply of houses as a result of 
depopulation that occurred in response to the loss of industrial employment.  This was then 
exacerbated by the housing crisis.  Between 2004 and 2008, REO properties increased by a factor of 
six and average time on the market doubled in Cuyahoga County.  REO properties are generally vacant 
and often undermaintained or unmaintained.  This leads to unsafe property conditions, vandalism, 
crime, fires, and property devaluation—both of the REO property itself and of neighboring properties.  
This can then result in a vicious circle, where REOs cause nearby property values to go down, increasing 
the chance of foreclosure, and then adding more REOs to the market, continuing the cycle.  As well, 
REOs are frequently tax delinquent, meaning that in addition to requiring extra city services they do 
not contribute any taxes.  Frequently sold and resold for small profits, it is difficult to determine 
ownership and collect delinquent taxes and fines for code violations.  As well, properties in foreclosure 
contribute to the vacancy and abandonment problem.  Between 2007 and 2012, properties typically 
sat in foreclosure between 15.5 and 23.5 months, and were usually vacant over this entire period.  As 
of 2012, Cuyahoga County had approximately 27,000 vacant properties, with approximately 16,000 of 
these in the City of Cleveland.  Within Cleveland, an estimated 7,700 of these vacant properties are 
condemnable, with an estimated cost of $77 million to demolish them all. 
The cumulative effects of the foreclosure crisis and concomitant vacancy and abandonment are 
substantial.  Nearly every tract in Cuyahoga County has experienced a decline in property value 
between 2000 and 2010.  The city has experienced reduced tax revenue as a result, and must therefore 
provide fewer services amid increased service demands. 
Quantitative examination of the foreclosure problem confirms the descriptions shared by 
interviewees.  First examining the model dependent variable, percent change in residential property 
value between 2000 and 2010, the general decrease in property value is clear, with an average 
decrease of 25%.  The independent variables represent a variety of socioeconomic, structural, 
locational, and foreclosure-related variables, as well as variables representing the various foreclosure 
responses implemented in Cuyahoga County.  In general, these variables have non-normal 
distributions and exhibit a large degree of variation.  One variable of particular interest is the 
percentage non-Hispanic black residents in a tract, which is highly polarized, illustrating the high 
degree of residential segregation observed in the county.  Investigating the foreclosure-related 
variables, a large degree of variation can again be observed, as well as the extent of the impact—for 
example, the maximum vacancy rate observed is 11% and the maximum completed foreclosure rate is 
14%. 
The dependent variable was chosen as a proxy for neighborhood health.  Though housing value is far 
from an ideal representative, it was chosen due to the importance of property value as the major 
wealth-accumulation vehicle for most U.S.-Americans.  More pragmatically, property value is a 
commonly-used shorthand for assessing neighborhood quality and property value data are available 
while other, more holistic indicators are not.  A hedonic pricing model aggregated to the Census tract 
level was used to determine the influence of various foreclosure responses on property value. The 
model time period 2000 to 2010 covers the period before, during, and after the foreclosure crisis.   
 223 
 
The model schematic can be seen in Figure 4.25 (page 201).  The model was built first as an OLS model, 
sequentially adding and removing variables to ensure model stability and minimize multicollinearity 
while preserving predictive power.  Spatial autocorrelation was also checked to ensure that any spatial 
influence was properly captured by the model.  The OLS model was then converted to a quantile 
regression model in order to examine the effects of the variables along different portions of the 
dependent variable distribution. 
Though the model form is not ideal—a two-period model comparing the situations ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
the shock of the foreclosure crisis would be better, but modelling attempts had highly unstable 
results—it does allow for some insight into the effects of foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County, 
and provides an opportunity to partially triangulate the qualitative results.  A second shortcoming of 
the model is that several relationships between the independent and dependent variables are likely 
bidirectional—for example the vicious cycle of vacancies and property value depreciation.  This means 
that the model results cannot be used to assert causation, but only correlation.   
Finally, two communities were introduced.  The first of these, Slavic Village, is a blue collar, mixed race 
community with a large proportion of elderly residents characterized by dense factory housing.  
Though the community was rather poor before the foreclosure crisis, it was stable.  This changed 
between 2000 and 2010, with the population decreasing 25%, unemployment doubling, poverty 
increasing by 30%, the non-Hispanic black population doubling, crime increasing 40%, and the median 
single family home sale price decreasing by 75%. 
Slavic Village is known nationally as an epicenter of the foreclosure crisis and is one of the inner city 
areas hit very early by foreclosures, beginning in the late 1990s.  Over the period 2000 to 2010, the 
cumulative rate of foreclosures in the community was one foreclosure per 4.3 housing units.  At first 
foreclosures were the result of fraudulent and predatory lending, targeted particularly toward seniors 
with fixed incomes but large amounts of home equity, as well as property speculation and flipping.  
Foreclosed properties were frequently repurchased by investors, who made little or no improvements 
to the property, and then resold them for small profits or, if unsuccessful, were foreclosed upon, 
leaving the property is worse condition.  Efforts to draw attention to this issue were largely 
unsuccessful at the time. 
In the early 2000s, Slavic Village provided the “perfect storm” of conditions:  large quantities of cheap 
and available housing, seniors moving out, an aggressive lending market, and the economic downturn 
at the time as the dot-com bubble burst.  At its peak, two foreclosures occurred per day in Slavic Village.  
The community experienced serious vandalism and abandonment problems, as the result of financial 
institutions and wholesalers dumping properties, as well as homeowner walkaways.  Stripping became 
rampant, to the extent that occupied houses were stripped in some cases.  Violent crime increased 
greatly, and the community fabric was weakened, with residents afraid to come out of their houses. 
The second community profiled is South Euclid, an inner suburb to the east of Cleveland, considered a 
bedroom community and characterized by starter homes.  Between 2000 and 2010, the median 
income dropped approximately 9%, the population decreased by about 5%, unemployment tripled, 
poverty increased by 70%, and the non-Hispanic black population doubled.  The median single family 
house price decreased by approximately a third.  Crime remained stable, though many in the 
community have the perception that it has increased. 
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South Euclid generally first began seeing foreclosures as the result of the economic crash, though there 
had been some problems with long term vacant properties stuck in the foreclosure process.  Over the 
period 2000 to 2010, the cumulative foreclosure rate was one foreclosure per 8.8 housing units.  First, 
these took the form of rental scams, where an investor would buy a property and rent it out while not 
making any mortgage payments or performing any maintenance.  Later foreclosures were more often 
the result of job loss or another disruptive trigger event.  This was followed by residents losing their 
houses as the result of overextending themselves in an effort to assist their children in paying their 
mortgages to prevent foreclosure.  Like Slavic Village, South Euclid has experienced problems with 
vandalism and stripping, but to a much lesser extent. 
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Chapter 5 Foreclosure Responses in Cuyahoga County 
Given the early onset and severity of the foreclosure crisis in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, there 
have been many efforts to counteract both foreclosures themselves and their aftereffects in the 
county.  To better understand how these responses developed, major contextual factors that 
significantly influenced the responses in the county are presented in order to answer the first sub-
question: 
 Under what political, social, and financial constraints do foreclosure responses in 
Cuyahoga County operate, and how do these constraints impact their operation and 
impacts? 
Next the foreclosure responses used in the county are presented.  This includes how they were created 
and implemented, as well as the impacts of contextual factors on these responses. These discussions 
answer the second sub-question:  
 What foreclosure responses have been implemented in Cuyahoga County?  How have 
these responses been created and developed? 
Data is presented concerning the extent to which these responses have been implemented for each 
response (as possible) to answer the third sub-question: 
 To what extent are these foreclosure responses implemented and/or utilized?   
Since this research investigates at the neighborhood and community levels, it is also necessary to 
investigate the spatial and temporal patterns of these responses.  Doing so answers the fourth sub-
question: 
 What distribution of outcomes is seen?  Do these vary among neighborhoods and 
communities? 
To answer these questions, each foreclosure response is presented separately. First, two programs 
that required large-scale coordination, the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program and the 
Strategic Investment Initiative (SII), are presented and discussed.  Of these, the former is more 
prevention-oriented, while the latter focuses more on foreclosure mitigation.  However, both 
programs to some extent address both foreclosure prevention and foreclosure mitigation.  Next, 
property acquisition and control responses are discussed, including the Vacant and Abandoned 
Property Action Council (VAPAC), landbanking, NSP2 fund targeting, and legal efforts.  Finally, 
neighborhood-level efforts are presented and discussed using the communities of Slavic Village and 
South Euclid as examples. 
When possible, I have included data on the extent to which responses were implemented, as well as 
information on the geographic distribution of the responses. While the locations of targeted 
responses, such as the SII and NSP, are clearly geographically defined, quantifying the responses on a 
more detailed level is not possible in the context of this research.  This is because the SII and NSP 
assignations are geographic indicators of targeted funding for other responses, such as demolitions; 
thus it is not possible to separate, for example, NSP demolitions from non-NSP demolitions.  Instead, I 
examine the total number of demolitions.   
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5.1 The Response Context 
In crafting responses to the foreclosure crisis, Cuyahoga County operated within an opportunity space 
determined by both external and internal policies and resources.  Externally, Cuyahoga County’s 
response was shaped by the broader foreclosure crisis, the policies and behaviors of national financial 
institutions, federal and state programs and policies, and the larger discourse surrounding the 
foreclosure crisis.  Internally, the county’s response was both enabled and constrained by the county’s 
resources and housing market conditions, while the local discourse concerning the foreclosure crisis 
was more favorable to addressing the problem than the discourse observed nationally. 
This section briefly provides an overview of external and internal factors that significantly shaped 
Cuyahoga County’s response to the foreclosure crisis.  These aspects will come up again in the 
discussion of particular programs, their design, and their efficacy later in this chapter. 
5.1.1 External Factors 
The National Foreclosure Crisis 
The situation of the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga County relative to the national foreclosure crisis is 
an important factor to consider in understanding the county’s foreclosure response efforts.  Early on, 
Cleveland had a foreclosure problem while most of the nation did not.  This allowed organizations and 
institutions in the county to get a “head start” in devising responses and receiving funding—for 
example, the Living Cities Initiative awarded Neighborhood Progress, Inc. (NPI) one of its ten grants 
under its Foreclosure Mitigation Initiative in 2008, largely due to the fact that NPI had already 
developed and initiated its Strategic Investment Initiative (SII) program in 2005 (Mayer & Temkin, 
2009). 
On the other hand, the early onset of the foreclosure crisis in Cleveland meant that there was little 
national awareness of the problem at that time, and consequently, few resources available.  Thus, 
responders initially had to deploy considerable time and resources drawing attention to the problem.  
Though the available resources throughout the crisis have been far below the level necessary to 
address the problem, they did increase as the problem became epidemic, at which point Cleveland and 
Cuyahoga County were better positioned than most to utilize them.   
Financial Institutions 
The priorities and behaviors of financial institutions have been key in shaping both the foreclosure 
crisis and responses to the foreclosure crisis.  As discussed in Section 1.1.1, lending behaviors and 
patterns have propelled and shaped the foreclosure crisis via nontraditional mortgage products, 
predatory lending, and reverse redlining.  For a large part of the foreclosure crisis, banks and servicers 
were unwilling to consider any option other than foreclosure for borrowers in default, citing concern 
over moral hazard.128  Later on, as REO inventories piled up and lost value precipitously, financial 
institutions adopted an “anything but REO” mindset and pursued foreclosure alternatives in greater 
numbers as well as left many properties in foreclosure or HAMP limbo (Coulton et al., 2010a).  As well, 
                                                          
128 Moral hazard occurs when a party’s willingness to take on risk increases as the result of the fact that a different 
party bears the burden of the risk.  Financial institutions argued that were they to grant workouts on mortgages 
in default, other homeowners would be encouraged to strategically default in order to receive a workout. 
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post-foreclosure bank behavior, such as undermaintaining REO properties and engaging in “bank 
walkaways,” has greatly harmed neighborhoods. 
Foreclosure responses have been shaped by the behaviors of financial institutions as well.  Foreclosure 
prevention counseling and foreclosure mediation have both been developed with a major goal of 
reducing the information barrier between homeowners and their servicers.  Advocacy efforts have 
attempted to bring attention to servicer abuses.  While less obvious, foreclosure mitigation efforts 
have been significantly influenced by financial institutions as well.  Many localities have attempted to 
rehabilitate or demolish REO properties, but must first purchase these properties from the financial 
institutions that own them.  The receptivity of banks to these efforts and the prices set impact local 
organizations’ abilities to implement these efforts. 
Federal & State Actions 
Federal actions have primarily influenced foreclosure responses through the programs it has funded.  
The federal government has a second tool available, regulation, but the federal response has been 
muted in this regard (see Section 2.4.1).  Federal programs have encouraged certain types of 
foreclosure responses—for example HAMP and HHF funding have encouraged local foreclosure 
counseling programs that help homeowners pursue loan workouts.  However, these programs often 
promise more than they deliver, mainly due to the participation of lenders and servicers being 
voluntary.  For example, Lou Tisler of NHS reported that 2% of homeowners in Ohio who apply to 
HAMP receive a permanent modification on their mortgage (Tisler, May 3, 2011). 
NSP funding has supported local efforts to stabilize neighborhoods, with the program rules 
encouraging property acquisition, rehabilitation, demolition, and landbanking.  Specifics of the 
program rules, and thus funding, have directed local organizations toward some types of efforts and 
away from others.  For example, NSP allows only housing redevelopment, which effectively prevents 
most local efforts from attempting mixed-use infill development (Immergluck, 2009b).  Tony 
Brancatelli, the city councilman for Slavic Village, described NSP funding as a “real lifesaver.”  Despite 
that, he found the restrictions frustrating, such as the cap on the funding percentage that could be 
used for demolition.  The funding limit reflects the fact that one set of funding guidelines are used for 
a problem that varies dramatically in form and impact around the country (2011). 
State actions also influence local foreclosure responses.  In the case of Cuyahoga County, the state of 
Ohio has both helped and hindered the local foreclosure response.  In order to set up the Cuyahoga 
County Land Bank (see Section 5.4.2), state enabling legislation needed to be, and was, passed.  On 
the other hand, when the City of Cleveland and the City of Cleveland Heights passed anti-predatory 
lending laws, the state stepped in to pre-empt, and thus nullify, the laws (Aalbers, 2006; Bostic, Engel, 
McCoy, Pennington-Cross, & Wachter, 2008).   
In June of 2006 the Ohio legislature passed a bill to include mortgages under the consumer protection 
statute, which would go into effect in June of 2007.  However, later during the ‘lame duck’ session of 
the Ohio Senate, a $5,000 limit on damages was added to the bill.  This meant that the inclusion of 
mortgages in the consumer protection statute became simply “a cost of doing business” for lenders 
(Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  Additionally, in 2013, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that servicing a loan is 
not a consumer transaction, meaning that unfair or deceptive practices carried out by mortgage 
servicers are not covered under Ohio’s consumer protection law (M. Williams, 2013). 
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Housing advocates have noted that while the state of Ohio has stepped up its efforts to a degree, 
including “increased notification of resources for assistance, the establishment of a toll-free state 
hotline, mediation efforts backed by the Ohio Supreme Court and non-binding compacts with servicers 
for loan modifications” (p.6), efforts that could make a significant change have not been implemented, 
such as legally requiring servicers to participate in mediation, requiring principal reduction when 
modifying loans, providing funding for counseling, and outlawing bank walkaways (Rothstein, 2013). 
National Discourse on the Foreclosure Crisis 
A final contextual aspect external to Cuyahoga County is the national discourse concerning the 
foreclosure crisis.  There have been three main discourses, which are referred to here as the 
government-at-fault, homeowners-at-fault, and deregulation/financial industry-at-fault narratives, 
each of which are briefly described and criticized here.  Understanding the role these narratives play 
is key to understanding the foreclosure crisis and, in particular, responses to it.  Without sufficient 
public buy-in, the government (at all levels) faces increased difficulty in enacting effective (or 
ineffective) responses.  Advocates and other leaders work to influence the public discourse in order to 
better position policies for support. Lenders, Servicers and others spend far more money framing the 
discourse in ways to limit their responsibilities. The framing of the foreclosure crisis, its causes, and its 
solutions greatly impact possible remedies and their political acceptability and thus feasibility.  
Furthermore, this framing strongly influences and bounds future policy possibilities. 
A key aspect of understanding narratives surrounding the foreclosure is the ideological component.  In 
many cases, ideology comes first, and then the narrative is fitted to that ideology.  In the U.S., 
neoliberal ideologies, which have been growing and gaining support since the 1970s, occupy a central 
role in the national discourse.  Thus explanations for the foreclosure crisis that reinforce such 
ideological positions and beliefs are, for a substantial segment of the population and political elite, 
highly convincing on their face.129 
The government-at-fault narrative emerged early in the national foreclosure crisis, but later died down 
substantially, presumably primarily due to clear evidence contradicting it.  The government-at-fault 
narrative laid blame for the crisis on policies intended to increase homeownership for low-income and 
historically underserved groups.  A major culprit in this narrative was the CRA, which required banks 
offering banking services in an area to offer (and make) loans as well.  According to this narrative, the 
CRA forced banks to make overly risky loans to non-creditworthy individuals, leading to mass 
foreclosures.  Similarly, GSE affordable housing goals forced banks to make poor quality loans.  This 
narrative also placed responsibility for the growth of subprime loans on the GSEs (Immergluck, 2011).  
Evidence was provided for this narrative by redefining subprime to encompass nearly 50% of all 
outstanding home loans in June 2008, rather than the more commonly used definition that counted 
less than 24% of mortgage originations at the peak of the bubble.  By redefining subprime loans in this 
way, it was possible to show that the GSEs were involved with about 12 million “subprime” loans, while 
the generally accepted definition counted less than 3 million (Immergluck, 2011).  Despite the work of 
Immergluck and other scholars debunking this narrative, it continues to influence the political 
discourse—though in many ways the homeowner-at-fault narrative has eclipsed it. 
                                                          
129 There are many cognitive and emotional reasons for this, such as confirmation bias and selective perception, 
though I do not go into them here.  It should be clear, however, that all people of all ideologies are susceptible 
to conflating ideology with reality, not only those who embrace neoliberalism. 
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The second major foreclosure crisis discourse is the homeowners-at-fault narrative.  Under this 
narrative, greedy homeowners intentionally or naively took out poor loans, at great cost to financial 
institutions and the U.S. economy.  This “unfair” behavior, resulting in undeserved gains, was the major 
driver of the foreclosure crisis in the homeowners-at-fault narrative.  In support of this narrative, terms 
such as “predatory borrower” were coined (Hammel, 2008; Rokakis, May 4, 2011).  This term is, of 
course, in nearly all cases nonsense.  Lenders’ abrogation of their underwriting duties facilitated these 
so-called predatory borrowers; data from 2006 shows that nearly 60% of borrowers who received a 
subprime loan could have, in fact, qualified for a prime loan but were likely steered to a riskier product 
that was more lucrative for the originator.  As well, borrowers were frequently sought out by lenders, 
rather than the other way around, and borrowers cited lenders having used emotional appeals to the 
home and future stability to make the sale (Crump, 2013; Hammel, 2008).  
This discourse also places strong moral constraints on which homeowner behaviors are socially 
acceptable.  As discussed in Chapter 1, homeownership is seen as a moral good in itself, and achieving 
homeownership is a source of pride for many.  Thus, the loss of a home is seen as a great personal 
failing.  Homeowners seek to avoid it to avoid this failing and its concomitant guilt and shame, as well 
as the negative consequences on their credit.  The general perception is that mortgage default is 
immoral—81% of homeowners take this stance (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009); thus it is an 
important determinant of the default decision.  However, lenders and servicers are not subject to the 
same moral standards and are expected to make profit-maximizing decisions, including strategic 
default when financially prudent.  Although mortgage contracts have an implicit “put” option—that is, 
the borrower can legally default on the mortgage.  This is why the property is the mortgage collateral; 
when the borrower defaults, ownership of the property reverts to the lender or current owner of the 
loan.130  Despite this, defaulting is characterized as violating the “sanctity of contract.”  White (2010) 
writes “these emotional constraints [guilt, shame, and fear] are actively cultivated by the government, 
the financial industry, and other social control agents in order to induce individual homeowners to act 
in ways that are against their own self-interest” (p.972), with the result that “the disparity between 
the norms governing the behavior of individuals and that of banks has created an imbalance in which 
individual homeowners have borne a disproportionate financial burden from the housing collapse” 
(p.973). 
The final discourse, the deregulation/financial industry-at-fault narrative, has placed much of the 
blame for the foreclosure crisis on the lack of regulation in the financial sector, which became highly 
overleveraged and speculative, at least with respect to the mortgage market.  The federal government 
removed or weakened many regulations over the last thirty years and preempted state regulations 
that attempted to place stronger limitations in the mortgage market (see Section 1.1.1).  Deregulation 
allowed the financial industry to increase its importance to the general U.S. economy, which then 
increased its power to lobby for additional deregulation, and so on.  As several authors have argued, 
these changes allowed homeowners and neighborhoods to become resources for the financial 
industry, rather than the financial industry being a resource for homeowners and neighborhoods 
(Aalbers, 2008; Gotham, 2009; Immergluck, 2009b; Newman, 2008, 2009), with far-ranging 
repercussions.  This narrative obviously takes a position that contradicts the first two narratives. 
                                                          
130 Yet another argument for high quality underwriting—poor or no underwriting greatly increases the lender’s 
risk in the loan, as the property’s value is more likely to be less than that of the loan, meaning that losses due to 
default can’t be recouped through repossession and resale of the property by. 
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Of the three major foreclosure crisis discourses, the homeowners-at-fault narrative has been most 
prevalent in the media and other popular representations.  The most well-known of these is Rick 
Santelli’s Februrary 19, 2009 rant, broadcasted on CNBC, where he decried “loser” homeowners who 
had intentionally purchased homes using high-risk mortgages and the federal government’s newest 
plan to help homeowners avoid foreclosures (HASP, as part of the larger HERA program).  In fact, due 
to his call for civil disobedience in a form reminiscent of the Boston Tea Party, his diatribe kickstarted 
the Tea Party movement, which combines libertarian, populist, and conservative elements and has 
played a major role in American politics since that time.  
These narratives have greatly affected the responses made by the federal government.  A frequently 
employed buzzword, “moral hazard,” was used repeatedly to argue against bailing out homeowners 
in any way.  Moral hazard describes an economic situation where a party is more likely to take risks 
due to the fact that said party will not bear all of the costs of that risk (but will accrue all of the gains).  
Thus, mortgage modifications would encourage homeowners to become delinquent or go into default, 
even when they could afford mortgage payments, in an effort to receive a modification and lowered 
monthly payment.   Interestingly, moral hazard only applied to homeowners, but not to financial 
institutions, for which bailouts were seen as necessary. 
Homeowners seeking help also faced negative assumptions about their character:  “The barriers they 
face in communicating with their lenders and other housing professional revealed that the working 
assumption was often that delinquent borrowers were trying to get away with something, or to get a 
handout to make up for their own irresponsibility” (Fields, Libman, & Saegert, 2010, p.648).  
Meanwhile few questioned the role of lenders and servicers in these occurrences. 
Finally, in ignoring the roles of deregulation and financial institutions in crafting policy responses, 
neighborhoods and communities are relegated to the status of collateral damage in the foreclosure 
crisis.  By focusing on fault, the larger picture is obscured and policy directives are based too much on 
apportioning responsibility and guilt, rather than addressing the facts on the ground.  Moreover, 
ideologically-driven narratives dominate the discussion and distract from efforts to prevent similar 
future occurrences. 
5.1.2 Internal Factors 
County Resources 
When responding to the foreclosure crisis it is important to be aware of what resources are available, 
which are lacking, and what factors may hinder efforts.  Cuyahoga County has several resources that 
many areas do not, including a strong network of CDCs, a history of community organizing, a well-
managed publicly available property database, and strong connections with local research institutions. 
In contrast, the county has limited financial resources and a fragmented governmental structure that 
can complicate and hinder efforts.  
Cuyahoga County is well known for its well-developed CDC (Community Development Corporation) 
network (Coulton et al., 2010a; Swanstrom, Chapple, & Immergluck, 2009).  According to NEO CANDO, 
Cuyahoga County has 26 CDCs, predominantly located in the City of Cleveland.  Each CDC has its own 
service area, a neighborhood or community on which it focuses its community development efforts.   
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CDCs came into being with the growth in federal funding for housing and community development in 
the 1960s (Griffin, 1981).  Though CDCs have traditionally been oriented toward “bricks and mortar” 
work—the construction and rehabilitation of housing—many have offered a variety of other housing-
related services, such as home repair and weatherization, self-help programs, and housing 
preservation as well (National Congress for Community Economic Development, 2005, cited in Vidrine, 
2011).  Kermit Lind described the role and impact of Cleveland’s CDCs: 
[CDCs] were significantly involved in the 1990s in developing housing, usually through 
rehabilitation, occasionally with new development.  The development of new housing and 
rehab housing was seen as a major component of the larger economic development strategy.  
If you build market-rate housing, or if you build good, solid, sustainable housing, it will 
strengthen the fabric of the neighborhood because it will increase the stability of 
homeownership, or homeownership would itself increase the social stability in neighborhoods.  
And people with more disposable income would be added to the residency mix, and that would 
help with commercial development.  This was seen as a way of fighting back against population 
loss.   It really was a blatant attempt to compete with the suburbs, especially the inner ring 
suburbs for those residents . . . Slavic Village was making very substantial investments in this 
kind of development.  And in the late 1990s, they began to see that their efforts were being 
undermined by new things happening in their housing market that had a bad effect, not only 
on what they were doing but on the neighborhood as a whole (Lind, May 19, 2011). 
The efforts of CDCs were affected by house flippers using CDC price points to sell cosmetically 
improved properties, while CDC rehabs and construction values were negatively impacted by nearby 
vacant, abandoned, and poorly maintained properties (Lind, May 19, 2011).  Jim Rokakis, former 
Cuyahoga County Treasurer, gave an off-the-cuff estimate of 90% of progress made by Cleveland’s 
CDCs having been undone by the foreclosure problem since 2000 (Rokakis, May 4, 2011). 
CDCs are generally small organizations and as such are often more agile and able to quickly respond to 
changing circumstances.   Thus, when the need became apparent, many Cuyahoga County CDCs shifted 
staff and resources toward addressing the foreclosure problem.  Many Cleveland CDCs already had 
experience with vacancies and the realities of a shrinking city due to Cleveland’s decline over the last 
half century (Coulton et al., 2010a). 
Another county asset with respect to the foreclosure crisis is Cleveland’s history of community 
organizing.  From the mid-1970s to mid-1980s, the community organizing movement in Cleveland 
addressed city issues through pro-neighborhood efforts.  Referring back to Section 4.1.2, prior to and 
during this time Cleveland was dealing with an urban crisis, including redlining, the Hough riots, white 
and middle class flight, and the city’s bankruptcy.  In response to this, community organizing took off, 
and residents demanded a stop to redlining, bank investment in neighborhoods, and fair service 
provision by the city.  Hundreds of block groups were formed and their members pushed the urban 
elite for efforts to save Cleveland neighborhoods, not just downtown (Cunningham, 2007).  Later, as 
conservatism gripped the nation, funding for community organizing dwindled, and both politicians and 
donors grew less tolerant of protest, community organizing lost its steam and less confrontational, 
more development-oriented organizations, such as CDCs, moved to the forefront (Cunningham, 2007; 
McQuarrie, 2010).  Many organizing groups transformed into community development organizations 
as they gradually took on more bricks-and-mortar projects (McQuarrie, 2010). Though the heyday of 
community organizing in Cleveland is over, some of the people and the skills they developed remain.  
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One organization in particular, ESOP, has led significant community organizing efforts during the 
foreclosure crisis. 
A third resource in Cuyahoga County is NEO CANDO (Northeast Ohio Community and Neighborhood 
Data for Organizing), a frequently updated, publicly-accessible online database (neocando.case.edu).  
NEO CANDO, hosted by the Center of Urban Poverty and Community Development at Case Western 
Reserve University, provides data on social and economic indicators (such as resident age, income, 
race, gender, education and employment status) and property data (such as structure age, square 
footage, sale price, and foreclosure filings) on a variety of levels ranging from the parcel (for property 
data only) to Census-defined boundaries (tract and block levels) to locally-defined boundaries (such as 
neighborhoods, planning districts, and CDC service areas) to the entire county.  NEO CANDO has been 
crucial to the efforts of researchers and neighborhood activists alike, allowing individuals and groups 
to track trends and identify mortgages at risk (Coulton et al., 2010a).  The National League of Cities 
lists NEO CANDO as one of the most well-developed regional data systems in the country (Swanstrom 
& Brooks, 2010). 
Prior to NEO CANDO, Cuyahoga County agencies each had its own data system that did not interface 
with the others.  The City of Cleveland had no computer-based data system at the time.  NEO CANDO 
grew out of the Land Assembly Team, and in particular the efforts and expertise of Michael Schramm 
(Lind, May 19, 2011).  Prior to the creation of NEO CANDO, organizations and governments could only 
access this data by pulling it from its individual sources, which was not feasible—“if you had to do it 
yourself, none of us have the manpower” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
A final county asset is the tradition of neighborhood and housing research carried out at local research 
institutions, such as Cleveland State University, Case Western Reserve University, and the Cleveland 
Federal Reserve Bank (Coulton et al., 2010a).  These researchers are strongly connected to, and often 
work closely with, community members and organizations.  Thus, the foreclosure problem as well as 
responses to it have been better documented and analyzed than in many other parts of the country. 
In addition to strengths and resources, some aspects of the county hinder foreclosure responses.  The 
large number of local governments in Cuyahoga County has been previously mentioned:  59 in total, 
including the City of Cleveland, 37 other cities, 19 villages, and two townships.  Cuyahoga County also 
contains a wide variety of other governmental organizations, including 33 school districts, 16 courts, 
and “at least 50 authorities, boards, commissions, and special districts, either advisory or policy-
making” as of 2009 (League of Women Voters, 2009, p.2).  This large number of stakeholders can cause 
complications in designing and implementing foreclosure responses, as each has different needs, 
priorities, and decision-making powers.  For example, for a long time foreclosures were considered “a 
[Cleveland] city problem” that didn’t impact the suburbs (Rudyk, May 2, 2011). Another aspect of 
fragmentation is that foreclosure suits go through the county government in Cuyahoga County; in 
order for a foreclosure to be completed it must move through eleven county agencies (Weinstein, 
Hexter, & Schnoke, 2006).  The number of agencies involved also complicated efforts to respond to 
the foreclosure crisis by modifying the foreclosure process. 
Like many declining cities, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County have had limited financial resources over 
the long term.  The additional impacts of the foreclosure crisis and the recession have stretched these 
limited resources even further.  Though the federal government has delivered some funding via NSP 
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grants and HHF funds, a lack of financial resources has consistently been an inhibitor to foreclosure 
responses in the county as a whole and within particular municipalities and communities. 
Housing Market Conditions 
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, Cleveland is a weak housing market city. Leading up to the foreclosure 
crisis it experienced weak housing appreciation and had an oversupply of housing relative to demand.  
In fact, in 2010, Cuyahoga County had over 70,000 more housing units than it had households (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013).  These market conditions meant that as the rate of foreclosure 
activity picked up, a pre-existing housing glut with significant vacancy levels became a serious vacant 
and abandoned building problem that overwhelmed neighborhoods. 
The specific problems of weak market cities—slow or no housing appreciation, high vacancy rates, and 
significant blight—mean that certain foreclosure responses are more appropriate and effective than 
others.  In strong market cities, housing demand remained strong enough that REO problems, such as 
those seen in Cleveland, often did not develop.  Thus property acquisition and control strategies, such 
as demolitions, should not be primary foreclosure responses in strong market cities, but are essential 
in weak market cities such as Cleveland.   
Swanstrom et al. (2009) argue that preventing foreclosure is easier in weak market areas due to the 
lower levels of housing price appreciation leading up to the crisis.  When the housing market collapsed, 
prices fell less where they had increased less, with the result being fewer homeowners underwater on 
their mortgages, and those that were underwater had less of a problem.  Thus the mortgages should 
be easier to work out, as lenders faced smaller losses (Swanstrom et al., 2009).  However, once a 
foreclosure has occurred, the likelihood of the property becoming vacant and/or abandoned is much 
higher in a weak market area.  Moreover, low property values, a long foreclosure process, extended 
pre-existing vacancies, and aged housing stock create an environment highly conducive to 
abandonment and blight (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013). 
This has been the experience in Cuyahoga County, which has seen incredible foreclosure levels.  
Coulton et al. (2010a) argue that the tremendous expansion in subprime credit where access to credit 
markets previously did not exist fueled foreclosures and the subsequent wave of vacant properties in 
the Cleveland area. Other contributing factors include the property flipping and mortgage fraud that 
occurred in the county.  Rising unemployment rates as the national economy weakened added to the 
number of homeowners in distress, increasing the number of foreclosures and further weakening the 
housing market. The negative feedback loop between foreclosures and property values greatly 
exacerbates the problem of foreclosure prevention. 
Local Foreclosure Discourse 
The foreclosure discourse in Cleveland and Cuyahoga County differed somewhat from the national 
discussion of the foreclosure crisis.  For a variety of reasons, including the earlier onset of the problem 
and the magnitude of the problem—particularly in certain neighborhoods and communities, such as 
Slavic Village, Cleveland’s east side, and the older inner suburbs west of Cleveland—the discussion in 
Cuyahoga County was less focused on the culpability of homeowners and more on that of financial 
institutions.  Part of this can be attributed to the growing awareness of government officials, policy 
researchers, and non-profit organizations, which drew attention to the crisis, its causes and effects, 
and advocated for intervention. 
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The foreclosure crisis and its impacts on homeowners, neighborhoods, and communities also caught 
the attention of the press in Cuyahoga County, with The Cleveland Dispatch, the region’s largest 
newspaper, devoting many more articles to the crisis and at an earlier date than other regional 
newspapers. Moreover, the paper included a larger proportion of local coverage, investigative 
reporting, and editorials, as well as more prominent placement (i.e. more front page stories) 
(Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010).  Swanstrom et al. (2010) attributed this to the efforts of Cleveland’s well-
organized and numerous housing non-profits and local leaders who took the role of prominent 
advocates, such as Jim Rokakis, then Cuyahoga County Treasurer, and Tony Brancatelli, Ward 12 (Slavic 
Village) Councilman. 
This is not to say that the discourse in Cuyahoga County took this form from the beginning.  At first, 
the problem was limited to lower-income, minority areas, and was not an issue of particular interest 
in the county outside of a few small organizations, in particular ESOP.  As non-profits, in particular 
CDCs, saw their progress in affordable housing and neighborhood revitalization evaporate, recognition 
spread that subprime and fraudulent lending, and the following increase in foreclosures were undoing 
twenty years of work (Ford, May 5, 2011).  As the problem’s range and intensity grew, so did the 
interest of policymakers and the public.  In particular, 2005 saw an increase in interest as the problem 
spread to the inner suburbs (Swanstrom et al., 2009).  Several research and policy reports quantified 
the costs of the foreclosure crisis and received good press coverage, further increasing awareness of 
the problem and effects and influencing the public perception of the issue (Swanstrom et al., 2009). 
5.2 The Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative 
Cuyahoga County used many of the local foreclosure prevention efforts discussed in Section 2.4.3 as 
part of its response to the foreclosure crisis.  These included counseling, mediation, and organizing, as 
well as public awareness campaigns.  More importantly, Cuyahoga County is one of the few areas in 
the country to have developed an umbrella foreclosure response organization, the Cuyahoga County 
Foreclosure Initiative (CCFI).  This section will mention aspects of all of these efforts, but will focus on 
the CCFI in particular.  It will also discuss the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Mediation Program in 
detail, which is a separate program that often overlaps with the CCFI. 
By 2005 it was clear that Cuyahoga County was in the midst of a foreclosure crisis.  Though some had 
noticed and spoken up about it earlier—Frank Ford of NPI credited ESOP as having called attention to 
foreclosures as a problem as early as the late 1990s, while Stephen Wertheim of United Way 211 
recalled being contacted by community groups in 2003 after the county’s predatory lending law was 
pre-empted by the state (Ford, October 12, 2012; Wertheim, May 4, 2011)—the critical mass of 
attention necessary to catalyze a response was not yet there.  But by 2005, advocates including ESOP, 
some CDCs, and research organizations such as Policy Matters Ohio had taken up the banner of 
foreclosures.  As well, the local newspaper, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, had run a series of articles and 
editorials on the crisis and the National Vacant Properties Campaign had released its report “Cleveland 
at the Crossroads” (Weinstein et al., 2006).  Of particular importance was a May 5th, 2005 letter to the 
County from the First Suburbs Consortium, which includes fifteen Cuyahoga County suburban cities.  
In the letter, the mayors of the first suburbs expressed their concern about the length of the 
foreclosure process and its effects on their communities, as well as their willingness and commitment 
to assisting in speeding up the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County courts (Hexter & Schnoke, 
2009).  Others, among them ESOP and Jim Rokakis, were calling for the prevention of predatory lending 
and help for borrowers in foreclosure (Ford, May 5, 2011; Wertheim, May 4, 2011).  As Weinstein et 
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al. (2006) wrote, “the general consensus was that the problem of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County had 
reached crisis proportions and a formal, public County-wide response was essential if the problem was 
to be addressed” ( Weinstein et al., 2006, p.1). 
The Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative began in 2005 as a three-year foreclosure prevention pilot 
program authorized by the state legislature and to be implemented jointly by the County Treasurer 
and County Prosecutor (Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010).131  The program began with two goals, to (1) 
“Make foreclosure proceedings ‘faster and fairer’” and (2) “Create an Early Intervention program to 
help residents prevent foreclosure” (Weinstein et al., 2006, p.1).   
5.2.1 Fixing the Foreclosure Process 
The first of these goals, to speed up the foreclosure process, at first sounds somewhat counter-
intuitive:  in the midst of a foreclosure crisis, why would we want to speed up the time it takes to carry 
out a foreclosure?  Referring back to Section 2.2.1, recall that while judicial foreclosure states provide 
the borrower more opportunities to contest the foreclosure or bring the mortgage current, they also 
result in more vacancies and increased blight as the houses sit empty longer during the foreclosure 
process.  As Mark Wiseman, the first director of the CCFI, wrote in an internal annual report, servicers 
often threaten to take the delinquent borrower’s house, giving them the option to “pay the amount 
due, or to pack up and leave” (Wiseman, September 17, 2007, p.4)—though in fact, borrowers can 
legally remain in the home until the Sheriff’s sale is completed. He continues to write that though 
foreclosures in Cuyahoga County took on average 18 to 24 months at that time (mid-2005), “most 
borrowers had no idea how long the process would take.  Given the (perceived) choice between 
possibly being waken [sic] up by the Sheriff or leaving right away, many borrowers fled their homes” 
(Wiseman, September 17, 2007, p.2). 
This is of course bad for the borrowers, who may be giving up on their mortgage prematurely, and in 
any case lose their home much earlier than necessary.  It is also very harmful to neighborhoods.  In his 
2007 report, Wiseman lists the average time it takes for a vacant house in Cleveland to be looted as 
72 hours.  Once fixtures and wiring are ripped out, the house is likely beyond saving; the repairs would 
cost more than it would ever be worth.  At this point the blighted house harms its neighbors’ property 
values, becomes dangerous, and may attract crime. A letter attached to the CCFI one year progress 
assessment comes from a Cleveland homeowner to the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court.  She 
complains that since she and her husband bought the property, the neighboring house has been vacant 
and in foreclosure for a total of nearly eight years at the time the letter was written and that she has 
been unable to get any active response from the Cuyahoga County courts (Weinstein et al., 2006). 
Georgine Welo, Mayor of South Euclid, described the situation in her community when she first 
became aware of the foreclosure problem:   
It was the people living in the neighborhoods clamoring about this.  They weren’t clamoring 
about [the fact that] they were losing their homes at that time.  And I think that is the critical 
thing that happened.  The neighbors wanted the home, the abandoned home, taken care of, 
and quickly . . . How could you purchase a home if you couldn’t get it out of the foreclosure 
process?  . . . We realized there was nobody responsible for that home.  It was a big burden on 
                                                          
131 In the third year, the program administration shifted fully to the County Treasurer’s office (Hexter & Schnoke, 
2009). 
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the communities because we had to maintain the grass, we had to pick up the trash, we had 
to watch for squatters—we were lucky we didn’t have any (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Cuyahoga County had a pre-existing problem with foreclosure cases before the foreclosure crisis began 
in earnest.  Judges had been shifting their foreclosure cases to magistrates,132 who also did not try the 
foreclosure cases.  The shifting of the cases to the magistrates had the benefit of removing the cases 
from the judges’ dockets, meaning that these unresolved foreclosure cases were not counted against 
the judges.133  Interviewees were careful to mention that this shifting of foreclosure cases to 
magistrates is simply how things were done—James Sassano stated that the Cuyahoga County courts 
had been treating foreclosure cases in this manner for at least thirty years (Sassano, May 12, 2011; 
Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Mayor Georgine Welo, of the City of South Euclid, became concerned about foreclosures during her 
mayoral election campaign in 2003.  She reported that she first saw a visibly foreclosed home—“a 
home ravaged by savages”—during her door to door campaigning.  Due to her previous work at the 
County Court of Common Pleas, she knew that foreclosures were a problem in the courts and that a 
small docket size was important to judges.  After becoming mayor in 2004, one of Welo’s priorities was 
to determine what was occurring with foreclosures in Cuyahoga County and why properties were 
sitting vacant and being looted and vandalized.   She recognized that the local municipalities and the 
county court system were disconnected, and that this disconnect was having terrible consequences 
for residents and neighborhoods without the problem being recognized at the county level (Welo & 
Martin, May 12, 2011).  As well, foreclosure attorney James Sassano reported getting calls from county 
residents and elected officials asking for help with problematic foreclosure properties.  However, the 
courts were overwhelmed and could not improve the processing of foreclosure cases at the time 
(Sassano, May 12, 2011).  They had requested additional magistrates to deal with the backlog but did 
not receive additional funding (McMonagle, May 24, 2011). 
Sassano and Welo knew one another previously, and Sassano went to Mayor Welo with a plan to 
improve the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County courts.  Welo was well positioned as a suburban 
mayor with knowledge of the courts, but was a new mayor and needed support.  She was able to 
persuade the mayors of the first suburbs134 to join her in open letters to the County and the County 
courts (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  This drew attention from the media and public officials, as well 
as the Ohio Supreme Court (McMonagle, May 24, 2011).  Others had been working to draw attention 
to the County’s foreclosure problems, including ESOP and Jim Rokakis, but had not garnered the 
necessary support at the county level at that time (Ford, May 5, 2011; Wertheim, May 4, 2011). 
To improve the handling of foreclosures it was necessary to fund additional magistrates and 
equipment.  This was done by increasing the foreclosure filing fee by $200, with the additional money 
going to a Special Projects Fund (McMonagle, May 24, 2011; Sassano, May 12, 2011; Welo & Martin, 
May 12, 2011).  The judges voted for the increased fee, and banks and other lending institutions agreed 
                                                          
132 Magistrates are unelected judicial officers who have the authority to try minor cases.  In the U.S., many judges 
are elected rather than appointed. 
133 Judges’ performance is evaluated in part by how many cases they clear and the percentage of their docket 
(case load) they address.  Judges with lackluster performance in these areas are likely to be reprimanded by the 
state Surpreme Court and less likely to win re-election. 
134 The Northeast Ohio First Suburbs Consortium is a group of inner suburbs of Cuyahoga County.  It includes 
Bedford, Cleveland Heights, Euclid, Fairview Park, Garfield Heights, Lakewood, Maple Heights, Parma, Shaker 
Heights, South Euclid, University Heights, and Warrensville Heights. 
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as well, as they also wanted to move foreclosure cases more quickly (McMonagle, May 24, 2011).  Over 
time Cuyahoga County saw approximately 22,000 foreclosures case with this increased filing fee, which 
amounted to $4.4 million in additional funding for the court system, allowing the court to add eight 
new magistrates and retrofit a building (McMonagle, May 24, 2011).  This money was also used to fund 
the additional resources to handle foreclosure cases, many of which are described below, as well as to 
add a mortgage fraud and predatory lending position at the County Prosecutor’s Office. 
The foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County was also complicated, involving eleven county agencies, 
some of which used outdated technology (e.g. forms were still filled out using a typewriter) and many 
of which lacked sufficient staff to handle the increase in foreclosure suits.  In general, these eleven 
agencies were relatively isolated from one another and did not coordinate their efforts (Weinstein et 
al., 2006). 
However, the crisis made the situation untenable.  By August 2005, when the Cuyahoga County 
Commissioners’ Report officially recommended the foreclosure initiative, the court’s case backlog was 
8,000 cases (Weinstein et al., 2006).  Meanwhile, foreclosure filings for 2005 stood at approximately 
11,000 and the rate of filings was not slowing down (see Figure 4.8).  Though some county agencies 
had already begun efforts to streamline the foreclosure process, the Commissioners’ Report signified 
the backing of the county government as well as the commitment of resources. 
An early effort to improve the speed at which foreclosure suits were handled was the court’s 
requirement of a “Certificate of Readiness” (CR) on all foreclosure filings, beginning in 2003.  The CR 
asked foreclosure lawyers to pre-certify various aspects of the mortgage, such as the property’s legal 
description, the promissory note, the interest rate of the loan, and determining if the defendant was 
currently under a bankrupcty stay (Cuyahoga County, 2004; H. Williams, May 13, 2011).  The purpose 
of the CR is to force foreclosure attorneys to screen for and address potential problems before the 
case comes to the magistrates.  
While some, including South Euclid Mayor Georgine Welo, criticized the magistrates for being 
overzealous in their use of CRs to dismiss cases, the one year CCFI progress assessment praised it for 
reducing the number of cases dismissed due to lack of preparation, and thus making a more efficient 
use of the magistrates’ time.  The assessment reports a change in approval rate at default hearings 
from 30% to 90% (Weinstein et al., 2006). 
As well, both the Clerk of Courts and the Sheriff’s Office implemented automation projects that 
allowed them to process foreclosures more quickly.  The Clerk of Courts implemented its automation 
project in January 2005 without coordinating with any other county agencies; the result was that the 
Clerk of Courts office nearly tripled its productivity in the foreclosure process, but had no overall effect 
on the county’s performance.  Instead, the backlog simply moved down the line to the Sheriff’s Office.  
However, this did spur the Sheriff’s Office to implement its own automation efforts in August 2005, 
which resulted in the Sheriff’s Office processing nearly twice as many Orders of Sale per month as prior 
to the automation (Weinstein et al., 2006). 
Within the courts, several changes were made by the judges and magistrates.  It was decided that all 
foreclosure cases would be included on the civil docket reported to the state Supreme Court and that 
magistrates would be assigned to specific judges.  The judges also developed a case management 
system and circulated monthly statistics on foreclosure cases to judges.  By early 2006, the court was 
able to hire nine additional magistrates to handle foreclosure cases; this additional staff plus the other 
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measures taken facilitated the court reducing the time to foreclosure case disposition from 550 days 
to 356 days, less than the state Supreme Court’s guideline of one year maximum (Weinstein et al., 
2006). 
In addition, the County Commissioners committed to implementing several streamlining measures, 
including adding the property address and parcel number to Clerk of Courts records, adopting rule 
changes to expedite suits involving vacant properties, and creating a vacant property inventory to help 
cities track and reutilize their vacant properties.  As well, the Commissioners provided temporary 
funding for one-time disbursements, such as systems upgrading, and increased the temporary filing 
fee in order to finance program needs, such as additional staff, over the longer term.  A detailed 
description of administrative changes to specific departments and agencies can be found in Weinstein 
et al. (2006). 
Finally, the eleven county agencies involved met monthly to monitor the program efforts and their 
success.  For many of the agencies, this was the first time they had actively worked together.  Some 
departments were able to share data documentation and reduce duplication.  The county has also 
worked to develop a GIS data management system for internal data, allowing for efficient data sharing 
between departments (Weinstein et al., 2006). 
One year into the initiative, the progress assessment reported that the following improvements had 
been made:135 
 Foreclosure cases were completed each month at a rate 20% to 70% above the new monthly 
filings since April 2006. 
 The average time to complete a foreclosure case was reduced by 35% (from 550 days to 356 
days) between March and October of 2006. 
 Between May and October 2006, the backlog of foreclosure cases two years or older was 
reduced by 50%. 
 The Sheriff’s office increased the ratio of Orders of Sale to foreclosure cases from 58% to 115% 
between October 2005 and October 2006. 
 The Sheriff’s office reduced the time needed to issue a property deed to a bank from 4-5 
months to 2 months. 
 HB 294, which expedited the Board of Revisions foreclosure process, was implemented for tax 
delinquent abandoned and vacant properties 
 Vacant property lists created.  The number of pending foreclosure cases was reduced from 
13,155 to 11,398, a reduction of 13% between May 31, 2006 and October 6, 2006 (Weinstein 
et al., 2006). 
Unfortunately little follow-up data concerning additional reductions or increases in the foreclosure 
processing time in Cuyahoga County is available.  Based on interview data, there is general satisfaction 
with the handling of foreclosure cases by the Cuyahoga County courts and Sheriff’s office.   
Ohio House Bill 294 has also helped speed up the foreclosure process.  This allows for “fast-track” 
foreclosures of abandoned or vacant properties in order to limit the damage to the structure and the 
community, and to move the property back into functional use quickly.  It affects only uninhabited 
properties, meaning that homeowners attempting to retain their houses are not negatively impacted 
                                                          
135 A more thorough account of these changes can be found in Weinstein et al.’s 2006 program evaluation. 
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by the faster process allowed for vacant and abandoned properties.  Thus, the combination of a faster 
and better coordinated foreclosure process, the availability of counseling and mediation for 
homeowners who want to keep their property, and a fast-track foreclosure process for vacant and 
abandoned properties allows for both the protection of homeowners and the reduction of negative 
neighborhood impacts from vacant properties.  According to a study investigating the potential 
benefits of fast-track legislation in Ohio, Fee & Fitzpatrick IV found that fast-tracking would apply to 
approximately 20% of foreclosure suits, could result in an eight to forty-three day reduction in 
foreclosure length, and could result in $24 to $129 million in saving to creditors (2014).136 
The streamlining of the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County is an interesting example of a 
foreclosure intervention, as it works both as foreclosure prevention and foreclosure mitigation.  The 
foreclosure prevention aspect lies in the Certificate of Readiness (CR) requirement.  In addition to using 
judges’ and magistrates’ time more efficiently, requiring prosecuting attorneys to present CRs 
completed in good faith has the side effect of potentially preventing wrongful foreclosure, by ensuring 
all relevant documents are present and accurate. 
The main impact of this prong of the CCFI is in the area of foreclosure mitigation.  By shortening the 
foreclosure process, the amount of time properties in foreclosure sit vacant is reduced, and thus 
potentially their impacts on their surrounding neighborhoods.  The implementation of HB 294 and 
maintenance of vacant property lists help municipalities to monitor the vacant property situations in 
their communities and obtain control of problem vacant properties quickly.  However, referring back 
to Mark Wiseman’s statement that properties are looted within 72 hours of becoming vacated, it is 
clear that an average foreclosure case processing time of just under a year, while greatly improved, 
was insufficient to address the problem.   
5.2.2 Early Intervention 
As the plan to improve foreclosure proceedings in the Cuyahoga County courts moved forward, some 
attention shifted to the plight of homeowners facing foreclosures.    Some, such as ESOP, had long 
been advocating for this and a group of advocates showed up to the initial CCFI meeting. Others 
became more aware of the problem as the CCFI progressed (Ford, May 5, 2011; Sassano, May 12, 2011; 
Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011; Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  As those involved became more aware of the 
foreclosure issue, “the foreclosure process started having faces” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  She 
described becoming aware of the problem: 
It was like a silent killer, so many of the neighbors were in the same boat as that vacant home 
. . . I would say it started changing 2006 more so.  December 2005 I think we really were on 
track of knowing how we were going to take care of all these problems in the spring, when the 
dandelions and the grass [grow], but in 2006 the awareness started coming that oh my gosh . 
. . And then we started getting lists of the Sheriff’s sales and who was coming up . . . I mean 
you’re talking seven, eight hundred homes (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
                                                          
136 The research used three possible scenarios because it is not clear which loans would be fast-tracked—
specifically, where on the distribution of foreclosure lengths do loans eligible for fast-tracking lie?  The low 
estimates correspond to a situation where fast-tracking would apply to the loans currently moving through 
foreclosure most quickly, while the high estimates correspond to a situation where the eligible loans are spread 
throughout the distribution (the authors used the first five percentiles of each quartile of foreclosure length). 
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Thus, a second goal of the CCFI was to create an early intervention program to help residents avoid 
foreclosure.  The committee working on the program developed the goal of “ensur[ing] that the 
County’s residents are able to remain in their homes until they are ready to leave, rather than when 
the lender is ready to foreclose” (Weinstein et al., 2006, p.14).  To do this, the Cuyahoga County 
Foreclosure Prevention Program (CCFPP) was created. The CCFPP was housed in the County 
Treasurer’s office but jointly administered with the Cuyahoga County Department of Development and 
had three full-time employees, including the director (Weinstein et al., 2006).  The program’s 
operations, including its administration, foreclosure prevention counseling, outreach activities, and 
rescue funds, were funded by a continually changing combination of county general funds, money 
reallocated from federal funding programs (TANF and CDBG), surplus county Delinquent Tax 
Administration and Collection (DTAC) funds, and grants from banks and foundations (Hexter & 
Schnoke, 2009).  Unfortunately the program never achieved a stable funding program, and 
consequently its existence never stabilized either (Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  The program was 
originally envisioned as a three year effort, but in effect ran for six years, from March 2006 through 
March 2012 (Bellamy, October 16, 2012; Wiseman, January 30, 2009). 
The primary service provided by the CCFPP was foreclosure prevention counseling, available to 
Cuyahoga County residents for their primary residence.  The counseling services were delivered in 
partnership with 211 First Call for Help, a free community service that provides information on social, 
health, and government resources, and several local nonprofits.  There were initially nine nonprofits, 
but this was later reduced to four counseling nonprofits (Cleveland Housing Network (CHN), 
Community Housing Solutions (CHS), Empowering and Strengthening Ohio’s People (ESOP), and 
Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS)) and the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland (LAS), which provided 
legal advice and representation to qualifying homeowners. While the quantitative aspects of the 
program—the number of people who received counseling, the distribution of counseling, and 
counseling outcomes—will be discussed later in this section, an assessment of the program’s strengths 
and weaknesses in light of its operating context will be made here.   
The program model was as follows: 
 Encourage borrowers to call 211 First Call for Help; 
 Upon receiving a call, 211 Information & Referral Specialists get a brief overview of the 
borrower’s situation and refer them to the most appropriate agency, based on the borrower’s 
needs and location; 
 The agency schedules the borrower for an intake session within the next seven days;137 
 Borrowers in foreclosure given priority and referred to Legal Aid138 as well as counseling; 
 Borrowers‘ budget reviewed and discussed; 
 Counselor contacts lender or servicer in an attempt to resolve the matter favorably for the 
borrower; 
                                                          
137 The seven day intake window was later extended to fourteen days.  Counseling agencies shifted to group 
intake sessions early on to meet their intake target period and increase efficiency by having borrowers fill out 
paperwork at the session and identifying ineligible individuals and those who cannot be assisted (Wiseman, 
September 17, 2007). 
138 Housing Advocates also provided legal assistance to referred borrowers in the first year of the program (2005-
6). 
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 Counselor discusses alternatives with the borrower if foreclosure cannot be avoided 
(Wiseman, January 30, 2009, pp.4-5).   
The CCFPP was the first in the nation to combine a local hotline with non-profit face-to-face counseling 
(Wiseman, January 30, 2009).  The innovation of using a local hotline as the preferred point of contact 
for all foreclosure prevention counseling had several benefits:  the use of a trusted local hotline 
encouraged borrowers to make contact; the single point and simple phone number was easy to 
effectively advertise, increasing the likelihood of reaching borrowers in need; 211 staff as referral 
specialists are able to direct borrowers to additional governmental, social, and health resources as 
appropriate; and the centralized contact point allows 211 staff to direct borrowers to the most 
appropriate counseling agency and adjust their referrals according to agency capacity (Weinstein et 
al., 2006; Wertheim, May 4, 2011; Wiseman, September 17, 2007).  Stephen Wertheim, the Director 
of 211 First Call for Help, added that 211 often serves as a “canary in the mine” with respect to social 
problems, as a spike in calls and requests for particular services or concerning new problems will reflect 
new issues before other organizations have them on their radar (Wertheim, May 4, 2011). 
The program’s first director, Mark Wiseman, also considered a major strength of the program and 
reason for its success to be the fact that the CCFPP, rather than being “merely [a] funding stream . . . 
work[ed] constantly with the non-profit counseling partners to provide them with training and daily 
assistance” (Wiseman, January 30, 2009, p.10). 
Like the effort to speed up the foreclosure process, the CCFPP had monthly meetings convened by the 
CCFPP Director, Mark Wiseman (and later Paul Bellamy), with representatives from the non-profits and 
211 First Call for Help to monitor progress and issues, share lender contacts and best practices, 
coordinate data collection, identify gaps and overlaps in service, and better coordinate efforts 
(Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Weinstein et al., 2006; M. Williams, 2013).  In some cases, specific 
agencies had access to funds (CHN, NHS) or agreements with lenders and servicers (ESOP) that 
facilitated their working with certain types of borrowers.  Via the monthly meetings, these advantages 
became clear and both 211 and the agencies themselves were able to (re-)direct borrowers to these 
agencies when appropriate (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  As of the first year progress assessment, the 
objectives of the CCFPP were the following: 
1. Educate homeowners before they enter into inappropriate refinancing loans. 
2. Engage delinquent mortgage borrowers early so that they never reach foreclosure.  
3. Counsel homebuyers before and after their purchase to avoid predatory loans. 
4. Negotiate workout agreements on behalf of delinquent borrowers to save homes. 
5. Intervene with civic and criminal legal action against predatory lenders. 
6. Advocate for legislative reform to discourage inappropriate home lending (Weinstein et al., 
2006, p.15). 
Referring to the program objectives as of year one, it is clear that the CCFPP was meant to “be a 
program of early intervention and prevention,” as reflected in objectives 1 through 3, while objective 
4 deals with crisis intervention (Weinstein et al., 2006, p.21).  In fact, it was anticipated that 60% of 
clients would need early intervention and prevention, in the form of education and pre-purchase 
counseling, with the remaining 40% needing crisis intervention to deal with a current or impending 
foreclosure action.  However, over the course of the first year of the program, 90% of clients needed 
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crisis intervention and it was necessary to adjust the CCFPP objectives and resources accordingly 
(Weinstein et al., 2006). 
For example, for Program Year 1, nine non-profits were funded, seven that provided counseling and 
two that provided legal services. As the program developed, it became clear that those agencies 
specializing in pre-purchase counseling and homebuyer education were offering services that few of 
the program’s clients needed.  As a result, from Program Year 2 on, only 5 non-profits were funded, 
four that provided foreclosure prevention counseling and one legal services non-profit (Hexter & 
Schnoke, 2009; Weinstein et al., 2006).  The change in program orientation is also reflected in the 
modification and reduction in program objectives by the end of Program Year 3 (February 2009), all of 
which address crisis intervention: 
1. Counsel homebuyers to prevent foreclosure. 
2. Negotiate workout agreements on behalf of delinquent borrowers to save homes. 
3. Administer rescue loans to provide one-time assistance to homeowners who have difficulty 
paying their mortgages (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009, p.4). 
Program Tools 
The main tools of the CCFPP were foreclosure prevention counseling, marketing and public awareness 
campaigns, and rescue loans.  In many cases, those using foreclosure prevention counseling also took 
advantage of Cuyahoga County’s foreclosure mediation program, though this will be discussed later, 
in Section 5.2.3.  
CCFPP is most known for foreclosure prevention counseling.  The general concept and some 
advantages of foreclosure prevention counseling were introduced and discussed in Section 2.4.3.  
Counselors and others involved in the program in Cuyahoga County listed a variety of benefits of 
foreclosure prevention counseling.  A main benefit is the expertise of the counselors.  They have gone 
through the process many times, know the industry vernacular, and have contacts with various lenders 
and servicers, all of which individual homeowners generally don’t have (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; 
Carden, April 26, 2011; Harris, April 27, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011; Tisler, May 3, 2011; Wiseman, May 
10, 2011).  In addition, the experience of foreclosure prevention counselors means that they generally 
have more reasonable expectations of the process and more patience with it than a typical homeowner 
(Tisler, May 3, 2011).   
Others cited the financial efficiency of foreclosure prevention counseling and the value of face-to-face, 
as opposed to telephone, counseling (Rokakis, May 4, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011).  The cost of 
foreclosure prevention counseling, at approximately $200 per client, is much less than any post-
foreclosure intervention (Seifert, February 2, 2010).  Face-to-face counseling also means that 
counselors are local, and know the various neighborhoods and other aspects of the city, which allows 
them a better grasp of individual situations and possibilities.  For example, in certain highly affected 
neighborhoods, servicers were sometimes accepting short pays and writing off the loan after receiving 
a modest lump sum.  A local counselor may be aware of this and recognize an opportunity, while a 
non-local counselor would be much less likely to have the necessary background knowledge (Rokakis, 
May 4, 2011). 
Foreclosure prevention counseling has several advantages for homeowners.  Several respondents cited 
counseling as giving hope to discouraged and frustrated homeowners.  Moreover, for the first time in 
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their foreclosure experience, having the assistance of a foreclosure prevention counselor makes 
homeowners feel they have an ally, someone “in their corner” (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Harris, April 
27, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011; Tisler, May 3, 2011).  Foreclosure prevention counselors are also able to 
help homeowners navigate the process and understand what is happening with their mortgage (Tisler, 
May 3, 2011).  Counselors have access to rescue funds that homeowners cannot acquire on their own 
(Harris, April 27, 2011) and awareness of programs that may save them money, such as veterans’ 
benefits and food assistance, and thus increase their mortgage budget (Anonymous, May 18, 2011). 
Finally, foreclosure prevention counseling offers advantages to lenders and servicers as well.  Scott 
Rose of ESOP stated that in some ways counselors act as a “satellite office” for servicers by explaining 
the process to homeowners, gathering documents, and contacting the servicer (2011).  Mahria Harris, 
a foreclosure prevention counselor at NHS, said that in her experience a counselor can find a “win-
win” solution where both the servicer and borrower benefit, that may not have been found otherwise 
(2011).  James Sassano, a foreclosure attorney, considers the assistance of a counselor for the 
homeowner to be beneficial: 
For the most part these counselors know what they’re doing.  And they can get us the 
documents quicker . . . and they’re more organized.  Because they’ve been through this, they 
know, they will pester the borrowers and get the stuff so that when we get it, it’s all ready to 
go.  So in that respect I do like having the counselors involved.  My experience has been that 
with most of the counselors including here in Cuyahoga County is that they’re realists.  They 
know.  When they see something that going to work, they know it.  And when something’s  . . 
. they’re not painting rosy pictures for people (2011). 
However, foreclosure prevention counseling has limitations.  Chief among these are the counselor’s 
inability to compel any action from servicers.  Just as individual homeowners encountered non-
responsive servicers, lost paperwork, and non-applied payments, counselors faced frustrating 
difficulties with servicers as well (Rokakis, May 4, 2011).139  Several interviewees expressed displeasure 
and frustration with the quality and type of modifications offered by servicers, noting that they 
generally added missed payments and fees to the loan principal and extended the term rather than 
engaging in principal reduction, which would address the underlying valuation problem (Anonymous, 
May 18, 2011; Ford, May 5, 2011).  Others reported borrowers being stuck in “no man’s land,” where 
the borrower had defaulted on the mortgage some time ago but no action was brought by the servicer.  
In these cases borrowers were hesitant to engage in counseling or any other attempt to rectify the 
situation, as the outcome could be worse than their current insecure situation.  In fact, in many of 
these cases the loan had been in default for so long that there was no longer any option other than 
foreclosure (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Bellamy, October 16, 2012).  Frank Ford (2011) also noted that 
sometimes the homeowner’s problem would change.  For example, the interest rate on an ARM would 
reset, with the result that the homeowner defaulted and then received a modification as the result of 
counseling.  However, afterward the homeowner would lose his or her job due to the economy, making 
even the modified loan unaffordable.  Alternatively, perhaps the homeowner would later decide to 
walk away in response to dropping house prices and being underwater on the loan, despite having an 
affordable payment on the modified loan. 
                                                          
139 It should be noted that several respondents, particularly those involved with foreclosure prevention 
counseling, commented that local banks were more cooperative and amenable to finding a mutually satisfactory 
solution than national lenders and servicers. 
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Lenders and servicers tended to offer borrowers modifications that included a change in interest rate 
and an extension of the loan term, with arrearages added to the principal.  Principal reduction, or 
writedowns, would improve the alignment of the property’s valuation and the mortgage value, but 
lenders and servicers rarely offered this, citing moral hazard, i.e. the inducement of other borrowers 
to stop paying their mortgages in order to obtain a principal reduction through a modification 
(Anonymous, May 17, 2011; Anonymous, May 18, 2011).  The unwillingness of lenders and servicers 
to reduce mortgage principal led many to feel that modifications were in many cases buying time but 
not actually improving borrowers’ situations (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Bellamy, October 16, 2012; 
Harris, April 27, 2011; Rokakis, May 4, 2011). 
The County Courts also began a foreclosure mediation program in May 2008 that gave borrowers the 
option of engaging in mediation with their lender or servicer and a court-appointed mediator prior to 
the foreclosure hearing, in the hopes of working out an alternative resolution.  In many cases, those 
homeowners utilizing foreclosure prevention counseling also went through the court mediation 
program, with the two programs working in a complimentary fashion.  One year into the mediation 
program, counselors and others intimate with foreclosure issues reported the program as a valuable 
tool in fighting the foreclosure problem (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). The specifics of Cuyahoga County’s 
foreclosure mediation program are discussed in Section 5.2.3. 
From the onset, advertising to generate public awareness and to reach at-risk homeowners was a key 
objective of the CCFPP.  The county first advertised the program’s services using Freddie Mac’s “Don’t 
Borrow Trouble” campaign, which included newspaper, radio, and television spots; posters on busses; 
and a variety of low cost branded paraphernalia, such as fans, doorhangers, buttons, and magnets 
(Weinstein et al., 2006).  The county also mailed approximately 30,000 bright yellow postcards to 
households in foreclosure alerting them to the availability of foreclosure prevention services.  The use 
of postcards was a strategic decision, as it is not unusual for households in foreclosure to stop opening 
their mail, not wishing to be reminded of their situation by any additional bills or foreclosure 
information.  Postcards were thus much more likely to reach their target audience, as the message is 
visible from the outside and the color attracts attention (Wiseman, September 17, 2007).  As well, the 
postcards and other marketing materials designed by the CCFPP staff contained the county logo or 
other government identification to reassure borrowers they were not being scammed (Wiseman, 
September 17, 2007).  The county also distributed marketing materials to populations more likely to 
face foreclosure due to financial distress, such as mailings to the former employees of a closing 
supermarket chain, pamphlets distributed in domestic relations (divorce) court, and billboards in high 
foreclosure risk neighborhoods (Weinstein et al., 2006; Wiseman, September 17, 2007).  In 2008, the 
CCFPP developed a mailer containing information on foreclosure resources with the Ohio Tax 
Commissioner that was sent out with tax bill to over 40,000 homeowners (Wiseman, January 30, 2009).  
The CCFPP also developed a website to inform visitors about the foreclosure process, answer 
frequently asked questions, and provide sample forms.  It also included an “Ask the Expert” feature, 
where visitors could anonymously email the director and receive answers from an attorney without 
needing an in-person appointment.  The website reported 44,891 unique visitors in 2008 (Wiseman, 
January 30, 2009). 
The CCFPP’s marketing and advertising efforts were generally successful, as evidenced by spikes in 
referrals and intakes shortly after the initiation of the campaigns (Weinstein et al., 2006).  In fact, a 
major concern at the start of the program was not to “over-advertise” and exceed the program’s 
capacity to provide services (Weinstein et al., 2006).  In August 2007, several local news channels 
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reported on the program and the result was that calls to 211 more than quadrupled over normal levels 
during that month, but dropped back to normal in September (Wiseman, January 30, 2009). 
Another necessary change in the program’s orientation, and particularly in marketing efforts, was to 
address foreclosure rescue scams.  Around mid-2008, subprime lending more or less disappeared as a 
problem for Cuyahoga County residents, while foreclosure rescue scams took their place.  Foreclosure 
rescue scams operate by contacting borrowers in distress, offering them assistance working out their 
loan, and requiring an upfront fee to do so, usually ranging from $500 to $1500.  Susceptible borrowers 
often invest their last available money in this hope, and then never hear back from the “rescuers” 
(Wiseman, January 30, 2009). Those involved in foreclosure prevention in Cuyahoga County also 
noticed several organizations offering services similar to those the CCFPP offers, but without the local 
connections and/or face-to-face counseling.  While careful not to call these services scams, 
interviewees considered these services to be inferior to CCFPP counseling, given that none had both a 
local trusted central point of contact like 211 and free, face-to-face counseling. Some felt these 
programs stirred up false hope in distressed borrowers and sometimes did more harm than good 
(Carden, April 26, 2011). 
As a result, the CCFPP increased its branding efforts to for CCFPP in the program’s third year.  The 
website was updated to include information on types of rescue scams, a rescue scam brochure was 
created, and the postcards mailed to homeowners in foreclosure was redesigned to include 
information on rescue scams (Wiseman, January 30, 2009). Mark Wiseman wrote in his 2009 report of 
the need to differentiate CCFPP from other, similar programs, given the similarities in their messages 
but differences in results.  Thus it was necessary to clearly distinguish CCFPP, using the 211 brand, from 
other programs in order to maintain CCFPP’s image as a trusted resource for borrowers in need. 
CCFPP also engaged in a variety of outreach activities.  These events included speaking at forums and 
conferences to explain the CCFPP and help other areas develop similar programs, providing predatory 
lending and foreclosure prevention counseling training, and congressional testimony (Wiseman, 
September 17, 2007).  On the community level, the CCFPP held foreclosure prevention outreach events 
to inform borrowers of available services and resources.  In 2008, the CCFPP held or participated in 
more than 85 outreach events, reaching over 1,600 county residents (Wiseman, January 30, 2009).  In 
2009, CCFPP partnered with Case Western Reserve’s NEO CANDO and Neighborhood Progress, Inc. 
(NPI) to reach homeowners with ARMs scheduled to reset.  The County Treasurer’s office sent letters 
to 30,500 at-risk homeowners urging them to attend a nearby foreclosure prevention workshop, 
where counselors would be present to assist homeowners.  Between March and June 2009, CCFPP 
held 17 workshops with a total attendance of 535 people.  An additional 271 residents called for 
information as a result of receiving the workshop letters (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
Rescue funds were another important tool used by the CCFPP.  These funds were available as small 
grants or loans up to $3,000 to distressed borrowers who needed financial assistance to become 
current on their mortgage to avoid foreclosure.  CCFPP also required that the loans be sustainable, 
meaning that the borrower must be able to afford the monthly payments and the interest rate must 
be fixed.  These loans were structured as “silent second” mortgages that required no payments and 
accrued no interest, unless the property was sold or the mortgage refinanced.  Thus, homeowners 
received financial help without increasing their monthly payment, while the county retains the ability 
to warn the homeowner if they are about to enter an inadvisable loan (Wiseman, January 30, 2009).  
Mark Wiseman, former director of the CCFPP, wrote in both his 2007 and 2009 annual reports that 
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rescue funds have been the program’s must successful initiative (Wiseman, January 30, 2009; 
Wiseman, September 17, 2007).  These funds helped the program succeed in two ways.  First, as of 
January 2009, 378 Cuyahoga County homeowners had received rescue loans totaling $948,000, for 
which over $5.4 million in loan concessions (reduced principal, reduced interest rates, waived fees, 
etc.) were given by lenders and servicers, which works out to a leverage factor of approximately 5.7 
per rescue fund dollar invested by the county (Wiseman, January 30, 2009).  Second, the availability of 
rescue funds served as a strong attractor to the program’s services for distressed county borrowers.  
Counseling agencies reported that the availability of rescue funds motivated borrowers to seek help, 
often earlier in their delinquencies than before the rescue funds were available.  Though not all of 
these borrowers ultimately received rescue loans, the availability of financial assistance encouraged 
many borrowers to make contact with 211 or a counseling agency (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  Similarly, 
despite having lackluster performance, federal foreclosure responses had some positive effect, as 
troubled borrowers would approach counseling agencies hoping for help from one of these programs.  
Though many did not qualify, hearing about these programs got them in the door and allowed 
counselors to assist some borrowers who otherwise would not have participated in foreclosure 
prevention counseling (Tisler, May 3, 2011). 
Another way to examine the impact of rescue loans is to identify what percentage of distressed 
homeowners they assisted, what percentage of those initiating counseling were assisted, and what 
percentage of those who completed foreclosure counseling were assisted specifically by rescue loans.  
In 2009, rescue funds were used in approximately 3% of all instances of foreclosure filings, 
approximately 12% of foreclosure counseling intakes, and approximately 29% of all completed 
foreclosure counseling cases (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  The availability of these funds brought many 
people in the door to consider counseling; the funds themselves were applied to the loans of a large 
proportion of those seeking assistance. 
Counseling Agencies 
Mark Wiseman, former director of the CCFPP, noted the various strengths of the counseling agencies 
participating in the program.  Some performed better with respect to counseling itself, others were 
more reliable with respect to paperwork, and each had specialization with various parts of the county, 
various types of borrowers, and various lenders (Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  As the program developed 
and the agencies became more comfortable working with one another and aware of one another’s 
strengths and resources, the agencies themselves, as well as 211 operators, began directing clients to 
other counseling agencies when they felt it would be a better fit or that there was a better likelihood 
of success in saving the house (Rose, May 6, 2011; Wertheim, May 4, 2011).  One interviewee reported 
that borrowers sometimes “shopped around” until they found a counselor or counseling agency that 
fit their needs or preferences (Rudyk, May 2, 2011). 
The four counseling agencies fall into two clear categories, both in their programmatic offerings and 
their underlying philosophies.  The first category is comprised of CHN, CHS, and NHS, while the second 
category contains ESOP.  These two categories have core missions of affordable housing and 
community organizing, respectively.  Having both types of organizations offering counseling proved to 
be an asset to the CCFPP, as mentioned above.  
In addition to offering foreclosure prevention counseling, all four of the counseling agencies existed 
prior to the foreclosure crisis and began with a mission other than counseling.  The organizations 
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continued with their original missions, but in some cases shifted significantly to foreclosure prevention 
counseling due to the high level of demand for these services.  
CHN, CHS, and NHS are traditional affordable housing organizations.  That means their operations 
revolved around increasing low to moderate income homeownership, with a focus on pre-purchase 
counseling, purchase programs, and affordable housing construction.   They also offer a variety of 
related programs, including tool loan, home maintenance and repair, and energy conservation and 
weatherization programs.  CHN in particular offers additional services likely in demand from low and 
moderate income households, such as computer training, personal finance management, GED 
preparation courses,140 utility payment assistance, and tax preparation assistance (Community 
Housing Network, 2013; Community Housing Solutions, 2013; Neighborhood Housing Services, 2012).  
With the advent of the foreclosure crisis and the housing market crash, these organizations, along with 
CDCs, have significantly scaled back or halted their home construction efforts (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Those involved with counseling at the above organizations explained that they viewed their counseling 
role as part of a holistic process, where the objective was not only to help borrowers with their 
mortgage but also to assist them in other areas by accessing appropriate supplemental services and 
programs (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Tisler, May 3, 2011).  A good example of this is the Family 
Stability Initiative Program offered by CHS.  The goal of this program is to keep families stable while 
dealing with foreclosure-related housing issues and to help them get through a rough patch while 
increasing their self-sufficiency.  For example, a major objective is to prevent children from having to 
change schools if the family loses their house, as this type of upheaval is known to be particularly 
stressful for children.  Program participants are assigned a Case Management Specialist, who is a 
licensed social worker, and additional services that deal with saving money, mental health, 
occupational training, and other barriers families may be facing are accessed as needed (Community 
Housing Solutions, 2013).   
ESOP, on the other hand, has its roots as an advocacy and community organizing agency.  This is 
evidenced by the other efforts advertised on its website—these are referred to as campaigns, not 
programs.  For example, in 2013 these included a mortgage principal reduction campaign, the support 
of specific government nominees, such as Melvin Watt for the Federal Housing Finance Agency and 
Rob Cordray for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and continuing campaigns for foreclosure 
reform (ESOP, 2013).  
Rather than focusing on clients’ financial situations and other available services, ESOP’s focus is on 
individual empowerment (Rose, May 6, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).  At ESOP, it is hoped that in addition 
to helping homeowners, community leaders can be identified through the counseling process and 
brought into community organizing.  This is facilitated through the counseling intake session, where 
the history of ESOP and its organizing are shared with homeowners seeking counseling.  ESOP’s goal is 
to empower people and to change their perceptions.  At counseling intake sessions, they work to dispel 
common perceptions of the causes of foreclosure: 
You’re taught that if you’re in foreclosure, it’s because you’re stupid.  Or you’re uneducated.  
Or you’ve made a mistake.  Or you’ve done something wrong. Well that’s not true. And so we 
                                                          
140 The GED, or General Educational Development tests, are  a set of five subject area tests, which, when passed, 
certify that the test-taker has a credential equivalent to a U.S. high school diploma, thus opening additional 
employment and further education opportunities. 
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disrupt that power balance, we disrupt the way things are, by engaging with residents, by 
telling them, that you’re not the one who did anything wrong, and by telling them the ESOP 
story, that you’re in this with the eight other people in this room.  Whether you’re from the 
suburbs, whether you’re from the country, or whether you’re from the inner city of Cleveland. 
We’re all in this together (Rudyk, May 2, 2011).   
In interviews homeowners that worked with ESOP—originally for help with their mortgages, later as 
community organizers—spoke very highly of their experiences with the organization (Anderson, May 
9, 2011; Gardner, May 11, 2011).  “It was such a great experience [being able to get my house back 
through working with ESOP] . . . then I started looking around my community and I realized it wasn’t 
just me . . . ESOP [gave] me a platform to talk and help other people” (Gardner, May 11, 2011). 
Employees of ESOP also described the organization’s culture as a ‘tough love’ approach where a 
particularly active role on the part of the homeowner is required.  They noted that this approach is not 
for everyone, and some homeowners prefer the style of other agencies offering counseling services 
(Gardner, May 11, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011). Nor do they expect all homeowners 
utilizing counseling services to become involved in community organizing.  Jim Rudyk (2011), one of 
ESOP’s community organizers, stated that one in five would be a good proportion, but the key factor 
is the depth of involvement an individual brings. 
ESOP noticed the foreclosure problem well before others, beginning in 1999, and was one of the only 
groups attempting to bring attention to the problem for many years.  It began when Barbara Anderson, 
a long-time resident of Slavic Village, had problems with her mortgage loan as a result of repeated 
racially-motivated arson on the property.  Eventually, she was unable to obtain fire insurance with a 
traditional loan, and ended up with a predatory lender.  As the loan became less and less affordable, 
she searched for an organization that could help her improve her situation.  When she arrived at ESOP, 
predatory lending and foreclosures were not yet on the organization’s radar.  Despite this, Anderson 
became involved with ESOP’s efforts, which focused on the Community Reinvestment Act141 at the 
time.  ESOP noticed fewer people were showing up to meetings, and eventually realized this was due 
to people being evicted from their homes as the result of foreclosure (Anderson, May 9, 2011).   
Charter One Bank, whom ESOP was working with on CRA efforts, offered ESOP a spot on a radio show 
early one Sunday morning.  Barbara Anderson and Inez Killingsworth, the founder and former 
president of ESOP, took the opportunity to talk about predatory lending.  Anderson mentioned 
FairBanks, the national servicer servicing her loan, and one known for abusive tactics, such as 
employees coming to delinquent borrowers’ homes wearing jackets printed with “FBI”—causing many 
homeowners to believe the Federal Bureau of Investigation was evicting them from their houses, 
though the servicer said the letters FBI were meant to stand for FairBanks, Inc., the name of the 
company (Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  Calls poured in with residents sharing similar stories and 
experiences.  From there the effort gained momentum and ESOP began focusing efforts on predatory 
lending and foreclosures (Anderson, May 9, 2011). 
                                                          
141 The Community Reinvestment Act, or CRA, is a federal law that requires banks to meet the banking needs of 
all residents of the communities they operate in.  It is required that banks lend in a non-discriminatory manner, 
particularly to low-income individuals and businesses.  The law is response to the practice of “redlining” or 
classifying certain areas—historically this has been black neighborhoods—as ineligible for loans. 
 249 
 
Despite ESOP’s attention to predatory lending and foreclosures, awareness of these problems in 
Cuyahoga County remained limited to fair housing- and civil rights-type organizations, with CDCs and 
local government unaware of the problem or its scope (Ford, May 5, 2011). This began to change as 
the foreclosure problem grew, particularly as its impacts expanded beyond poor black neighborhoods 
of inner city Cleveland (Ford, May 5, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).  Representatives from ESOP attended 
various meetings, including the original CCFI meeting, in an effort to draw attention to the human side 
of the foreclosure problem in addition to the problems facing the courts and municipalities (Ford, May 
5, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).   
Key components of ESOP’s stance are mutual responsibility and righteous anger when these 
responsibilities are not met.  The organization works to convey that CEOs of financial institutions are 
no different than anyone else.  Jim Rudyk described it as such:   
And that’s what it’s about, it’s about letting them know . . . that banks have a responsibility to 
be in our community to give loans, not to foreclose on people. That we gave them billions of 
dollars in bailout money and they continue to take our homes . . . I also believe that we have 
to hold these banks accountable for what they’ve done.  They’re making billions of dollars on 
the backs of poor people, of minorities, of the elderly.  And so that I think is what ESOP’s about, 
it’s about power in numbers, and it’s about the fact that we can create with numbers, with 
people, with enough power, with enough signs and protesting, we can create change, we can 
change the way the banks do business (Rudyk, May 2, 2011). 
To enact this, ESOP sought to make Best Practices agreements with banks and servicers.  These 
agreements are both formal and informal, depending on the servicer, and in them banks and servicers 
agree to practices such as maximum interest rates for loans, not to use forced placed insurance,142 the 
naming of a single point of contact for ESOP foreclosure prevention counselors, the establishment of 
maximum turnaround times and escalation procedures, and co-branded outreach efforts (Anderson, 
May 9, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011). ESOP began pushing banks and servicers to send 
representatives to meet with homeowners to hear their stories, and to be presented with lists of 
demands.  In many cases, financial institutions resisted meeting ESOP.  This led ESOP to begin 
campaigns to pressure these lenders to the table.  They used organizing tactics to deliver “hits,” where 
busses carrying homeowners would show up at the home of a CEO and toss 2.5” plastic sharks143 on 
the lawn and house, or a billboard would be purchased that displayed an executive officer’s cell phone 
number (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).   
Of course we went wherever they were, we did our shark thing, we sat, we marched, we 
screamed, we hollered, we sent letters, we did whatever we had to do to force people to the 
boardroom.  Because we felt once we could get them into the boardroom and lay out exactly 
what was happening that perhaps we would be able to work out some kind of agreements 
(Anderson, May 9, 2011).   
                                                          
142 Forced placed insurance is the term for when the lienholder (mortgagee) purchases insurance for the property 
that will cover any lapse in the insurance purchased by the borrower.  Though the mortgagee purchases the 
insurance, the cost is immediately added to the lien (mortgage balance), and is thus ultimately paid by the 
borrower.  This practice has been frequently and easily abused by lenders; for this reason the Dodd-Frank Act 
(see Section 1.1.4) has placed restrictions on the use of forced place insurance. 
143 The sharks represented loan sharks, meaning individuals and organizations that lend at extremely high interest 
rates or engage in predatory lending. 
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These hits are meant to draw media attention, and thus increase public awareness and pressure.  ESOP 
also used such tactics in a campaign against a foreclosure rescue scam operation (Rose, May 6, 2011). 
The campaigns and hits proved effective.  ESOP has made fair lending agreements with over thirty 
lenders and servicers as of 2008 (Weinstein, Hexter, & Schnoke, 2008).  Quarterly or biannual meetings 
take place in which the agreements are reviewed and issues are discussed.  According to Community 
Organizer Jim Rudyk (2011), ESOP does not have significant problems with financial organizations not 
holding up their end of the agreement.  It has also become much easier to bring companies to the 
table, both due to ESOP’s reputation and the increased impacts of the foreclosure crisis, which have 
changed lender and servicer expectations with respect to loss mitigation (Rose, May 6, 2011; Rudyk, 
May 2, 2011).  For example, in 2007, Ocwen sent ESOP a list of borrowers with mortgages set to reset 
within the next year so that ESOP could contact these homeowners before their interest rates 
increased and assist them in securing workouts, if desired (McQuarrie, 2010).  In fact, at one point 
ESOP’s foreclosure prevention counseling workout rate was 76.5%, while the other three organizations 
had workout rates of 18% or below (Weinstein et al., 2008).  With time and experience, ESOP changed 
the name of the agreements from Best Practices to Proven Practices, because “it was proven by that 
time that you can still make money and still be decent” (Anderson, May 9, 2011). 
ESOP is also the only one of the four counseling agencies to be involved in an effort involving post-
foreclosure mitigation, namely the Strategic Investment Initiative (SII).  ESOP’s role in the SII was to go 
door-to-door to borrowers in trouble or at risk in selected neighborhoods, often alongside a local CDC 
representative (Ford, May 5, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).  Given ESOP’s core mission of community 
organizing and the core mission of affordable housing for the other three agencies, ESOP is clearly the 
most likely to be involved in such an activity.  “Doorknocking” involves face-to-face communication 
and outreach and thus fits in well with ESOP’s community-oriented approach.  ESOP also sees it as a 
way to increase name recognition and credibility in neighborhoods where they are not yet well known 
(Rudyk, May 2, 2011). The SII is described and discussed below in Section 5.3. 
A Changing Environment 
Throughout the program’s existence, the foreclosure environment was changing.  This meant that 
what worked previously or currently would not necessarily continue to work.  For example, as time 
went on foreclosures spread from the City of Cleveland out to the inner suburbs. This changed the 
effectiveness of many parts of the program.  For example, the 211 number was one that many inner 
city residents were aware of and comfortable using.  Suburban residents, on the other hand, often had 
no experience with 211 and thus did not have a baseline level of trust and comfort in calling the 
number (Tisler, May 3, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Another interviewee noted that suburban 
homeowners were more demanding of counselors and more anxious. He also noted that borrowers 
who had “thrown the white flag up” and no longer felt ashamed of their situation were easier to help; 
those who hadn’t often found the process invasive (Anonymous, May 18, 2011). 
Over the first three years of the program, the percentage of clients who lived in the City of Cleveland 
decreased, from 63% in Program Year 1 to 50% in Program Year 3 (see Table 5.1).  Over this time the 
proportions from the inner and outer suburbs increased, from 33% to 43% and 4% to 8%, respectively 
(Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  This tracks with the spread of the foreclosure problem through the county.   
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Table 5.1:  Locational Characteristics of Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Clients, PY1 - PY3  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.15) 
 PY1 PY2 PY3 
Cleveland 63% 54% 50% 
Inner Suburbs 33% 39% 43% 
Outer Suburbs 4% 7% 8% 
 
This change is also reflected in the data collected by 211, in this case the cities of callers.  The City of 
Cleveland had the largest share each year, varying from a high of 55% in 2006 to a low of 48% in 
2008.144  The top five zipcodes for callers in the City of Cleveland in 2010 were all located on the east 
side of the city.  In 2009 and 2010, approximately 10% of callers lived in the outer suburbs, while 
approximately 40% lived in the inner suburbs (211 First Call for Help, 2011).  The inner suburbs with 
the highest percentages of calls were Euclid, Maple Heights, Cleveland Heights, East Cleveland, Garfield 
Heights, and Parma, all of which, with the exception of Parma, are located on the east side of the 
county.  Calls from each of these cities contributed between four and six percent of total calls to 211 
each year (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
Comparing the incidence of foreclosures with the incidence of calls to counseling agencies by 
municipality in Program Year 3, it is seen that cities with higher foreclosure rates provide a mildly 
disproportionate number of foreclosure prevention clients, as shown in Table 5.2.  On average, the 
ten cities with the highest foreclosure filings make up 77% of total filings, but 83% of counseling 
clients.  Moreover, in these ten cities the ratio of counseling clients to foreclosure filings is 14%, 
while in the remaining Cuyahoga County cities this ratio is 10%.  Garfield Heights has the highest 
ratio, with 18% counseled, while eight of the ten cities have a ratio of 13% or larger (Hexter & 
Schnoke, 2009).  This may reflect targeted advertising of the program and/or word-of-mouth 
recommendations within community and neighborhood networks. 
Figure 5.1 shows another way to measure the intensity of foreclosure counseling between 2006 and 
2010, the ratio of counseling instances to the number of housing units in the tract.  Note that an 
approximately 1 in 3 sample of the full sample of counseling instances was used for this research (see 
Appendix B:  Variable Definitions for more information).  Thus the rates shown in the map below are 
roughly one-third the actual rate.  One can quickly see the higher levels of counseling intensity coincide 
with higher levels of foreclosures (see Figure 4.10, Section 4.2.1)—the east side of Cleveland, eastern 
inner suburbs, and to a lesser extent the west side of Cleveland.   
 
  
                                                          
144 The values in this and the previous paragraph vary due to the difference in sources:  the values in the first 
paragraph refer to the clients served by the counseling agencies, while those in the second refer to those who 
called 211 seeking a referral to a counseling agency.  These values differ because (1) not all counseling clients 
arrived at foreclosure prevention counseling via a referral from 211, and (2) not all callers that receive counseling 
referrals from 211 follow through with foreclosure prevention counseling. 
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Table 5.2:  Agency Clients as Percentage of Foreclosure Filings (PY3)145   
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.21) 
City Foreclosure 
Filings - 
Percent 
Agency 
Clients - 
Percent 
Agency Clients as 
Percentage of 
Adjusted 
Foreclosures 
Cleveland 46% 49% 13% 
Euclid 6% 8% 17% 
Maple Heights 5% 6% 17% 
Cleveland Heights 4% 4% 13% 
East Cleveland 3% 3% 13% 
Parma 4% 3% 9% 
Garfield Heights 3% 5% 18% 
Lakewood 2% 1% 8% 
South Euclid 3% 3% 15% 
Shaker Heights 2% 2% 14% 
Total (Top 10 Cities)  77% 83% 14% 
Total (Other Cities) 23% 17% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 13% 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Rates by Tract, 2006 - 2010 
                                                          
145 Please note that this table uses adjusted foreclosure filings based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland.  The values are adjusted to 79% of the total number of foreclosure filings, which reflects the fact that 
nationally 79% of residential foreclosure filings are on owner-occupied units.  This choice was likely made in 
(Hexter & Schnoke, 2009) due to the fact that the CCFPP is open only to owner-occupants. 
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As foreclosures spread beyond Cleveland, the CCFPP stepped up their 211 marketing campaign and 
began offering outreach events in areas with increasing numbers of foreclosures.  CCFPP also began 
opening counseling offices in suburban locations to serve suburban homeowners (Hexter & Schnoke, 
2009).  In addition to offering events and services to homeowners in trouble, the CCFPP and 
municipalities had to carefully consider how homeowners were contacted.  South Euclid Mayor 
Georgine Welo observed that residents from her community were attending foreclosure prevention 
outreach events in nearby communities rather than those offered in South Euclid itself.  She explained 
that among middle class suburbanites, there was a strong sense of shame surrounding needing 
assistance, and South Euclid residents went to other communities to obtain information without being 
recognized by their neighbors.  As a result, the CCFPP began putting the dates and locations of nearby 
foreclosure prevention outreach events in addition to information on the local event on flyers, making 
it easier for residents to find an event in another community to attend (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; 
Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Outreach events were also held in “neutral” locations such as at the 
municipal office, where residents could be visiting to pay a parking ticket or take out a permit as well 
as attending a foreclosure outreach event, meaning the likelihood that neighbors and friends 
determining that their mortgage was in trouble was greatly reduced (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  
South Euclid also carefully considered the wording on letters sent to homeowners at risk, using 
addressing the letters to “Dear Valued South Euclid Resident” rather than to individual homeowners.  
This was done to reduce the invasiveness of the letter, giving the homeowner the impression that the 
letter about foreclosure resources was generic rather than targeted—“I think the way we approached 
it, in a way that left you with dignity, was so important and in doing that I think we’ve saved more 
homes—we probably could have lost a whole another round of them [otherwise]” (Welo & Martin, 
May 12, 2011).   
As the location of foreclosures changed, so did the economic and demographic characteristics of 
homeowners in default who sought assistance from foreclosure prevention counseling.  During the 
first years of the foreclosure problem, African Americans (and to a lesser extent Hispanics), lower 
income households, and the elderly comprised the majority of those facing foreclosure and those 
seeking assistance.  Over time, the balance shifted and increased numbers of white homeowners and 
those living in more affluent areas faced foreclosure and sought assistance (see Table 5.3 and recall 
Table 5.1 indicating increased suburban representation in the client mix).  This tracks with the change 
in the location of foreclosures, described in the previous paragraph and Section 4.2.1, as well as with 
the changes observed in the cause of the foreclosures.   
Initially, most foreclosures stemmed from fraudulent, predatory, or simply “bad quality” loans.  Later 
this transitioned to ARMs—as the payment reset many could not manage the higher monthly 
payments.  Then, as the economy worsened, more and more homeowners had difficulty making their 
mortgage payments, on what were generally “good quality” prime loans.  When homeowners ran into 
financial difficulties, such as illness, family issues (such as divorce), or unemployment, it was no longer 
possible to make payments.  While the economy was growing and the housing market was stable or 
appreciating, these homeowners could usually easily sell or refinance.  When the economy weakened, 
these options were no longer available (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Carden, April 26, 2011; Ford, May 
5, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011; Tisler, May 3, 2011; Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  Scott Rose of ESOP 
estimating that early on approximately three-quarters of those seeking counseling had bad quality 
loans; as of 2011 the proportion was switched, with about three-quarters coming in due to economic 
issues (Rose, May 6, 2011).  Lou Tisler of NHS explained that while the modification decision was always 
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a financial question, it was possible to change the terms of poorer quality loans to facilitate a workout, 
but in the case of prime loans this was less often the case (Tisler, May 3, 2011).  Many of these 
defaulted prime loans had been made as the housing market peaked and were now underwater, 
leaving little room for negotiation (Wertheim, May 4, 2011). 
Table 5.3:  Selected Demographic Characteristics of Foreclosure Prevention Counseling Clients, PY1 - PY3  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.14) 
 PY1 PY2 PY3 
White 18% 17% 24% 
Non-Hispanic Black 81% 77% 71% 
Female 68% 66% 67% 
Female Headed Household 66% 65% 39% 
Age > 62   7% 10% 11% 
Income < 50% AMI 32% 41% 45% 
 
These changes are captured by the changing demographic profile of the clients served over the three 
years.  The proportion white increased from 18% to 24%, while the proportion black decreased from 
81% to 71%, likely reflecting the shifting geography of the foreclosure crisis.  No other race had a 
significant number of clients.  Only three to four percent of clients were Hispanic throughout the three 
program years, reflecting that Hispanics make up approximately 5% of the county’s population.  
Throughout the three years, approximately two-thirds of clients were women, and in Program Years 
(PY) 1 and 2 approximately two-thirds of these women were also the head of household, though in 
PY3 this dropped to 39%.   With respect to age, the percentage of counseling clients were over 62 grew 
from 7% to 11% over the three year period.  Finally, the proportion of clients with extremely low 
incomes (below 50% of the AMI146) increased over the three years, from 32% to 45% (Hexter & 
Schnoke, 2009). 
As discussed previously in this section, the CCFPP used 211/First Call for Help as the preferred point of 
contact for homeowners seeking assistance.  Between March 2006 and February 2009, 211 received a 
total of 13,763 calls from county residents for foreclosure assistance.  Year by year, 3,937 calls were 
received in Program Year 1, 5,718 in Program Year 2, and 4,108 in Program Year 3.147  The spike seen 
in Program Year 2 can be mostly attributed to a spike in calls in August 2007.  211 received 
approximately four hundred calls in a typical month during this three year period; in August 2007 it 
received 1,481.  This is due to increased news coverage focusing on additional available rescue funds 
at this time (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009; Wiseman, January 30, 2009). 
                                                          
146 Area median income 
147 Program Year 1 ran March 2006 through February 2007, Program Year 2 from March 2007 through February 
2008, and Program Year 3 from March 2008 through February 2009. 
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Figure 5.2:  Foreclosure Assistance Calls to 211  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.3) 
The type of service referral requested by 211 callers was tracked as well, for the years 2006 through 
2008, as shown in Figure 5.3.  Mortgage foreclosure assistance was the most-requested, with 75% of 
callers seeking this service in 2006, 56% on 2007, and 46% in 2008.  Mortgage payment assistance, 
which only 2% of callers sought in 2006, rose to 25% and 35% of callers in 2007 and 2008, respectively.  
Predatory lending assistance made up a small proportion of requests throughout all three years, but 
dropped from 7% in 2006 to 3% in 2008 (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
 
Figure 5.3:  Service Referral Type Requested by 211 Callers  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.10) 
During Program Year 3, the referral source of foreclosure prevention clients was tracked for the first 
time.  Forty-five percent of counseling clients had been referred by 211, with 28% referred from other 
sources, and 27% for which the referral source was unreported (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  Of those 
who reached foreclosure prevention counseling by way of 211, the percentage of callers who had 
heard about the 211 service via television or radio decreased by nearly two-thirds, from 45% in 2006 
to 17% in 2008.  During the same period both the percentage referred to 211 by friends and family or 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
PY1 PY2 PY3
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
C
al
ls
Program Year
Foreclosure Assistance Calls to 211
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2006 2007 2008
P
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
C
al
le
rs
Year
Service Referral Type Requested by 211 Callers
Mortgage foreclosure assistance Mortgage payment assistance
Predatory lending assistance Utility payment assistance
Other
 256 
 
via a flyer or postcard approximately doubled, from 5% to 10% for a referral from a friend or family, 
and from 8% to 18% via a postcard or flyer—see Figure 5.4 (Wiseman, January 30, 2009). 
 
Figure 5.4:  Sources of Referral to 211  
Source:  Adapted from Wiseman (2009, p.4) 
In the year three program evaluation, several changes in the composition of those seeking help were 
noticed.  Some of these were due to changes in the economy, such as the preponderance of borrowers 
who were “upside down” or owed more on their properties than the properties were worth after the 
housing market had contracted.  Earlier, when most homeowners were seeking counseling due to 
having a predatory loan, it was easier to help save the home.  As the underlying cause of foreclosure 
shifted from predatory lending to the downturn in the housing market and economy, it became much 
more difficult.  Borrowers in trouble owed more than their homes were worth, so a simple interest 
rate adjustment was not the panacea it was for predatory loans (Wertheim, May 4, 2011).  Likewise, 
foreclosure prevention counselors reported that borrowers, in general, were becoming more difficult 
to assist, as many more had lost jobs and had no income with which to support a loan (Anonymous, 
May 18, 2011). 
Examining loan, default, and credit characteristics of borrowers during Program Year 3, 45% of 
counseling clients had fixed rate loans with an interest rate under 8%—i.e. good loans.  People with 
fixed rate loans above 8% and ARMs with interest rates of 8% or higher made up 19% of clients.  This 
reflects that by 2008/9, the foreclosure problem had spread well beyond predatory and other poor 
quality loans.  Table 5.4 supports this:  42% of clients cited a reduction or loss of income as their reason 
for default; other reasons were medical expenses (11%), an increase in expenses (9%), a family death 
(2%), divorce or separation (2%), and business venture failure (2%).  Only 5% cited an increase in loan 
payment, and 6% poor budget management (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
In contrast, clients’ credit scores were skewed low (see Table 5.5).  Combining bad (500-580) and very 
bad (below 500) credit scores, 63% of clients fell into this category in Program Year 3.  Credit score 
data was not available for an additional 23% of clients (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  From the data it is 
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not clear what proportion of these clients had already seen credit score reductions due to mortgage 
default; the profile may have appeared much different prior to mortgage origination, or before going 
into default.  One reason for this is likely financial institutions’ refusal to communicate with borrowers 
prior to default.  
Table 5.4:  Reasons for Mortgage Default (PY3)  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.22) 
Reason for Mortgage Default Percentage of Clients 
Reduction of Income 28% 
Loss of Income 14% 
Other 12% 
Medical Issues 11% 
Increase in Expenses 9% 
Poor Budget Management 6% 
Increase in Loan Payment 5% 
Death of a Family Member 2% 
Divorce/Separation 2% 
Business Venture Failure 2% 
N/A 10% 
 
Table 5.5:  Client Credit Scores at Intake (PY3)  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.23) 
Credit Score at Intake Percentage of Clients 
700 and up (excellent) 2% 
680 – 699 (good) 1% 
620 – 679 (fair) 5% 
580 – 619 (poor) 7% 
500 – 580 (bad) 36% 
Below 500 (very bad) 27% 
None Reported 23% 
 
Those involved in counseling also noticed that the cases they were working on began to stretch out 
over longer periods of time, in part due to applications for programs such as HAMP and Restoring 
Stability, as well as increased processing times as the foreclosure crisis expanded and lenders became 
overwhelmed by the volume of cases.  Mediation was also a frequent factor.  A duration of three to 
six months was common in these cases.  For some, this is beneficial, as it gives the homeowner more 
time to find a solution (such as additional income from a job); for others it is detrimental, as the 
foreclosure cases age to a point where they cannot be rescued, due to the accruement of past due 
payments and late fees (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Bellamy, April 27, 2011). 
Another change that occurred was lenders’ and servicers’ responses to the program.  When the 
program began, lending institution officials reacted negatively to the program and stated it was 
unnecessary (Wiseman, May 10, 2011).  Later lending and servicing institutions became more 
amenable to and comfortable with foreclosure prevention counseling, though this varied significantly 
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by institution.  One interviewee stated that some servicers came to see counseling agencies as 
“satellite offices” because the counselors understood the language and process used by the servicers 
better than borrowers who contacted servicers themselves.  One of the counseling agencies, ESOP, 
was able to make fair lending agreements with a number of servicers, which facilitated loan workouts 
for homeowners with those servicers by setting guidelines for both parties to follow (Rose, May 6, 
2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011).  Several interviewees cited the fact that lenders and servicers were often 
unable to improve their modification responses due to not having the organizational infrastructure to 
undertake loss mitigation efforts (Anonymous, May 17, 2011; Anonymous, May 18, 2011). 
Counselors also noticed that local lenders were in some cases more willing to work with counselors 
and borrowers.  Fifth Third, a bank local to Ohio, was repeatedly praised for its efforts—waiting longer 
to initiate foreclosure proceedings, a general willingness to work with forthcoming clients, and an 
understanding of what foreclosure prevention counselors were trying to achieve (Anonymous, May 
18, 2011; Harris, April 27, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011). 
The decision whether to give a borrower a modification remained throughout a purely financial 
decision to maximize lender revenue.  That is, lenders considered the borrower’s financial situation 
exclusively (Anonymous, May 17, 2011; Sassano, May 12, 2011).  This sometimes resulted in difficulties 
for borrowers who had nontraditional employment arrangements, such as independent contractors, 
who could not document continuing revenue streams although they could potentially make the 
mortgage payment resulting from a modification (Sassano, May 12, 2011).  In some cases this purely 
financial calculation worked in the borrower’s favor in a situation known as a “short pay.”  In particular, 
lenders and servicers were amenable to releasing liens on properties in neighborhoods devastated by 
foreclosure—those that they had classified as non-recoverable, allowing the borrower to own the 
property in full after paying anywhere from a few thousand to thirty-five thousand dollars—much 
more than the lender or servicer could hope to get from the property otherwise (Anonymous, May 18, 
2011; Bellamy, April 27, 2011; Martin, November 2, 2011; Sassano, May 12, 2011).   
In 2006 and 2007, rescue funds were a particularly fruitful strategy.  Foreclosure prevention counselors 
were able to work out more favorable loan terms for distressed borrowers by offering relatively 
modest upfront payments to lenders and servicers.  However, in 2008, lender and servicer behavior 
with respect to workouts began to change, and workouts no longer depended so strongly on upfront 
payments.  Instead, many were willing to offer forbearance or to accept smaller upfront payments to 
bring a mortgage current (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).   
However, two changes reported by counselors indicate successes for the program.  First, distressed 
borrowers began seeking help earlier.  This allows more time and more workout options, but, 
frustratingly, counselors reported that some lenders and servicers refused to work with borrowers 
until their loan was delinquent.  Second, more delinquent borrowers were staying in their homes 
during the foreclosure process, a strategy counselors had stressed.  By remaining in the home until it 
is necessary to leave, borrowers save money they would otherwise expend on rent or other 
accommodations (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  At the same time the negative impacts on the property, 
neighborhood, and community that frequently arise from vacancy were reduced, or at least delayed. 
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Outcomes  
An early (mid 2006) evaluation of the CCFPP indicated that approximately 25% of clients who 
approached counseling agencies were not served.  Reasons included insufficient funds to sustain (any 
realistic) payments, being too far along in the foreclosure process, and a lack of follow-up on the part 
of the borrower (Weinstein et al., 2006).  The Program Year 3 evaluation provided additional 
information concerning the intake to outcome ratios of the four counseling agencies.  Table 5.6 shows 
these values.  It should be noted that any case still in progress is not counted as an outcome here, 
meaning that the true outcome numbers are likely significantly higher.  This also explains why the mid-
2006 value of 75% served is so much higher.  Looking at the ratios, there are two clear groups, with 
CHN and ESOP having ratios above 45% and with CHS and NHS with ratios below 35%.  Examining the 
elapsed time between intake and outcome, the average across all agencies is 3.5 months, with ESOP 
having the shortest period at 2.4 months.  CHN and CHS averaged 4.5 months (Hexter & Schnoke, 
2009).  
Table 5.6:  Intake to Outcome Ratios by Agency, PY3  
Source:  Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.13) 
 CHN CHS ESOP NHS Total 
Intakes 516 565 1185 911 3177 
Outcomes 244 189 552 315 1300 
Ratio 47.3% 33.5% 46.6% 34.6% 41.0% 
 
Table 5.7 provides the percentage of total clients (1,300) served in Program Years 1 - 3, by agency.  
These values reveal no clear pattern, with the agencies counseling the highest and lowest percentages 
of clients varying year to year.  It appears that ESOP’s disproportionately large share of counseling 
clients may be permanent, given the consistency from Program Year 2 to Program Year 3.  However, it 
should be kept in mind that the percentage of clients counseled is not a measure of an agency’s 
efficiency.  Agencies’ counseling staff levels vary greatly—for example, in 2009 CHN had two 
counselors, plus a full-time assistant, while ESOP had nine (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  The ratio of 
homeowners who received counseling (3,177) to the number of foreclosure filings in Cuyahoga County 
over the same time period (13,157) is nearly one in four—indicating that the CCFPP was able to come 
into contact with a large percentage of struggling homeowners in the County.  Comparing only the 
counseling instances with outcomes, the ratio is nearly one in ten, which is quite remarkable given the 
difficulty and complexity of the task at hand and the limiting funding available. 
Table 5.7:  Percentage of Counseling Clients by Agency, PY3   
Sources:  Ford (2008), Hexter & Schnoke (2009) 
Agency CHN CHS ESOP NHS 
Program Year 1 17.5% 38.1% 13.7% 30.7% 
Program Year 2 31.8% 11.7% 37.6% 18.9% 
Program Year 3 18.8% 14.5% 42.5% 24.2% 
 
In 2006, six months after the CCFPP began, approximately 40% of counseling clients had avoided 
foreclosure (Weinstein et al., 2006).  This rate held for the remainder of the first program year, as seen 
in Table 5.8.  This increased the following year, to over 55%.  An increase was expected, according to 
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the 2006 assessment, as individual counselors, counseling agencies, and the foreclosure prevention 
program increased their skills and acumen with respect to assisting homeowners (Weinstein et al., 
2006). 
In the program’s third year, 53% of clients had retained their houses (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).148  
Table 5.9 shows these broken down by outcome type and counseling agency.  The “Total” column 
provides the weighted average of the individual agencies’ rates.  Of particular interest in the “house 
lost, non-foreclosure” category, the assignment of which has been contentious.  Some feel that a 
homeowner losing a house is a negative outcome regardless of the manner in which the house is 
lost, while others see losing a house to an outcome other than foreclosure, such as Deed-in-Lieu or a 
short sale, as a positive outcome, at least when the alternative is a foreclosure.  Which reading is 
correct depends greatly on whether one’s primary concern is homeowners or neighborhoods and 
communities.  On the homeowner level, any loss of a house is a negative outcome.  On the 
neighborhood level, non-foreclosure alternatives in which the homeowner loses the house are 
preferential to a foreclosure, due to reduced devaluation and likelihood of vacancy and 
deterioration.  As this research is primarily interested in the community effects of foreclosure 
responses, I am classifying both outcomes where homeowners retain their house and outcomes 
where the house is lost, but through a foreclosure alternative, as successful counseling outcomes. 
Table 5.8:  Intake & Outcome Rates by Agency, PY 1 & 2  
Source:  Adapted from Ford (2008) 
 
  
                                                          
148 Comparing this to the results of other foreclosure prevention counseling programs is not straightforward, as 
who participates in counseling greatly influences the possible outcomes.  Thus a direct comparison of outcomes 
may be comparing apples to oranges. Instead a survival model, which would control for observed differences 
between counseling client groups and account for censored observations, would be appropriate.  For example, 
Mayer, Tatian, Temkin, & Calhoun (2009) use this method.  However, to give a rough comparison:  In a study of 
24 counseling agencies, 56% remained in their homes after 18 months (Jefferson, Spader, Turnham, & Moulton, 
2012), while an examination of counseling outcomes in St.Louis, Missouri found that 84% remained in their 
homes, though these data are a maximum of 21 months after counseling, and sometimes only a few months 
post-counseling (Winter & Swanstrom, 2010). 
CHN CHS ESOP NHS Total As % of FC filings
Foreclosures 14,000
Appts Kept 215 469 169 377 1,230 8.8%
FCs Averted 67 235 98 95 495 3.5%
Ratio Averted:Appts 31.2% 50.1% 58.0% 25.2% 40.2%
CHN CHS ESOP NHS Total As % of FC filings
Foreclosures 15,000
Appts Kept 990 363 1170 588 3,111 20.7%
FCs Averted 461 130 1,000 165 1,756 11.7%
Ratio Averted:Appts 46.6% 35.8% 85.5% 28.1% 56.4%
Program Year 1
Program Year 2
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Table 5.9:  Outcome Rates by Agency, PY3  
Source: Adapted from Hexter & Schnoke (2009, p.20) 
  CHN CHS ESOP NHS Total 
Kept House 39% 61% 55% 57% 53% 
Lost House, non-foreclosure 12% 3% 6% 1% 6% 
Lost House, foreclosure 2% 7% 6% 2% 4% 
Ongoing 16% 16% 1% 5% 7% 
Other 30% 13% 32% 35% 29% 
 
To compare the values in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9, it is necessary to combine the “Kept House” and 
“Lost House, non-foreclosure” rates in Table 5.9, the combination of which is equivalent to the 
category “Ratio Averted:Appts” in Table 5.8.  Adding these rates together, the foreclosure aversion 
rate for Program Year 3 is 59%, a moderate increase from Program Year 2 (56.4%).  It is also possible 
that this rate is low, due to some clients’ cases remaining open past the publication date of the 
evaluation.  In any case, the counseling success rate increased each year.  
Examining the “success” rates of the individual agencies, there is a large degree of variation, from a 
low of 25% for NHS in Program Year 1, to a high of 86% for ESOP in Program Year 2.  I have compiled 
the relevant data from Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 into Table 5.10, below.  Again no clear patterns or 
differences emerge between the counseling agencies.  It is clear that overall ESOP has had the 
greatest success rate, particularly in Program Year 2.  It led the group in the first two years, but in 
year 3 ESOP’s success rate is similar to that of the other agencies.  Over time, the overall success rate 
has increased and the agencies’ success rates appear to be converging.  Given the interview data, it is 
likely that these patterns reflect two facts:  (1) the counseling agencies have improved their general 
counseling abilities over time; and (2) with experience each agency has found its own niche and 
strategies.  For example, CHN and NHS clients come primarily from the City of Cleveland, while CHS 
and ESOP clients come from relatively more suburban locations (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
Table 5.10:  Success Rates by Agency & Year  
Sources:  Ford (2008), Hexter & Schnoke (2009) 
 CHN CHS ESOP NHS Total 
Program Year 1 31.2% 50.1% 58.0% 25.2% 40.2% 
Program Year 2 46.6% 35.8% 85.5% 28.1% 56.4% 
Program Year 3 51.6% 63.5% 61.2% 58.7% 59.2% 
 
However, the outcomes and outcome patterns of foreclosure prevention counseling provide some 
information about its impacts in Cuyahoga County.  Examining the geographic distribution of successful 
counseling outcomes, as seen in Figure 5.5, they again follow the distribution pattern of foreclosures 
in the county, but more weakly than the distribution of the counseling rate (Figure 5.1).  The success 
ratio is highest on the east side of Cleveland and inner suburbs located adjacent to them.  To a lesser 
extent, the ratios are also high on the west side of Cleveland.  As in Figure 5.1, this map shows the ratio 
of successful counseling outcomes to housing units in a tract—not the ratio of successful outcomes to 
counseling instances, as used in Table 5.10. 
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Figure 5.5:  Geographic Distribution of Successful Counseling Outcomes, 2006 - 2010 
The redefault rate of mortgages worked out under foreclosure prevention counseling is also an 
important factor to consider.  If mortage workouts are only buying time for homeowners, their true 
benefit is questionable, particularly at the neighborhood level.  A small redefault study was conducted 
on 107 cases where the homeowner received a rescue loan between August 2008 and February 2011.  
Though the study did not capture whether homeowners were behind on mortgage payments (i.e. 
delinquent but not in default) and the sample size was somewhat small, the results are promising.  Of 
the 107 homeowners receiving rescue loans, ten had foreclosure actions filed against them.  Of these, 
two were completed, with the remaining eight pending.  Of the eight pending foreclosures, it appeared 
likely that five would be dismissed.  In addition, six properties had been sold in short sales, and two 
had tax liens at the time of the study.  Overall, thirteen of the 107 rescue loans were unsuccessful.  
Thus, in this study the rescue loans had a success outcome rate of 87.9% (Bellamy, April 27, 2011), 
indicating that the rescue loans were an extremely successful tool for saving mortgages and preventing 
foreclosures during this time period. 
Finally, the financial impact of foreclosure counseling is a key component of the analysis.  According to 
Mark Seifert of ESOP, it costs the organization approximately $200 for each case of foreclosure 
prevention counseling (2010).  Cuyahoga County generated an estimate of the value of foreclosure 
prevention counseling, using housing values and the number of successful counseling instances over 
the period 2008 through 2010.  The table is reproduced in Table 5.11 below. 
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Table 5.11:  Valuing Foreclosure Prevention in Cuyahoga County, 2008 - 2010  
Source:  Reprinted from Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention (2011) 
 
Median 
Home 
Price 
Percent 
Value Lost 
Due to 
Foreclosure 
Decrease in 
Median 
Home Value 
Due to 
Foreclosure 
Residential 
Sheriff’s 
Sales 
Aggregate 
Housing Value 
Lost 
Successful 
Counseling 
Outcomes 
Value of 
Foreclosure 
Avoidance 
2008 $80,000 75% $60,000 7,921 $475,260,000 573 $34,380,000 
2009 $84,000 71% $59,640 5,753 $343,108,920 732 $43,656,480 
2010 $92,050 67% $61,674 6,035 $372,199,573 932 $57,479,702 
Total       19,709 $1,190,568,493 2,237 $135,516,182 
 
Table 5.11 first estimates the property value lost due to foreclosures by multiplying the county median 
home value by the average percentage of a property’s value lost via a completed foreclosure, 
multiplied by the number of residential Sheriff’s sales in the county that year.  Totaling the values from 
2008, 2009, and 2010, the estimated value lost is nearly $1.2 billion.  To estimate the housing value 
saved via successful foreclosure prevention counseling, the decrease in median home value lost as a 
result of foreclosure is multiplied by the number of successful counseling outcomes.   For the three 
years combined, this value is approximately $135.5 million. 
The total funding for foreclosure counseling in the county from 2008 to 2010 can be estimated at $4 
million ($750,000 in private charitable contributions, $2.25 million in county government allocations, 
and a liberally estimated $1 million in additional private donations to the individual counseling 
agencies).  Dividing $135.5 million by $4 million, the result is $33.88, which is the estimated return on 
one dollar of investment in counseling (Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention, 2011).   
This estimate of retained housing value is probably somewhat high, given that the incidence of 
foreclosures was much higher in areas with lower housing values (see Figure 4.5).  As well, the rate of 
foreclosure prevention counseling and the rate of successful counseling outcomes are both more 
prevalent in areas of lower housing value (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.5).  Given this, it is reasonable 
to assume that the average decrease in property value was lower than that used in the estimate.  
However, the estimate only covers one effect of foreclosures, the direct impact on the property value 
of the foreclosed property.  This leaves out several important impacts, such as:  the decrease in 
surrounding property values due to foreclosure and/or abandonment, the municipal costs accrued in 
caring for abandoned property, the loss of property tax revenue to the municipality, and social costs 
due to displacement and homelessness.  Were all these costs included, it is highly likely that they would 
outweigh the impact of lower than median housing values on the estimation. 
Lasting Impacts? 
The CCFPP ended in early 2012, a result of changes to Cuyahoga County’s leadership and governmental 
structure.149  The new County Executive elected not to back the program by not supporting funding 
applications submitted by the CCFPP, seriously reducing the program’s ability to win grants and thus 
continue to exist.  The new County Treasurer, now three levels below the County Executive, supported 
                                                          
149 In 2009, Cuyahoga County residents voted to adopt a county charter governmental form, replacing the three-
member Board of County Commissioners with a single County Executive.  In 2010, the first County Executive 
election took place, with the winner, Ed Fitzgerald, taking office in January 2011. 
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the program but lacked the authority to keep it running without the backing of the County Executive.  
The remnants of the program moved to the County Department of Development, where Paul Herdeg, 
the Manager of the Housing Division, attempted to continue the program, despite difficulties arising 
from the lack of formal endorsement of the program and understanding of its importance by the 
county’s political leadership. Despite this, some grant money was awarded to continue the program’s 
efforts (Bellamy, October 16, 2012). 
After six years of the program’s operation, the counseling agencies were able to continue to offer 
counseling and to work together collaboratively.   Each counseling agency had developed contacts with 
various lenders and servicers, and knew which contacts other agencies had, thus being able to direct 
distressed borrowers to the counseling agency most likely to be able to assist them. As well, each of 
the agencies grew in staff, resources, and reputation while working with CCFPP, and in two cases 
opened offices in additional counties (Wiseman, January 30, 2009).  The agencies demonstrated their 
commitment to the program’s aims and collaborative efforts, continuing to meet and work together 
during a period when the program lacked funding altogether (Bellamy, October 16, 2012).  While the 
end of the CCFPP was not a positive development for dealing with Cuyahoga County’s foreclosure 
problem, it did not spell the end of foreclosure prevention counseling efforts.  Former Director Paul 
Bellamy stated that “though the program no longer formally exists, the essence of the program 
continues” (Bellamy, October 16, 2012). 
In addition, several participants of the CCFPP point to increased collaboration as a major and long-
lasting benefit of the program.  Previous to the program’s introduction, agencies tended to view one 
another as competitors for grant funding and clients (Bellamy, October 16, 2012).  Though at first many 
were concerned about losing resources, with the advent of the CCFPP the counseling agencies and 
others began working together and seeing benefits—reducing the duplication of efforts and sharing 
best practices with one another, allowing the agencies to better serve their clients (Anonymous, May 
18, 2011).  It quickly became clear that agencies would not need to compete for clients, as the problem 
was so extensive (Tisler, May 3, 2011).  In case of NFMC grants, the funding scheme was originally 
highly anti-collaborative.  The agencies complained and the funding scheme was modified so that 
multiple agencies could receive cost recovery when homeowners visited multiple agencies.  This was 
important to facilitate collaboration and the goal of foreclosure counseling itself, as clients sometimes 
move from one agency to another in the course of trying to rescue their loan (Tisler, May 3, 2011).   
Despite the continuation of counseling services and the benefits of increased interorganizational 
communication and collaboration, several interviewees expressed doubts as to the true efficacy of the 
program.  In particular, those higher on the organizational or governmental ladder—those whose job 
it is to see and understand “the bigger picture”—had significant doubts about whether the CCFPP’s 
efforts would have lasting impacts.  Several interviewees used the term “buying time” when discussing 
the CCFPP’s impacts.  These interviewees felt that the inevitable, a crisis of home valuation, was being 
put off, but that the CCFPP might carry the County until principle reduction started occurring en masse, 
or legal remedies were put into effect (Anonymous, May 18, 2011; Bellamy, April 27, 2011; Rokakis, 
May 4, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011).  This was reflected in the type of modifications given to homeowners, 
which some of those involved in counseling did not feel were sustainable.  Rather than reducing the 
amount of the loan to reflect the property value, missed payments and penalties were tacked on to 
the end of the loan.  Scott Rose, the Director of Foreclosure Prevention Advocacy at ESOP, clarified 
that, contrary to popular belief, modifications are not refinances—rather they are “designed to keep 
the homeowner’s head above water until things improve” (Rose, May 6, 2011).  Thus, if the situation 
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does not improve, in the housing market and/or the economy, modifications won’t be sustainable in 
the longer run. 
Paul Bellamy (2012), the former Director of the CCFPP, referred to federal responses as “foaming the 
runway,” a term used by then United States Secretary of the Treasury to describe the goal of federal 
responses to the foreclosure crisis—that is, to soften the crash landing of the economy as much as 
possible.150  One method of doing this is to draw the process out over time, resulting in a more gradual 
devaluation that extends over a longer period of time, thus avoiding the need for a massive capital 
infusion.  The foreclosure prevention efforts in Cuyahoga County may be doing this as well, rather than 
changing the overall situation.  Given the limited data concerning redefaults, those involved were 
unable to determine whether foreclosure prevention efforts in Cuyahoga County had a lasting effect 
or simply put the foreclosure crisis on hold for a brief period.   
5.2.3 Mediation  
As a part of the State of Ohio’s Save the Dream program, counties were encouraged to set up 
foreclosure mediation programs and provided with a “Model Program” from which to develop their 
own.  Cuyahoga County’s foreclosure mediation program became operational in May 2008 
(Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011; Hexter & Schnoke, 2009; H. Williams, May 
13, 2011).151  Recalling Section 2.4.3, the main difference between foreclosure counseling and 
foreclosure mediation is that foreclosure counselors are advocates for the borrower, while foreclosure 
mediators are neutral and do not represent either party in the mediation. 
The program operates in the following manner: 
1. Upon receiving a foreclosure complaint filing, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 
first mails a postcard advertising the mediation program to the defendant (borrower).  The 
objective is to increase the likelihood the borrower will later open the letter sent by the court, 
advising the homeowner to stay in the home and explaining the mediation program, as well as 
a foreclosure summons containing a “request for mediation” to the homeowner. 
2. If the homeowner elects to do so, he or she may fill out the “request for mediation” summons 
indicating he or she would like to be considered for mediation and return it to the mediator.152 
3. Upon receipt, the mediator informs the lender or servicer that they have a limited number of 
days to respond to the request for mediation. 
4. The court determines whether the case is appropriate for mediation.  Reasons cases are not 
considered appropriate for mediation include the homeowner having insufficient income or 
the case being a Board of Revisions foreclosure. 
5. If the case is appropriate for mediation, the court orders mediation and imposes a stay on the 
case, meaning the case will not move forward until mediation is concluded.  Approximately 
ten days after the referral is received, the pre-mediation conference between the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
150 It should be noted that Geithner’s use of “foaming the runway” was with respect to cushioning the fall for 
financial institutions, not homeowners. Many, including Rokakis, argue the strategies employed to lessen the 
impact on banks were done to the detriment of homeowners and nearby residents.  
151 It should be noted that the Legal Aid Society of Greater Cleveland also has a mediation program, which has 
more limited eligibility requirements and as such accepts fewer cases (H. Williams, May 13, 2011).  It was also 
not advertised or promoted to the extent the county mediation was. 
152 The magistrate handling the case also has the option of referring the case to mediation at any point. 
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counsel (the servicer’s lawyer) and the borrower153 is scheduled to be held within 30 to 45 
days.  The full mediation is held approximately thirty days after the pre-mediation conference.  
A plaintiff’s client representative with decision-making authority must also attend the full 
mediation. 
6.  Once the court has ordered mediation, participation is mandatory for both the borrower and 
the lender or servicer.  If the borrower does not appear for mediation or the case remains 
unresolved after mediation, the case returns to the foreclosure docket.  If the lender or 
servicer (or their attorney) does not appear, the foreclosure case is dismissed.  If the 
borrower’s financial situation changes, he or she can return for an additional round of 
mediation (Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011; Hexter & Schnoke, 2009, 
p.26). 
According to the director of the court’s foreclosure mediation program, the mediation process from 
start to finish lasts approximately four months (Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 
2011).  In contrast, an attorney who represents servicers felt that cases involving mediation lasted 
from six to twelve months (Anonymous, May 17, 2011).   
Mediation is open to Cuyahoga County residents currently in foreclosure on their primary residence.  
Borrowers who want to keep their house must have a monthly income that exceeds their monthly 
expenses to be eligible, though borrowers who do not want to keep the property, but seek an 
alternative resolution (for example, a Deed-In-Lieu), may be eligible regardless of their financial 
situation.  The director of the mediation program estimated that between 30% and 45% of all 
foreclosure cases in Cuyahoga County participate in mediation, and that a high percentage of those 
who apply are accepted (Anonymous, May 18, 2011) 
The goal of mediation in general is to provide a neutral setting where the parties have equal bargaining 
powers; that is, a court-appointed mediator assists in negotiation efforts between the two parties, in 
part to overcome the relative advantage of a lawyer held by the financial institution.  Thus, the program 
director believes the mediation program does not actually change the options to homeowners—as far 
as what possible solutions exist—but it does make it possible to level the bargaining table, which can 
in fact open possibilities that the homeowner previously did not have sufficient bargaining power to 
access (Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011; Bellamy, April 27, 2011).  The program 
also provides space and time for the servicer and borrower to communicate (Foreclosure Mediation 
Program Director, April 29, 2011).   
Interviewees spoke positively of the mediation program.  Paul Bellamy (2011), the director of the 
CCFPP, felt it was fair to homeowners and servicers alike.  Kate Carden (2011), the Foreclosure 
Prevention Program Manager at CHN, reported that the mediation program has had a tremendous 
positive impact on homeowner attitudes.  The program director stressed that relationships were key 
in developing and implementing the mediation program.  The court has worked hard to include all 
stakeholders in the process, and the director reported that while servicers and their attorneys were 
originally resistant to the program, they later saw the neutrality of the process (Foreclosure Mediation 
Program Director, April 29, 2011).  The two servicer attorneys I interviewed had somewhat mixed views 
on the program.  Both said that Cuyahoga County is special, meaning that the county’s program is 
better than most and that they have a high success rate (Anonymous, May 17, 2011; Sassano, May 12, 
                                                          
153 While the borrower may in fact be represented by a lawyer, in general this is not the case. 
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2011).  Attorney James Sassano (2011) attributed this to the quality of work of the court’s mediators 
and that Cuyahoga County has the resources to effectively implement the program that others may 
not.  He reported at first being skeptical of mediation, particularly given the pressure on attorneys to 
speed foreclosure cases through the litigation process.  However, he now is a strong proponent of the 
mediation process and even recommends borrowers having difficulty communicating with their 
servicers to go this route.  He considers the fact the mediation slows the foreclosure process down and 
provides all parties breathing room to be a key advantage.  On the other hand, the other foreclosure 
attorney I interviewed had more mixed feelings, considering the increased focus on loss mitigation in 
mediation to be the main advantage but finding the process tedious, frustrating, and an unnecessary 
extension of the time required (Anonymous, May 17, 2011). 
One problem the mediation program faced was that of lenders, servicers, and their attorneys reporting 
to mediation without the authority to modify the loan, effectively making mediation useless.  Without 
the authority to make a final and binding agreement, the advantages of mediation are weakened.  Due 
to this, the Court determined that beginning in August 2009, the lender, servicer, or their 
representative must have full decision-making authority in order to participate in the mediation 
process (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  Since the lender or servicer is compelled by the court to participate 
in mediation (if the borrower or court requests it), this pushes  the lender or servicer to actively 
consider modifying loans or to face losing the ability to foreclose on defaulted loans in Cuyahoga 
County. 
Mediation is of course not able to help every homeowner find a more amenable outcome.  The 
program director listed five groups that tended to be more difficult to work out.  The first group is 
those with properties worth between thirty and forty-five thousand dollars.  These homeowners often 
don’t have the financial resources to make a modification work, and servicers consider the property 
value too high to offer a short pay.  The second group is homeowners with significant equity in the 
property.  The financial incentives are then such that servicers are likely to be able to cover their loss 
on the mortgage through a Sheriff’s sale.  Third, properties with second and third mortgages are 
difficult, as the court cannot compel these mortgage holders to participate, and thus they have a 
stronger negotiating position.  Fourth, as with foreclosure counseling, it has been harder to reach 
middle class property owners as the foreclosure problem has spread.  Finally, borrowers who are self-
employed encounter more difficulties than others due to the difficulty in verifying their incomes 
(Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011). 
In many mediation cases, homeowners also used the assistance of housing counselors.  The court 
allows homeowners to bring an additional party with them to mediation (possibly a foreclosure 
prevention counselor) (Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011).  Harold Williams 
(2011) of the Legal Aid Society of Greater Cleveland recommends borrowers planning to participate in 
mediation to see a housing counselor.  Foreclosure prevention counselors are also on-site at the 
courthouse to provide borrowers with assistance on pre-mediation days (Foreclosure Mediation 
Program Director, April 29, 2011). 
As with foreclosure prevention counseling, the characteristics of the individuals participating in the 
mediation program have changed over time.  When the program began in mid-2008, participants 
hailed primarily from the City of Cleveland and inner ring suburbs; they were generally African 
Americans and/or seniors.  Over time increased numbers of participants resided in outer suburbs and 
tended to be more affluent as well (Foreclosure Mediation Program Director, April 29, 2011).  
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Examining the map of cases settled in 2010 (see Figure 5.6, below), it appears that mediation 
settlements roughly follow the incidence of foreclosure in the county (see Figure 4.10), though it 
appears that the west side of Cleveland is somewhat overrepresented. 
 
Figure 5.6:  Distribution of Mediation Settlements in 2010 
Outcomes data for the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Mediation Program are available for two time 
periods:  over the first year of operation, from June 2008 through June 2009, and over the first three 
years of operation, from June 2008 through June 2011.  This data are shown in Table 5.12.  Please note 
that the categories are not mutually exclusive; thus the percentages add up to more than 100%.  For 
example, a homeowner and servicer could engage in a pre-mediation but the homeowner did not 
appear for the full mediation.  In this situation, the case would be counted both under “Pre-Mediation 
Held” and “Failed – Defendant”categories. 
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Table 5.12:  Mediation Outcomes, 2008 - 2009 & 2008 – 2011  
Sources:  Hexter & Schnoke (2009), Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Mediation Program (2011) 
  
June 2008 - June 2009 June 2008 - June 2011 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Total Cases Referred 2,846 100.0% 10,181 100.0% 
Unsuitable 430 15.1% 1,678 16.5% 
Bankruptcy 46 1.6% 249 2.4% 
Failed - Defendant 356 12.5% 2,095 20.6% 
Failed - Plaintiff 56 2.0% 163 1.6% 
Sub-Total:  Did Not Proceed to Mediation 888 31.2% 4,185 41.1% 
Pre-Mediation Held 1,542 54.2% 7,594 74.6% 
Full Mediation Held 443 15.6% 5,236 51.4% 
Settled 231 8.1% 3,418 33.6% 
Full:Pre-Mediation   28.7%   68.9% 
Settled:Full Mediation   52.1%   65.3% 
 
Comparing the first year of operation with the first three years of operation indicates the mediators 
and program have improved over time.  About one in two cases made it to pre-mediation in the first 
year, while by the end of the third year, cumulatively three in four cases made it to pre-mediation.   In 
the first year, less than three-tenths of cases proceeded from the pre-mediation to a full mediation, 
while after three years, this ratio was nearly seven in ten.  The settlement rate of cases in full mediation 
was approximately one in two in the first year, and approximately two in three over all three years.  In 
the first year, only 8.1% of all referred cases resulted in a settlement; the average for the first three 
years was 33.6%, more than four times the first year value.   
These numbers indicate that not only did the mediation program improve its actual mediation ability, 
but it also improved its ability to transition from one step in the process to the next.  Settlements as a 
percentage of full mediation cases rose by about 25%, while the total percentage of cases referred 
that resulted in a settlement rose by over 315% between the first year and the first three years, 
indicating that increased positive outcomes are due to improvements throughout the process and not 
solely in the ability to find a mutually agreeable settlement at the full mediation. 
5.3 The Strategic Investment Initiative 
A second, privately initiated program was the Strategic Investment Initiative (SII), which targeted 
foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts in small neighborhood areas “that showed evidence of 
nascent market resurgence” while “leverage[ing] locational assets . . . and recent market 
improvements” (Mayer & Temkin, 2009, p.A-3).  Originally envisioned as a market recovery initiative, 
the advent of the foreclosure crisis later caused the program’s focus to shift to neighborhood 
stabilization (Ford, May 5, 2011).  The program used land acquisition, rehabilitation, and demolition to 
mitigate foreclosure’s negative effects and the marketing of foreclosure prevention counseling to 
prevent additional foreclosures in the target areas (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
The SII was spearheaded by Neighborhood Progress, Inc. (NPI), a local community development 
funding intermediary. As an intermediary, NPI’s goals are to “provide programs and services to 
implement neighborhood recovery strategies, build community capacity, invest in physical 
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development, grow partnerships to expand the players in community revitalization, increase assets for 
residents, and create neighborhoods of choice that are increasingly able to attract residents and 
business throughout the region,” which is achieved by creating partnerships with local foundations, 
CDCs, government, and the business community (Neighborhood Progress, 2013). 
The Strategic Investment Initiative was first envisioned in 2004 in response to a 2003 external 
evaluation of NPI that questioned whether NPI was sufficiently market-conscious in its efforts.  That 
is, the evaluation suggested NPI consider how people decide where they will live in addition to 
achieving housing production goals.  Frank Ford, NPI’s Senior Vice President for Research and 
Development at the time, said “we should be putting on our radar not just . . . physically improving the 
neighborhoods, but also . . . influenc[ing] the competitiveness of neighborhoods in the city [of 
Cleveland]” (Ford, May 5, 2011).  That meant to consider how many people were leaving a 
neighborhood and why, as well as who was moving in and why, in addition to simpler measures 
capturing population growth or decline or how many houses had been rehabilitated (Ford, May 5, 
2011).   
From this, the Strategic Investment Initiative was developed as a ten-year program, for which success 
would be measured by changes in property values, homeownership and occupancy rates, and private 
investment, with six CDCs in six neighborhoods receiving funding from NPI beginning in 2005 
(Neighborhood Stabilization Team, 2013b).  Within their coverage areas, each CDC had designated an 
SII area of approximately thirty square blocks. The six CDCs were Buckeye Area Development 
Corporation; Detroit Shoreway Community Development Organization; the Famicos Foundation, 
which services the Glenville area; Fairfax Renaissance Development Corporation; Slavic Village 
Development Corporation; and Tremont West Development Corporation (see Figure 5.7).  These six 
CDCs received a higher level of funding from NPI with the intent that a market-focused concept would 
be used to improve the neighborhood’s attractiveness to current and new residents (Ford, May 5, 
2011).  According to the NST154 wiki, the SII has ten key characteristics: 
1. “A focus on broad market outcomes, rather than on producing housing units 
2. Precise, narrow targeting 
3. Comprehensive plans 
4. High-impact anchor projects 
5. ‘Model Blocks’ to complement the anchor projects 
6. Land acquisition [of] vacant/abandoned properties 
7. Comprehensive amenities and services through strategic partnerships 
8. A pervasive attention to marketing and market competitiveness 
9. Dedicated staffing for the initiative at the CDC 
10. A new partnership relationship between NPI and the CDCs” (Neighborhood Stabilization Team, 
2013b). 
In 2008, the foreclosure crisis led to the development of the Opportunity Homes Program, where 
smaller areas (approximately 15 blocks) within the SII areas were targeted for market recovery efforts 
by NPI, the City of Cleveland, CHN, ESOP, and the CDC located in each SII area (Ford, May 5, 2011; T. 
Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010).  Similar to the SII, Opportunity Homes’ objective was to create 
                                                          
154 Neigborhood Stabilization Trust 
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“neighborhoods of choice” within the City of Cleveland, to be evidenced by increases in population, 
homeownership, housing values, and household income (Mayer & Temkin, 2009). 
NPI applied for and was awarded a $500,000 grant for its Opportunity Homes Program from the Living 
Cities Foreclosure Mitigation Initiative, which sought to “support new efforts to stabilize 
neighborhoods facing large numbers of foreclosed, often vacant housing units” (Mayer & Temkin, 
2009, p.iii).  Living Cities’ strategy was to support innovative neighborhood stabilization pilot programs, 
with the hope that these programs could then be copied or scaled up when federal foreclosure funding 
became available (Mayer & Temkin, 2009). 
The Opportunity Homes Program is comprised of three components:  (1) rehabilitation of vacant 
foreclosed homes for resale; (2) acquisition and demolition of vacant blighted properties; and (3) 
targeted foreclosure prevention counseling (Mayer & Temkin, 2009; Swanstrom & Brooks, 2010).  In 
addition, the CDCs received consultation and advice from the Neighborhood Stabilization Team,155 
which included Frank Ford of NPI, Michael Schramm of NEO CANDO, and Kermit Lind of the Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law at Cleveland State University.  The Neighborhood Stabilization Team’s purpose 
was to increase the capacity of Cleveland’s CDCs, by assisting them in strategically targeting properties 
and offering the following services: 
 “Identification, mapping and research on potential acquisition/renovation targets. 
 Identification and mapping of blighted properties that threaten to undermine existing 
neighborhood assets and housing renovation projects. 
 Identification and mapping of occupied homes at risk of foreclosure and abandonment. 
 A method for prioritizing and categorizing destabilizing properties. 
 A method for linking properties with the appropriate stabilization intervention. . . . 
 A way of organizing the stabilization work . . . 
 A systematic means of tracking outcomes through the CWRU156 NEO CANDO data system” 
(Neighborhood Stabilization Team, 2013a). 
Or, more succinctly, the Neighborhood Stabilization Team “help[s] [communities] target vacant 
properties and [helps] them figure out how to get control of them for strategic development” (Ford, 
May 5, 2011).  This is done by, for example, creating neighborhood stabilization maps using the NEO 
CANDO data system that show the property circumstance—namely if it has been affected by the 
foreclosure process in some way.  The maps show which properties are in foreclosure or coming out 
of foreclosure, if they are for sale or might be for sale, if they are REOs, whether they are vacant or 
occupied, whether they are in housing court for code violations, which properties are owned by the 
city or county land bank, which needed inspection, and which had been condemned by the city, among 
other things (Lind, May 19, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Thus, municipal governments and 
CDCs can clearly identify the situation in their communities block by block and house by house and 
then strategically intervene.  Furthermore, the maps and, more generally, the data available on NEO 
CANDO can be used as evidence in litigation, for example in the suits against Deutsche Bank and Wells 
Fargo (see Section 5.5) (Lind, May 19, 2011). 
                                                          
155 The Neighborhood Stabilization Team was originally referred to as the Land Assembly Team.  The name was 
changed to better reflect the group’s activities (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
156 Case Western Reserve University 
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The Neighborhood Stabilization Team meets with each CDC monthly, and at these meetings CDCs can 
give direct input on rehab and demolition decisions and provide their in-depth knowledge of the 
community.  Together, community assets and investments, high priority targets, blighted property, 
and homes at high foreclosure risk are identified in the course of making a plan for the community or 
CDC area.  The CDCs are responsible for setting neighborhood stabilization goals, such as the number 
of rehabs or demolitions to be completed (Neighborhood Stabilization Team, 2013a). 
5.3.1 Neighborhood Selection 
The SII began with six neighborhoods in 2005, with three additional neighborhoods added in 2010-
2011 (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Subareas of the first six SII neighborhoods then became the Opportunity 
Homes neighborhoods in 2008.  The first six SII neighborhoods were Buckeye-Shaker, Detroit 
Shoreway, Fairfax, Glenville, Slavic Village, and Tremont.  Kinsman, Ohio City, and North Shores 
Collinwood were added later (Rudyk, May 2, 2011). 
To select the SII neighborhoods, NPI first contacted approximately twenty CDCs about the program, 
and later asked fourteen of them to submit an application (Ford, May 5, 2011).  NPI looked for CDCs 
with a strong history of development, that had identified a large-scale, shovel-ready anchor project 
within their coverage area, and that had a clear vision for the future of their communities (Mayer & 
Temkin, 2009).  NPI’s intention was not to stabilize the most distressed neighborhoods in Cleveland; 
rather, the objective was to identify “areas that showed evidence of nascent market resurgence, which 
could be accelerated by the completion of a large anchor project” (N. Mayer & Temkin, 2009, p.A-3), 
or as one respondent put it, “they’re supposed to be the nine stable neighborhoods in the City of 
Cleveland.  The nine that still have some type of housing market, some type of assets” (Rudyk, May 2, 
2011).  NPI defined an anchor project as a housing development of scale, meaning a concentrated 
housing project, not scattered site development.  The scale of the anchor projects varied, with Famicos, 
operating in the Glenville neighborhood, having planned a 25-unit development, while Detroit 
Shoreway planned a 300-unit project.  The idea was these new housing anchor projects would function 
as a catalyst for the area and stimulate others to improve their properties (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Within the CDC’s service area, the SII subarea was selected by the presence of an anchor, such as a 
waterfront, a university, a string of art galleries, or a strip of boutique commercial development.  Frank 
Ford stated it as any feature that “could . . . become a magnet, both to retain the existing residents as 
well as to attract new people” (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Other characteristics of the SII area were important 
as well, such as their connections within the Cleveland metro area, the prevalence of cultural 
institutions, and housing quality (Ford, May 5, 2011). Figure 5.7 illustrates the locations of the six 
original SII areas. 
Each SII is located within a CDC’s service area, but is smaller than the full service area.  In general, the 
SII area contained 2,500 to 6,000 residents (Mayer & Temkin, 2009).  Beginning in 2008, an Opportunity 
Homes area was designated within each SII, which was even smaller and generally contained the 
anchor project.  NPI’s Frank Ford listed the approximate sizes as 80 blocks for a CDC service area, 30 
blocks for an SII area, and 15 blocks for an Opportunity Homes area (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Residents 
living within model blocks, areas deemed to play a key supportive role to the anchor projects and which 
often serve as entryways to the neighborhood, were eligible for funds to repair and improve their 
homes’ exteriors and lawns (N. Mayer & Temkin, 2009).   
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Figure 5.7:  Strategic Investment Initiative (SII) Areas 
Over the course of the SII and Opportunity Homes programs it became clear that rather than 
undertaking market recovery efforts, the goal needed to be neighborhood stabilization.  One 
respondent described this as doing the same things—removing blight, renovations, foreclosure 
prevention—but changing the objectives (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Rather than attempting to improve the 
local housing market, the goal is simply to keep the bottom from falling out further.  Frank Ford 
described Cleveland as a weak market city one can envision as a donut, where residents and their 
purchasing power have moved outward to the suburbs.  NPI and the CDCs attempt to reverse this 
trend, and attract residents to neighborhoods in the City of Cleveland. This was the paradigm that the 
SII program was designed for and that these organizations worked under until 2006 or 2007, when the 
foreclosure crisis hit in way that made this paradigm clearly untenable.  At this point, NPI and the CDCs 
realized that they could no longer operate as housing developers and instead needed to actively 
engage in addressing the problems caused by foreclosures (Ford, May 5, 2011).   
As the SII and the foreclosure crisis progressed, it became clear that the anchor project component 
was not necessary or prudent.  Frank Ford considered it an error that nearly everyone working in 
housing development and related activities in Cleveland made.  The exception was ESOP, who 
attempted to draw attention to the mounting foreclosure problem early.  He says, “it wasn’t obvious 
in ’04 or ’05 . . . by ’06 we were getting concerned about it and by ’07 it was just absolutely obvious” 
(Ford, May 5, 2011).   The Tremont and Detroit Shoreway SIIs, which are located on the west side and 
the stronger of the six neighborhoods, sold houses from their anchor projects.  But the other four—
Buckeye, Famicos/Glenville, Fairfax, and Slavic Village—either never broke ground on their projects 
(Fairfax and Slavic Village) or began their projects and quickly experienced market difficulties (Buckeye 
and Famicos/Glenville) (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
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5.3.2 A Three-Pronged Approach 
To meet the SII and Opportunity Homes goals, a three-pronged approach consisting of 
rehabilitation/renovation, demolition, and foreclosure prevention was used.  The logic behind the 
approach was as follows.  CDCs are traditionally development-oriented; they rehabilitate, renovate, or 
build properties within their service areas, and then sell these properties, usually at a discount, to 
homeowners.  The objective is to support the neighborhood by upgrading or improving a portion of its 
housing, or adding improved new housing.  In the CDC areas participating in the Opportunity Homes 
Program, market experience had shown that rehabilitated homes could sell in these neighborhoods 
for approximately $90,000.  However, these rehabilitated or renovated homes would not sell if they 
were located adjacent to or across the street from a vacant, abandoned house.  Thus, the targeted 
demolition component comes in.  While it wouldn’t be feasible to demolish all vacant, abandoned 
homes in Cleveland, or even within the SII areas, it was possible as part of the Opportunity Homes 
effort to demolish blighted houses located near the rehabilitated homes.  Finally, NPI wanted to “get 
ahead of the curve” with respect to foreclosures, and prevent foreclosures and their negative 
consequences from occurring in the Opportunity Homes areas.  The strategy was to use targeted 
foreclosure prevention efforts, by going house to house to at risk homeowners and informing them 
about the risk of foreclosure and foreclosure prevention counseling (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
The first prong of the neighborhood stabilization effort for SII areas157  is the acquisition and 
rehabilitation of homes within the target area.  The renovations include new roofs, new mechanicals, 
new furnaces, and new windows; the houses are insulated to green energy efficient standards.  Each 
costs approximately $140,000 to renovate, and gap funding from the city and state is used so that the 
fully renovated properties sell for an average of $95,000, ten thousand above NPI’s projection (Ford, 
May 5, 2011).  NPI’s initial goal was to rehabilitate and sell 50 homes per year in the six SII areas (Mayer 
& Temkin, 2009).  As of spring 2011, nearly three years into the program, approximately 50 houses had 
been successfully rehabilitated and sold (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Three clear issues hindered the 
program’s ability to acquire and rehabilitate homes.  The first is that the financing used was highly 
complicated, including five sources of debt divided into four tranches, and took until nearly a year into 
the program to close on.  Second, though initial discussions with Fannie Mae about bulk purchases of 
REO properties were promising, no agreements were reached and property acquisition had to be done 
in a more piecemeal fashion.  Third, rehabilitation costs were approximately $33,000 per unit above 
projections, partially due to the need to remove asbestos from many properties, resulting in the need 
to secure additional gap funding (Mayer & Temkin, 2009). 
The second prong of the SII approach was property acquisition for demolition by the City of Cleveland.  
These demolitions were strategically selected to support the rehabbed properties in the SII area by 
removing nearby vacant and blighted structures, putting the land into conservatorship, and, when 
possible, creating parks or yard extensions from them.  The demolitions were financed using part of 
the City of Cleveland’s NSP1 funds (Mayer & Temkin, 2009).  NPI also used code enforcement and 
nuisance abatement litigation to deal with problem properties in the SII areas Neighborhood 
Stabilization Team, 2013a). Demolition as a neighborhood stabilization strategy was at first a hard sell 
for NPI and many in the CDC community.  Traditionally, CDCs are production-oriented organizations, 
                                                          
157 Though the Strategic Investment Initiative and Opportunity Homes are two separate programs, the locations 
and objectives of the two overlap.  For this reason I use the term Strategic Investment Initiative or SII to refer to 
both from this point on, unless stated otherwise. 
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and in many ways are housing developers.  Demolishing homes at first seems to run counter to their 
goals of increasing housing and in a neighborhood to revitalize it.  However, given the extent of the 
foreclosure crisis and the vacant and abandoned property problem in Cleveland, it became clear that 
a purely production-oriented approach would not suffice. 
NPI originally estimated a ratio of 2:1 of demolitions to rehabs would be necessary; three years into 
the program it was seen to be closer to 3:1 (Ford, May 5, 2011). A priori, the goal for SII demolitions 
was one hundred per year, but as with rehabilitations, this number turned out to be about twice what 
was actually achieved—by May 2011, 142 houses had been demolished as part of the Strategic 
Investment Initiative.  Additionally, 41 vacant lots had been converted to gardens and lot additions as 
a part of the ReImagining Cleveland effort,158 which seeks to find new uses for vacant land, such as 
pocket parks, market and community gardens, playgrounds, and tree farms (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
One reason for fewer than projected demolitions was that the City of Cleveland was not able to keep 
up with the demolition requests NPI put in after the property had been acquired as part of the 
Opportunity Homes program (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Under the best of circumstances, a demolition takes 
six to twelve months from request to completion (Ford, May 5, 2011).   
The final prong of the Opportunity Homes approach was to prevent foreclosures in the targeted areas.  
Working with NEO CANDO and purchased proprietary data, homeowners at risk of foreclosure were 
identified.  At the time, it was common for homeowners to be unaware that their ARM loan would 
adjust, resulting in significantly higher payments from one month to the next; others had been assured 
they could easily refinance upon reset.  Thus, NPI and other stakeholders believed they could prevent 
foreclosures by engaging and informing borrowers before they reached foreclosure.    Four groups of 
borrowers were targeted:  (1) those actively in foreclosure, (2) those with a high cost interest rate, (3) 
those with a mortgage from a HUD-designated subprime lender, and (4) those with an ARM (Rudyk, 
May 2, 2011). 
To do so, for each month that doorknocking, or door-to-door outreach efforts, was planned, the CDC 
would mail flyers to homeowners explaining that the CDC and ESOP would be doing doorknocking in 
the neighborhood the following week (Mayer & Temkin, 2009).  Beginning in December of 2008, ESOP, 
one of the four agencies that provided counseling as part of the CCFPP, engaged in doorknocking to 
make contact with homeowners and inform them of the availability of foreclosure prevention 
counseling.  In some cases ESOP also trained CDC employees to engage in doorknocking activities or 
ESOP and CDC employees worked in tandem (Ford, May 5, 2011; Rudyk, May 2, 2011)}.  This was the 
first time active efforts to get borrowers to enter foreclosure prevention counseling were made in 
Cleveland; up to that point counseling agencies and the CCFPP had undertaken more passive efforts 
via marketing to attract borrowers in trouble (Ford, October 12, 2012). 
The initiative’s goal was to prevent one hundred foreclosures per year within the target areas.  Of the 
three goals, SII fared the worst on the foreclosure prevention objective, with only 36 foreclosures 
prevented in the Opportunity Homes areas in three years (56 if the larger SII areas are used instead). 
Frank Ford of NPI noted that while intake numbers went up approximately fifty percent for the SII 
areas, outcomes were not as positive.  He pointed to timing as a significant issue, that the opportunity 
to intervene in the foreclosure process had already passed—by 2008 foreclosure filings were already 
decreasing on the east side of Cleveland, where four of the six SII areas were located.  In fact, between 
                                                          
158 ReImagining Cleveland is discussed more thoroughly in Section 5.6. 
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2007 and 2010, the foreclosure rate of the east side decreased by one half.  Had they known this in 
advance, the goal of preventing one hundred foreclosures per year never would have been selected 
(Ford, May 5, 2011).   After four years of funding the doorknocking effort, NPI discontinued it due to a 
lack of results (Ford, October 12, 2012). 
The foreclosure prevention outreach efforts had other problems as well.  One was that the data 
acquisition to determine which homeowners had ARM loans that would reset within two years and 
thus were at risk of foreclosure was not as simple as originally thought, and delayed the effort.  Another 
was that people simply weren’t at home when the canvassers knocked. As a community organizing 
group, ESOP canvassers were used to doorknocking during non-business hours and making repeated 
attempts, but this wasn’t always feasible for the CDC employees trained by ESOP.  Another problem 
was that some of the at-risk homeowners had already moved out.  Finally, in many cases homeowners 
already had direct or indirect experience with foreclosure scams, and this created “a wall of distrust” 
for the doorknockers (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Frank Ford (2011) considers the outreach efforts to have 
been overly optimistic in hindsight, explaining the original mindset as “you know we’re going to 
identify everybody who’s got an adjustable rate mortgage and all we’re going to have to do is just go 
talk to them and they’ll be thrilled to get the help.” 
A final possible issue with the efficacy of the doorknocking campaign was that though the effort was 
targeted to the Opportunity Homes areas, the foreclosure prevention counseling itself was not 
targeted.  The counseling occurred through the normal channels any other homeowner seeking help 
from the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program would, rather than through NPI, one of 
the six CDCs, or ESOP as a component of the program.  This was the only aspect of the program that 
wasn’t coordinated in a targeted manner through the Opportunity Homes Program (Ford, May 5, 
2011). 
Looking to outcomes, recall that the Strategic Investment Initiative had three major components:  
demolitions, rehabilitations, and foreclosure prevention counseling.  The first round of the SII was 
comprised of six communities, and later expanded to nine.  In mid-2011, two and a half years into the 
program, data was available for the first six communities. 
The aims of the SII were to demolish one hundred homes per year, demolish fifty, and to prevent one 
hundred foreclosures via foreclosure prevention counseling, spread across the six areas.   Table 5.13 
lists the numbers of each component completed, the goal for the time period (2.5 years), and the 
percentage achieved.  Vacant lot conversions are included as well, although they were not one of the 
specified components of the program. 
Table 5.13:  SII Outcomes  
Source:  Ford (May 5, 2011) 
Component Completed Objective 
Percent 
Achieved 
Demolitions 142 250 56.8% 
Rehabilitations 50 125 40.0% 
Foreclosures Averted 33 (56) 250 13.2% (22.4%) 
Vacant Lot Conversions 41     
The numbers in the table show clearly that the initial objectives of the SII program were not met in the 
first two and a half years.  The most successful category was demolitions, where 56.8% was achieved.  
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According to Frank Ford, some of the problems in achieving the desired number of demolitions were 
due to a lag in the City of Cleveland’s ability to demolish properties quickly enough (2011).  With 
respect to rehabilitations, only 40% of the target was achieved.  However, the rehabilitated houses 
were all sold or under contract, and the average selling price was $10,000 above projections ($95,000 
v. $85,000) (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Though the target was missed, the outcomes for houses that were 
rehabbed were very positive. 
Foreclosure aversions were much lower than projected.  According to Frank Ford, the counseling intake 
increased by about fifty percent, the actual foreclosure aversions did not (2011).  Just thirty-three 
foreclosures were averted in the Opportunity Homes areas in the first two and a half years, much lower 
than the 250 projected.  Including the entire SII areas, the number increases to 56.  However, even 
when using the larger geographies, the rate is only 22.4%.  A large part of the reason for this was that 
the pace of foreclosures slowed substantially during this time, particularly in the hard hit areas on the 
east side of Cleveland, where the wave of foreclosures had hit earlier.  As previously mentioned, there 
were additional difficulties related to the foreclosure prevention counseling objective, including 
overcoming the trust barrier of many residents. 
Additionally, vacant lot conversions were tracked.  During this period, 41 properties were converted 
to sidelot expansions, pocket parks, community gardens, or other uses (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Table 5.14:  Demolitions & Rehabilitations in SII Areas  
Source:  Ford (May 5, 2011) 
Area Demolitions Rehabilitations 
Buckeye 18 19 
Detroit Shoreway 23 10 
Famicos 31 12 
Fairfax 30 2 
Slavic Village 28 5 
Tremont 12 2 
Total 142 50 
Table 5.14 lists the numbers of demolitions and rehabilitations that occurred in each of the initial six 
SII areas.  One important aspect to note is the Slavic Village carried out large numbers of demolitions 
and rehabilitations outside of the SII program, and the table values reflect only the SII-driven instances 
(Ford, May 5, 2011). 
5.3.3 An Innovative Foreclosure Response 
The SII and Opportunity Homes programs are considered to be highly innovative and successful, 
market-driven approaches to neighborhood stabilization in the wake of the foreclosure crisis.  
Although its targets had not been met, one year into the program Living Cities made a positive 
evaluation of the program, stating that it “ha[d] successfully worked with partners to establish a 
structure in which all program elements are underway” (Mayer & Temkin, 2009, p.A-5).  The 
SII/Opportunity Homes effort is considered to be innovative due to its small-scale targeting, its division 
of labor, and its use of data at the parcel level to guide decision-making (Mayer & Temkin, 2009). 
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A key element of the SII effort is that small, strategically chosen areas were targeted for market 
stabilization efforts (Ford, May 5, 2011).  Given the scale of the foreclosure problem in Cleveland, 
undertaking market stabilization efforts for the entire city—or all of Cuyahoga County—would be 
formidable.  According to Frank Ford of NPI, in 2010 the City of Cleveland had approximately ten 
thousand condemnable vacant houses.  Using an average demolition cost of $7,000,159 to meet the 
city’s demolition needs it would cost approximately $70 million.  Frank Ford cited the cost of one 
rehabilitation at a minimum of $50,000, and more realistically around $100,000.  Thus, as a rough 
estimate, it would cost $500 million to rehab all the vacant properties in Cleveland (Ford, May 5, 2011).  
Given that the total federal NSP fund was approximately $7 billion for the entire U.S., it is clear that 
targeted neighborhood stabilization was the only realistic option for dealing with the vacancy problem 
in Cleveland. 
Kermit Lind explained the targeting rationale:   
NPI embraced [targeting] in around 2004, where instead of just spotting good houses 
wherever they were and working on them, rehabbing them, they would be more strategic and 
try to work on selected areas.  And not spread their resources so thinly, but by doing three 
houses on the street you’d increase the chances of achieving longer lasting stability.  . . . there 
was a need then to look at a street more holistically and deal with distressed houses . . . to 
assemble land for these strategic developments . . . If you’ve got a fifty million dollar 
investment in converting a former hospital into townhouses and condominiums, you want to 
be able to surround that with things that are valuable or contributive.  In order to do that you 
have to acquire the land and assemble the land (2011). 
The Opportunity Homes program used a “division of labor” approach to make the most of the 
resources available.  Given the breadth and depth of experience held by Cuyahoga County’s CDCs, the 
program was uniquely situated to make use of this infrastructure and its resources.  NPI had expertise 
in financing, CHN had significant experience with scattered-site infill development, NEO CANDO made 
data analysis at the parcel level possible, the CDCs were the “eyes and ears” of the project, and ESOP 
had community organizing expertise (Mayer & Temkin, 2009).   In the Living Cities evaluation, it is 
stated that “no one organization could have implemented a $10 million project across six 
neighborhoods by itself” (Mayer & Temkin, 2009, p.A-17).  As well, the effort “deepened relationships 
. . . that may be leveraged for future community development activities” (Mayer & Temkin, 2009, p.A-
16). 
Finally, the program was data-driven, meaning that participants used parcel-level data on loans and 
properties to better target their actions.  This was particularly helpful in forecasting probable 
foreclosures and intervening when possible (Mayer & Temkin, 2009). 
The SII and Opportunity Homes programs were so well-regarded as innovative and effective that the 
City of Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, the Cuyahoga County Metropolitan Housing Authority, and the 
Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation asked NPI to help in the development of the area’s 
NSP2 fund proposal.  The proposal used the SII/Opportunity Homes framework, requesting funds for 
twenty Cuyahoga County neighborhoods, including the six SII areas, nine additional Cleveland 
                                                          
159 In the course of my fieldwork I heard and read demolition cost estimates ranging from $5,000 per house on 
the low end and $10,000 on the high end.  Informants explained that the cost depended primarily on the 
presence of asbestos, for which removal costs average $3,000. 
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neighborhoods, and five suburban neighborhoods.  Though due to program rules it was not possible 
to use funds for foreclosure prevention, the proposal included funding requests for 415 units of 
acquisition-rehabilitation, 1,000 demolitions, 100 deconstructions, 150 units of long-term 
acquisition/stabilization, and 150 units of land reutilization.  A second constraint to the SII model was 
that only 15% of the NSP2 funds could be used for demolition (Ford, May 5, 2011; Mayer & Temkin, 
2009).  The joint NSP2 proposal was approved and the coalition received a total of $41,084,199 in 
January 2010 (OneCPD, 2013d). 
However, there remains room for improvement.  The SII and NSP2 programs only touch a small 
proportion of the foreclosed homes, abandoned properties, and devastated neighborhoods in 
Cuyahoga County.  “Although stabilization is the hot word, besides NPI I don’t see groups out there 
stabilizing what we have.  I see them building new, I see them demoing vacant properties . . . We’re 
still missing the boat on that.   We’re not being proactive” (Rudyk, May 2, 2011). 
5.4 Property Acquisition & Control 
Post-foreclosure responses focus on preventing and alleviating blight that often results from 
foreclosures, particularly in a weak housing market.  The demolition and rehabilitation efforts of the 
SII represent one instance of the application of more general post-foreclosure responses.  However, 
the extent of the foreclosure crisis in Cleveland, coupled with a preexisting vacancy problem, forces 
stakeholders to take a strategic view:   
The phenomenon of vacant abandoned properties is going to be with us a lot longer than the 
financial crisis.  There’s going to be a period measured in decardes over which there are 
profound adjustments in the way land in the city is used.  We need to find a way to deal 
constructively with that rather than in a way that caters to speculation and abuse (Kermit Lind, 
qtd in Living Cities, 2011, p.14).  
Frank Ford of NPI explained that NPI and other groups started with a pure property acquisition and 
land assembly approach to the problem of abandoned properties, based on the assumption that the 
market was healthy enough to absorb those properties.  But as blight mounted and home values 
plummeted it was necessary to move away from redevelopment and toward a market stabilization and 
systems reform approach:   
We work at a ground level, where we’re out in the streets, meeting with neighborhood groups, 
working with specific blighted properties that undermine market stabilization.  But we also 
work at a kind of twenty thousand foot level, that’s more of a systems reform level.  Many 
county and city government systems were never designed to handle the magnitude of the 
problems we are now seeing.  So we use the lessons learned from working ‘on the ground’ to 
seek reforms in code enforcement, foreclosure process, data management and other 
government systems that would help the community tackle the foreclosure and abandoned 
property crisis (Ford, May 5, 2011).  
 Sally Martin, Housing Manager for South Euclid, stated that Cuyahoga County is at the forefront of 
foreclosure responses.  “Cuyahoga County seems to be where everyone comes to for answers.  We 
don’t have all the answers, but I think we’re working harder than anybody to find them” (Welo & 
Martin, May 12, 2011). 
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In this section, the Vacant and Abandoned Properties Action Council (VAPAC) is first introduced.  
Second, modern land banking, the key innovation that allows the effective and efficient application of 
tools such as Board of Revisions foreclosure, rehabilitation, and demolition, is discussed.  The use of 
these three tools (Board of Revisions foreclosure, rehabilitation, and demolition) in Cuyahoga County 
is then examined.  A brief summary of the County’s use of NSP2 funds—heavily used for property 
acquisition and reuse—follows.   
5.4.1 VAPAC 
VAPAC, the Vacant and Abandoned Properties Action Council, was formed as the result of a 
recommendation in the Cleveland at the Crossroads report (Mallach, Mueller Levy, & Schilling, 2005) 
to create an active coordinating council that involves all players with a stake in the issue of vacant and 
abandoned properties in Cuyahoga County (Ford, May 5, 2011; Lind, May 19, 2011).  The report 
pointed out the problematic separation of both the public information systems160 and institutions:  
They didn’t have a mechanism to talk to each other, to work together, and they kept bumping 
into each other, and revolving doors in dysfunctional ways, and impeding each other more 
than helping each other often. . . . as a result of that people could take advantage of the 
decrepitude of our whole system . . . the phrase was ‘it’s really easy to speculate on blighted 
property in Cleveland. You can’t miss.’ (Lind, May 19, 2011). 
VAPAC was created to address the vacant property problem in Cuyahoga County through sharing 
information and resources (Coulton et al., 2010a).  In particular, a primary objective of VAPAC is to 
increase and facilitate efforts between various agencies to collaborate and coordinate policies in order 
to prevent counterproductive programming and to assist one another with challenges (Lind, May 19, 
2011).  In 2013, VAPAC had working groups focusing on demolition funding and protocols, tax lien and 
forfeiture sales, code enforcement, REO and mortgage servicing, an REO investor research project, and 
legislative, administrative, and judicial reform (Ford, October 22, 2013).  It’s participants include 
representatives from Cleveland City Council, Cleveland’s Community Development, Building and 
Housing, and Development Departments, the Mayor’s office, Cleveland Housing Court, the Cuyahoga 
Executive’s Office, the Cuyahoga County Treasurer’s, the County Prosecutor, the County Sheriff, the 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program, the First Suburbs Consortium, the Western Reserve 
Land Conservancy, Enterprise Community Partners, NPI, the Federal Reserve  Bank of Cleveland, the 
Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation (the county land bank), and the Cleveland office of 
the Ohio Attorney General (Ford, October 22, 2013). 
NPI convenes VAPAC, with Frank Ford organizing meetings approximately once a month.  NPI was 
selected as the convener both due to its major role in creating the council, as well as its position as an 
independent, non-political entity (Ford, May 5, 2011; Lind, May 19, 2011).  VAPAC is an informal body 
with no legal authority and invitational participation (Lind, May 19, 2011).  VAPAC is extremely useful, 
as it created a space for city, suburban, and county officials to hear one another’s concerns and discuss 
issues together.  The variety of participants results in policies and activities that affect both ground-
level operations and policy development and implementation (Coulton et al., 2010a; Ford, May 5, 
2011; Lind, May 19, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
                                                          
160 This separation led to the recommendation that a county-wide information system be established, which 
became NEO CANDO (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
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Much of VAPAC’s work involves systems reform.  For example, code enforcement efforts—a 
foreclosure mitigation tool—were stepped up as a result of VAPAC discussions (see Section 5.5) (Lind, 
May 19, 2011).  VAPAC was also key in the development of the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization 
Corporation (see Section 5.4.2), lobbying for the required state legislation and testifying before the 
state government (Lind, May 19, 2011).  VAPAC has also created a code of conduct for REO owners, 
developed guidelines for municipal CRA agreements, and held a county-wide code enforcement 
summit (Coulton et al., 2010a).  Another issue VAPAC addressed was related to Board of Revisions, or 
tax, foreclosures.  Board of Revisions foreclosures had often been put on hold due to the legal principle 
of lis pendens, meaning that no foreclosure suit would be initiated until prior pending lawsuits were 
resolved.  Sometimes these pending cases stalled, resulting in abandoned properties sitting and further 
deteriorating, reducing the effectiveness of Board of Revisions foreclosures as a blight-prevention tool.  
As the result of VAPAC efforts, the court made efforts to close out cases pending on properties where 
Board of Revisions foreclosures were pending (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Sally Martin, South 
Euclid’s Housing Manager and a member of VAPAC, credited the council with facilitating more 
demolitions in South Euclid than were previously possible (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
5.4.2 Landbanking 
One of the key issues in preventing and removing blight due to vacant and abandoned property is that 
of property acquisition and control.  If properties, especially REOs, are transferred to speculators and 
irresponsible investors, the blight problem continues, worsens, and spreads.  Instead, it is necessary 
for communities or the county to develop strategies to acquire and control these properties in order 
to maintain, improve, or reuse them.  In addition to reducing the vacant and abandoned property 
problem, larger tracts of land can be assembled for redevelopment as well.  An innovative and effective 
tool to achieve this purpose is the modern land bank, an entity that “allows . . . so much more flexibility 
to get stuff done, and get titles cleaned and back into productive use.  It’s a big big thing” (Welo & 
Martin, May 12, 2011). 
On December 10th, 2008, the Ohio state legislature passed enabling legislation (SB161 353) that allowed 
Cuyahoga County to create a county-wide Land Reutilization Authority, otherwise referred to as a Land 
Bank (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).  In April 2009, when the law went into effect, the Cuyahoga County 
Land Reutilization Corporation (CCLRC), often referred to as the County Land Bank, was created (Ford, 
2009).  The enabling legislation originally only applied to Cuyahoga County, but after additional 
counties petitioned the state legislature, the legislation was extended to cover an additional 41 of the 
88 counties in Ohio.  As of May 2013, fifteen counties have begun or completed the process of 
establishing a county land bank (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013). 
According to the County Land Bank’s website, “The mission of the Cuyahoga Land Bank is to 
strategically acquire properties, return them to productive use, reduce blight, increase property 
values, support community goals and improve the quality of life for county residents” (Cuyahoga 
County Land Bank, 2013).  This section will examine the structure and objectives of the CCLRC, followed 
by an example illustrating the advantages of a modern land bank162 in comparison to the traditional 
form. 
                                                          
161 (Ohio) Senate Bill. 
162 An introduction to the differences between a traditional and modern landbank is provided in Section 2.4.3. 
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Structure & Objectives 
As discussed in Section 4.2.2, vacant and abandoned properties have been one of the greatest 
problems facing Cuyahoga County.  The first step in addressing this problem is to gain control of 
abandoned and dangerous properties, as well as vacant properties that are at risk of becoming 
abandoned.  To do so, Cuyahoga County emulated the structure of the Genesee County Land Bank 
(Flint, Michigan), which was the first of its kind in the nation and had already shown success by 2008 
(Hexter & Schnoke, 2009). 
The (Cuyahoga) County Land Bank is a non-profit, quasi-public entity formed by the county with a 
statutorily defined mission to “acquire vacant and abandoned housing, remediate it, and put it back 
into productive use” (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013, p.19).  To do so, the land bank has the 
authority to demolish property, borrow money, issue bonds, accept property as gifts, apply for grants, 
provide mortgages, and, with County permission, seek a general operating levy (tax) (Hexter & 
Schnoke, 2009).  The County Land Bank is independent of county government, but overseen by a Board 
of Directors consisting primarily of county officials (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 2013).  The land 
bank is funded by penalties and interest paid on delinquent property taxes and assessments, projected 
to be between $6 and $8 million per year (Ford, 2009; Hexter & Schnoke, 2009; Swanstrom & Brooks, 
2010).  Additional funding flows include the sale of acquired properties to qualified purchasers and 
fees for managing mothballed163 properties (Hexter & Schnoke, 2009).   
As quoted above, the land bank’s mission is to strategically gain control of properties and return them 
to productive use beneficial to the county and community in which they are located.  The Year 3 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative report lists the following goals for the county land bank: 
 “Facilitate the reclamation, rehabilitation and reutilization of vacant, abandoned, tax 
foreclosed and/or other real property. 
 Efficiently hold and manage that real property pending its reclamation, rehabilitation and 
reutilization. 
 Assist governmental entities and other non-profit or for-profit entities in the assembly of that 
real property and the clearing of title in a coordinated manner. 
 Promote economic and housing development of the county or region” (Hexter & Schnoke, 
2009, p.28). 
Simplified, the above four goals are to (1) obtain property, (2) “store” or mothball property, (3) reuse 
property, and (4) benefit the county while doing the above.  The fourth goal, to benefit the county, 
directs the land bank to carry out the first three objectives in a strategic manner, rather than simply 
acquiring any available property.  Alternatively, Jim Rokakis, who spearheaded the effort to create the 
county land bank, described the land bank’s primary activity as triaging properties, determining which 
to tear down, which to hold for future redevelopment, and which to hold for responsible rehabilitation 
(2011). 
The land bank acquires properties primarily in three ways:  (1) through Board of Revisions (tax) 
foreclosures, (2) from properties abandoned by financial institutions (REOs), and (3) property 
donations (Cuyahoga County Land Bank, 2013).  Board of Revisions foreclosures are accelerated 
                                                          
163 Mothballing is the practice of putting a property (or other capital) into storage while keeping it in working 
condition.   
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foreclosures for vacant and abandoned property with delinquent property taxes.  The purpose of this 
fast-track foreclosure process is to limit the negative effects of vacant and abandoned properties.   
The county land bank has also worked with national level partners to acquire properties.  These 
organizations work to connect national financial institutions with local community development 
organizations and to achieve discounts on REO purchases for local organizations.  In particular, the 
National Community Stabilization Trust (NCST), formed by six national non-profits in 2008, is an 
organization founded with the mission of facilitating the transfer of REO properties to local housing 
organizations and promoting productive reuse and neighborhood stability.  The organization also seeks 
to build local capacity to acquire, manage, sell, and rehabilitate foreclosed properties.  In particular, 
the NCST has worked to form public-private partnerships to better leverage NSP dollars (Nickerson, 
2010).  Similarly, the REO Clearinghouse, a for-profit organization founded by SafeGuard Properties in 
2009, has been a partner in the county land bank’s efforts (Coulton, Schramm, & Hirsch, 2010b). 
Parcels owned by the county land bank are available for purchase to responsible investors and 
qualified individuals.  The land bank sells both professionally renovated residential properties and 
properties to renovate.  In the case of properties to renovate, the land bank offers these at prices from 
$4,000 to approximately $20,000, depending on the degree of renovation required.  Once a property 
appears for sale, the municipality in which the property is located has first right of refusal164 for thirty 
days, after which the sale is opened to owner-occupants and investors.  Owner-occupants are given 
priority in purchasing houses which require less renovation.  The land bank also offers several financing 
programs to prospective renovators (Cuyahoga County Land Bank, 2013). 
The land bank also offers side lots for purchase to owner-occupants of adjacent properties.  Once a lot 
is vacant, usually after an abandoned property is demolished, these lots can be purchased for $100165 
to be used as yard expansion.  To purchase such a lot, the homeowner must be current on property 
taxes and have no outstanding housing or zoning violations, and obtain a letter of support from his or 
her municipal councilperson, mayor, or housing department (Cuyahoga County Land Bank, 2013). 
In addition to renovated properties and side lots, the land bank contracts demolitions and 
deconstructions of houses impractical to renovate, and works with governments and community 
organizations to convert vacant lots to community gardens and for use as urban agriculture (Cuyahoga 
County Land Bank, 2013). 
Advantages 
As previously mentioned, modern land banks have several advantages with respect to blight 
prevention and reduction in comparison to traditional land banks.  Traditional land banks were 
designed and created for a different purpose and thus are not ideally suited for addressing foreclosure-
related blight.   For example, the City of Cleveland has a land bank as well. And although it owns and 
holds a large number of properties, it is unable to manage or maintain properties containing vacant 
structures due to financial and legal limitations (Ford, 2009). 
                                                          
164 “First right of refusal” is a contractual right that gives the holder exclusive right to enter a transaction 
according to conditioned specified in the contract, similar to a call option. 
165 Some larger parcels with additional redevelopment potential are sold for higher prices. 
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The experience in Cuyahoga County illustrates the advantages of a modern land bank.  The City of 
Cleveland Land Bank (as well as other municipal land banks located in the county) had been interested 
in obtaining REO properties held by Fannie Mae, but had difficulties getting to the bargaining table.  It 
took the City of Cleveland over a year to do so, and ultimately no agreement was finalized.  Once the 
county land bank came into existence, it also tried to bring Fannie Mae to the bargaining table.  Only 
six months after its incorporation, the Cuyahoga County Land Bank finalized an agreement with Fannie 
Mae, stipulating that the land bank has a first right of refusal on all Fannie Mae REO properties valued 
below $25,000; the land bank pays $1 for each of these properties it purchases, and Fannie Mae 
contributes $3,500 toward the demolition of unsalvageable properties.166  Fannie Mae reported that 
it preferred to work with a single purchaser who bought large numbers of properties.  Similarly, the 
county land bank later made an agreement with HUD, in which it has first right of refusal to purchase 
any property worth $20,000 or less for $100, and receives discounts on higher-valued properties 
(Fitzpatrick IV, 2010). 
The impact of the land bank on municipalities’ and communities’ abilities to manage the vacant 
property problem in their areas has been considerable:  “The county land bank . . . that’s a 
gamechanger too.  It allows us so much more flexibility to get stuff done, and get titles cleaned and 
back into productive use.  It’s a big big thing” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  In fact, the CCLRC’s clear 
success was the reason for the state to authorize the creation of modern land banks in other Ohio 
counties as well. 
Figure 5.8 shows the maximum percentage of land banked parcels in a Census tract over the years 
2000 to 2010.  Again, the ratio shown is the maximum number of land banked parcels as a percentage 
of total residential properties in the tract.  The image is quite similar to that showing the Board of 
Revisions foreclosure rate, above, but is even more restricted to the City of Cleveland, and the east 
side in particular.  This reflects both higher foreclosure rates, and subsequent vacant and abandoned 
property rates, found on the east side of Cleveland, as well as the focus in these communities on using 
land banking as a policy tool to address deteriorating and unsafe properties.  One can also see elevated 
rates in the SII neighborhoods (see Figure 5.7, page 273).  In comparison, this relationship is not clearly 
observable in the tracts that received NSP2 funding (Figure 5.11, page 289). Again, one can see 
particularly high levels of land banking activity in SII and NSP neighborhoods. 
                                                          
166 $3,500 represented fifty percent of the average demolition cost at the time the agreement was made.  Later, 
the average rose to about $10,000, due to the additional $3,000 needed for asbestos removal for a large 
proportion of demolished houses (Ford, October 12, 2012). 
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Figure 5.8:  Maximum Landbanked Property Rate in Cuyahoga County, 2000 – 2010 
According to a Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank Staff Report, the Cuyahoga County Land Bank averages 
over one hundred properties per month in acquisitions.  Further, since its founding in 2009, the land 
bank has acquired over two thousand vacant and abandoned properties.  It has demolished over a 
thousand properties and rehabilitated seven hundred (Nozar, 2013; Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland, 2013). 
Cuyahoga County generated a cost structure for holding, marketing, and selling both vacant properties 
and vacant land.  The costs depend on the length of time a property is held, whether a structure is on 
the parcel, and the time of year.  The approximate cost for holding, marketing, and selling a vacant 
structure is $4,480 during winter months and $5,020 during summer months.  Vacant land costs $1,440 
per year to maintain (Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention, 2011). 
Whitaker & Fitzpatrick IV (2012) released a study of the Cuyahoga County Land Bank and the impact 
of its activities on property values.  They found that sale prices of properties located within 500 feet of 
a property that would be acquired by the land bank in the future were depressed by 3% to 5%.167  In 
contrast, sale prices of homes located within 500 feet of a land bank-owned property saw a 5% 
increase.  Sale prices of properties located close to a land bank demolition saw a 4% to 9% increase 
over homes not located near a land bank demolition.  
The authors also examined the impacts on 329 properties in their sample that were located near a land 
bank property or demolition and were sold during the study period.  They found evidence that the 
                                                          
167 The idea here is that the land bank tends to acquire particularly problematic properties, i.e. those that would 
negatively impact the value of nearby properties. 
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total sales value ($12,154,739) would be 13% less ($1,583,334) if not for the presence of the land bank 
properties (Whitaker & Fitzpatrick IV, 2012).  Taking the per house value of $4,813, the costs incurred 
by the land bank and the increases in nearby sale prices approximately cancel out.  However, the 
analysis includes only properties that were sold during the study period, not the increase in property 
value and mortgage equity seen by all nearby property owners.  Thus, in a moderately dense urban or 
suburban environment,168 the positive impact of land banking activities significantly outweighs the 
costs of holding, marketing, and selling land bank properties. 
5.4.3 Board of Revisions Foreclosures 
Board of Revisions foreclosures, also known as tax foreclosures, are used to gain control of an 
abandoned property when property taxes have not be paid to the county.  The county then becomes 
a creditor and can file a foreclosure suit to seize the property.  This tool is used to gain control of 
problem properties that are damaging the community.  Since 2006, it has been possible to expedite 
Board of Revisions foreclosures of vacant properties in the state of Ohio, which has increased the value 
of using these foreclosures as a foreclosure mitigation response. 
Figure 5.9 maps the ratio of Board of Revisions foreclosures to the total number of residential 
properties in a Census tract, for the years 2006 to 2010.  The map shows that Board of Revisions 
foreclosures were much more heavily concentrated on the east side of Cleveland.  The eastern inner 
suburbs and the west side of Cleveland also saw more Board of Revisions foreclosure activity than the 
county overall, but to a much lesser extent than Cleveland’s east side.  Interestingly, in comparison to 
foreclosure counseling, Board of Revisions foreclosures are comparatively limited to the east side of 
Cleveland.  This is likely due to the large numbers of abandoned properties in these communities in 
comparison to the west side of Cleveland and the suburbs.  However, this doesn’t entirely explain what 
is observed; one would expect a higher rate of Board of Revisions foreclosures on the west side of 
Cleveland if the main factor were the vacancy rate seen in the tract (see Figure 4.12). 
The distribution also likely reflects the use of other foreclosure interventions, such as the SII and NSP 
funds.  These efforts used property acquisition and control responses in a strategic and concentrated 
manner to address blight problems.  Comparing Figure 5.9 with Figure 5.7 (page 273), there is 
significant overlap between the SII areas and areas with higher concentrations of Board of Revisions 
foreclosures, as well as in areas adjacent to SII areas.  Again, this relationship is less evident for Board 
of Revisions foreclosures and areas that received NSP2 funding (Figure 5.11, page 289). 
                                                          
168 For example, the dominant lot pattern in Slavic Village has 20 foot frontages, meaning at least forty properties 
are located within 500 feet of a landbank-owned property as one proceeds along the street.  The front lot-back 
lot land use pattern increases this number further.  Thus, the financial impact would be much higher when all 
properties located within a 500 foot radius of the property are included. 
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Figure 5.9:  Board of Revisions Foreclosures in Cuyahoga County, 2006 - 2010 
5.4.4 Demolitions 
Another property acquisition and control response used in Cuyahoga County is demolitions.  
Demolitions are used to remove blighted or dangerous structures from properties.  These properties 
are then frequently put into reuse as community gardens, sidelot expansions, and other greenspace 
uses.  Though in some cases these uses are permanent, it is also possible to implement temporary and 
productive uses until longer-term redevelopment plans are feasible. 
Examining the distribution of demolition concentration in Figure 5.10, one can that the pattern varies 
from that observed for the other property acquisition and control strategies covered in this section.  In 
this case, the demolition data are limited to the City of Cleveland, due to availability issues.  Thus 
demolitions that occurred in other Cuyahoga County municipalities are not displayed on the map.  
Given the distribution’s similarity to the distributions shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.8, it is likely that 
the concentrations of demolitions in Census tracts outside the City of Cleveland are comparatively low.  
Again there is a correlation between areas with higher demolition rates and the locations of the SII 
target areas (see Figure 5.7, page 273), but in this case only on the east side—the two west side SII 
neighborhoods, Tremont and Detroit Shoreway, show very low demolition rates. No obvious 
correlation between areas with higher demolition rates and areas that received NSP2 funds (see Figure 
5.11, page 289) is apparent.  Demolitions are concentrated on the east side of Cleveland; this likely 
reflects both the earlier onset and the devastating effects of the foreclosure crisis as well as the fact 
that the lower typical property value of structures in these areas reduces the likelihood that a 
rehabilitation is financially feasible. 
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Figure 5.10:  Demolition Rate in Cuyahoga County, 2005 – 2010 
Prior to general awareness of the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga County, the City of Cleveland carried 
out approximately two hundred residential demolitions per year.  In 2007 and 2008, the city 
demolished approximately one thousand homes per year, and was expected to demolish 1,700 
properties in 2010 (Ford, 2009).  According to Edward Rybka, Director of the Department of Building 
and Housing for the City of Cleveland at the time, the city demolished a total of 6,100 over the period 
2006 to 2012, at a cost of $44 million or about $7,200 per demolition (Condon Jr., 2012).  Referring to 
Figure 5.10, some tracts experienced demolition rates over 8%, with a maximum observed rate of 
13.7% of all residential units demolished.  As discussed in Section 5.6.1, Slavic Village has been 
especially active when it comes to demolitions.  According to Tony Brancatelli, as of mid-2011 the 
community had demolished eight to nine hundred properties over the last decade (2011). 
One study has examined the effects of demolitions in Cleveland with respect to real estate equity and 
foreclosures.  The study found that approximately six thousand demolitions occurred in Cleveland 
between 2009 and 2013, at a cost of approximately $56.3 million.  The researchers calculated that 
these demolitions resulting in an increase in real estate equity of $78.9 million.  Taking the difference, 
the net benefit was $22.6 million in increased property values.  These benefits accrued primarily in 
moderate and high functioning real estate markets, with minimal impact on weak real estate markets.  
In addition, the researchers found evidence that demolitions decrease foreclosure rates in all real 
estate markets (Griswold, Calnin, Schramm, Anselin, & Boehnlein, 2014). 
 289 
 
5.4.5 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
A second important component of fighting blight is the Neighborhood Stabilization Program, a federal 
program established in order to stabilize communities suffering from blight and abandonment as a 
result of the foreclosure crisis.  Councilman Tony Brancatelli of the Slavic Village neighborhood referred 
to NSP funds as a “lifesaver” that allowed for a big demolition push to calm and stabilize 
neighborhoods, despite the sometimes unwieldy restrictions on their use.  In fact, the City of Cleveland 
pioneered using NSP funds for large-scale demolition.  According to Communities at Risk (Living Cities, 
2011), the city used $15 million of its $25 million in NSP funds, or sixty percent, for demolition.  In 
comparison, cities on average planned to use six percent of their NSP funds for demolition. 
The City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County each received NSP1 and NSP3 funds, while the Cuyahoga 
County Land Reutilization Corporation, leading a coalition that included the City of Cleveland, 
Cuyahoga County, and the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), received NSP2 funds 
(OneCPD, 2013a; Bulava, 2013).  The NSP2 funding award was particularly impressive; the coalition led 
by the land bank received one of the highest per capita allocations nationally.  Twenty communities 
received funding, with fifteen of them in the City of Cleveland169 (Bulava, 2013).  Figure 5.11 shows the 
Census tracts that received NSP2 funding.   
Figure 5.11:  Census Tracts Awarded NSP2 Funds 
                                                          
169 The fifteen communities in the City of Cleveland were Detroit Shoreway/West Tech, Corlett, Fairfax, Glenville, 
Lee-Miles, Westown, Mount Pleasant, Slavic Village, Old Brooklyn, Colfax/Garden Valley, St. Clair Superior, 
Buckeye/Larchmere, Collinwood, Tremont and Clark Fulton.  The five communities outside of Cleveland were 
East Cleveland, Lakewood, Shaker Heights, University Heights and Garfield Heights. 
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Table 5.15 lists the amounts awarded by round and entity, as well as the distribution among the 
approved activity categories, while Figure 5.12 shows this graphically. Each area that received NSP 
money has its own development program and funding priorities; in addition there is no readily 
available data concerning NSP allocations on the tract or block level.  Thus this level of detail is not 
included here.   
 
Figure 5.12: NSP Awards for Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, and the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation  
Sources:  OneCPD (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f) 
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Table 5.15:  NSP Awards for Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, and the Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation  
Sources:  OneCPD (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f) 
 
  
Acquisition Clearance Homeownership Land Banking
Public Facilities, 
Economic 
Development
Residential, 
New 
Construction
Residential, 
Rehabilitation
Other Total
City of Cleveland $0 $8,860,303 $0 $550,000 $0 $0 $6,008,027 $1,614,120 $17,032,450
Cuyahoga County $0 $172,446 $316,834 $885,273 $958,266 $0 $8,664,124 $846,244 $11,843,187
NSP2 CCLRC $0 $6,554,776 $0 $418,362 $0 $10,258,348 $20,685,514 $3,167,199 $41,084,199
City of Cleveland $0 $2,814,290 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,800,000 $679,000 $6,293,290
Cuyahoga County $0 $508,496 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,942,234 $100,803 $2,551,533
$0.0 $18,910,311.0 $316,834.0 $1,853,635.0 $958,266.0 $10,258,348.0 $40,099,899.0 $6,407,366.0 $78,804,659.0
Acquisition Clearance Homeownership Land Banking
Public Facilities, 
Economic 
Development
Residential, 
New 
Construction
Residential, 
Rehabilitation Other
City of Cleveland 0.0% 52.0% 0.0% 32.0% 0.0% 0.0% 35.3% 9.5%
Cuyahoga County 0.0% 1.5% 2.7% 7.5% 8.1% 0.0% 73.2% 7.1%
NSP2 CCLRC 0.0% 15.9% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 25.0% 50.4% 7.7%
City of Cleveland 0.0% 44.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 44.5% 10.8%
Cuyahoga County 0.0% 19.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 76.1% 4.0%
0.0% 24.0% 0.4% 2.4% 1.2% 13.0% 50.9% 8.1%Overall Percentage
Total
NSP1
NSP3
Activity Type
Activity Type
NSP1
NSP3
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5.5 Legal Efforts 
Various parties in Cuyahoga County have also pursued legal action to prevent or manage the effects of 
foreclosure.  These have included code enforcement, public nuisance lawsuits, and building mortgage 
fraud cases.   
5.5.1 Code Enforcement 
The housing code details the minimum requirements to which residential properties must be 
maintained.  It covers aspects such as how many exits a building must have, what is and is not 
acceptable wiring, and how the property should appear from the street.  Vacant and abandoned 
buildings often do not meet these standards.  Frank Ford described how code inspection and 
enforcement in the City of Cleveland was weak and slow, and that as the number of foreclosures 
increased, an already overburdened system simply was not able to keep up.  As a result, financial 
institutions, flippers, and investors did not keep or bring their properties up to code: 
There was no sense of urgency . . . It was more like, well, the last thing I have to worry about 
is a city inspector inspecting my property.  I can drift, I can coast, I can do nothing with this 
property because the chances of [the property] being inspected, based on the city’s track 
record back in ’04 and ’05, were so low that you could count on the fact that you could just get 
by doing nothing and wait.  There was no downside to holding a vacant property and letting it 
deteriorate (Ford, May 5, 2011).  
As the foreclosure problem progressed, the Cleveland Municipal Housing Court stepped up its 
prosecution of housing code violations, particularly for REOs.  REO owners are financial institutions 
and not local property owners, and often ignore code violations and court summons.  To overcome 
this, the housing court began holding trials in absentia, and issuing fines to financial institutions who 
did not maintain their properties to standard.  Given the large number of REO properties, these fines 
were quite high—for example, an Oklahoma investor was fined $140,000, while a California investor 
was fined $850,000 (Ford, 2009).  Altogether, the court issued $1.4 million in fines (Guillen, 2010). 
However, in mid-2010 the Ohio Supreme Court forbade the Cleveland Municipal Housing Court from 
holding additional housing code trials in absentia.  Instead, the courts began holding financial 
institutions in contempt of court if they fail to appear twice.  Using this method, the court had issued 
$8.3 million in fines as of mid-2010 (Guillen, 2010). 
By aggressively prosecuting code violations, the county has reduced its demolition costs.  Rather than 
pay many thousands of dollars in fines, several large financial institutions agreed to pay for all or part 
of the demolition cost of their worst properties and turn them over to the county land bank.  Typically 
this ranged from $3,500 to $7,500, with financial institutions paying for a portion or all of the cost of 
half of the county’s seven hundred scheduled demolitions in 2011 (Ford, October 12, 2012). 
The housing court also hears cases of nuisance abatement when a property poses a danger to the 
community and the owner is unresponsive.  To rectify the problem, the court is able to put the property 
into receivership and transfer control of the property to a third party, generally a CDC, which 
demolishes the property at the owner’s expense (Coulton et al., 2010a). 
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The court also has a “clean hands” docket, which prevents a party from initiating eviction proceedings 
if there is a code violation case pending for the property.  The result of these policies has been 
increased numbers of REO owners appearing for their court dates (Coulton et al., 2010a). 
To assist in code enforcement, some cities have developed Vacant Property Registration Ordinances 
(see Section 2.4.3), which require properties that fulfill the ordinance’s definition of vacancy to be 
registered with the city, in order to ensure vacant property owners can be identified and held 
accountable for the condition of their properties. South Euclid, which passed the first ordinance of this 
type in Ohio, requires a $200 yearly registration fee and monthly inspections.  An inspection certificate 
is required before a vacant property can be sold, and violations must either be rectified before the sale 
or, if the buyer takes responsibility, an escrow account of at least $1,000 must be set up before the 
title transfer can take place.  Two years into the ordinance’s existence, it was credited with bringing 
two hundred houses up to code and another one hundred closer to code compliance (Chronicle-
Telegram Staff, 2012).   
5.5.2 Public Nuisance Lawsuits 
In addition to stepping up code inspection and enforcement, efforts were made to attack the 
abandonment and blight problem more systematically, through the use of public nuisance lawsuits.  
Both the City of Cleveland and a subsidiary of NPI filed public nuisance lawsuits in an attempt to rectify 
and prevent additional damage. 
A public nuisance is an injury suffered by the community as a whole, rather than by specific individuals, 
as the result of interference with the rights bestowed upon the public, such as violations of public 
health and safety.  A classic example of a public nuisance is the pollution of a waterway by a factory, 
where an entire community suffers injury—in this case decreased water quality—as a result of a 
private entity’s conduct.  Legislatively there are definitions of public nuisance that are very close to 
defining vacant and abandoned buildings in an urban area as public nuisance (Lind, May 19, 2011).  
Based on this several public nuisance lawsuits have been filed in the Cleveland area in an effort to 
prevent and address the negative impacts of vacant and abandoned properties.   
The City of Cleveland filed a public nuisance lawsuit against 21 banks and mortgage lenders, asserting 
that their subprime lending practices had created a public nuisance in the City of Cleveland.  More 
specifically, their use of risky lending practices resulted in increased foreclosures, which then created 
a public nuisance in the form of abandoned and blighted properties, which then caused injury to 
Cleveland’s economy (Ricciardi, 2010).  The crux of the case was whether there was a causal connection 
between the defendants’ actions (subprime lending) and the plaintiff’s injury (increased poverty and 
mass foreclosures) (Cohen & Rosenthal, 2008).  However, the judge ruled that the harms were distinct 
from the misconduct, and thus no redress was warranted (Ricciardi, 2010). 
As the problems caused by vacant and abandoned houses became increasingly apparent, it was 
realized that a means of intervention was necessary for properties which the owner was unable or 
unwilling to maintain.  Kermit Lind and Tony Brancatelli in particular became aware of the use of Ohio’s 
Nuisance Abatement statute, as the result of a case involving blighted properties in Slavic Village in 
1999 (Lind, May 19, 2011).  At first, these public nuisance lawsuits were undertaken on the basis of 
location, by filing nuisance lawsuits against each owner with an abandoned property in a specific 
neighborhood.  However, it became clear that an owner-based strategy would be more efficient by 
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naming many problem properties owned by a particular individual or institution in one lawsuit (Lind, 
May 19, 2011). 
Cleveland Housing Renewal Project (CHRP), a subsidiary of NPI, sued Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo 
on the grounds of a public nuisance created by their REO properties in NPI’s six SII areas.  The lawsuit 
alleged that “owning and dumping vacant REO property is a public nuisance that threatens the health 
and safety of neighbors and damages property values” and sought correction of conditions, via 
rehabilitation or demolition, rather than damages (Ford, 2009).  The lawsuit had three claims and 
requested that the housing court:  “(1) find the specific properties named to be ‘public nuisances,’ (2) 
order the owner to abate the nuisance at the named addresses, and (3) find the general business 
practice of owning and failing to maintain the post-foreclosure property to be a public nuisance” 
(Cleveland Housing Renewal Project, 2010).  The third claim was key—that the financial institutions’ 
business practice of “deliberately ignoring the local housing codes and allowing their properties to 
languish there in an unsafe condition in violation of law” should be declared unlawful (Lind, May 19, 
2011).  Otherwise stated, “we just asked them to be financially responsible for dealing with their own 
trash” (Lind, May 19, 2011). 
Rather than naming all vacant properties owned by Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo, CHRP decided to 
strategically select the most egregious examples for the lawsuit.  Frank Ford did the inspections 
himself, selecting properties open to casual access and thus posing a clear danger to the community.  
He cited a Deutsche Bank-owned property as an example:  owned two to three years with no property 
tax paid (approximately $8,000 owed), no back door, and water running in the basement due to the 
copper pipes having been stripped.  The management company’s inspection log last held an entry from 
two years ago (Ford, May 5, 2011).  By selecting the worst of the worst, CHRP increased the likelihood 
of a ruling in their favor. 
The Cleveland Municipal Housing Court issued an injunction against Wells Fargo, ordering the company 
to bring all of its inventory, approximately 150 houses, up to code, or demolish them (Ford, 2009).  
However, Wells Fargo appealed the decision, and the Ohio Court of Appeals struck down the third 
claim, concerning the general business practice as public nuisance.  Though Wells Fargo and Deutsche 
Bank had demolished approximately 40 structures (saving the city $400,000 in demolition costs) as a 
result of the case, the key objective was the business practice claim.  Without it, lawsuits would need 
to be filed continually, naming each non-code compliant property.  CHRP and NPI (or other parties) 
would need to constantly file lawsuits on properties already presenting a public nuisance, resulting in 
a costly and time-intensive process to rectify blighted REOs.  Though the Court of Appeals struck down 
the third claim on standing grounds (meaning that CHRP had not suffered measurable harm in the 
Court’s opinion), indicating that other parties, who did (in the Court’s opinion) suffer measurable harm 
from non-code compliant REOs, could sue seeking a court order against the general business practice 
(Cleveland Housing Renewal Project, 2010). 
5.5.3 Investigating Fraud 
Cleveland experienced significant levels of flipping and mortgage fraud, which was relatively easy to 
carry out given the state of Ohio’s exclusion of mortgages from consumer protection statutes through 
2007 (Christie, 2007c).  In some cases, communities were devastated by these practices.  For example, 
Slavic Village was particularly hard hit (see Section 4.4.1). 
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Slavic Village residents, staff of the local CDC (Slavic Village Development), and the ward councilman, 
Tony Brancatelli, undertook an investigation into flipping and mortgage fraud in their community.  
Examining the time period from 2003 to 2007, they found suspicious patterns between mortgage 
brokers and appraisers and, using NEO CANDO, strong evidence of flipping.  They turned their report 
over to law enforcement, which led to indictments (Coulton et al., 2010a).  In this particular 
investigation, seven individuals were indicted for mortgage fraud, totaling $5.8 million in loans for 78 
houses (Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, 2008; Atassi, 2009), over 90% of which experienced foreclosure 
(Jackson, 2010).  The leader of this scheme was sentenced to fourteen years in prison, a record 
sentence at the time, and ordered to repay over $5.8 million in restitution to lenders and 
approximately $187,000 to those who had sold their properties on the same block as one of the 
properties involved in the scheme (WKYC, 2010; Mortgage Fraud Blog, 2010). 
Cuyahoga County also developed a Mortgage Fraud Task Force in 2007, which also worked on the 
Slavic Village cases.  During its first three years of operation, the task force indicted 339 people involved 
with a total of $121 million in mortgage fraud spread across 892 properties and 29 cities (WKYC, 2010).  
Other major cases included a case involving five individuals, $44 million in fraudulent loans, and 453 
properties in fourteen cities.  Of the 453 properties involved, 358 went into foreclosure (Galbincea, 
2011; Steer, 2011).  Another scheme involved thirty-two people and four companies that took out $5.1 
million in fraudulent loans for properties on Cleveland’s east side (Gillispie, 2011). 
5.6 Community & Neighborhood Level Efforts 
In addition to the county- and city-level efforts described earlier in this chapter, many communities 
have responded to the foreclosure crisis by leveraging resources provided by the aforementioned 
programs as well as creating and implementing their own, locally-based and -tailored efforts.  These 
efforts include forming neighborhood block groups and local CDCs, conducting doorknocking efforts in 
their communities, neighborhood clean-up efforts, and the use of peer pressure, to name a few.  In 
some cases communities have implemented responses very similar to county efforts, using and 
leveraging their own resources.   A good example of this would be Slavic Village’s aggressive demolition 
effort, which began well before the Strategic Investment Initiative and the Opportunity Homes 
program. 
Rather than attempting the difficult and time-intensive task of detailing all neighborhood-level 
responses, here I will detail neighborhood-level efforts in the two communities of Slavic Village and 
South Euclid.  Slavic Village, a working class neighborhood on the east side of Cleveland, is nationally 
known as one of the communities earliest and hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis (see Section 4.4.1).  
As a result, Slavic Village began devising foreclosure responses before many other communities had 
even recognized the existence of a foreclosure problem.  Barbara Anderson, a community activist, and 
Tony Brancatelli, the local city council man, both participated in the foreclosure discussion at the 
national level.   
The City of South Euclid is a suburban “starter home” municipality located to the east of the City of 
Cleveland that has seen its share of foreclosure problems as well (see Section 4.4.2).  South Euclid has 
also gained significant national attention, due to the efforts of its citizens and officials, and particularly 
those of Mayor Georgine Welo, who initially drew attention to the problem of vacant and abandoned 
property as the result of unresolved foreclosure cases in the Cuyahoga Courts (see Section 5.2.1). 
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As mentioned in Section 4.4, neither Slavic Village nor South Euclid could be said to have a “typical” 
foreclosure response in the Cleveland area.  Both areas have been on the forefront of local responses, 
and both have had significant influences on the county, regional, and national debates concerning the 
foreclosure crisis and how to appropriately and effectively respond. 
Section 4.3 provided brief overviews of the history and demographic and economic situations of each 
community, as well as a description of the foreclosure problem in each.  This section discusses 
community-level foreclosure responses for each of the communities.  The focus is on efforts that occur 
primarily at the community level, such as block clubs and neighborhood clean-ups, though some 
responses and strategies that occur at multiple levels are mentioned as well. 
5.6.1 Foreclosure Responses in Slavic Village 
All of the aforementioned foreclosure responses—systems reform advocacy, foreclosure prevention 
counseling, foreclosure mediation, the Strategic Investment Initiative and Opportunity Homes 
program, NSP funding, land banking, and mortgage fraud investigation—have been a part of the 
foreclosure response in the Slavic Village community.  In addition, residents have self-organized and 
undertaken many community improvement efforts themselves.  Some of these actions are in direct 
relation to the negative effects of the foreclosure crisis, particularly the vacant property problem.  
Others take a longer view of these effects, and work to envision opportunities and strategies for the 
future.  Finally, many efforts address the damage done to the community fabric by both the foreclosure 
problem and the community issues that predate it.  This section examines these three primary 
categories of community responses as seen in Slavic Village. 
I have chosen to leave some of the efforts undertaken in Slavic Village out of this section, primarily 
because they have been covered previously in this chapter.  Very few of the programs and efforts 
discussed occur only at one level.  For example, mortgage fraud investigations are discussed in Section 
5.5, although Slavic Village had its own major mortgage fraud investigation efforts that actually 
predated county-level efforts.  As well, the implementation of the Strategic Investment Initiative is 
very specific to each community in which it takes place.  However, other than a short mention, I have 
discussed this program on the county level rather than on the community level. 
Just as Slavic Village was the first and hardest hit area in Cleveland by foreclosures, it was also the first 
to respond to the effects of the foreclosure crisis within the community.  Barbara Anderson stated “it 
was devastating.  And there were no ground rules.  We didn’t know what to do or what we could do.  
So the good thing about Slavic Village, and the good thing about being hit first, and [that] there were 
no ground rules, is that we made up our own rules” (Anderson, May 9, 2011).  Thus, the reason so 
many innovative responses originated in Slavic Village is the same reason the extent of foreclosures 
and their damages to the community was so great.  Even as the problem expanded and became 
newsworthy, it was necessary for the community to help itself:  “There’s [federal] programs, or I’m 
sorry, there’s titles of programs out there, but the help that the average consumer is getting is very 
small.  It is nowhere in comparison to the help that the banks got” (Anderson, May 9, 2011). 
A main player not yet mentioned are Slavic Village’s block clubs.  Slavic Village Development, the area 
CDC, lists fourteen active block clubs (Slavic Village Development, 2014).  I interviewed several block 
club members and sat in on a meeting of the Bring Back the 70’s Street Club (BB70),170 located in Slavic 
                                                          
170 The 70’s refers to the streets the club covers, not the decade. 
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Village, to the north of Broadway.  The club was founded in 2004 and is a racially mixed group with 
about fifteen core members.  With the exception of Barbara Anderson and Tereena Marks, the 
president, the group is comprised mainly of senior men, which is unusual.  The members are generally 
long-term residents; the group I met had resided in Slavic Village from a low of seventeen years to a 
high of over seventy (Anderson, Marks, & Malianga, May 18, 2011).  The group lists its priorities as 
safety, security, and beautification in the North Broadway neighborhood.   
Many of the foreclosure-related activities occurring in Slavic Village are initiated by or organized by its 
block clubs.  These activities often work with or capitalize on other foreclosure-related efforts that take 
place in the community or at the county level.  Investigating the activities of the Bring Back the 70’s 
Street Club, these activities can be grouped according to three strategies:  (1) dealing with blight, (2) 
strengthening the community fabric, and (3) planning for the future.  Rather than detailing each 
response individually, here I group neighborhood- and community-level responses by strategy for 
clarity.   
Dealing with Blight 
The strategy used in neighborhood- and community-level responses is that of addressing blight in the 
community.  As discussed in Section 4.4.1, Slavic Village has experienced severe blight issues—at one 
point approximately 25% of the community’s houses were vacant (Smith, 2013).  As of mid-2012, Slavic 
Village still had around five hundred structures slated for demolition (Baur, 2012).  Due to the 
overwhelming numbers of blighted properties in the community, as well as the earlier arrival of the 
foreclosure problem in Slavic Village, the community began demolishing properties well before other 
areas.  Frank Ford of NPI pointed out that Slavic Village was extremely proactive with demolitions, 
successfully lobbying the City of Cleveland to demolish problem properties early on.  The community 
also contracted private rehabbers to update strategically selected houses before the advent of the SII 
(Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Tony Brancatelli explained the rationale for demolitions as a major foreclosure mitigation strategy: 
We chose demolition as our first and primary tool.  We said let’s put the brakes on new 
construction, put the brakes on rehab, use [rehab] [only] in a very targeted manner and do 
demolition in a wholesale manner to get rid of the distress and try to calm and stabilize the 
neighborhood.  And it has worked well (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).   
Barbara Anderson concurred and reported that most residents would say even more is needed 
(Anderson, May 9, 2011).  Brancatelli went on to explain that many outside of Cleveland have difficultly 
comprehending demolition as a community development tool.  During my initial field work trip I too 
was confused as to how destroying properties could build and strengthen a neighborhood.  Brancatelli 
explained: 
These are factory-built homes [from] the 1800s that never had any intention of lasting a 
hundred years.  These aren’t rowhouses, these aren’t some beautiful quarters, and they were 
dugout basements, didn’t have running water [at the time they were built] . . . At some point 
you’ve got to realize a 900 square foot [84 m2] home on a 20 foot [6 m] [wide] lot doesn’t make 
sense.  So they’ve outlived their useful life (2011).   
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Moreover, demolitions are done strategically—either because the property is adjacent to a 
rehabilitated house or other stabilization effort, or the structure has been condemned or is physically 
obsolete.  Structures that have potential to be rehabilitated at a later date are mothballed for the time 
being (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  The community also works to incorporate the empty lots that result 
from demolitions into its future development, as discussed in the next section, Planning for the Future. 
The Bring Back the 70’s Street Club has also been involved in fighting blight in several ways.  The club 
gives out and collects several forms that track issues in the community and in some cases brings them 
to the attention of the city.  These include “hot spot” cards, which track issues such as hazardous areas, 
illegal dumping, and loitering.  They also distribute community eyesore complaint forms, which allow 
community members to inform the club of property problems such as unkempt yards, abandoned 
vehicles, and rodents, among others; the group then sends a warning letter to the owner before 
informing the city of code violations.  There is also a Clean Cleveland Service Need Form, which can be 
filled out and faxed to the city to address a wide variety of issues, such as graffiti removal, fire hydrant 
repair, illegal dumping, potholes, sidewalk repair, street sweeping, and broken street lights.  The group 
also communicates with the police and local schools about issues in the community and lobbies local 
businesses for supplies and funding (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011; Christie, 2007a).  The club also 
works to draw attention to and resolve infrastructure issues, such as a water main that flooded the 
street and sidewalk three times over a two year period (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011). 
BB70 also organizes and undertakes clean-up activities.  Its signature event is the Annual Spring Clean 
Up Bash, where members and other volunteers from the community spend the day cleaning the 
neighborhood.  I was informed of the 2011 event, which had recently occurred, when I visited the 
street club.  Tereena Marks, the president of BB70, reported that the event had approximately 65 
participants, despite miserable weather.  Local businesses donated supplies and food; representatives 
from local agencies attended as well.  The group cleaned eight abandoned houses and five vacant lots 
over a nine hour period (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011).  At an earlier clean-up, members of the club 
gathered between four and five hundred tires from empty lots (Christie, 2007a). 
In addition to demolitions, residents in Slavic Village have worked to put unoccupied buildings into 
reuse.  For example, Another Chance of Ohio, an organization headed by Barbara Walker, has used 
properties donated to the organization by banks for a freecycle ‘store,’ a shelter for veterans, and a 
home for victims of domestic violence (Light, 2014). 
Many residents contribute to preventing blight as well.  Several articles have interviewed residents 
who cut the grass on adjacent vacant properties, and in some cases even decorating vacant properties 
for the Christmas holidays to improve the streetscape and give the appearance of occupancy (Christie, 
2007a; Smith, 2013).  The community also engaged local youth, particularly in a project called Mr. Blue.  
Neighborhood kids were recruited to paint the boards on the windows of vacant houses and then 
beautify them by painting on flower boxes and other motifs.  The youth went on to paint encouraging 
and anti-drug slogans along the path to school on signs on the vacant property (Anderson, May 9, 
2011). 
Strengthening the Social Fabric 
A second strategy used in community and neighborhood responses is to strengthen and repair the 
social fabric of the community.  The toll of the foreclosure crisis, vacancies, and high levels of crime 
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caused many residents to withdraw from the community.  As Slavic Village began organizing this 
changed:  “What I have been seeing is more people participating.  When before, people were in such 
a bunker mentality, you know ‘screw this, I can’t take it anymore.’  We’re now seeing people come 
out” (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). Barbara Anderson agreed, stating that more people had joined the 
fight to save the neighborhood (2011). 
Much of this is due to the efforts of block clubs and other local organizations, which develop and carry 
out a wide variety of social activities in the neighborhood.  These include organized bicycle rides, free 
fishing instruction and equipment, computer lessons, a tenant townhall to discuss renters’ issues, the 
“Walk a Hound Lose a Pound” event, community festivals, community clean-up events, and securing a 
space for community activities (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011; Anderson, May 9, 2011).  Another focus 
of these efforts is activities for youth to keep them productively engaged in the community, such as 
the Mr. Blue project described previously, arts and culture events, and sport programs (Brancatelli, 
May 13, 2011).  The community garden has also been an opportunity to bring residents together, 
sometimes through the participation of residents’ children (Anderson, May 9, 2011).   
Local organizations, such as the Bring Back the 70’s Street Club, have also developed initiatives to 
improve safety in the community, such as asking and if necessary pressuring local merchants to keep 
their properties clean and secure, holding vigils on corners known to be drug trafficking hotspots, and 
adding security cameras.  The clubs also function as communication channels, linking community issues 
to the proper city departments and social services to resolve them (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011). 
Though I only sat in on one street club meeting, it was clear that the major functions of the group are 
community bonding and information sharing.  Community bonding occurs at the meetings among the 
group’s members, and the events they plan and coordinate encourage and develop bonds within the 
larger community.  The atmosphere I experienced was one of shared struggle and proactivity.  It was 
clear that all of the attendees were concerned for and aware of the happenings and driving forces in 
their community.  It is clear that these local, grassroots organizations contribute greatly to the 
stabilization and improvement in the Slavic Village community.  These organizations have helped the 
neighborhood come back from a nadir of civic participation and confidence that occurred earlier in the 
2000s, when many were afraid to leave their homes.  As more and more residents joined these efforts, 
their influence and impacts grew.  These organizations allow residents and the community to respond 
as a group to what has occurred and is occurring in their neighborhoods, giving them a larger voice 
and influence than residents or community representatives working alone could.  Through their 
efforts, properties are kept in better order and residents have emerged from their houses, 
reinvigorating Slavic Village’s porch culture (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011).  With fewer accessible and 
visibly unoccupied properties, and more eyes on the street—i.e. the residents who no longer remain 
shut in their houses—crime, residents reported that crime—especially violent crime, drug-related 
crime, and prostitution—has declined (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011; Anderson, May 9, 2011; 
Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). 
Another key to the success of the block club is networking with governmental departments and 
services, local private businesses, and other community leaders.  At the Bring Back the 70’s Street Club, 
Barbara Anderson and Tereena Marks fulfilled this role.  Both were involved in a variety of other 
related activities, such as Tereena Marks’ position as the property manager for Ivy Park, the pocket 
park in Slavic Village that is a part of the ReImagining Cleveland initiative, and her awareness of city 
programs, resources, and working groups that can assist club members in their efforts for the 
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community (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011).  This essential function of community and neighborhood 
organizations connects the neighborhood and its residents to larger organizations, for example city 
government, and their resources, increasing the ability of residents to maintain their communities. 
Planning for the Future 
Many of the residents of Slavic Village have determined that the foreclosure crisis and the concomitant 
blight and demolition provide new opportunities for the community as well.  Though the foreclosure 
crisis did irreparable harm, it has also opened the eyes of the community to future possibilities.  Well 
before the crisis it was clear that the closely-spaced, factory-built housing that characterizes the area 
no longer offers desirable homes or land use pattern to today’s homebuyer.  Foreclosures brought 
these underlying issues to the forefront, and residents and community leaders have responded by 
envisioning future possibilities for their community. 
The City of Cleveland and a variety of public and non-profit organizations have partnered to create 
ReImagining Cleveland, an award-winning initiative to reuse vacant land in sustainable ways while 
building community.  The initiative’s website states: 
ReImagining Cleveland views vacant land as a raw asset.  The alternative land use strategies 
employed in this initiative return vacant land to productive use in ways that complement the 
City of Cleveland’s long-term development objectives and empowers residents to reclaim their 
neighborhoods, become ambassadors for their communities, and start regaining a sense of 
pride and value (Neighborhood Progress, 2014).   
Since its convening in 2008, the initiative has funded fifty-six projects, including community gardens, 
market gardens, orchards, vineyards, sideyard expansions, native plantings, pocket parks, rain gardens, 
neighborhood pathways, and other greening projects (Neighborhood Progress, 2014).  An Ideas to 
Actions Resource Book is available, which gives descriptions, examples, and cost estimations for the 
types of projects supported by ReImagining Cleveland.  For each project type, the book describes ideal 
locations, benefits and opportunities, aspects to consider, local examples, and the level of community 
commitment needed.  It provides a detailed cost breakdown structure, with most project types 
estimated around $5,000, with the exception of a rain garden, where expected costs are closer to 
$1,000 (Kent State University's Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative & Neighborhood Progress, 2011). 
Frank Ford explained the driving force behind ReImagining Cleveland: 
“In the past . . . the automatic kneejerk reaction would have been, well of course we’re going 
to build new housing on that.  Because of the weak market we have today, there is no market 
for doing that.  So it’s now really [about] being creative and thoughtful on that.  Well what 
about green, sustainable solutions?  What about tree farms? What about orchards?  What 
about vineyards?  Community gardens.  What about just how greenspace is used for 
appropriate water runoff? . . . There is a whole emerging program, which we call ReImagining 
Cleveland.  It has a broader name, the name suggests something much broader, but in reality 
it’s mostly about what is Cleveland going to do with all these emerging vacant lots?  How do 
we think forward about the reuse of them?  And maybe imagine a city that’s not quite built up 
the way it used to be.  Maybe it has a lot of greenspace” (2011). 
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ReImagining Cleveland recruits block clubs, community organizations, and local institutions to 
proactively develop both short-term and long-term uses for vacant property (Ford, 2009).  Barbara 
Anderson described the thought process in Slavic Village:   
Now we’re in a period where we are trying to design a neighborhood for the future.  I believe 
that takes time.  So strategically you have to decide what is it going to look like in ten, fifteen, 
maybe even twenty years.  How do we best use this land?  What areas are most attractive for 
commercial in the future?  What lands are more attractive for residential in the future?  What 
should we save or hold onto for parks? (Anderson, May 9, 2011). 
Slavic Village contains six ReImagining Cleveland projects:  Willow Community Garden, East 66 Grapes 
(a vineyard), the Morgana Run Trail Savannah Project (a native planting project), Ivy Park (a pocket 
park), and Trailview Pathway Park (a neighborhood pathway), and a sideyard expansion project 
(Neighborhood Progress, 2014).  The community garden had been in place for three years as of 2011, 
with forty plots for individual residents, ten plots to cultivate food for the community, run by local 
youth, and a children’s area, with a bed shaped like a pizza with each “slice” growing a common pizza 
ingredient, such as herbs or tomatoes (Anderson et al., May 18, 2011).   
Another of the ReImagining Cleveland projects is the Trailview Pathway Park, which was the first rail-
to-trail program carried out in an urban area in the U.S.  The project took a three mile (4.8 km) disused 
rail spur in a former industrial area and converted it to a trail for pedestrians and bicyclists (Brancatelli, 
May 13, 2011).  These parks, gardens, and other amenities transform nuisance properties into sources 
of local pride and neighborly bonding. 
The community also works to attract jobs and industry to the area as part of its future visioning.  
Brancatelli explained that the community is also assembling land for job creation and factory 
expansion, and actively recruiting businesses to remain in the community with the help of the 
community in finding land for expansion.  The strategy appears to be working, with approximately two 
hundred manufacturing jobs added to the community in the past several years and Third Federal 
Savings Bank’s decision to build their new operations center in the community (Brancatelli, May 13, 
2011). 
New homes built as part of the Opportunity Homes program are also a part of the community’s 
strategy for the future.  Slavic Village residents want to attract young people and young families to 
their neighborhood for the future.  The new homes are designed to meet the needs of these potential 
residents, with larger rooms, built-in closets, play areas for children, and overall larger square footage 
(Anderson, May 9, 2011).  The sideyard expansion program and the community’s demolition policy are 
also aimed at attracting new residents.  “[The goal is to] reshape our neighborhood, get rid of those 
front and back houses, get rid of doubles, converting them into singles.  Having more sane housing 
footprints in a very dense market that wasn’t dense in a positive way” (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011). 
5.6.2 Foreclosure Responses in South Euclid 
Like Slavic Village, the bedroom community of South Euclid and its residents have also participated in 
and taken advantage of many of the foreclosure responses described previously in this chapter, such 
as foreclosure prevention counseling, foreclosure mediation, NSP funding, land banking, VAPAC, and 
systems reform advocacy.  In particular Mayor Georgine Welo was a major instigator of the foreclosure 
streamlining component of the CCFPP, while Housing Manager Sally Martin has been very active in 
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VAPAC (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  South Euclid has undertaken several additional local 
foreclosure responses as well.  In South Euclid these again use three primary strategies to address the 
effects of the foreclosure crisis:  fighting blight, strengthening the community fabric, and planning for 
the future.  Each of these is discussed below. 
One local-level foreclosure response that is left out of this section is the outreach efforts undertaken 
to educate homeowners about foreclosures and foreclosure prevention resources.  These efforts, 
including the crafting of a letter alerting homeowners with potential mortgage problems to appear 
generic, are covered in detail in Section 5.2.2. 
The municipal government has itself changed in response to the foreclosure crisis.  A Housing Manager 
position was added in late 2006, and City Hall was repartitioned to accommodate space needs.  The 
crisis was also what compelled the city to switch from a paper-based records system to an electronic 
one (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
An additional important aspect of South Euclid’s foreclosure responses is the desire to share the city’s 
innovations with other municipalities.  The city government has a policy of sharing practices, to “be 
part of the solution instead of just keeping it in our backyard” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  The 
hope is to help strengthen the overall region.  Thus, South Euclid municipal employees participate in 
many conferences and forums, make presentations to municipal governments interested in adopting 
one of their practices, and provide the architectural plans of the Idea House free of charge to anyone 
interested (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Sally Martin, the Housing Manager, sits on VAPAC and a 
Federal Reserve Bank working group (Martin, November 2, 2011). 
Fighting Blight 
While South Euclid has had problems with vacant and abandoned structures, in comparison to Slavic 
Village and other east side Cleveland communities these have been moderate—as of mid-2011 South 
Euclid had demolished fewer than thirty structures, of a total of 9,300 structures in the city.  This is not 
intended to discount the significant impact of blighted properties in South Euclid, but rather to 
acknowledge that in harder hit areas it was necessary to develop community-specific strategies to 
manage and mediate blight, such as those discussed in the previous section concerning Slavic Village. 
In contrast South Euclid was able to rely more on county-wide tools on the municipal level to address 
its blight issues, including Board of Revisions (tax) foreclosures, the county Housing Court, and limited 
demolitions.   However, the importance of strategic demolitions should not be understated.  In 
discussing this topic, Sally Martin explained, “[With an abandoned house] the blight spreads, it’s like a 
cancer.  You have to surgically sometimes excise that cancer, to keep the rest of the street healthy.  
And that’s exactly the approach we’ve had to take at times” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Welo and 
Martin described the targeted use of demolitions as key to controlling the foreclosure problem—if 
residents don’t see the city taking action and don’t have reason to believe it will soon, they are 
substantially more likely to lose hope and leave, further exacerbating the vacancy and foreclosure 
problems (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
South Euclid has targeted several neighborhoods as the foreclosure problem has run its course.  The 
first area targeted, known as the West Five, had the most serious foreclosure problem during 2005 
and 2006.  But in doing so, they lost sight of other impacted areas of the city for some time, allowing 
the foreclosure problem to grow in other areas.  Other reasons for targeting areas are to preserve high 
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quality housing stock or their proximity to neighboring municipalities with foreclosure issues of their 
own (Martin, October 15, 2012; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
As well, the City of South Euclid has been successful in preventing blight, in particular by developing 
and implementing Ohio’s first vacant property registration ordinance (discussed in Section 5.5).  The 
ordinance requires the registration of all uninhabited properties, that all properties be kept up to 
housing code standards, monthly inspections, and a $200 yearly registration fee (Chronicle-Telegram 
Staff, 2012).  The ordinance has been so successful that other municipalities have copied and 
implemented it (Payerchin, 2012).   
Though the vacant property ordinance has reduced the number and frequency of code violations 
greatly—Sally Martin credited it with bringing three hundred properties up to code—it can pose 
difficulties for small developers.  The ordinance has resulted in some lost buys for the city, some of 
which would have resulted in good quality rehabilitations and others that would have resulted in 
substandard housing by the community’s standards.  With respect to general code enforcement, Sally 
Martin reported that some homeowners have had financial difficulty in keeping their properties up to 
code, but that the city tries to work with them in order to retain quality homeowners (2012). 
Residents, and particularly block clubs, have held several neighborhood clean-ups.  These generally 
target lots with vacant properties, but sometimes include vacant lots as well.  One block club, 
Avonville-Argonne and Everything in Between, is considered particularly good at organizing residents 
to undertake clean-up efforts.  According to a local newspaper article, the group simply asked residents 
to clean up the empty property closest to them, and let each decide what was necessary.  The back of 
one lot had not been mowed in a year, and four residents worked together to mow it three times, 
trying to make it appear cared for, as it was visible from the street (Piorkowski, 2011). 
Mayor Welo described another clean-up effort, this one organized by the city.  City employees 
distributed letters to the residents of East Antisdale Road, which by the city’s standards was in 
particularly bad shape, informing them of a city-sponsored clean-up on an upcoming Saturday.  The 
city provided materials such as mulch, mowers, and plants, and hosted a hot dog roast and block party 
afterward.  The city asked city employees to participate—voluntarily—and some brought their older 
children along as additional labor.  According to Welo, the result was that the neighborhood’s downhill 
slide was halted, saving the neighborhood from further deterioration.  As well, the residents saw a 
commitment from the city, which encouraged them to fight harder for their neighborhood and to stay 
(Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
The city and its leaders have been very proactive in addressing the foreclosure problem.  Sally Martin 
reported that many municipalities were in denial about having a foreclosure problem and not willing 
to acknowledge the danger of blight spreading from foreclosed houses.  She and Georgine Welo 
reported their high expectations for the community.  Visitors who are more familiar with communities 
more strongly impacted by foreclosures—for example Slavic Village—view the neighborhoods as being 
in great condition.  For example, in Slavic Village the community struggles to keep all houses secured, 
while in South Euclid boarded up windows are considered unacceptable.  Martin and Welo feel “it’s 
not good enough for us.  We’re not going to stop until we get it where we’re proud of it and we feel 
like everything looks great, and we get rid of all this blight, one by one by one” (Welo & Martin, May 
12, 2011). 
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In order to do so, the city needs the participation of and buy-in from residents.  Sally Martin reported 
that without the efforts of the block clubs, it wouldn’t be possible to get vacant properties up to their 
standards using code enforcement alone.  Neighborhood groups work to make homes appear lived in 
and cared for, such as putting up Christmas decorations and placing attractive plants on stoops, giving 
the impression of an occupied home (Martin, October 15, 2012).   
Strengthening the Community Fabric 
Many of the foreclosure responses observed in South Euclid strengthen the community and 
neighborhood fabric.  These efforts are generally resident-initiated, in particular by block groups.  
According to the city’s webpage, South Euclid has six block clubs (City of South Euclid, 2013).  The city 
helps interested residents set up additional block clubs as well (Martin, November 2, 2011).  As in Slavic 
Village, the activities of block groups are an essential component to the success of local foreclosure 
responses.  As Sally Martin said, “Block groups have become the backbone of what the [city] 
administration is trying to do” (Martin, October 15, 2012).  These groups carry out efforts to fight and 
prevent blight, set and enforce community norms, and promote community bonding and pride. 
As mentioned previously, block clubs and residents are extremely important in fighting blight in South 
Euclid.  The city lacks the resources to manage this problem on its own and also recognizes that in 
order for a successful response to the foreclosure problem to be possible, buy-in from residents is 
necessary.  As described previously, the city has organized clean-up efforts in order to demonstrate to 
residents that they are willing to make a commitment and work to save the city and its neighborhoods.  
Residents have undertaken beautification efforts as well, such as maintaining wooded areas and 
adding perennial beds around the city (Martin, October 15, 2012; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  One 
group has raised money in order to purchase Neighborhood Watch signs, in an effort to deter criminal 
activity and increase the feeling of security and safety in the neighborhood (Piorkowski, 2011).  These 
efforts indicate that the community is not ready to give up and will fight to keep their neighborhood.  
This in turn encourages others to join the fight and commit to their neighborhoods. 
Residents also play a large role in setting and enforcing community norms.  For example, the Avondale 
Through Argonne and Everything in Between block club worked to enforce rules concerning when 
residential trash containers are allowed to be on treelawns (next to the street curb).  According to city 
ordinance, trashcans can be placed next to the street no earlier than 6 pm the evening preceding 
pickup, and can remain there no longer than twelve hours after pickup (Piorkowski, 2011).  Though 
such problems may seem trivial, they affect how the neighborhood looks and how residents feel about 
their neighborhoods, as well as to what extent they feel they can exert control over their surroundings 
(Martin, November 2, 2011).  Seeing signs of pride of ownership—such as planters, well-maintained 
gardens and lawns, and holiday decorations—encourages residents to believe that their neighborhood 
is worth saving, indicates that others are invested in and willing to fight for the neighborhood, and 
encourages and pressures others to undertake similar efforts as  members of the community (Martin, 
October 15, 2012). 
The city also makes efforts to set and enforce community norms.  For example, Sally Martin, the city’s 
Housing Manager, wrote an editorial in the local newspaper urging personal responsibility and peer 
pressure with respect to property maintenance and mortgage walkaways (Martin, November 2, 2011).  
Upon moving into South Euclid, new residents receive a copy of the city’s Good Neighbor Guide, which 
includes an overview of city ordinances concerning property use, such as lawn height, noise limitations, 
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and maintenance of house exteriors and gutters.  It also contains information on city departments and 
officials, the recycling program, community groups, and block watches (City of South Euclid, n.d.).  
Other city officials or neighbors may bring the guide to new residents if there is the impression that 
the neighbor is not meeting the community’s expectations (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
While not included in the Good Neighbor Guide, there is also an expectation that residents in South 
Euclid will take on responsibilities with respect to nearby vacant properties: 
If you live next to a foreclosed home, and [the city] can’t get there to mow the grass, guess 
what?  Being a good neighbor means when you’re mowing your grass, mow the front.  And I’ll 
mow the back, if I live on the other side . . . Or if you’re [trimming] your bushes, [trim] the 
bushes there, because you don’t want that house to bring down your house (Welo & Martin, 
May 12, 2011).   
Welo went on to say, “Your residents need to trust you and know that what you’re asking of them you 
would do yourself.  And so they see me . . . mowing my grass . . . marching down the street picking up 
trash” (2011). 
Community pride also grows as a result of the efforts undertaken by the city, block clubs, and residents.  
This is essential, as the stress on the community and individual homeowners takes a significant toll.  
Sally Martin described the situation in late 2011: 
“[Residents have] a feeling of desperation.  More people are close to giving up than ever before 
in middle class communities.  They are nearly impoverished from trying to save their home.  
I’ve seen more desperate people.  A new block group formed over the summer.  It worked out 
issues . . . the neighbors engaged with each other, they own [the neighborhood].  The 
grassroots efforts are really good, but we need even more.  Most people understand it’s a bad 
time to sell, so they hunker down and make the best of it.” 
Thus, in addition to fighting and preventing blight, neighborhood clean-ups serve the additional 
function of increasing the feeling of neighborhood togetherness and building community.  Both 
neighborhood groups and the city frequently hold block parties or hot dog roasts after a clean-up 
effort, indicating that these efforts are not simply to address the physical appearance of the 
neighborhood; they are also encouraging neighbors to connect with one another.  The participation of 
city employees in some clean-up efforts also builds the bond between neighborhoods and their city 
officials (Piorkowski, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Community gardens also play an important role in strengthening community bonds and trust.  Sally 
Martin relayed an anecdote concerning the placement of a community garden that was originally 
opposed by many in the neighborhood.  They suspected the man living adjacent to the potential garden 
was a drug dealer due to his frequent comings and goings.  In fact, the man owned a carpet cleaning 
business, and he is now heavily invested in the community garden and provides tools for community 
use (Martin, October 15, 2012).  Another community building effort is ‘pop-up’ gardens, where 
interested homeowners can obtain “welcome” flags to put outside at times when they would like 
interested neighbors to stop by and visit their gardens.  This encourages homeowners to take pride in 
their properties as well as for neighbors to stop and get to know each other (Piorkowski, 2013). 
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Planning for the Future 
Like Slavic Village, South Euclid has attempted to seize the opportunities found within the foreclosure 
crisis.  The city administration sees an opportunity to shape the city for the future and to capitalize on 
and further develop the city’s unique selling points.  In South Euclid, this has consisted of both public 
and private initiatives. 
The major public initiative undertaken in South Euclid is the Green Neighborhoods Initiative (GNI), a 
neighborhood marketing effort.  The goal of the Green Neighborhoods Initiative is “to utilize strategic 
public-private partnerships to re-invent and re-brand [South Euclid’s] hardest hit neighborhoods, 
creating increased demand for existing housing, increasing property values and neighborhood pride, 
and creating a ‘green brand’ for the city” (City of South Euclid, 2011).  The project combines $800,000 
in NSP funds and $300,000 from the Vacant and Abandoned Property Fund grant, awarded by the First 
Suburbs Development Council.  The initiative has three components:  (1) the rehabilitation of 
foreclosed bungalows, (2) the creation of community gardens and other park areas, and (3) an infill 
development program.  This program adds to and complements existing green initiatives in the city, 
such recent changes in city ordinances concerning storm water, riparian protection, and air pollution; 
the South Euclid Land Conservancy; and the retrofitting of the Langerdale marsh, which had been 
converted to a concrete retention basin during the 1960s (City of South Euclid, 2011). 
In launching the GNI, South Euclid sought buy-in from area residents.  To do this, the city worked to 
illustrate its commitment to the neighborhood.  This was done by improving the area’s physical 
appearance with new roads, sidewalks, treelawn trees, and street signs, as well as other aesthetic 
improvements such as freshly painted fire hydrants.  The city also met with area residents, and 
Georgine Welo reported that these efforts worked, with residents’ commitments to staying in South 
Euclid strengthening (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011). 
In rehabilitating previously foreclosed bungalows, “we wanted to transform what some would consider 
an ‘obsolete’ housing style, making it beautiful, livable, better for our environment, and most of all, 
affordable to the buyer, ensuring sustainable homeownership” (City of South Euclid, 2011).  The 
bungalows, which are located in walkable neighborhoods, are designed with the assistance of the 
Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative of Kent State to accommodate all life stages.  All have first floor 
bedrooms to ensure empty nesters and seniors can age in place.  The properties also incorporate high 
levels of storm water retention, native, drought-resistant plants, rain barrels, rain gardens, and 
pervious paving materials.  The first bungalow rehabilitation received the LEED for Homes Gold 
certification, and the following projects have all met the Enterprise Green Communities standards.171  
These rehabbed properties have all sold for over twice the average sales price of other homes on the 
same street, indicating the program’s success and the value homeowners place on these modernized 
homes and green amenities (City of South Euclid, 2011).  One drawback of rehabbing bungalows is that 
a full rehab, such as that described above, costs more than a new build (Martin, October 15, 2012). 
The second component of the GNI is community gardens, which the city attempts to pair with GNI 
rehabilitations.  By the end of 2011, South Euclid had constructed three community gardens on 
residential lots where vacant houses had been demolished.  The city has utilized partnerships with 
Whole Foods, a natural foods retailer, and the Ohio State University Extension Suburban Gardening 
                                                          
171 South Euclid switched to the Enterprise Green Communities standards when HUD adopted them. 
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Program, drawing additional cash and in kind resources.  The gardens have been very successful:  
“Residents have taken ownership, host community building events in the gardens and gave forged 
relationships with neighbors that have truly created stronger neighborhood bonds” (City of South 
Euclid, 2011).  The city received more requests for garden plots than there were spaces in 2011; as a 
result two additional gardens as well as a small meditation garden were planned for 2012.  One of the 
two new gardens focuses on children’s education.  The city has also added a splash park and a dog park 
(City of South Euclid, 2011). 
The third component of the GNI is the infill redevelopment program.  This aspect also addresses vacant 
lots by encouraging the construction of new homes that fit the community character.  The city 
constructed an “Idea House” in order to demonstrate what can be built for $150,000; the plans for the 
house are freely available to those wishing to build in South Euclid or elsewhere.  This effort again 
involved a partnership, this time with the Cleveland Institute of Art, which did the interiors of the Idea 
House.  Infill lots are eligible for a five-year, 75% tax abatement; homeowners who agree to begin 
building within a six month timeframe receive a 75% discount on the appraised parcel value.  South 
Euclid also gives property donated by financial institutions to pre-screened developers.  The deed is 
held in escrow until the building or renovating is completed (City of South Euclid, 2011; Martin, October 
15, 2012). 
South Euclid’s GNI is considered to be a highly innovative use of NSP funding, and has received 
significant media coverage and visits as a result.  The city received a Crain’s Emerald Award, which 
recognizes efforts with positive triple bottom line impacts (people, profits, planet).  South Euclid was 
the first municipality to receive this award (City of South Euclid, 2011). 
The GNI spurred other changes as well, such as the founding of South Euclid’s first CDC, One South 
Euclid, which is oriented toward commercial revitalization and improving streetscapes as well as 
housing.  The city also upgraded its website and logo as a further part of its re-branding effort.  Money 
earned from GNI sales is planned to be used for commercial redevelopment, and the city also planned 
to create a revolving loan fund for emergency home repairs, similar to one found in the suburb of 
Cleveland Heights (Martin, October 15, 2012).   
According to Sally Martin, the biggest challenge South Euclid faced was to restore market confidence.  
Examining the level of investment in South Euclid in recent years, it appears the city administration 
and the GNI have made major strides toward achieving this goal.  Private developers carried out eight 
additional green rehabs using Cuyahoga County’s NSP developer loan program in 2011;  the city saw 
an increase in the valuation of residential construction and rehabilitation from $4.2 million in 2009 to 
$6.6 million in 2011 (City of South Euclid, 2011; Martin, October 15, 2012). 
The city has also experienced significant investment on the retail side.  A rundown stripmall, Cedar 
Center, located on the southern end of the GNI area, has been redeveloped.  This adds to the GNI 
concept, providing residents somewhere to walk to, have dinner, or go shopping.  As well, a developer 
purchased what was an abandoned golf course, located adjacent to Cedar Center, to build the first 
LEED-certified powercenter (bigbox) in Ohio.  The new development has improved bus and pedestrian 
access, and the city’s total park land was increased nearly 60% by the developer’s donation of 21 acres.  
The developer attributed the redevelopment decision in part to the GNI (City of South Euclid, 2011; 
Martin, October 15, 2012). 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter introduced the various foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses in Cuyahoga 
County, as well as the context within which these responses were developed and implemented.  These 
responses include the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative, the Strategic Investment Initiative, 
property acquisition and control efforts, and community and neighborhood level responses.  When 
possible, the extent to which these responses were implemented and the geographic and 
socioeconomic distributions of these responses were included.  In the case of community and 
neighborhood level efforts, the data and discussion were limited to the two example communities of 
Slavic Village and South Euclid. 
5.7.1 The Response Context 
 Under what political, social, and financial constraints do foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga 
County operate, and how do these constraints impact their operation and impacts? 
The context in which Cuyahoga County’s foreclosure responses occurred greatly shaped the 
opportunity space for their development and implementation.  This context was affected by both 
external and internal factors, namely the national foreclosure crisis, the behavior of financial 
institutions, federal and state actions, and the national level discourse on foreclosures externally, and 
county resources, local and regional housing market conditions, and the local level discourse on 
foreclosures internally.  These factors both constrained and facilitated foreclosure responses in 
Cuyahoga County.  It should be noted that these contextual factors were not necessarily static; for 
example, as the national foreclosure crisis developed, additional resources became available to 
Cuyahoga County for foreclosure prevention and mitigation that were not present when the 
foreclosure crisis initially struck in the county well before it became a national issue. 
The first of the external factors, the larger foreclosure crisis, had both positive and negative effects on 
foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County.  Because the foreclosure problem began much earlier in 
the county, particularly on the east side of Cleveland, the city, county, and other groups and 
organizations began developing responses well before most had realized the seriousness of the 
problem.  Thus, when the foreclosure crisis was in full effect, Cuyahoga County had a “head start” with 
respect to foreclosure responses.  Many issues had been ironed out at this point and in some cases 
evidence of the responses’ effectiveness was available, making the county and constituent parts better 
positioned when applying for grants and federal foreclosure response funding.  On the other hand, the 
early impact of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County and concomitant lack of awareness on the national 
level meant that few resources were available when the county first began to address foreclosure-
related issues. 
Secondly, the policies and behaviors of the financial industry shaped foreclosure responses in 
Cuyahoga County.  For one, the industry worked to shape the larger foreclosure narrative:   one 
respondent referred to industry “language pollution,” citing terms such as “predatory borrowing” and 
“principal forgiveness” that place blame on the borrower and position the lending industry as 
benevolent (Bellamy, October 16, 2012).  With respect to foreclosure prevention, the communication 
barrier between lenders and servicers on one side and borrowers on the other led to the use of 
foreclosure prevention counseling as a tool to reduce communication and information asymmetries.  
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The practices of bank walkaways and REO property neglect resulted in significant blight and vacancy 
issues, requiring a focus on foreclosure mitigation.   
Federal and state actions also influenced foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County.  Federal programs 
addressing the foreclosure crisis played a large role in shaping local foreclosure responses due to the 
pass-through funding and incentives attached.  For example, the introduction of HAMP led to a focus 
on foreclosure prevention counseling and in particular on mortgage modifications.  NSP funding 
addressed post-foreclosure impacts on neighborhoods and communities, but program rules limited 
what types of stabilization responses were possible.  One restriction that came up in the interviews 
was the fact that only residential redevelopment is allowed under NSP; thus mixed-use redevelopment 
that is often suitable in urban residential areas was off the table.  The use of demolitions as a 
stabilization tool was originally rather limited under NSP funding, but later petitions resulted in 
significant increases.  State actions also shaped the environment in which foreclosure responses were 
developed and implemented.  These actions were sometimes helpful, such as the passing of county 
land bank enabling legislation, and sometimes harmful, such as the state of Ohio’s pre-emption of local 
anti-predatory lending laws. 
In many ways, the national foreclosure discourse limited the range of possible responses to the 
foreclosure crisis.  The focus on “greedy” and “irresponsible” homeowners led to policies that left 
nearly all decision-making power in the hands of servicers and lenders when it came to foreclosure 
prevention efforts.  Meanwhile, the impacts of the foreclosure crisis on neighborhoods and 
communities—the collateral damage—was relatively ignored.   
Three internal factors that shaped the county’s foreclosure responses were county resources, the local 
housing market, and the local foreclosure discourse.  Organizations such as CDCs and research 
institutes were of particular importance in Cuyahoga County.  Cleveland’s history of organizing assisted 
in drawing attention to the severity of the foreclosure crisis, while the large number of CDCs provided 
human resources and familiarity with neighborhoods and communities.  Research institutes helped 
garner attention and led to improved understanding of the problem and its consequences.  Similarly, 
NEO CANDO provided accessible and frequently updated data to those involved in foreclosure 
responses, from county officials to academic researchers to local residents.  On the other hand, the 
county’s lack of financial resources, which had been dwindling since the 1970s and were further 
exacerbated by the foreclosure crisis and subsequent property devaluations, posed difficulties in 
finding funding to respond to the foreclosure crisis.  Similarly, the large number of jurisdictions and 
other governmental and quasi-governmental bodies in the county complicates the development of 
responses given the number of parties involved. 
The local housing market also shaped foreclosure responses.  Cleveland and Cuyahoga County are 
weak housing markets, with high vacancy rates and low pre-crisis property value appreciation.  The 
result of this is that foreclosure prevention is, at least in theory, easier, since the difference between 
the current value of the property and the value of the loan is less than that seen in strong and mixed 
market cities.  On the other hand, high pre-existing vacancy rates and low housing demand results in 
larger post-foreclosure problems, in particular blight. 
Finally, the local foreclosure discourse had a large influence on the opportunity field for foreclosure 
responses in Cuyahoga County.  Given the local media’s focus on the stories surrounding and the 
impacts of foreclosures, the academic and policy research done on the foreclosure problem in 
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Cuyahoga County (and newspaper coverage thereof), and the advocacy efforts both locally and on the 
national stage, it became possible to initiate more sweeping and varied foreclosure responses than in 
many other locales. 
In addition to being affected by these contextual factors, actors and organizations in Cuyahoga County 
affected the foreclosure context through their efforts as well.  Advocacy groups, in particular ESOP, 
and local government representatives drew attention to the foreclosure problem in Cuyahoga County, 
and particularly on the east side of Cleveland, via attention-grabbing campaigns and legislative 
testimony at the state and national level.  The efforts of the CCFPP garnered significant local media 
attention and raised public awareness.  Joining representatives from Michigan, local stakeholders such 
as Jim Rokakis lobbied the federal Treasury Deparment for, and obtained, permission to use additional 
Hardest Hit Fund money on demolition.  Although even minor policy changes at the federal level were 
always an uphill battle, all of these facilitated a more effective foreclosure response in the county than 
would have been possible otherwise. 
5.7.2 Foreclosure Responses 
 What foreclosure responses have been implemented in Cuyahoga County?  How have these 
responses been created and developed? 
The depth and breadth of foreclosure responses used in Cuyahoga County exceeded that of anywhere 
else in the nation.  These included the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative to address the 
foreclosure process in the county; the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program; a post-
foreclosure targeting effort, the Strategic Investment Initiative; property acquisition and control 
efforts, including the Vacant and Abandoned Property Action Council, land banking, Board of Reviews 
foreclosures, demolitions, rehabilitations, and the use of NSP funds; legal efforts, including code 
enforcement, public nuisance lawsuits, and fraud investigations; and community and neighborhood 
level responses. 
Table 5.16 contains a brief summary of the types of foreclosure responses found in Cuyahoga County 
and discussed in this research.  It lists responses by category, identifies each as a pre- or post-
foreclosure response, lists the geography to which it applies, and the section of this document in which 
it is introduced and discussed. 
The responses are divided into six categories:  (1) systems reform, (2) foreclosure prevention, (3) 
targeting, (4) property control and acquisition, (5) legal efforts, and (6) neighborhood- and community-
level efforts.  Many of these responses can be assigned to multiple categories and/or use other 
responses.  For example, the CCLRC addresses blight using targeting, property acquisition and control, 
and legal efforts.    For simplicity, I have grouped all neighborhood- and community-level responses 
together. 
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Table 5.16:  Summary of Foreclosure Responses in Cuyahoga County 
Category Foreclosure Response Pre/Post Foreclosure Geography Section 
Systems Reform* 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative (Fixing the foreclosure 
process) Pre-Foreclosure County-wide 5.2.1 
Foreclosure Prevention 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative (Foreclosure Prevention 
Counseling) Pre-Foreclosure County-wide 5.2.2 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Mediation Program Pre-Foreclosure County-wide 5.2.3 
Targeting 
Strategic Investment Initiative (targeted demolitions, 
rehabilitations, and foreclosure prevention) Pre- & Post-Foreclosure 
Selected communities 
(six; later expanded to 
fifteen) 5.3 
NSP Funding (targeted property acquisition & control) Post-Foreclosure Selected communities  5.4.5 
Property Acquisition & 
Control 
Vacant & Abandoned Properties Action Council (Working Group) Post-Foreclosure County-wide 5.4.1 
Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corportation (Landbanking) Post-Foreclosure County-wide 5.4.2 
Board of Revisions Foreclosure (Tax Foreclosure) Post-Foreclosure County-wide 5.4.3 
Demolitions Post-Foreclosure County-wide 5.4.4 
Legal Efforts 
Code enforcement Post-Foreclosure By municipality 5.5.1 
Public nuisance lawsuits Post-Foreclosure By servicer 5.5.2 
Investigating fraud Post-Foreclosure Community 5.5.3 
Community- & 
Neighborhood-level Efforts   Post-Foreclosure 
Community/ 
Neighborhood 5.6 
 * While several responses deal with systems reform (VAPAC in particular), this response is the only one that does so exclusively.
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The early and severe impact of the foreclosure crisis required Cuyahoga County to be experimental 
and creative in its response.  There were few existing tools or strategies to adopt, and the negative 
effects in parts of the county were overwhelming.  Action was necessary and in some ways less 
constrained without examples to follow.  Thus, the wide variety of foreclosure responses developed in 
Cuyahoga County attacked the foreclosure problem from nearly all angles.  They address foreclosures 
before, during, and after the foreclosure; by reaching out to borrowers, financial institutions, and those 
who can effect policy change; at many levels—county, municipal, strategically targeted areas, 
community, neighborhood, and homeowner; and with a variety of approaches—addressing individual 
cases, working to assemble land, using and updating legal remedies, speaking out regionally and 
nationally, and spurring systems reform.  This wide array of efforts allowed Cuyahoga County to shift 
focus as the foreclosure crisis progressed and changed within the county.  Together these responses 
comprise the most varied and comprehensive foreclosure response efforts undertaken in the nation.  
The forms, functions, and experiences have been shared with others across the country to assist 
municipalities and communities in designing locally-tailored foreclosure responses. 
Responses to foreclosure in Cuyahoga County place a strong emphasis on foreclosure mitigation as a 
result of the t vacancy and vandalism problems typical of weak market cities and regions.  This is not 
to say that the county has not developed and implemented responses that address foreclosure 
prevention as well, namely the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative (both the systems reform and 
early intervention components) and the county mediation program.  However, the widespread and 
long-term impact of blight and vacancy, as well as the ability of the county, municipalities, and other 
units to address physical property issues, required the development and use of a wide variety of 
foreclosure mitigation responses.  Local governmental units and individual neighborhoods and 
communities have limited influence when it comes to modifying loans and other pre-foreclosure 
interventions.  While the county can change the operating environment of foreclosure proceedings, 
for example by its reform of the foreclosure process and by requiring financial representatives 
participate in mediation, it cannot compel lenders and servicers to make loan modifications.  In 
comparison, local governments have, at least legally, the ability to address property conditions through 
code enforcement, Board of Revisions foreclosures, receivership, and other tools based in a 
jurisdiction’s police power.172  Though much of the vacancy and abandonment problem is due to the 
fact that Cleveland is a weak market city, low property values are also a major the reason that property 
acquisition tools can be employed so effectively in the county. 
These responses were developed around the county’s resources as well.  For example, the Strategic 
Investment Initiative used the well-established, experienced, and agile local CDC network to its 
advantage by partnering with a CDC in each target area.  Previous community organizing experience 
was used, for example the doorknocking activities of the Strategic Investment Initiative and ESOP’s 
general approach.  The ability to target responses and track developments at a high level of detail using 
the NEO CANDO database facilitated the SII’s Land Assemby Team’s efforts, as well as those of many 
municipal governments, CDCs, and block clubs.  Local higher education and policy institutions that 
carry out neighborhood and housing research carried out program analyses on behalf of the CCFI and 
carried out independent research that provided insights into the foreclosure problem, often including 
                                                          
172 These abilities depend on each jurisdiction’s particular statutes.  As discussed in Section 5.4, many jurisdictions 
have passed stronger property control legislation and stepped up enforcement of preexisting statutes.  In some 
cases states have passed additional enabling legislation allowing local jurisdictions to expand the use of their 
police powers. 
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Cuyahoga County or Cleveland in the study area.  In particular the program evaluations assisted the 
CCFI in adapting its efforts as the foreclosure environment changed. 
Finally, the responses were also shaped by a local discourse more favorable to struggling homeowners.  
This resulted in additional and more favorable media coverage, increased awareness of and 
participation in programs, and helped attract local political support and funding. 
5.7.3 Outcomes & Distribution 
 To what extent are these foreclosure responses implemented and/or utilized?   
 What distribution of outcomes is seen?  Do these vary among neighborhoods and 
communities? 
Table 5.17 provides a summary of the responses used in the county by category, including the number 
of instances of each response (or its component parts), the success rate of the response (as applicable), 
the spatial distribution (when possible), and the distribution over time (when possible).  
In general the responses were used to a great extent throughout the county, often with strong records 
of success.  The Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative’s “Fixing the foreclosure process” efforts 
reduced the average length of a foreclosure suit by 35% over a six month period.  The Cuyahoga 
Counseling Foreclosure Prevention Program had 5,671 clients over three years, representing about 
13% of the foreclosure filings in the county over that period.  Its successful outcome rate increased 
from 40% in PY1 to 59.2% in PY3.  The Cuyahoga County Mediation Program had 10,181 cases over a 
three year period, representing approximately 26% of foreclosure filings.  In its first year, the 
settlement rate was 8.1%, which increased to a 33.6% three-year average. 
The Strategic Investment Initiative began in six neighborhoods, completing 142 demolitions, 50 
rehabilitations, and 41 vacant lot conversions as well as preventing 56 foreclosures in its target areas.  
These were well below targets (57% of projected demolitions, 56% of projected rehabs, and 22% of 
projected prevented foreclosures; there was no goal for vacant lot conversions).  However, the 
initiative is considered highly effective and has been expanded to nine additional areas.  Cuyahoga 
County received a total of $78.8 million in NSP funding, the second targeted foreclosure response, in 
twenty communities. 
Land control and acquisition efforts have been very widely used in the county.  VAPAC attracted a large 
number of interested and influential stakeholders that enabled it to collaboratively and cooperatively 
address many aspects of the vacant and abandoned property problem in Cuyahoga County.  The 
county land bank, the second of its kind, held nearly ten thousand properties as of 2010.  The county 
used Board of Revisions foreclosures to gain control of 3,541 properties between 2006 and 2010.  Over 
six thousand demolitions were carried out by the City of Cleveland between 2006 and 2012. 
Legal efforts generally resulted in revenue for the City of Cleveland and other municipalities.  Through 
code enforcement fines, Cleveland collected $1.4 million in fines.  A public nuisance lawsuit filed by 
the City of Cleveland resulted in the demolition of forty structures by Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo. 
Fraud investigations led to the discovery of nearly $176 million in fraudulent mortages and 
consequently 383 indictments.  
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Table 5.17:  Foreclosure Responses in Cuyahoga County, Grouped by Category 
 
Category Foreclosure Response Metric Spatial Distribution Temporal Distribution 
Systems Reform Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative 
(Fixing the foreclosure process) 
35% reduction in average length of 
foreclosure suit (2006)     
Foreclosure 
Prevention 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative 
(Foreclosure prevention counseling) 
5,671 clients (13% of foreclosure 
filings) (PY1-3) 
weakly follows 
foreclosure distribution 
increase from 40% successful 
outcomes (PY1) to 59.2% (PY3) 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Mediation 
Program 
10,181 cases (26% of foreclosure 
filings) (PY1-3)   
increase from 8.1% settled 
(PY1) to 33.6% (3 year average) 
Targeting 
Strategic Investment Initiative (targeted 
demolitions, rehabilitations, and 
foreclosure prevention) 
142 demolitions (57% of goal) 
50 rehabilitations (40% of goal) 
56 foreclosures averted (22% of goal) 
41 vacant lot conversions 6 targeted areas   
NSP Funding (targeted property 
acquisition & control) $78.8 million (Rounds 1-3) 20 communities   
Property Acquisition 
& Control 
Vacant & Abandoned Properties Action 
Council (Working Group)       
Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization 
Corporation (Landbanking) 9,446 parcels held by CCLRC (2010) 
concentrated on east 
side of Cleveland   
Board of Revisions Foreclosure (Tax 
Foreclosure) 
3,541 Board of Revisions Foreclosures 
(2006-2010) 
concentrated on east 
side of Cleveland  
Demolitions 6,100 in Cleveland (2006-2012) 
concentrated on east 
side of Cleveland   
Legal Efforts 
Code enforcement $1.4 million in fines (Cleveland)     
Public nuisance lawsuits 
40 structures demolished by 
Deutsche Bank & Wells Fargo City of Cleveland   
Investigating fraud 
$175.9 million in mortgage fraud; 383 
indictments (major cases only)     
Community- & 
Neighborhood-level 
Efforts     
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Excluding the targeting responses (SII and NSP), post-foreclosure responses for which geographic 
distribution data are available appear to be related to the progression and extent of the foreclosure 
crisis in the county.  These are most highly concentrated where the foreclosure crisis had its most 
severe impacts, on the east side of Cleveland (especially with respect to land banking and Board of 
Revisions foreclosures) and the eastern inner suburbs, and to a lesser extent the west side of 
Cleveland (in particular with respect to foreclosure prevention counseling).  Referring back to Figure 
4.8, these distributions strongly reflect the patterns of the foreclosure crisis in the county.  The 
concentration of responses corresponds well with the timing and extent of the problem, as well as 
with the locations of targeting responses in the case of property acquisition and control responses.  
The land banking, Board of Revisions foreclosures, and demolition distributions are more 
concentrated in SII areas as well, but not in areas that received NSP2 funding.  
In contrast, the spatial distributions of the two foreclosure responses that work to avert foreclosures 
appear to be more weakly correlated with the foreclosure problem.  Temporally, both increased their 
success rates over time:  from 40% to nearly 60% successful foreclosure prevention counseling 
outcomes from the first to the third program year, and from 8.1% in the first year of foreclosure 
mediation up to a cumulative three year rate of 33.6%.  Increases are to be expected over time as 
counselors and mediators become increasingly familiar with the process; as well bottlenecks and other 
sticking points are addressed and minimized when possible.  Increasing specialization among 
counseling agencies and the agencies’ willingness to direct clients to the best fit also helped increase 
the successful outcome rate over time. 
Though it isn’t possible to draw conclusions as to the differences in community and neighborhood 
responses based on an examination of two case study communities, the data do show differences 
between the two, which can provide a starting point for further investigation.  First, the types of 
responses indentified in Slavic Village, a declining working class community on the east side of 
Cleveland, and South Euclid, a starter home community located in the inner suburbs, are broadly the 
same.  Each used strategies of dealing with blight, planning for the future, and strengthening the social 
fabric.  Both relied heavily on block clubs for these efforts.  However, these efforts began earlier and 
in more of a bottom up fashion in Slavic Village, due substantially to the fact that the foreclosure crisis 
appeared much earlier and was exceptionally severe in Slavic Village.  In addition, residents’ familiarity 
with public service providers, the community’s history of organizing, and preexisting CDC were 
important resources in the community’s response to the foreclosure crisis.  In contrast, efforts in South 
Euclid, which has no history of organizing, developed in a more top down fashion, with the mayor and 
local government organizing the initial clean-up and community building events, supporting the 
creation of block clubs, and initiating a CDC in response to the crisis.  It is also likely that South Euclid’s 
status as a smaller, less complex, and more homogeneous municipality (in comparison the City of 
Cleveland) facilitated government-led changes that would be very difficult for an individual community 
within and governed by a larger city, such as Slavic Village, to achieve. 
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Chapter 6 The Impacts of Foreclosure Responses on Neighborhoods & 
Communities 
This chapter presents the results and analysis of the impacts of foreclosure responses on the 
neighborhood and community levels in Cuyahoga County.  First, Section 6.1 provides a qualitative 
analysis of the neighborhood impacts of foreclosure responses, drawing primarily on interview data.  
Section 6.2 presents and evaluates the results and implications of the quantitative model.    These two 
sections combined answer the final three sub-questions: 
 What strategies have been used in the foreclosure responses observed in Cuyahoga 
County? 
 What neighborhood and community impacts are observed? Are these physical, 
economic, social, and/or political?   
 Do these impacts vary according to certain neighborhood and community 
characteristics? 
Section 6.1 lists the foreclosure response strategies used in foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County 
and identifies physical, social, and political changes resulting from the use of these strategies.  In 
contrast, 6.2 identifies primarily economic changes and is limited to the two strategies of targeting and 
addressing blight.   
Section 6.1 examines this variation through the case studies of Slavic Village and South Euclid, which 
limits conclusions to the two localities themselves.  However, these results also suggest hypotheses 
based on the case study results that can be investigated in future research.  Section 6.2 looks at 
variation across the distribution of the percent change in residential property value.  This is 
conceptualized as the extent to which communities were affected by the combined forces of their 
starting conditions in 2000, larger social, economic, and political changes, and the foreclosure crisis, as 
reflected by changes in residential property value measured at the Census tract level. 
It should also be noted that these changes are interconnected, so a response that affects one aspect 
of the community often affects others as well.  This also occurs indirectly, with changes in one 
dimension effecting changes in another.  For example physical improvement due to blight reduction is 
associated with social changes both directly and indirectly.  Both the manner in which the physical 
surroundings are changed—e.g. via the efforts of a block club—and the improved physical conditions 
themselves—e.g. reduced blight encouraging residents to feel safer and spend more time outdoors—
affect the strength of social relationships in the community. 
Finally, Section 6.3 synthesizes and compares the results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses 
to address the overall research question:   
Do foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an impact on neighborhood well-
being?   
6.1 Qualitative Analysis of Neighborhood Impacts 
This section analyzes the community and neighborhood impacts of foreclosure-related responses using 
qualitative data.  These data include the open-ended interviews conducted during the fieldwork trips 
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(see Section 3.4.1), participant observation, and personal observations of the communities more 
closely examined, Slavic Village and South Euclid.   
This section first reviews the impacts of foreclosures on communities, with a focus on the perceptions 
of community leaders, residents, and others involved in foreclosure responses within the county.  
Special attention is paid to the state of the communities before the foreclosure crisis, in addition to 
the actual impacts of the crisis itself.  Secondly, an analysis is made of the qualitative impacts of pre- 
and post-foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County.  Several themes emerged from the data:  
targeting, addressing blight, strengthening community identity, planning for the future, institution 
building, and advocacy.  Each of these themes is analyzed and discussed below.  Finally, the qualitative 
data concerning the success of foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County are discussed. 
6.1.1 Foreclosure Impacts 
Before attempting to analyze the effect of foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts on 
communities in Cuyahoga County, it is important consider community conditions before the 
foreclosure crisis.  Community characteristics relate to how vulnerable the community was to the crisis, 
the severity of the crisis, and what resources were available to mitigate the ill effects of the crisis.  With 
respect to the two communities investigated in this work, Slavic Village, a mixed race working class 
community located on the east side of Cleveland, came into the foreclosure crisis much worse off than 
South Euclid, a bedroom community located in the inner suburbs east of the City of Cleveland.  Thus, 
the “baseline consideration” is much different, both when considering the impact of foreclosures and 
the impact of foreclosure-related responses.  As Frank Ford explained: 
The east side of Cleveland, the African American neighborhoods, even before the foreclosure 
problem hit, were generally the more blighted deteriorating neighborhoods to begin with . . . 
and the west side of Cleveland [had] a little more stable homeowners, and certainly the 
suburbs were stable homeowner neighborhoods.  So, the suburbs and the west side of 
Cleveland are able to withstand a certain number of foreclosures . . . that the east side of 
Cleveland couldn’t (2011).   
Referring back to Section 4.1.2, it is clear that different socioeconomic “starting points” were seen 
around the county.  These differences were seen at smaller geographic levels as well, at the 
community, neighborhood, and even block level.  For example, Sally Martin of South Euclid pointed 
out that neighborhoods comprised primarily of brick housing fared better than those consisting of 
mostly wood-framed, or a mix of brick and wood-framed, houses (2012).  Interviewing local 
government officials and neighborhood activists, they frequently described differences with respect 
to the foreclosure crisis between neighborhoods or even streets within their communities and 
neighborhoods (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; Martin, October 15, 2012; Welo & 
Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Problem Extent & Variation 
Further, the extent to which the foreclosure crisis hit different communities varies, as discussed in 
Sections 4.2 and 4.4.  Slavic Village was named the foreclosure capital of the U.S., and was hit much 
earlier than most of the country.   
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Unlike much of the rest of the county, foreclosure filings on the east side of Cleveland, which includes 
Slavic Village, began dropping in 2007.  This decrease improved the chances of successful intervention: 
“On the east side of Cleveland . . . which has been the hardest hit area, foreclosures are down 
significantly, and if they keep dropping that means that the mitigation efforts, whether it’s 
foreclosure prevention, demolition or renovation, will actually have a chance to catch up.  It’s 
very hard to catch up if foreclosure filings and the incoming pipeline of new vacancies and 
abandoned properties continues to stay high.  But those numbers on the east side have 
dropped, fifty percent from 2007 to 2010” (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Though the actual extent of foreclosures and their impacts varied greatly, the language used by 
participants from different communities to describe the effects of the foreclosure crisis in their 
communities was often similar.  Georgine Welo, mayor of South Euclid, described seeing houses 
“ravaged by savages” (2011).  Tony Brancatelli, the city councilman for Slavic Village, described 
abandoned houses in his community as “ravaged and stripped, where they then caused further 
decline” (2011).  Respondents in both communities referred to the impacts of the foreclosure crisis in 
their neighborhoods as “absolutely devastating” (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Welo & Martin, May 12, 
2011).  With respect to mortgage fraud, Barbara Anderson explained that in Slavic Village “a lot of 
people would take out all the equity, and then just leave the houses rotting in the neighborhood” 
(2010); meanwhile the same patterns occurred in South Euclid, where predatory landlords had “no 
intention of ever paying the mortgage” but instead had “an intention of having a tenant in there and 
milking that property as long as they could” (Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  Death and emptiness 
were also common metaphors for the impacts of foreclosures.  Referring to the turnover of abandoned 
homes in Slavic Village:   “in the meantime the vandals, the vultures are picking up the dead carcasses” 
(Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  Describing a once close-knit community on the east side of Cleveland:  
“the neighborhood is now a shell of itself,” “neighborhoods are now like cemeteries, the houses are 
gravestones,” “houses die without an occupant” (Gardner, May 11, 2011). 
Though the extent of foreclosure damage in these communities varied, all respondents felt their 
communities were being torn apart, possibly irreversibly damaged, and that something important to 
them had been destroyed.  Their language choices reflect this, and reflect the similarities in sentiment 
shared across social, economic, and geographic differences. 
The concept of a tipping point was used to demonstrate the importance of varied community 
conditions before the foreclosure crisis.  Discussing the idea of a community or neighborhood “tipping 
point,” Frank Ford felt that while Slavic Village and many other east side communities had already 
“tipped,” other communities in the county had not, but could in the future.  He loosely defined a 
neighborhood that had “tipped” as one where the level of foreclosures on a street is high enough that 
there is an obvious visible problem (2011).  In “tipped” neighborhoods the amount of effort required 
to bring the community back to stability and viability is significantly greater because the problem has 
reached a level that impacts the entire neighborhood, as opposed to the more limited effects of 
isolated foreclosures. 
This concept is demonstrated by the two case studies.  On the ground, the visible impacts of the 
foreclosure problem were clearly different in Slavic Village and South Euclid, though the impacts were 
clearly noticeable in both communities.  Driving and walking through Slavic Village in 2011, abandoned 
and boarded up properties were a common sight, as were vacant lots that had obviously recently 
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hosted a housing structure.  Obviously unsecured structures were also visible.  Some houses had had 
external siding ripped out, or trees and plants growing out of the roof, or garbage strewn about the 
yard.  Though the general physical situation in South Euclid was clearly preferable to that of Slavic 
Village, on a drive through the city hosted by Housing Manager Sally Martin in 2012, evidence of the 
foreclosure crisis was not difficult to find.  While South Euclid does not have boarded up houses,173 
REOs can still be picked out.  According to city code, the structures and property must meet certain 
health and safety standards, such as having walkways and porch stairs in good condition, including a 
handrail.  In the case of REOs, the financial institutions that own them keep them up to the minimum 
code requirements.  That means in a neighborhood of brick walkways and stairs with metal handrails, 
REO properties are outfitted with a much cheaper version, consisting of cheaply made wood stairs and 
a handrail built from two by fours174 sloppily nailed together and then lodged in the ground.  Other 
telltale signs were bare yards with patchy grass, no plantings around the house foundation, and 
unaddressed property damage such as cracked garage doors and broken concrete stairs.175 
6.1.2 Response Strategies & Impacts 
Important strategies used in foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County include addressing blight, 
targeting, strengthening the community fabric, planning for the future, building institutions and 
organizational capacity, and advocacy.   
Table 6.1 lists the strategies used by the foreclosure responses employed in Cuyahoga County.  Every 
foreclosure response in the county dealt with blight in some way.  Addressing blight is the main priority 
of the targeting, property acquisition and control, and legal responses.  In other cases this was done 
indirectly, such as the CCFI and foreclosure mediation.  In these instances the responses work to 
prevent blight by reducing the length of the foreclosure process and working to find solutions to keep 
homeowners in their houses or offer a dignified exit.  Neighborhood efforts to plan for the future select 
areas most important to improve and maintain, while blight removal is frequently used as a means to 
strengthen the community.  The centrality of blight prevention and removal to neighborhood 
stabilization efforts in Cuyahoga County is clear. 
Targeting was used in several foreclosure responses in the county, namely the Strategic Investment 
Initiative, NSP2 funds, the county land bank, demolitions, and the neighborhood-level responses to 
address blight and plan for the future.  This strategy was essential due to the overwhelming lack of 
funds and other resources needed to address all the effects of the foreclosure crisis on communities 
and neighborhoods.  Instead, organizations chose to focus resources on smaller areas to demonstrate 
what can be done and with the hope that stabilization will spread beyond the borders of the targeted 
area. 
Neighborhood- and community-level responses actively strengthened the community fabric.  Some 
efforts addressed the social fabric directly, such as Slavic Village’s community activities to get people 
out of their houses and meet their neighbors via dogwalks, bike rides, and other outdoor activities.  
Others strengthened the community fabric indirectly, in the process of planning for the future and 
removing and preventing blight.  Both of these require residents to meet and share their thoughts and 
                                                          
173 The city’s policy is to not allow boarded up windows on unoccupied properties. 
174 “Two by four” is the colloquial term for piece of lumber with a 2” by 4” cross-section. 
175 It should be noted that absentee landlords also own properties in these conditions. 
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efforts.  They provide residents with stronger feelings of control and agency and demonstrate 
neighborhood solidarity.  
Three responses explicitly made an effort to plan for the future.  The first is the SII, which selected 
target areas by identifying current strengths that could be built upon to create “communities of 
choice”—i.e. attractive neighorhoods—in the future.  The Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization 
Corporation strategically obtains vacant land with an eye toward land assembly and future reuse.  
Finally, many community and neighborhood responses that address the future.  These include efforts 
such as land assembly for future light industry investment in Slavic Village, ReImagining Cleveland 
projects, and the development of housing attractive to today’s buyers. 
All responses used the strategy of building institutions and organizational capacity in some way.  The 
responses related to preventing foreclosures—the CCFI and mediation—required the use of this 
strategy to change the way the foreclosure process operated in Cuyahoga County and to gather and 
share resources to facilitate foreclosure prevention.  The SII depended on the organization of and 
resource-sharing between NPI, the Land Assembly Team, local CDCs, and counseling agencies.  
Similarly, the working group VAPAC depends on information and resource sharing to achieve its goals.  
The Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation (the county land bank) is an example of the 
creation of a new institution designed to address the aftereffects of the foreclosure crisis, as well as 
more generally Cuyahoga County’s vacancy problem.  It was necessary to build organizational capacity 
to design and implement the joint NSP2 application led by the county land bank.  The use of Board of 
Revisions foreclosures, demolitions, and legal responses such as code enforcement, public nuisance 
lawsuits, and investigating fraud all required the organization of additional resources and expertise to 
implement.  Finally, community and neighborhood efforts depended on the organization of residents 
and resources to create local block clubs and other groups that carried out neighborhood clean-ups, 
lobbied for additional resources from the city, and worked to develop and lay the groundwork for a 
common vision for the future of their neighborhoods.  
Finally, the majority of responses used the strategy of advocacy in some way.    Advocacy efforts were 
rarely the focus of a foreclosure response—the exceptions being the CCFI’s efforts to fix the 
foreclosure process in the county and VAPAC’s efforts to address vacant property issues.  Though the 
primary objective of foreclosure prevention counseling was to limit the negative effects of the crisis, 
ESOP in particular continued to advocate for distressed homeowners.   In the case of other responses, 
including mediation, the SII, property acquisition and control responses, legal efforts, and 
neighborhood responses, some advocacy aspect was necessary, in order to gather resources—for 
example lobbying to use a larger share of HHF for demolition—and sometimes to make necessary legal 
changes.  In many cases it was a logical extension to share information and experience gained from 
foreclosure responses with other hard hit areas, and to present Cuyahoga County’s experiences on the 
state and national level.  
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Table 6.1:  Strategies Employed by Foreclosure Responses in Cuyahoga County 
Foreclosure Response 
Strategy 
Addressing 
Blight 
Targeting 
Strengthening 
the Social 
Fabric 
Planning for 
the Future 
Building 
Institutions & 
Organizational 
Capacity 
Advocacy 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative 
(Fixing the foreclosure process) 
X       X X 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Initiative 
(Foreclosure Prevention Counseling) 
X       X X 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Mediation 
Program 
X       X X 
Strategic Investment Initiative (targeted 
demolitions, rehabilitations, and 
foreclosure prevention) 
X X   X X X 
NSP Funding (targeted property 
acquisition & control) 
X X     X    
Vacant & Abandoned Properties Action 
Council (Working Group) 
X       X X 
Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization 
Corporation (Landbanking) 
X X   X X X 
Board of Revisions Foreclosure X        X    
Demolitions X X     X X 
Code enforcement X        X X 
Public nuisance lawsuits X        X X 
Investigating fraud X        X X 
Community- & Neighborhood-level Efforts X X X X  X X  
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Addressing Blight 
Removing and preventing blight was essential to foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County.  In 
particular, as a weak housing market city, there was a pre-existing vacancy and abandonment problem 
that was greatly exacerbated by the foreclosure crisis.  The result was unprecedented levels of visible 
abandonment and blight, especially on the east side of Cleveland and inner eastern suburbs. 
Blight was counteracted in Slavic Village through organizing the demolition abandoned properties, 
neighborhood clean-ups, tracking community hazards and requesting city action, working with the 
police, and the assumption of maintenance responsibilities for nearby abandoned properties by 
residents.  In South Euclid, blight was addressed and prevented by community clean-ups and residents 
taking responsibility for external maintenance activities of nearby abandoned properties. 
Removing blight was very important to neighborhood stabilization and judged to have the greatest 
impact.  For example, Frank Ford stated that the demolition of abandoned properties was the most 
important tool used in the Strategic Investment Initiative, in part due to the lower cost in comparison 
to rehabilitations (2011).  Demolitions are especially important in communities with weak housing 
values, where it is unlikely a private buyer will invest in the property.  Mayor Welo of South Euclid 
referred to a neighborhood clean-up of an area with concentrated foreclosures as stabilizing the 
neighborhood and preventing further downward decline for the time being (2011).  By demolishing 
abandoned structures and removing other signs of blight, maintained houses in the community once 
again became visible, rather than being overshadowed by blight (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Ford, May 5, 
2011). 
The centrality of blight prevention and mitigation indicates that addressing blight is key to 
neighborhood stability.  Its prominence in the interview data suggests that clearing blight is a necessary 
first step in community stabilization. 
The following two strategies, targeting and strengthening the community fabric, overlap greatly with 
the strategy of addressing blight.  This is because targeting efforts often consist primarily of blight 
removal and efforts to remove blight have both physical and social effects, making it impossible to fully 
separate the three.  Thus, many of the effects of blight removal will be discussed in these sections and 
provide further evidence of the importance of blight prevention and removal. 
Targeting 
The strategic use of targeting in implementing foreclosure responses played an essential role with 
respect to the efficacy of foreclosure-related programs, such as the SII and the use of NSP funds. This 
was referred to as the defibrillator approach, as opposed to the “peanutbutter approach” of spreading 
resources evenly across the county.  Had foreclosure response resources, in particular foreclosure 
mitigation efforts, been applied equally across the county, it is likely that none would have been 
sufficiently concentrated to make a significant difference anywhere. 
Instead, post-foreclosure responses such as the SII, NSP funding, and the GNI were spatially targeted.  
The use of targeting allowed for more effective use of limited resources by stabilizing smaller areas 
within larger communities that provide a base for further stabilization.  These areas then serve as 
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bellwethers for the surrounding communities, demonstrating the possibility of post-foreclosure crisis 
neighborhood stabilization and serving as a focal point around which further stabilization and 
reinvestment can occur.   
Discussing Slavic Village, both Barbara Anderson and Tony Brancatelli stressed the impact of the Model 
Blocks program (SII) in their community.  Barbara Anderson focused on the visual impact of the 
targeted intervention:   
“They did so many houses on that little short block, that the whole block looks good.  And if 
you go down that block, and I go down it all the time, it’s just nice.  To have a fresh, clean block 
of houses.  It makes a bigger difference than just having one house here.  Because one house 
here in this great big area doesn’t really have the impact of ten or fifteen houses in an area, in 
a small area, where you can actually see a significant difference” (2011).   
Brancatelli viewed the targeted investment as both strengthening local faith in the community and a 
catalyst for further private investment:   
“Folks are saying, ‘Oh, it’s quieter, we’re not having to deal with the stress of these boarded 
and abandoned properties.’  Or folks seeing investment that they didn’t see ten years ago.  ‘Oh 
my gosh, someone’s actually investing in the neighborhood.’  So people are feeling better. 
Our property values haven’t stopped dropping; they’re still dropping.  But stemming the 
emotional tide of that, and seeing people invest is making a difference . . . the private market 
is the better market to work our way out of these issues, government can only help set the 
table.  So that’s where I look at working in these model blocks is that we’re kind of setting the 
table to work our way out of this, to get people to invest again” (2011). 
Frank Ford, of NPI, discussed the impacts of the SII in the six communities initially targeted.  From his 
point of view, of the three components of the SII, demolitions had the greatest impact, followed by 
rehabilitations: 
“I would have to say the number one thing is the demo.  The demolition is without question 
the number one thing that we do to stabilize communities.  Second would be the renovation.  
And I only say that because there just isn’t enough money.  I mean, we might like to renovate 
everything but we can’t.  Nobody can do it.  The demo is so cost effective at seven thousand 
per house, and you know the [financing] gap on our [rehabbed] houses is at least forty 
[thousand].  You have to raise money [beforehand] for the whole rehab, which is over a 
hundred [thousand].  Then there’s the foreclosure prevention, which I don’t want to say it’s 
not of consequence, but in terms of bulk, the sheer numbers, what’s really happened is the 
windfall benefit of the foreclosure counseling is down . . . it’s less our having prevented the 
foreclosure there than it is the fact that fewer foreclosures have been filed [lately] . . . there 
are fewer foreclosures, there are fewer houses going vacant now” (2011). 
Examining the impacts of the SII in the six SII communities individually, it is first important to again 
note the differences between the four SII communities on the east side of Cleveland and the two on 
the west side.  The four on the east side are primarily African American, have higher poverty  and 
unemployment rates, and lower housing values than their counterparts on the west side, which enjoy 
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a better socioeconomic status and have predominantly white residents.  In addition, both SII areas on 
the west side are “destination” areas:   
Another significant aspect of these two [SII target areas] is that when the foreclosure crisis 
began they already had assets or amenities that gave them stronger housing markets and a 
higher likelihood of neighborhood market recovery.  Both Tremont and Detroit Shoreway have 
emerging arts and culture scenes along with restaurants, coffee shops . . . they are places that 
have become destinations (Ford, May 5, 2011).   
As well, the west side of Cleveland was hit by foreclosures to a much lesser extent than the east side.  
The combination of these factors meant that Detroit Shoreway and Tremont required less intervention 
than the four SII areas on the east side. 
Of the four east side SII areas, “One of [the SII areas] has been very aggressive in trying to get either 
demolition or properties renovated.  And that’s Slavic Village . . . separate from the Opportunity Homes 
program, they started even before, on their own.  Persuading the city to do demolition of blighted 
houses.  And they have done rehabs on their own, with private rehabbers they’ve sponsored” (Ford, 
May 5, 2011).  These efforts have paid off:   
Today you drive down the streets and those houses that were bad are gone—some of them, 
actually, they’re not all gone.  Some of them have been rehabbed.  The ones that are gone, 
now there’s greenspace, with a little decorative park in the front of it.  And the end effect is 
that the houses that already looked [good], the people that were hanging on, their houses now 
stand out.  Now I don’t want to paint a picture that all of a sudden you’ve just driven into the 
suburbs.  It’s not that black and white . . . in fact I would say if you’ve never seen it, if I took 
you down those streets today you might say, ‘Jeez it doesn’t look that good to me.’  But it’s 
such a huge improvement.  And I think the message it sent to existing homeowners is one of 
hope that there’s positive momentum, that something’s changing . . . it’s an undeniable thing 
that, if you drove on those streets, or if you lived on those streets, it’s different.  It’s 
significantly different (Ford, May 5, 2011). 
Buckeye, another east side SII area, has also seen significant improvements: 
Buckeye, I’d have to say, yes, it’s noticeable there too.  It really is . . . like Woodland Avenue 
between 115th and 110th, which just looked horrible.  And now a lot of it is vacant green lots, 
grass.  Actually this became a component of NPI’s “Re-Imagining Cleveland” program for re-
purposing vacant land.  Today you can drive the streets and there’s a whole series of 
greenhouses that have been built there.  So that’s been converted to green sustainable use 
(Ford, May 5, 2011).   
In contrast, Glenville and Fairfax, the remaining two east side SII areas, saw less noticeable 
improvement, though they had the largest numbers of SII demolitions of the six areas. 
The use of targeting in South Euclid stemmed from the success of a neighborhood clean-up action that 
took place on East Antisdale Road, where a large concentration of vacant and abandoned properties 
was located.  City employees and neighborhood volunteers spent a day mowing grass, mulching yards, 
securing doors and windows, and generally making houses appear inhabited by adding wreaths and 
porch plants.  According to Mayor Georgine Welo, “[The neighborhood] was not going to come back.  
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We knew it.  But we saved the neighborhood to that point” (2011).  Following this stabilization, the 
question arose as to how to improve neighborhood conditions.  From this question the GNI was 
created, which concentrated revitalization efforts.  The city improved the area’s infrastructure, 
including street paving, street signs, treelawns, and fire hydrants to demonstrate its commitment to 
the area.  These infrastructure improvements then set the baseline for the three major components 
of the GNI:  rehabilitations, the addition of community parks and gardens, and infill development (Welo 
& Martin, May 12, 2011).  The impact of the program is both visibly apparent and is evidenced in the 
increase in year-to-year residential construction permit valuation (Martin, October 15, 2012; Welo & 
Martin, May 12, 2011). 
Strengthening Community Identity 
Reviewing the foreclosure responses in Chapter 5, it is clear that residents’ actions within their 
communities are essential to neighborhood stabilization.  These efforts that address a community’s 
physical condition (e.g. neighborhood clean-ups) also affect the social fabric.  These efforts are 
essential not only because voluntary resident efforts supplement insufficient funding and resources, 
but also because “it’s more than about houses and land, it’s really about bringing a community 
together to make a difference” (Anderson, May 9, 2011).  As residents see their neighbors and local 
governments invest time and resources into their community, it encourages further action—a “domino 
effect” that increases the sense of community among residents.  This feeling of community is observed 
in the increased pride, commitment, and engagement of residents within their neighborhoods and 
communities.  Referring to neighborhood clean-ups, one respondent explained: 
“. . . it keeps people invested in the communities . . . for example [a resident and ESOP member] 
said, ‘I have my home, I was given a second chance, I want to be here and I’m going to honor 
it and be respectful and clean up my area.’  So I think you have an added sense of pride” (Rudyk, 
May 2, 2011). 
Local foreclosure responses in Slavic Village that affected the social fabric include block clubs, 
community events, and exerting peer pressure within the community to raise and maintain community 
norms.  Respondents in Slavic Village reported major community impacts as the result of these efforts.  
Tony Brancatelli, Councilman for Ward 5 where Slavic Village is located, reported “What I have been 
seeing is more people participating.  Where before people were in such a bunker mentality, you know, 
‘Screw this, I can’t take it anymore.’  We’re now seeing people come out” (2011).  Members of the 
Bring Back the 70’s Street Club told me that Slavic Village’s “porch culture,” where residents spend 
time on their front porches, socializing with neighbors who stop by and talk, has been restored 
(Anderson, Marks, & Malianga, May 18, 2011).  Barbara Anderson reported: 
“I see a difference in the faith and encouragement of the neighborhood.  I see a difference in 
how we come together and how we interact with each other.  I see a difference in the children, 
when I see them smiling and running down the street to get a broom so that they can sweep 
up or play in a garden.  I see those differences.  Those differences outweigh everything else.   
I see a difference when I can see a senior come out of their home now and walk to the store.  
And they don’t feel threatened.  I see a difference when I hear children playing on the street.  
I see a difference. 
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So, yes, I see a difference.  And maybe it’s not in the house, like there that you see on the 
corner that’s boarded up.  But the neighborhood is coming after that one too” (2011). 
She pointed out that this cohesiveness came from experiencing the neighborhood’s decline and the 
foreclosure crisis together—“It’s just so much more inclusive than it’s been before.  And I think some 
of that is because we’ve gone through a struggle together” (2011). 
Community-based foreclosure responses that affected the social fabric in South Euclid included social 
activities (such as community clean-ups), block clubs, and enforcing community norms.  In comparison 
with Slavic Village, more of these efforts originated at the municipal government level,176 which then 
catalyzed resident action—“It showed a commitment to the area, we started meeting with [the 
residents] on a regular basis, and they started feeling that they had a commitment from us” (Welo & 
Martin, May 12, 2011).  For example, the first clean-up efforts in South Euclid were planned by the 
municipal government and announced to residents, who then joined government employees in the 
clean-ups.  A second example would be the Good Neighbor Guide, which is published and distributed 
by the city. 
As in Slavic Village, respondents in South Euclid reported substantial positive impacts as the result of 
these efforts.  Sally Martin reported that in areas where the physical effects of foreclosures were 
visible, one now observes signs pride of ownership, such as plantings, trimmed lawns, and holiday 
decorations (Martin, October 15, 2012).  Block clubs have formed and work on community issues, 
whether they be neighborhood clean-ups or whether residents are meeting community standards for 
garbage bin placement—“The neighbors are engaged with each other, they own [the neighborhood].  
The grassroots efforts are really good, but we need even more” (Martin, November 2, 2011).  Residents 
engage in community-building efforts in some cases because they see remaining in their homes as 
their only viable option, due to owing more on their mortgage than the house is worth or being 
unwilling to take a large loss on their property investment. 
Describing the impacts, Mayor Georgine Welo said: 
“We started building neighborhood pride.  And that has single-handedly shown us that our 
greatest assets are the people who are living on the street.  And so now we had to build on 
that even more.  So more community gardens, a real push for block parties, a push for 
community policing . . . you name it, we’re pushing it.  So that’s where we really put the 
investment into that area.  It was curb appeal, it was blood and sweat, it was programs, it was 
building on the neighborhood, building on neighbors.  Building on South  Euclid as a whole, 
and on the garden plots, by bringing people from all over together on those streets” (2011). 
Based on these two sub-case studies, it appears that neighborhood and community responses such as 
neighborhood clean-ups, block clubs, and other community events that strengthen the social fabric 
are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for neighborhood stabilization in the wake of the 
foreclosure crisis.  These efforts increase trust and community bonds, allowing residents to pull 
together resources (i.e. those available from federal and local foreclosure responses) as well as their 
own time, energy, and networks, to stabilize and improve their communities.   
                                                          
176 It should be noted that it may have been easier to initiate efforts at the local government level in South Euclid, 
given that it is it’s own municipality, in comparison to Slavic Village, which is one community among many in the 
City of Cleveland. 
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Foreclosure responses addressing the social fabric and community identity had a greater impact in 
Slavic Village than in South Euclid.  This is due to the fact that both the starting points of the two 
communities were very different (see Section 4.4) and the extent to which the foreclosure crisis 
impacted South Euclid was much less than that in Slavic Village.  Slavic Village had been devastated by 
years of physical, economic, and social decline, to the point where residents feared leaving their 
houses and multiple elderly residents had been murdered in their own homes.  Thus, the task in Slavic 
Village was to turn the community around and return to a quality of life that had been missing for 
many years.  In South Euclid the objective was to halt the decline instigated by foreclosures and hold 
community property care norms stable.  Based on this research, it can be said that both communities 
have made significant strides toward achieving these ends. 
Planning for the Future 
Another major aspect of foreclosure responses is planning for the future of the community.  
Envisioning and taking steps toward achieving a future version of their neighborhoods and 
communities provides residents with feelings of ownership and control over their environment, even 
when they are unable to substantially alter current conditions.  It also encourages psychological and 
physical investment from residents.  Residents and community organizations identify what aspects of 
their communities they would like to preserve and strengthen, such as racial diversity in both Slavic 
Village and South Euclid, “porch culture” in Slavic Village, and affordable, “right-sized” houses in South 
Euclid. 
Planning for communities’ futures has also become necessary, due to the often irreversible changes 
wrought by the foreclosure crisis, as well as the preexisting decline that has affected Cleveland, and to 
a lesser extent Cuyahoga County, since the 1970s.  “There’s the shift we’re seeing now, going forward 
we will see more of it, [toward a] more radical revisioning of what a neighborhood can be where it has 
been depopulated so severely.  It’s kind of a reboot, start from scratch again” (Lind, May 19, 2011).  
The increase in vacant land due to foreclosures and subsequent demolitions both facilitates and 
requires future planning in many communities. 
Residents and community leaders in Slavic Village sought opportunity in the devastation of the 
foreclosure crisis.  “We’re looking at the neighborhood completely differently.  Now is the time to re-
imagine, re-look at our neighborhood” (Brancatelli, May 13, 2011).  As Slavic Village demolished vacant 
and abandoned properties, residents were simultaneously investigating the future of their community.  
Community meetings were held to determine what is desired by current residents, what uses are 
possible for vacant land, and what direction the community is heading.  “What we’re doing is planning 
everything with the thought of, ‘Is this what we want for the future?’” (Anderson, May 9, 2011). 
This orientation toward the future is evidenced in many of the foreclosure responses undertaken in 
Slavic Village.  The rehabilitations and demolitions are intended to create more attractive housing for 
young families, with less densely spaced housing and modern amenities, to help facilitate Slavic 
Village’s transition from an older to a younger community.  The ReImagining Cleveland efforts are 
working to create a greener community with more open space and increased outdoor recreational 
activities, such as community gardens and walking trails.  The community is also working to assemble 
land to attract jobs and light industry—to “set the table” for private investment, as well as to retain 
current commercial and industrial uses in the community. 
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South Euclid has also looked at the foreclosure crisis as an opportunity to plan for the community’s 
future.  In responding to the foreclosure crisis, South Euclid has worked to capitalize on its existing 
strengths and respond to emerging preferences, in particular by adding “green” amenities to houses 
and the community.  With respect to the city’s strengths, Sally Martin said: 
“I think a city like South Euclid is uniquely poised to recover, because the houses are right-
sized . . . which means a house that most people can afford, even on one income . . . I mean 
you can get a four-bedroom, two-bath house for a price that somebody could support on one 
income.  So that gives you a lot of flexibility in life.  You could travel, you could take a vacation, 
the houses are sized so that you’re not spending hours and hours cleaning or mowing glass.  
The community’s walkable, there are sidewalks, there’s bus transportation, it’s close to 
everything you might want to get to” (2011). 
The city, which has a long history of working with Kent State University’s School of Design to modernize 
its postwar-style bungalows, has worked to take advantage of market trends, such as the desire for 
houses where one can age in place.  Rehabilitations as part of the GNI were designed so that the houses 
are liveable for people at any life stage—for example, a first floor room that can be used as a bedroom 
by older residents.  Another component of the GNI, community gardens and other greenspace uses, is 
oriented toward the increased interest in community greenspace of many homebuyers today.  The 
creation of a CDC, OneSouthEuclid, is intended to plan for and address future housing needs, as well 
as to increase commercial development and improve streetscaping.  The city has also attracted 
commercial investment, in the form of the first LEED-certified power center in Ohio and the 
redevelopment of a stripmall.  These commercial investments are attractive to modern homebuyers, 
who are often environmentally-conscious and prize walkable mixed use communities. 
Both communities have significantly invested in planning for their futures as part of their foreclosure 
response.  They both look to increase their attractiveness to future residents, in particular by increasing 
greenspace and developing housing that fits modern needs and desires.  They also have identified what 
aspects of their community are essential to its character, especially community norms, such as Slavic 
Village’s “porch culture” and South Euclid’s high standards of property care, and work to preserve 
them.  As with the strengthening of community identity, efforts to plan for the community’s future 
were more resident-led in Slavic Village then in South Euclid, where many initiatives originated with 
the municipal government.  The impacts of these future-oriented efforts are often not visible in the 
short-term.  There is recognition that while it is not possible to rectify all the problems facing a 
community today, it is possible to set the groundwork for the future shape of the community.  “It’s not 
necessarily about what we see right now today, but if you can just see past that, and see what it looks 
like down the road a piece, as my grandma used to say, I see a significant difference” (Anderson, May 
9, 2011). 
Building Institutions and Organizational Capacity 
On the county level, another outcome of foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County was the building 
of institutions and institutional capacity.  Among the institutions formed were the Cuyahoga County 
Foreclosure Initiative (CCFI), including both the improvements in the foreclosure process and the 
Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention Program (CCFPP); NEO CANDO, the county-wide data 
system; the Vacant and Abandoned Property Action Council (VAPAC); and the Cuyahoga County Land 
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Reutilization Corporation (CCLRC).  Many other organizations were created or developed 
organizational capacity, such as CDCs and neighborhood block clubs. 
These organizations were created to increase communication, coordination, and collaboration 
between governmental departments, organizations, advocacy groups, and residents in order to 
address the foreclosure crisis.  In many cases, these institutions served to connect between 
geographies and between levels.  For example, a major advantage of VAPAC is that it connects the City 
of Cleveland with the suburban municipalities, and Cleveland with Cuyahoga County.  By bringing all 
of these parties to the same table to discuss issues, determine best practices, and avoid policy 
duplication, VAPAC has greatly increased all parties’ ability to proactively and effectively respond to 
the issue of vacant properties.  Likewise, block clubs often have a member or members who are the 
go-to person for connecting public service issues in the community to the appropriate city or county 
departments. 
NEO CANDO, the county-wide data system, connects data from disparate sources that had been 
operating vastly different systems (e.g. computerized and paper-based systems) together to form one 
database that unifies the data from all of these systems and that is accessible to all. NEO CANDO 
increases the capacity of every other organization working to address foreclosure issues in Cuyahoga 
County, and provides reports and information that none could produce on their own.  NEO CANDO is 
used by municipalities to track and address the foreclosure problem in their communities; by CDCs to 
strategically demolish, rehab, and reuse abandoned properties; by researchers investigating policy-
relevant questions; to generate evidence in public nuisance and code violation lawsuits; and by 
individual residents and neighborhood activists to track issues in their communities. 
Capacity building has also occurred at the community and neighborhood levels.  Community responses 
in South Euclid led to the formation of the city’s first CDC, OneSouthEuclid.  The Neighborhood 
Stabilization Team (formerly the Land Assembly Team) was formed to assist CDCs in strategic planning 
by lending expertise in legal issues, property research, and other data issues.  A frequent community-
level response was the formation or expansion of neighborhood organizations and block clubs, such 
as those located in South Euclid and Slavic Village (see Section 5.6).  These organizations empower 
community residents to effect change in their neighborhoods and increase their ability to respond to 
community issues.  They have brought more residents together to determine and address common 
goals and have developed resources upon which to draw to achieve these goals.  These community 
and neighborhood organizations also provide resources to aid municipalities in achieving their 
efforts—“block groups have become the backbone of what the [city] administration is trying to do” 
(Martin, October 15, 2012).  
The building of institutions and networks has played several roles in responding to foreclosures in 
Cuyahoga County.  These include sharing information and resources, creating a forum for discussion, 
and connecting between, across, and within levels.  For example, VAPAC connected representatives 
from a variety of municipalities, county departments, and others with a stake in issues connected to 
vacant properties, creating a forum to discuss these issues, share information, and work out strategies 
to address these issues. Likewise, block groups connect residents to one another and to governmental 
and non-profit resources, provide a forum to discuss neighborhood problems and concerns. These 
organizations are essential, because the work of institutions on one level is often necessary to allow 
those on another to reach their goals, and vice versa.  For example, VAPAC generated the proposal to 
HUD and FNMA that low value REO properties be donated to the city, which both organizations 
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accepted (Ford, October 22, 2013).  More local organizations, such as CDCs, block groups, and in some 
cases municipal governments, were then able to more effectively address specific problem properties.  
Similiarly, community groups cleared the worst blight from their neighborhoods, allowing 
organizations such as the SII and the City of South Euclid to focus on more complex and expensive 
interventions such as demolitions and rehabilitations. 
There continues to be a need for these organizations to address the causes and effects of foreclosures 
in Cuyahoga County and will be for years to come.  But even as the driving force behind the 
development of these institutions wanes, the expanded institutional capacity will, at least in part, 
remain.  For example, though the formal effort to improve the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County 
has been completed, the city and county departments involved continue to communicate and work 
together.  Although the CCFPP no longer formally exists, due to the discontinuation of funding, the 
inter-organizational connections and collaboration between the organizations continues.  This is 
particularly impressive given that these organizations have no prior history of working together and 
initially were hesitant to collaborate.  As well, it will be possible for the county, municipalities, 
communities, and neighborhoods to utilize the increased capacity they have developed to address 
future issues when they arise.  Despite this, there remain many obstacles—in particular the lack of 
resources to address foreclosures and neighborhood stabilization and the pre-emption of improved 
consumer protection laws at the federal level.  Though the county and the city have made great strides 
in foreclosure prevention and mitigation, financial limitations greatly constrict their reach.  This 
shortcoming—the failure of the federal and state governments to address the foreclosure crisis with 
anything near sufficient financial resources—led to advocacy efforts at the state and federal levels by 
many involved in foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga County. 
Advocacy 
A final result of foreclosure response efforts in Cuyahoga County has been compelling advocacy and 
subsequent influence on the national level.  In fact, these foreclosure responses and the media 
attention they have garnered often function as advocacy in themselves, by means of drawing attention 
to the problem and the innovative responses seen in Cuyahoga County.  This is reflected by the large 
number of journalistic, governmental, and research investigations into the foreclosure problem, its 
impacts on the community, and efforts to prevent and mitigate the damage in county and its 
communities.   
Cuyahoga County has received strong media coverage and publicity due to the heavy and early impact 
of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County, particularly in Slavic Village. As the foreclosure crisis grew, media 
attention grew accordingly, with heavily impacted areas being of strong interest.  A second reason is 
that as regions and municipalities have looked for solutions to their own foreclosure issues, the 
county’s well-developed and innovative responses to foreclosures, such as the SII, the CCLRC, and the 
GNI, have been publicized.  For example, CNN Money ran a nine-part series on foreclosure issues in 
Slavic Village; the community has also been covered by the New York Times, Salon.com, National Public 
Radio, The National Journal, and foreign media, particularly in Germany—due to the connection with 
Deutsche Bank—including Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, arte, and das Handelsblatt.  These articles have often 
focused on the severity of the foreclosure problem in the Slavic Village community and the larger 
economic forces that propelled the community to this state.  South Euclid has also attracted attention 
for its foreclosure responses locally, nationally, and internationally. There was even a film, Cleveland 
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versus Wall Street, concerning the lawsuit filed by the City of Cleveland against thirty-two Wall Street 
banks for public nuisance damages. 
Secondly, due to media coverage as well as recognition in policy circles, many affected by foreclosures 
and involved in foreclosure responses in the county have been given a platform at the state and 
national levels to advocate for improved foreclosure responses.  This has included the testimony of 
Barbara Anderson, Jim Rokakis, and Tony Brancatelli before Congress and the testimony of Sally Martin 
and Tony Brancatelli to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  Many of the prominent actors in 
Cuyahoga County have spoken to legal groups, planning groups, and various government workshops.  
They also reported that Cuyahoga County is seen as a leader in addressing vacant properties on the 
national level. The willingness of Cuyahoga County actors and institutions to share their experiences, 
programs, and tools has also been conspicuous.  South Euclid’s willingness to assist other municipalities 
in addressing their own foreclosure problems has been particularly notable.  City representatives have 
assisted nearby counties and municipalities in developing their own foreclosure responses and provide 
the plans for the Idea House to anyone interested, free of charge. 
Stakeholders such as Kermit Lind and Frank Ford have written articles published in research and policy 
journals concerning the foreclosure crisis, the lack of federal response, and efforts in the county to 
address it. 
As foreclosure responses within the county developed, efforts began to expand to systems reform in 
addition to dealing with the problems seen on the ground.  VAPAC is a good example of this. Originally 
organized solely to carry out land assembly, the organization began to involve itself in systems reform 
to prevent additional vacant land issues.  For example, VAPAC was instrumental in lobbying state 
lawmakers to pass enabling legislation to facilitate the creation of the CCLRC. 
These efforts to bring attention to the foreclosure crisis and its impacts on communities have had 
successes, such as the creation of enabling legislation mentioned above, the Treasury Deparment’s 
rule change to allow additional HHF money to be used for demolitions, and generally contributing to 
the discussion surrounding policy responses on the state and federal levels. 
6.1.3 A Significant Impact? 
All interviewees felt that they and the mitigation programs were making a difference on the 
community level in their responses to the foreclosure problem in Cuyahoga County, though of course 
to varying extents and with different opinions on how effective programs were in relation to one 
another.  Many respondents provided positive appraisals of the effects of these efforts, but stopped 
short of making any kind of quantitative assessment.  This is unsurprising, as data on the neighborhood 
level was often lacking, and even in cases where it was available analysis had not yet been carried out.  
Many of those involved were keenly aware of these limitations and preferred not to speculate. 
This was particularly common with respect to the neighborhood and community impacts of foreclosure 
prevention counseling.  Respondents involved with county-level responses were not able to estimate 
whether there was an effect on the neighborhood level or not.  Foreclosure prevention counselors 
were also unable to assess the impact of counseling on the neighborhood or community level—their 
work focused on individual homeowners rather than neighborhoods or communities.   
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In general, the larger the geographical scope of the respondent’s work, the less optimistic he or she 
was concerning the effects of foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts.  This is not to say that 
these respondents considered the efforts wasted, but that their view of the larger problem significantly 
influenced their perspectives.  To illustrate this difference, the example of a foreclosure prevention 
counselor and the head of a counseling agency can be used.  A foreclosure prevention counselor will 
see a variety of homeowners seeking help with their mortgages.  Those who obtain a favorable 
workout are seen as evidence of successful efforts and those who do not are not.  However, the 
director of the CCFPP or an agency that provides counseling is more likely to be attuned to the overall 
foreclosure situation and be aware of the large percentage of distressed homeowners not accessing 
counseling or other services and the serious impacts of foreclosed properties on surrounding 
properties. 
Those interviewees whose work involved the foreclosure at the county level often expressed 
resignation with respect to making headway on the foreclosure problem.  Jim Rokakis, the former 
Cuyahoga County Treasurer and a key player in the development of the CCFI, said that “for every 
[homeowner] saved, twenty more [foreclosures] are filed,” (2011).  Though he felt the program was 
worthwhile, in his opinion the overall situation was too immense to address using the available tools 
and resources.  He also felt that while foreclosure prevention counseling helps individual homeowners, 
it simply was not widespread enough to have a community level impact (2011).  
These participants also acknowledged that it was not possible to address the root causes of the 
problem at the municipal or county level, and thus that effectively intervening on a large scale in 
Cuyahoga County was not possible.  Both Scott Rose of ESOP and Jim Rokakis felt that the number of 
homeowners leading up to and during the crisis was simply unsustainable—“[they] created a monster 
by pushing everyone into homeownership” (Rokakis, May 4, 2011).  Thus, both expressed the opinion 
that foreclosure responses were at least partially “buying time for the county” and “delaying the 
inevitable” as opposed to addressing the underlying issues including the increased deregulation, 
financializiation, and globalization of the economy, weak consumer protection statutes, the 
assumption that homeownership is unquestionably a social good, and a history of racial discrimination 
(Bellamy, April 27, 2011; Rose, May 6, 2011).  Likewise, a foreclosure counseling agency employee 
stated that while foreclosure prevention counseling helped individual homeowners and was important 
work, the foreclosure crisis was truly a crisis of valuation that could not be directly addressed using 
counseling or other available tools and strategies (Anonymous, May 18, 2011).  Despite not addressing 
the underlying issues, the strategy of buying time may have provided homeowners the opportunity to 
improve their financial situations or locate affordable alternate living arrangements.  On the other 
hand, some respondents feared that poor quality modifications could result in continued payments on 
an unsustainable investment that further drains homeowners’ resources.  Those working at the county 
level and in foreclosure prevention counseling often believed that foreclosure prevention counseling 
and mediation could have an effect on the neighborhood level, but were doubtful the reach of the 
programs in Cuyahoga County was sufficient to do so. 
The subgroup of respondents that included neighborhood activists and local government officials did 
articulate more specific impacts of the foreclosure responses on the neighborhood level.  They also 
often appraised the impacts as being more significant than the average respondent and were certain 
that, though changes were slow, foreclosure responses were having an impact.  For example, residents 
and community leaders in both Slavic Village and South Euclid pointed to a clear visual impact as the 
result of foreclosure mitigation efforts (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; Welo & 
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Martin, May 12, 2011).  Respondents from both communities reported significant changes in the 
mindset of the people in their communities as well—an increase in hope and commitment to their 
neighborhoods and communities (Anderson, May 9, 2011; Brancatelli, May 13, 2011; Martin, October 
15, 2012; Welo & Martin, May 12, 2011).  There were also rare instances of interviewees pointing to 
quantitative measures of improvement, such as the increase in the year-to-year valuation of residential 
construction permits in South Euclid (Martin, October 15, 2012).  That these respondents were able, 
and willing, to more concretely estimate the effects on their neighborhoods reflects that their efforts 
and viewpoints are more focused on their local areas than their counterparts who are involved in 
foreclosure responses on a city- or county-wide level.  These residents and officials see and experience 
what is happening in their areas more thoroughly and in a more place-specific manner compared to 
both counselors whose clients, seen on an individual basis, hail from around the county and officials 
and administrators whose duties are spread across all of Cuyahoga County. 
On the other hand, there is likely a psychological aspect to the especially positive evaluations of 
neighborhood residents and local government officials as well.  These respondents are particularly 
concerned about their local areas, their neighborhoods, their homes, and thus have a greater 
psychological investment in these areas.  Their efforts and their success are tied directly to their sense 
of place and home environment.177  They have a stronger desire, or perhaps need, to see their efforts 
as effective and thus that there is a reason to continue with them. 
On the overall county level, foreclosure responses were unable to address the negative effects 
foreclosures have had on communities.  The resources available were simply far too few to address all 
the impacts of foreclosures on communities throughout the county.  However, at the same time, these 
efforts did make a significant difference in small, geographically limited areas, ranging from single 
blocks to the neighborhood and community levels.   
6.2 Quantitative Analysis of Community Impacts 
6.2.1 Quantitative Model Results & Analysis 
The quantile regression model was run on 421 observations, each representing a Census tract in 
Cuyahoga County.  The County contains a total of 444 tracts, with one of these representing Lake Erie.  
The other twenty-two tracts were omitted from the model due to missing data.  The missing tracts are 
listed in Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas and are shown in grey in maps throughout this 
document. 
This section first provides an overview of the model fit and results, then further describes the 
dependent variable distribution in order to provide additional context when interpreting the results.  
The results are examined and interpretation for each set of independent variables is provided.   
Overview 
The quantile regression model described in Chapter 4 was run on 421 observations, or 95% of the 
Census tracts located in Cuyahoga County.  The other 5% were excluded from the analysis due to 
missing data.  
                                                          
177 The success of these efforts, and thus the state of the neighborhood, are also directly tied to their personal 
wealth (property value) and well-being, and in the case of local government officials, their careers. 
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The pseudo-R2 values of the quantile regressions ranged from .3399 to .5093, with higher values for 
the lower deciles.  Though the pseudo-R2 value for quantile regression is less meaningful than the R2 
value is for OLS regression (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group, 2014), it can be used as a rough 
goodness-of-fit measure.  These values indicate that the model fits the phenomena quite well by social 
science research standards.   
Table 6.2 provides a summary of the regression output.  The variables are listed in the leftmost column, 
and the remaining columns represent the results for the deciles of the dependent variable, percent 
change in residential property value.  I have reported the estimates at the deciles in order to provide 
an informative summary of the results; the figures presented later in this chapter graphically represent 
the estimates at each centile.  The coefficient estimates followed by their significance levels (in 
parentheses) are listed for each decile.  Cells highlighted green (positive) or red (negative) indicate that 
a variable is significant at the p=0.10 level at that decile.  Thus, uncolored cells in the table indicate 
that a particular variable was not significant at that particular quantile at the 10% level.  However, 
many of the highlighted cells are significant at the 5% or 1% level. In fact, the vast majority are:  nearly 
two-thirds of the highlighted cells are significant at the 1% level, while another 20% are significant at 
the 5% level.  Despite this, the 10% was selected as the cutoff level to capture additional evidence of 
possible relationships.  This research is exploratory, with the objective of providing evidence and 
generating hypotheses to guide future research. 
Tables containing full regression results (coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-values, significance 
levels, and 90% confidence intervals) can be found in Appendix D:  Quantile Regression Output. 
Briefly examining Table 6.2, one can see that many of the control and key variables included in the 
model vary in significance, depending on the quantile of interest, supporting the need for quantile 
regression.  Some variables, such as the average property value in 2000, come in and out of significance 
across the quantiles.  Others have a threshold point above or below which they are significant, such as 
per capita income in 2000 and the land banked parcel rate, respectively.  Only one variable, the 
Strategic Investment Initiative designation, changes sign across the quantiles.  No variable has multiple 
sign changes across the distribution.  Each variable’s coefficients and significance will be examined 
individually in the next sections.   
In some cases when explaining the results I use a smaller change in the variable’s value, namely 0.01%, 
in addition to a one percent change to assess expected impacts on the dependent variable.  This is 
because using a one percent increase in these cases does not represent a realistic change in the 
variable’s level.  For example, the typical (average) value of the Kept House foreclosure prevention 
counseling outcome rate in the county is 0.143%.  Using an increase in the Kept House outcome rate 
of 1% to demonstrate the relationship between this outcome rate and the percent change in property 
value is not particularly realistic, since no tract has a Kept House outcome rate that reaches even 0.9%.  
Thus using a smaller change in the independent variable provides an example of a change that could 
be realistically observed. 
  
 336 
 
Table 6.2:  Signs of Significant Variables by Quantile 
Note:  Values listed are formatted as the coefficient estimate followed by the significance level in parentheses.  Green and red highlighted values indicate positive and negative significance at 
the 90% level, respectively. 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit -0.007 (0.082) -0.005 (0.124) -0.007 (0.051) -0.008 (0.004) -0.009 (0.004) -0.010 (0.022) -0.011 (0.021) -0.013 (0.151) -0.023 (0.055)
PCI 2000 0.001 (0.911) 0.003 (0.621) 0.002 (0.736) 0.002 (0.683) 0.002 (0.711) 0.017 (0.079) 0.017 (0.080) 0.030 (0.076) 0.087 (0.000)
Poverty Rate 2000 0.071 (0.573) 0.044 (0.706) 0.228 (0.064) 0.344 (0.001) 0.208 (0.075) 0.284 (0.093) 0.412 (0.028) 1.288 (0.001) 1.770 (0.000)
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.607 (0.000) 0.530 (0.000) 0.726 (0.000) 0.761 (0.000) 0.777 (0.000) 0.738 (0.000) 0.802 (0.000) 0.912 (0.001) 0.856 (0.034)
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.163 (0.001) -0.106 (0.045) -0.123 (0.015) -0.163 (0.000) -0.149 (0.000) -0.146 (0.011) -0.211 (0.000) -0.296 (0.003) -0.117 (0.374)
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.156 (0.010) -0.101 (0.095) -0.098 (0.101) -0.068 (0.158) -0.100 (0.065) -0.091 (0.232) -0.154 (0.049) -0.277 (0.058) -0.448 (0.009)
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.239 (0.009) -0.148 (0.101) -0.237 (0.017) -0.183 (0.032) -0.192 (0.047) -0.125 (0.356) -0.075 (0.605) -0.160 (0.589) -0.110 (0.778)
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.159 (0.000) -0.150 (0.000) -0.117 (0.000) -0.143 (0.000) -0.114 (0.000) -0.113 (0.003) -0.103 (0.010) -0.090 (0.234) -0.115 (0.181)
West side of Cleveland -0.206 (0.000) -0.180 (0.000) -0.140 (0.000) -0.191 (0.000) -0.142 (0.000) -0.141 (0.006) -0.141 (0.009) -0.056 (0.546) -0.131 (0.174)
East side of Cleveland -0.233 (0.000) -0.185 (0.000) -0.137 (0.002) -0.150 (0.000) -0.130 (0.002) -0.106 (0.065) -0.031 (0.616) -0.009 (0.940) -0.121 (0.376)
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy Rate -0.208 (0.075) -0.426 (0.001) -0.460 (0.001) -0.537 (0.000) -0.382 (0.004) -0.459 (0.011) -0.560 (0.002) -0.771 (0.017) -0.488 (0.203)
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -0.949 (0.000) -0.980 (0.000) -1.003 (0.000) -1.051 (0.000) -1.328 (0.000) -1.411 (0.000) -1.298 (0.000) -1.099 (0.030) -2.377 (0.000)
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Tax Foreclosures (rate) 0.239 (0.840) 2.817 (0.095) 4.271 (0.010) 3.783 (0.009) 5.279 (0.001) 5.712 (0.015) 3.556 (0.182) 5.462 (0.304) 10.908 (0.109)
Demolitions (rate) 1.860 (0.001) 0.774 (0.352) 0.614 (0.426) 0.355 (0.580) 0.136 (0.866) -0.563 (0.614) -1.532 (0.216) -3.594 (0.143) -4.250 (0.155)
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.567 (0.017) -0.781 (0.035) -1.244 (0.000) -0.849 (0.007) -0.950 (0.006) -0.506 (0.318) 0.278 (0.604) 0.750 (0.418) -0.530 (0.637)
Strategic Investment Initiative area -0.063 (0.003) 0.023 (0.562) 0.036 (0.353) 0.049 (0.132) 0.100 (0.007) 0.120 (0.021) 0.339 (0.000) 0.443 (0.000) 1.688 (0.000)
NSP2 area 0.045 (0.067) 0.024 (0.566) 0.016 (0.736) 0.010 (0.787) 0.007 (0.878) 0.060 (0.337) 0.040 (0.544) 0.002 (0.985) -0.157 (0.303)
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) 8.042 (0.131) 0.630 (0.915) -3.751 (0.531) -2.971 (0.548) -3.997 (0.467) -10.021 (0.204) -14.426 (0.086) -14.271 (0.362) -1.407 (0.937)
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 48.235 (0.048) 39.140 (0.118) 31.856 (0.172) 37.000 (0.066) 36.250 (0.096) 33.089 (0.265) 16.401 (0.595) 36.462 (0.537) 49.272 (0.497)
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) -18.476 (0.477) -18.311 (0.504) 7.872 (0.769) 11.183 (0.603) 17.729 (0.477) 21.115 (0.510) 8.677 (0.820) -16.314 (0.809) 33.382 (0.640)
Unknown Outcome (rate) -9.268 (0.006) -8.066 (0.004) -6.620 (0.019) -6.779 (0.004) -3.509 (0.175) -1.734 (0.642) 0.654 (0.870) 0.339 (0.964) 10.633 (0.220)
QuantileDependent Variable:  %Δ in Property 
Value
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Dependent Variable Distribution 
In order to provide a stronger and more policy relevant presentation of the results and analysis, the 
dependent variable distribution is explicated here in further detail.  For reference, a boxplot and 
histogram of the variable’s distribution are found in Section 4.3.1 (Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15), while 
Figure 4.13 displays the percent change in residential property value between 2000 and 2010 mapped 
by Census tract. 
Table 6.3 provides expanded summary statistics and decile estimates for the dependent variable, while 
Table 6.4 lists the number of observations per decile. Figure 6.1 displays the values of the dependent 
variable plotted for each centile estimate.  Examining these values, one sees that approximately 80% 
of the tracts in Cuyahoga County experienced a decline in property values between 2000 and 2010 and 
that it is only in the top five percent of the distribution where the percent change in property values 
suddenly increases. 
Table 6.3:  Summary Statistics & Decile Values for Percent Change in Residential Property Value, 2000 - 2010 
 
 
Table 6.4:  Observations within Deciles for Percent Change in Residential Property Value, 20000 - 2010 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1:  Dependent Variable Distribution 
In order to better connect the quantitative data to the reality on the ground, the percent change in 
residential property values for Census tracts located in Slavic Village and South Euclid are presented 
here.  Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 contain the values for the percent change in residential property value 
and the approximate percentile of the distribution for tracts in Slavic Village and South Euclid, 
respectively.  Tracts in Slavic Village experienced changes in property value between -76.5% an -11.4%, 
with an unweighted average percent change of -59.2%.  Clearly residential property values in Slavic 
Village decreased substantially over the period 2000 to 2010.  Moreover, property values were not 
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high to begin with in Slavic Village.  The median sale prices of a single family residence in 2000 were 
$30,000 (North Broadway) and $50,000 (South Broadway); by 2010 these values were $8,000 and 
$10,000, respectively. 
Table 6.5:  Percent Change in Residential Property Value for Tracts in the Slavic Village Community 
Tract 
Percent 
Change 
Residential 
Property Value 
Approximate 
Percentile 
115400 -0.765 5 
115100 -0.738 7 
110901 -0.728 8 
114900 -0.716 9 
115800 -0.663 15 
115700 -0.654 16 
115900 -0.642 17 
115200 -0.632 18 
110801 -0.506 34 
115300 -0.484 36 
110501 -0.461 37 
114600 -0.114 67 
Unweighted 
Average -0.592 23 
 
Meanwhile, tracts in South Euclid saw decreases in residential property value ranging from -58.8% to 
-11.3%, with an unweighted average value of -36.4%.  While these are large decreases in property 
value, in comparison to the changes in Slavic Village, South Euclid saw an average decrease of 
approximately 60% of the average decrease observed in Slavic Village.  Over this time the median single 
family house sales price decreased from $106,000 to $71,000.  Again, this was a tremendous decrease, 
although it occurred at approximately the median of the change in property value distribution. 
Table 6.6:  Percent Change in Residential Property Value for Tracts in the South Euclid Community 
Tract 
Percent 
Change 
Residential 
Property Value 
Approximate 
Percentile 
185201 -0.588 24 
185101 -0.548 28 
185202 -0.379 44 
185103 -0.342 47 
185102 -0.294 50 
185104 -0.285 51 
185203 -0.113 66 
Unweighted 
Average -0.364 45 
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Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 map the values for percent change in residential property value in Slavic 
Village and South Euclid.  Looking at Slavic Village, larger drops in property value occurred primarily 
south of Broadway, which runs diagonally northwest to southeast through the community.  The one 
tract that fared much better than the rest of Slavic Village, 114600, dropped only 11.4% between 2000 
and 2010 and is the tract in the community farthest away from what was previously referred to as 
South Broadway (those tracts in Slavic Village located south of Broadway).  Looking to South Euclid, 
tracts farther to the west have larger relative decreases in property value than those to the east.  
Interviewees pointed to spillover effects from the adjacent community of Cleveland Heights, which 
borders South Euclid to the west and was heavily impacted by the foreclosure crisis (refer to Figure 
4.13, where Cleveland Heights tracts are mostly orange or red, indicating larger decreases in property 
value).  In contrast, South Euclid is bordered to the east by Lyndhurst, which fared comparatively well 
during over the decade, with changes in residential property value ranging from -3% (61st percentile) 
to -18% (77th percentile). 
 
Figure 6.2:  Change in Residential Property Value in Slavic Village 
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Figure 6.3:  Change in Residential Property Value in South Euclid 
General Control Variables 
The signs and significance of the general control variables in Table 6.2 are examined first.  Five of the 
seven general control variables have the expected signs:  per capita income, professional employment 
rate, non-Hispanic black population, the proportion of housing over thirty years old, and the 
proportion of residents with tenure less than ten years.  The property value per housing unit and 
poverty rate control variables have what at first appear to be unexpected signs, but upon reflection 
are classic examples of the phenomenon of regression to the mean.178  Especially considering the 
foreclosure and economic crises, it is not surprising that communities with higher property values in 
2000 saw (in general) larger drops in property value than those that had relatively low property values 
in 2000—they had farther to fall.  Likewise, those with lower poverty rates in 2000 had more jobs to 
lose than communities that already had high poverty rates in 2000. 
It is possible to examine these variables and their coefficients in more detail using quantile regression 
coefficient plots, such as those shown in Figure 6.4 below.  (The estimate and coefficient values for 
each variable can be found in the quantile regression output tables in Appendix C.)  In each of the plots, 
the solid green line represents the coefficient estimate at each quantile of the dependent variable 
distribution.  The gray areas surrounding the green line represent the 90% confidence intervals.  
Therefore, if the zero line is crossed by the grey area, the variable is not significant at the 10% level in 
that quantile.  The confidence intervals always increase at both ends of the quantile distribution.   This 
                                                          
178 Regression to the mean is the tendency for observations that are extreme on the first measurement (in this 
case in 2000) to be closer to the average on the second measurement (in this case in 2010). 
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is due to the method of calculation, which uses few observations at extreme quantiles and thus 
reduces the certainty of the estimate.179   
 
Figure 6.4:  Quantile Coefficients for Per Capita Income, Professional Employment Rate, Value per Housing Unit, and 
Poverty Rate (2000).   
The dashed line (red and black) on each plot represents the OLS estimate for the variable and the 
dotted lines above and below the dashed line (green and black, yellow and black) represent the 90% 
OLS confidence interval.  Comparing the quantile regression and OLS regression estimates in Figure 
6.4, one can see that in all cases except one (poverty rate), the OLS estimate is exaggerated in 
comparison to the quantile estimates.  This is because outlying values influence the OLS estimate, 
which is centered on the mean, resulting in an estimate of greater magnitude.  In contrast, the quantile 
estimators are each centered on a particular quantile and outlying values generally do not exert large 
influences on the estimates.   
The per capita income (2000) variable is positively significant only at the top half of the distribution of 
the dependent variable, indicating that there is a positive relationship between residents’ PCI in 2000 
and the percent change in property value between 2000 and 2010 for tracts that experienced an above 
average percent change in total property value.   Examining Figure 6.4, one can see that the tract level 
per capita income is insignificant up to approximately the 60th percentile, at which point it becomes 
positively significant from approximately the 60th to the 80th percentile.  Within this range, a $10k 
increase in the tract’s per capita income is associated with an approximately 1.7% increase in property 
                                                          
179 Though the certainty of the estimate is reduced, this does not imply that they are increasingly biased or 
misleading.  The reduced level of certainty simply means that the confidence intervals are wider, making it less 
likely that a variable will be statistically significant at the tails of the distribution. 
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value between 2000 and 2010.  At the 80th percentile the strength of the effect jumps to a higher level.  
At the 90th percentile, an increase in PCI of $10k is associated with an 8.7% increase in property value.  
Had only the OLS estimate been used here, the result would show only a positive and significant 
association for the average of the dependent variable distribution.  The use of quantile regression 
allows the effect to be better pinpointed. 
Likewise, a higher proportion of residents employed in the professions in 2000 is related to a positive 
change in tract property values between 2000 and 2010.  In this case the positive relationship is 
significant across the entire distribution, and the coefficient increases gradually from approximately .5 
to 1.0 as one progresses from the lowest to the highest quantile.  This translates to a 0.5% to 1.0% 
increase in property value 2000 to 2010 for each one percent increase in residents employed in the 
professions in the tract.  Again, OLS regression would deliver a significantly higher coefficient of 
approximately 1.6 for the entire distribution. 
In contrast, a higher average property value in 2000 is negatively associated with the percent change 
in neighborhood property value between 2000 and 2010, across nearly the entire distribution.  Though 
these signs were unexpected, with some reflection it is clear that this (as well as the poverty rate 
estimate) is an example of observations with extreme values at the first measurement period tending 
to have values closer to the mean at the time of a subsequent measurement.  Examining the value per 
housing unit coefficient more closely, one sees that the coefficient is relatively stable across the change 
in property value distribution, dipping at the high end of the distribution.  The coefficient ranges from 
about -0.007 to -0.023.  Scaling this up to more meaningful numbers, an increase in a tract’s 2000 
average property value by $10,000 is associated with a decrease of approximately 0.7% to 2.3% in the 
tract-level property value change between 2000 and 2010, which is a modest effect.  It is possible that 
this estimate simply reflects that tracts with higher average property values in 2000 were more likely 
to see drops in property values over the course of the decade than those which started with lower 
average property value, and therefore had fewer possibilities for property value decreases, given their 
starting positions. 
An increased poverty rate in 2000 likewise has an unexpected positive coefficient associated with 
change in property value.  Again this is likely an artifact of the data, as with average property value in 
2000.  The poverty rate coefficient is slightly positive, around 0.25, up to about the 70th percentile, at 
which point it rises to 1.77 at the 90th percentile, when it approximately matches the OLS coefficient.  
This indicates that for a 1% increase in the poverty rate of a tract, an increase of 0.25% to 1.77% in 
property value would be expected.  The positive relationship between a higher poverty rate and the 
percent change in tract property value is only expressed strongly for the areas that experienced the 
greatest relative growth in property value between 2000 and 2010. These are tracts that were either 
minimally impacted by the foreclosure crisis—these are generally tracts in the outer suburbs, with low 
poverty rates—or because property values in the tract were extremely low in 2000—generally in or 
close to downtown Cleveland, with elevated poverty rates.  As the property value in these high poverty 
tracts was much lower in 2000 than in the outer suburb tracts, the percent change in property value 
in these tracts was higher than that for the outer suburb tracts, thus explaining the counterintuitive 
sign for the poverty rate control variable. 
The remaining three general control variables had the expected signs.  The higher the percentage of 
non-Hispanic blacks in the tract in 2000, the lower the percent change in property value between 2000 
and 2010.  This effect reaches across nearly the entire distribution.  Up to the 60th percentile the 
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coefficient holds relatively steady, around -0.14, and then gradually increases in magnitude to 
approximately -0.30 at the 80th percentile.  These values translate to 0.14% and 0.30% decreases in 
property value per percentage point increase in the non-Hispanic black population of a tract.  This is 
unsurprising, and likely reflects both the effects of historical and continuing housing discrimination as 
well as the impact of predatory lending on black homeowners and neighborhoods.   
Second, the proportion of housing older the thirty years in 2000 is negatively associated with the 
percent change in property value in six of the nine deciles.  The coefficient and significance varies 
across the property value change distribution, but on average the coefficient is about -0.10, which 
translates to a 0.1% decrease in percent change in property values for each percentage point of 
housing older than thirty years in the tract.  At the 80th percentile, the coefficient is -0.28, 
corresponding to a 0.28% decrease in property value per percentage point increase in housing over 
thirty years old.  This again confirms expectations, reflecting that older properties tend to be smaller, 
lacking modern amenities, and situated on smaller lots, and are therefore less appealing to modern 
homebuyers and more likely to decrease in value.  As well, many neighborhoods with high proportions 
of older housing stock experienced higher rates of predatory lending and foreclosures. 
Finally, the percentage of residents who have lived in their homes for less than ten years as of 2000 is 
negatively related to percent change in property value in the tract for several deciles in the lower 
portion of the distribution (see Table 6.2).  The significant coefficients vary from -0.18 to -0.24, meaning 
an increase of one percentage point in residents with under ten years tenure is associated with a 
decrease in tract-level property value of 0.18 to 0.24 percent for the lower portion of the distribution.  
Tracts with a higher percentage of more recent arrivals in 2000 are likely tracts that generally have 
larger numbers of in-movers and out-movers, such as neighborhoods of “starter” homes.  Thus, at any 
given point in time, a larger portion of the properties will have new mortgages than other 
neighborhoods with more long-term residents.  Particularly in lower income neighborhoods, beginning 
around 2000, these loans were much more likely to be poor quality loans.  When the foreclosure and 
economic crises struck, homeowners were no longer able to pay their mortgages and many 
foreclosures occurred, along with concomitant vacancies and property value decline.  Thus 
neighborhoods with higher rates of shorter-term tenure were more likely to experience greater 
decreases in property value through the foreclosure crisis. 
Referring to Figure 6.5, the quantile coefficients for proportion non-Hispanic black, housing age, and 
tenure are all relatively stable, with the negative effect increasing around the 75th quantile for non-
Hispanic black and housing age.  This means that for a tract at the high end of the percent change in 
property value distribution—a tract that weathered the foreclosure crisis relatively well—a higher 
proportion of black residents or old housing would have a stronger negative effect than for tracts that 
did not fare as well.  As with the previous four variables, all OLS estimates have greater magnitudes 
than their quantile regression counterparts. 
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Figure 6.5:  Quantile Coefficients for Proportion non-Hispanic Black, Proportion Housing > 30 Years Old, and Proportion 
Residents with Tenure < 10 Years (2000) 
Locational Variables 
All three locational variables, representing the east side of Cleveland, the west side of Cleveland, and 
inner suburb locations, had consistently negative coefficients with respect to the reference category 
of an outer suburb location up to the 80th percentile (the 70th percentile in the case of the east 
variable).  
Figure 6.6 plots the coefficients over the quantile range.  All three have stronger effects at the very low 
end of the distribution:  -0.16 (inner), -0.21 (west), and -0.23 (east), which are associated with 16%, 
21%, and 23% property value penalties, respectively. These gradually increase up to approximately -
0.10 (a 10% penalty) for the inner and east locations, and about -0.14 (a 14% penalty) for the west 
location, before losing significance around the 70th and 80th quantiles.   To interpret these, one begins 
with a tract in the reference category, in this case a tract located in the outer suburbs. Which quantile 
the tract belongs to should be determined, using the change in tract-level property value between 
2000 and 2010.  Let us assume this particular tract saw a 41.5% decrease in property value over this 
period, which would place it in the 40th percentile of the distribution.  The coefficients for the locational 
variables at the 40th percentile are -0.143, -0.191, and -0.150, for inner, west, and east, respectively.  
Thus, were one to “move” the tract to an inner suburb, the expected change would be -14.3%, making 
the total change in property value -55.8%.  Likewise, were the tract “moved” to the west or east side 
of the City of Cleveland, the expected change would be -19.1% (total change -60.6%) or -15.0% (total 
change -56.5%), respectively.   
 345 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficients for the three locational variables are quite similar.  One might 
expect that the east coefficient would be the most negative, given that the foreclosure problem started 
much earlier in and hit hardest on the east side of Cleveland.  However, considering the longer time 
range of the research, by 2010 many of the problems originally concentrated on the east side had 
progressed to the west side of Cleveland and the inner suburbs (see Figure 4.11, Section 4.2.1).  A tract 
in either of these two subareas would also have been negatively affected by the foreclosure crisis by 
2010.  Other control variables also capture some of the locational variation in their coefficients, e.g. 
the east designation and the completed foreclosure rate (Sheriff’s sales rate) are strongly correlated 
(see Table 4.4). 
 
Figure 6.6: Quantile Coefficients for Locational Variables 
Unlike the general control variables, the OLS estimate for the locational variables is either quite similar 
to the quantile estimates (inner) or underestimates the effect for most quantiles (west and east). 
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables 
Two foreclosure-related control variables were included in the model, the maximum tract vacancy rate 
between 2007 and 2010, and the Sheriff’s Sales rate between 2000 and 2010.  Several of the general 
control variables have partially controlled for these impacts—such as the proportion of black residents 
in 2000—by nature of being associated with foreclosures, as was discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
Both control variables are negative across the entire percent change in property value distribution.  
Examining the maximum residential vacancy rate, the quantile estimates are relatively consistent 
across the distribution, with some decrease in the strength of the effect at very low quantiles and some 
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increase in the strength of the effect at very high quantiles.  In this case, the OLS estimator would 
overestimate the strength of the effect over most of the dependent variable range.   
The coefficient for the maximum vacancy rate ranges from -0.21 at the 10th percentile to -0.77 at the 
80th percentile.  In neighborhoods that fared the worst (around the 10th percentile), for an increase of 
1% in the maximum vacancy rate, a decrease of 0.21% would be expected.  At the 80th percentile, for 
a 1% increase, a decrease of 0.77% would be expected.  The variation in the effect makes sense, as the 
impact of additional vacancies in tracts that fared the worst would be much less than the effect in 
tracts that fared better.  These tracts with very large drops in property value have little property value 
left to lose, and thus the additional impact is reduced. 
The Sheriff’s Sales rate is quite similar to the OLS estimate, with a somewhat weaker effect for 
neighborhoods with large percent decreases in property value and a somewhat stronger effect for 
neighborhoods with small percent decreases or increases in property value.  Examining the size of the 
effect, the Sheriff’s Sales estimates range from -0.95 (10th percentile) to -2.38 (90th percentile). At the 
10th percentile, an increase of 1% in Sheriff’s Sales would be expected to decrease tract-level property 
values by an additional 0.95%.  At the 90th percentile, this decrease would be expected to be 2.38%.  
Again, as with the maximum vacancy rate coefficients, the expected impact is less in tracts that have 
experienced greater drops in property value during the study period. 
To compare the two effects, one can take the example of a tract in the center of the percent change 
in property value distribution, which would have experienced a 30% decrease in aggregate residential 
property value between 2000 and 2010.  Increasing the maximum vacancy rate in the tract by one 
percent would result in an additional 0.38% drop in property values for that tract.  Increasing the rate 
of Sheriff’s Sales by one percent would result in a 1.33% drop, three and a half times that associated 
with the maximum vacancy rate. 
 
Figure 6.7:  Quantile Coefficients for Maximum Residential Vacancy Rate and Sheriff’s Sales 
Key Variables 
Nine key variables were included in the model.  The first three pertain to property acquisition and 
control, the second two represent the targeting of interventions, and the final four are categories of 
foreclosure counseling outcomes. 
Figure 6.8 shows the quantile coefficients for the key variables that are related to property acquisition 
and control.  The upper left image shows the coefficients for the Board of Revisions foreclosures rate.  
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The coefficients are positive and significant from approximately the 20th to the 60th percentile.  As 
Board of Revisions foreclosures are generally used to gain control of abandoned properties, this 
relationship provides evidence that undertaking Board of Revisions foreclosures to deal with vacancy, 
abandonment, and blight can be quite effective across a range of neighborhoods that have seen 
property value decreases over the last ten years.  However, it remains unclear as to whether this 
intervention can be effective in extremely highly impacted tracts or in the top 40% of tracts with 
respect to percent change in property value.  The coefficient for Board of Revisions foreclosures is 
quite high, ranging from 2.8 at the 20th percentile to 5.7 at the 60th percentile.   
 
Figure 6.8:  Quantile Coefficients for Board of Revisions Foreclosure, Demolition Rate, and Maximum Landbanked Property 
Rate 
Throughout most of the county, rates of Board of Revisions foreclosures are quite low—the median is 
approximately two-tenths of a percent of all residential properties.  Using similarly low values to 
illustrate the effect, one sees moderate impacts.  For example, increasing the Board of Revisions 
foreclosure rate by 0.1% in a tract would result in an increase in property value change of 0.28% at the 
20th percentile, and by 0.57% at the 60th percentile. 
However, about twenty percent of tracts have a Board of Revisions foreclosure rate above 1%. The 
maximum rate is nearly 8%.   These tracts are heavily concentrated on the east side of Cleveland, 
though there is also a cluster on the near west side as well as some suburban tracts to the northeast 
and southeast of the city that were heavily impacted by the crisis (refer to Figure 5.9, Section 5.4.3).  
Using larger changes in the rate of Board of Revisions foreclosures, such as 1%, the expected increase 
in property value would range from 2.8% to 5.7%, depending on the quantile.   
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The demolition rate is only significant at the 10th percentile, with a coefficient of 1.86.  Once again, the 
average rate of demolitions is quite low, at 1.05%.  However, the maximum rate is 13.7%, and thirty-
eight tracts have rates of 4% or above.  A one percent increase in the demolition rate for a tract in the 
lowest decile of the property value change distribution is associated with a 1.86% increase in property 
value. 
The final variable related to property acquisition and control is the maximum rate of land banked 
parcels in a tract, which is negatively significant at and below the 50th percentile.  The coefficients 
range from -0.57 at the 10th percentile to -1.24 at the 40th percentile, which translate to a decrease in 
property value ranging from 0.57% to 1.24% for a one percent increase in the demolition rate in the 
tract. 
The three property acquisition and control variables represent similar and overlapping actions, though 
it was not possible to quantify to exactly what extent the three overlap.  As explained in Section 5.4.3, 
Board of Revisions foreclosures occur when the County forecloses on a property for which taxes or 
another lien have not been paid.  When using Board of Revisions foreclosures as a foreclosure 
mitigation tool, the County forecloses on a property for which there is a lien for the costs of demolition; 
the property then goes to the county land bank.  Thus, this measure overlaps with both the demolitions 
and the land banking measures.  However, this overlap isn’t complete; some Board of Revisions 
foreclosures are undertaken due to unpaid taxes, not as a foreclosure mitigation tool.  Likewise, not 
all demolitions are followed by a Board of Revisions foreclosure, nor are all land banked properties the 
result of one. 
It appears that the Board of Revisions foreclosure rate and the demolition rate are capturing the same 
phenomena, which is the acquisition of and removal of blight from vacant properties.  Thus these 
variables have positive coefficients, representing the removal or mitigation of negative foreclosure 
effects from the community.  On the other hand, the rate of land banked parcels captures the control, 
or holding, of parcels.  This is more difficult to interpret.  Holding the parcels after demolition, as 
opposed to putting them back into productive use, may be the reason for the negative coefficient for 
land banking—recall Whitaker & Fitzpatrick IV (2012), who found that property values near a parcel 
that would soon be acquired by the land bank were depressed, and that property values near a parcel 
that had been acquired by the land bank were elevated.  Since the quantitative model covers the 
period 2000 to 2010, aspects of either or both of these relationships may be captured by the land 
banking variable.  Alternatively, the maximum land banking rate may be capturing the extent to which 
a neighborhood has been affected by vacancy, abandonment, and blight, while the Board of Revisions 
foreclosures and the demolition rate of vacant, condemned properties are capturing the responses. 
Another approach is to look at these three variables and their relationships with percent change in 
property value quantitatively. Table 6.7 lists all three indicators and their coefficients at decile intervals 
(deciles above the 60th are omitted as none of the three variables are significant in these quantiles).  It 
was previously mentioned that the three indicators significantly, but not fully, overlap.  Thus, the 
bottom row of Table 6.7 contains the sum of the three coefficients, which is always positive.  That is, 
if the rate of Board of Revisions foreclosures, demolitions, and land banking all increased by one 
percent, the expected change in property value at a particular quantile would be the percentage listed 
in the bottom row of the table.  For example, at the 30th percentile, with an increase of 1% for all three 
variables, one would expect a 3.027% increase in residential property value at the tract level.  Though 
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somewhat difficult to interpret, it appears that on the whole property acquisition and control 
responses lead to increased property values. 
Table 6.7:  Property Acquisition & Control Coefficients  
Note:  The “Net” Coefficient assumes a 1% increase in all three property acquisition and control indicators 
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 
Board of Revisions Foreclosure Rate -- 2,817 4.271 3.783 5.280 5.712 
Demolition Rate 1.860 -- -- -- -- -- 
Landbanking Rate -0.567 -0.781 -1.244 -0.849 -0.950 -- 
“Net” Coefficient 1.293 2.036 3.027 2.934 4.330 5.712 
 
Using the “net” property acquisition and control coefficients, one can examine the expected effect in 
tracts located in Slavic Village and South Euclid—refer to Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3.  The tracts located 
in Slavic Village to the south of Broadway generally experienced changes in property value in the 
bottom quantile of the distribution.  According to the model results, one could expect an increase in 
change in property value on the order of 1.3% to 2.0% in these tracts.  Tracts on the west side of South 
Euclid are located between the 20th and 30th percentiles, while those located north of Broadway in 
Slavic Village are generally found between the 30th and 40th percentiles.  Using the three property 
acquisition and control responses together, one would expect the change in property value to increase 
between 2.0% and 3.0% in those tracts on the west side of South Euclid, and by approximately 3.0% in 
those north of Broadway in Slavic Village.  Tracts to the east side of South Euclid are located between 
the 40th and 50th percentiles and an increase of three to four percent would be expected there, while 
the each community has one tract at approximately the 67th percentile of the distribution, for which 
an increase of five to six percent would be expected (though all three indicators have lost significance 
by the 70th percentile). 
The next two foreclosure response variables have to do with targeting.  They are the Strategic 
Investment Initiative (SII) areas and the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 (NSP2) areas.  Figure 
6.9 shows the quantile coefficients for these two variables.  Examining the SII plot first, the variable 
starts off with a negative coefficient in the 10th percentile, then is insignificant from the 20th through 
the 40th percentile, and finally is positively significant from the 50th through the 90th percentile.  It 
makes a particularly large jump between the 80th and 90th percentiles. 
 
Figure 6.9:  Quantile Coefficients for SII and NSP2 Areas 
At the 10th percentile, SII has a coefficient of -0.06, indicating that a tract in the 10th percentile of 
percent change in property value would have a 6% lower change in property value if it were designated 
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an SII area in comparison that one that was not.  Between the 50th and 80th percentiles, the SII 
coefficient ranges from 0.10 to 0.44, which correspond to 10% and 44% higher changes in property 
values for tracts in these quantiles that are designated SII.  The coefficient at the 90th percentile is 1.69, 
which corresponds to a 169% greater change in property value for an SII tract than a non-SII tract, all 
else held equal. 
Looking at the data for the tracts designated as SII areas provides some additional information.  Five 
tracts are located at the 92nd percentile or above, three in Tremont and two in Detroit Shoreway, the 
two SII areas located on the west side of Cleveland.  These two SII areas were particularly successful, 
while the others saw mixed results.  Of course, the regression coefficients provide information about 
correlations, not causation.  Thus, it is not possible to know what would have happened in the absence 
of the SII in either the tracts that experienced property value increases over the period or those that 
did not.  The quantile regression model results provides some evidence that a targeted response such 
as the SII can stabilize property values, or even help them to recover, particularly in areas with strong 
amenities.   
In contrast, the NSP2 variable is significant only at the 10th percentile, where it has a coefficient of 
0.045.  This indicates that, ceteris paribus, a tract in the 10th percentile receiving NSP2 funds is expected 
to have a 4.5% greater property value increase than one not receiving them.  Thus, for example, several 
tracts located south of Broadway in Slavic Village, located in the lowest quintile of the distribution, 
may have been good candidates for NSP2 funding.  In contrast, it does not appear that the other tracts 
in Slavic Village or those in South Euclid would have seen an increase in property value as the result of 
being the NSP2 funding grantees. 
One reason for the differences in the quantitative estimates for the two targeting efforts, SII and NSP2, 
may be that the SII was locally developed and implemented, while the NSP was developed on the 
federal level and implemented on the local level.  As a result, NSP is more of a ‘one size fits all’ program, 
to which Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland have had to fit their needs, while the SII is a locally 
developed program tailored to the specific needs of the city.  An example of this is the funding rules.  
NSP2 funding was competitive (i.e. funds awarded based on the stabilization plans’ merits), but still 
required target areas to meet thresholds based on the incidence of foreclosures and vacancies in the 
area.  While the SII areas were all substantially impacted by foreclosures, the selection process was 
more focused on the presence of community anchors and CDCs with strong track records.  In addition, 
since NSP rules apply to all awardees across the country, in many cases local implementation was 
limited.  For example, Ohio leaders had to campaign in order to be allowed to allocate additional funds 
to demolition and mixed use development was not possible under the program rules. 
The final set of key variables is the counseling outcome variables.  The counseling outcomes were 
divided into four groups:  Kept House, Lost House non-Foreclosure, Lost House to Foreclosure, and 
Unknown outcome.  The specific outcomes that were assigned to each group can be found in Appendix 
B:  Variable Definitions.  All of the rates are calculated by dividing the number of counseling outcomes 
in each outcome group by the number of residential units in the tract.    
Beginning with the Kept House outcome, the coefficients for which are shown in Figure 6.10, one can 
see that the outcome is significant only at the 70th percentile, with a t-value of 0.086.  Here the quantile 
regression shows that a counseling outcome of keeping the house has a coefficient of -14.42, indicating 
that a one percent increase in this foreclosure prevention counseling outcome is associated with a 
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14.42% decrease in tract property value over the period 2000 to 2010.  This value is very large; however 
the incidence of the kept house outcome is quite low, with an average value of 0.14% of the housing 
units in a tract having this outcome.  The maximum is 0.87%.  Using a more reasonable increase relative 
to the observed values, were a tract in the 70th percentile of the percent change in property 
distribution to experience an increase in the kept house outcome of 0.01%, the expected impact on 
property values in the tract would be -0.14%.  The kept house outcome rate variable is positive at the 
very low end of the change in property value distribution; however, here it is not significant. 
The second counseling outcome variable, which represents the rate at which homeowners lost their 
house but to a foreclosure alternative, such as deed-in-lieu or a short sale, is shown on the top right 
side of Figure 6.10.  The lost house, non-foreclosure outcome rate has a positive sign throughout the 
distribution, but is only significant at the 10th, 40th, and 50th percentiles.  Where it is positive, the 
coefficient ranges from a high of 48.23 at the 10th percentile to a low of 36.25 at the 50th percentile.  
That is, a one percent increase in this outcome is associated with a 48.23% percent increase in 
residential property values at the 10th percentile, and a 36.25% increase at the 50th percentile.  These 
coefficients are even larger in magnitude than those for the previous counseling outcome of keeping 
the house. Again using a more reasonable increase, one would expect an increase in the tract’s 
property value of 0.48% (10th percentile) to 0.36% (50th percentile), were the lost house, non-
foreclosure outcome rate to increase by 0.01%.  The positive coefficient for counseling cases where 
the house was lost, but not to foreclosure, may be signaling that foreclosure alternatives benefit a 
neighborhood.   
 
Figure 6.10:  Quantile Coefficients for Counseling Outcomes 
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The next foreclosure counseling outcome variable, the lost house to foreclosure rate, is non-significant 
across the dependent variable distribution. This may be because any negative effect of an additional 
foreclosure is already captured by the Sheriff’s sales rate variable.  It is not expected that a property 
with a non-successful counseling outcome would have any negative effect on the community in 
addition to that of the foreclosure and possible vacancy and abandonment. 
The final foreclosure counseling outcome variable represents all counseling instances where the 
outcome is unknown.  This variable is negatively significant up to the 40th percentile, with coefficients 
ranging from -9.27 at the 10th percentile to -6.62 at the 30th percentile (the coefficient’s magnitude 
rebounds slightly at the 40th percentile, to -6.78).  These coefficients correspond to -9.27% and -6.62% 
percent change in residential property value at the 10th and 30th percentiles of the dependent variable 
distribution, respectively.  The coefficients remain negative, but not significant, through the 60th 
percentile, after which they are positive but not significant.  A 0.01% increase in the unknown outcome 
value would be expected to decrease neighborhood property value by 0.09% to 0.07%, depending on 
the tract’s location in the property value change distribution (up to the 40th percentile).  The effect of 
counseling with unknown outcomes may be negative because these cases have not been brought to a 
conclusive end; instead these properties may be primarily those that are lingering in a state of limbo, 
neither foreclosed nor in the hands of a mortgagor able to make payments and perform upkeep on 
the house.   
Applying this information to the cases of Slavic Village and South Euclid, one can examine how 
counseling and percent change in property value are associated in specific parts of the change in 
property value distribution.  For example, the tracts located south of Broadway in Slavic Village would 
be expected to see large increases in property value were the counseling outcome of losing the house 
via a foreclosure alternative to increase by 0.1%--approximately 3.9% to 4.8%.  Were the unknown 
outcome rate to increase likewise, a decrease in property value between 0.8% and 0.9% would be 
expected.  Tracts on the west side of South Euclid would be expected to decrease in property value 
between 0.6% and 0.8% for a 0.1% increase in the unknown counseling outcome rate, but no significant 
association is present for the lost house to a foreclosure alternative outcome.  Similarly, tracts north 
of Broadway in Slavic Village could expect a decrease of approximately 0.7% for each 0.1% increase in 
the unknown outcome rate.  Tracts on the east side of South Euclid would expect an approximately 
3.6% increase in property value for each 0.1% increase in the foreclosure alternative counseling 
outcomes, and possibly a 0.7% decrease for a 0.1% increase in the unknown outcome rate.180  Finally, 
the tracts located at approximately the 67th percentile, one in each Slavic Village and South Euclid, 
could expect about a -2.8% percent change in property value for a 0.1% increase in the kept house 
outcome rate—though the reason for this remains unclear. 
6.2.2 Summary 
Examining the model as a whole, it can be seen that foreclosure interventions have varying magnitudes 
and vary in impact depending on in which tracts they are used.  The model itself captures the influences 
on tract change in property value relatively well, with pseudo-R2 values ranging from 0.34 to 0.51, with 
more of the variation accounted for in the lower half of the change in property value distribution. 
                                                          
180 The coefficient is significant at the 50th percentile but not the 60th percentile; hence “possibly.” 
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In some cases variables had unexpected signs, namely value per housing unit (2000) and poverty rate 
(2000).  Both of these variables however behaved highly consistently over the course of building the 
model, and testing of the variable inflation factors (VIFs) indicated that multicollinearity did not play a 
role.  However, a likely explanation presents itself:  since nearly all tracts saw a decrease in property 
value between 2000 and 2010, those that started the period with higher average property values had 
more room to fall than those with lower property values in 2000.  Likewise for the poverty rate variable.   
As expected, the locational control variables representing the east side of Cleveland, the west side of 
Cleveland, and the inner suburbs (with the outer suburbs as the reference category) were negatively 
significant throughout much of the dependent variable distribution.  Likewise, the foreclosure-related 
control variables, the maximum residential vacancy rate and the Sheriff’s sales rate, were negatively 
significant, this time for the entire dependent variable distribution. 
Examining the land acquisition and control key variables, both the Board of Revisions foreclosure rate 
and the demolition rate had positive coefficients, with the Board of Revisions foreclosures significant 
from the 20th through the 60th percentile, and the demolition rate significant at the 10th percentile.  In 
contrast, the maximum land banked parcels rate was negatively significant from the 10th to the 50th 
percentile.  This mixture of signs likely has to do with the high level of correlation between the three 
variables; the land banking variable may be capturing the disamenity effect of future land bank parcels 
on nearby properties before the land bank gains control of the property.  Referring back to Table 6.7, 
the net effect of the three property acquisition and control responses is positive in all quantiles where 
a significant effect was detected—indicating that, on the whole, property acquisition and control 
responses have a positive relationship with change in property value.  Though the three responses do 
not always coincide, they often do, making this net effect a reasonable approximation for the 
relationship between property acquisition and control responses and the percent change in residential 
property value. 
Of the three land acquisition and control variables, the Board of Revisions foreclosure rate variable has 
the greatest impact on the change in property values, with an expected increase of 5.7% for a 1% 
increase in the rate of Board of Revisions foreclosures in a tract.181 In contrast, a 1% increase in the 
demolition rate in a tract is expected to increase the property value by 1.86%, while a 1% in the rate 
of land banking is expected to decrease the property value by 1.24%.  Here it is clear that, on the whole, 
the acquisition of vacant and blighted properties is positively related to property values on the tract 
level. 
Of the two targeting key variables, the Strategic Investment Initiative areas had positive coefficients 
over the top half of the change in property value distribution, and a negative coefficient at the 10th 
percentile.  The Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2 variable was only significant at the 10th 
percentile, where the coefficient was positive.   
Comparing the two targeting variables, the SII variable has a maximum effect of increasing tract 
property values by 169%, while the NSP2 variable has an effect of 4.5%.  However, these two 
                                                          
181 Please note that I use the maximum magnitude of the coefficients in describing and comparing the 
relationships between key variables and residential property value in this section.  All decile coefficients can be 
found in the previous section and Appendix D:  Quantile Regression Output. 
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coefficients apply to opposite ends of the percent change in residential property value distribution (the 
90th and 10th percentiles, respectively).   
The final set of key variables is the counseling outcomes.  The kept house outcome rate was negatively 
significant only at the 70th percentile.  The lost house, non-foreclosure outcome, which represents 
foreclosure alternatives, had a positive coefficient at the 10th, 40th, and 50th percentiles, while the lost 
house to foreclosure outcome was not significant across the entire distribution.  Finally, the unknown 
outcome rate variable was negatively significant up to the 40th percentile of the distribution. 
The counseling outcome variables are compared using 0.01% hypothetical change values to reflect 
more plausible changes in these variable levels.  The kept house outcome would have an effect of 
decreasing the tract’s property value by -0.14%, were it to increase by 0.01%.  The lost house, non-
foreclosure outcome, when increased 0.01%, would increase the property value by 0.48%.  The lost 
house to foreclosure variable was non-significant, and the unknown outcome variable would be 
expected to decrease tract property value by 0.09%, were its frequency to increase by 0.01%.  This 
suggests that the outcome of losing the house, but not to foreclosure, has the largest effect on 
residential property values on the tract level. 
In comparison with other research on foreclosure prevention counseling the focuses on the 
homeowner level (see Section 2.4.3), this research examines whether there are benefits to foreclosure 
prevention at the neighborhood level.  While the outcome of keeping the house is non-significant, 
except at the 70th percentile, where it is negative, the outcome of losing the house but not to 
foreclosure—e.g. a Deed-In-Lieu or a short sale—is positively significant at the 10th, 40th, and 50th 
percentiles. In fact, referring to the top right panel of Figure 6.10, one can see that the variable is 
positive and nearly significant throughout the distribution up to the 80th percentile.  This indicates that, 
in addition to having positive benefits for the homeowner (e.g. less of a reduction in one’s credit 
rating), the use of foreclosure alternatives (see Section 2.2.1) also benefits neighborhoods and 
communities by reducing the occurrence of vacant properties.  This in turn reduces physical neglect 
and vandalism, which has positive effects on both the social fabric and property values.   
Based on the results of the quantitative model, several foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts 
appear to be related to increasing neighborhood stability.  The SII designation has by far the largest 
impact; however, it is important to keep in mind that SII areas were chosen based on a competitive 
process and thus likely represent the areas best situated to benefit from the SII program.  NSP2 areas 
also have a large impact, at 4.5%, however this is significant only at the 10th percentile.  The land 
acquisition and control efforts also appear to have an impact, in particular the Board of Revisions 
foreclosures tool, which has an expected impact of a 5.7% increase in property value for a 1% increase 
in its occurrence.  Targeted demolitions appear to work in concert with these, while the maximum land 
banking rate has a negative effect.  Finally, the foreclosure prevention counseling outcomes’ effects 
are somewhat surprising.  The kept house outcome has a negative effect in one decile, while the lost 
house, non-foreclosure outcome has a positive effect.  Losing a house to foreclosure in the process of 
counseling has no significance in the model, and unknown outcomes are negatively associated with 
the change in property value. 
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6.3 Foreclosure Responses & Neighborhood Well-Being 
This section integrates both the qualitative and quantitative results to answer the initial research 
question: 
Do foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an impact on neighborhood well-
being?   
While the qualitative and quantitative portions of this research attempt to answer the same question, 
listed above, the ways they attempt to answer the question differ.  Of particular importance are the 
different methods used and the instrumentalization of “community stability” used with each method.  
The qualitative component examines community stability in a holistic fashion, incorporating physical, 
social, political, and to some extent economic aspects.  In contrast, the quantitative component 
instrumentalizes community stability using a purely economic measure—the percent change in total 
residential property value.  This instrumentalization entirely neglects social and political aspects of 
community stability and acknowledges physical characteristics only through the proxy control measure 
of the tract vacancy rate.   
However, the use of exclusively economic data has several advantages:  (1) it supplements the 
qualitative results, which are generally restricted to the physical, social, and political impacts of 
foreclosure responses; (2) it allows for analysis over a much larger area (in this case the entire county); 
(3) hedonic pricing theory asserts that many non-economic community qualities are capitalized into 
property prices and thus are accounted for in the monetary representation of property value; and (4) 
housing value is the measure used in financial industry decision-making, governmental policy 
decisions, and neighborhood change research.  Thus, this simplified version of community stability 
provides results in the lingua franca of the policy worlds in which the problem is embedded. 
The two components combined provide both a macro- and a micro-level perspective on the research 
question.  This furnishes a more thorough understanding of the problem and its context than either 
component alone could provide.  Furthermore, the quantitative portion focuses on the what 
question—do these responses have an impact on community stabilization?—while the qualitative 
portion focuses on the how—what processes and mechanisms play a role in these impacts?  How do 
they occur? 
As described in Section 3.1.4, the mixed methods research design allows the two methods to inform 
one another during the research processes, as well as providing opportunities for the triangulation of 
results (Section 3.1.5).  Because the two components approach the research question in different 
ways—what v. how, macro- v. micro-, economic v. holistic definitions of community well-being—not 
all results can be triangulated.  Nonetheless the research offers opportunities to examine results that 
complement, corroborate, or contest one another. 
In this research, comparing the results of the qualitative interviews and the quantile regression 
indicates significant concurrence in several areas.  First, the controls in the quantile regression and the 
contextual factors described in the interviews concur.  The general control variables account for the 
different starting points of different neighborhoods and communities, an important factor when 
comparing the impact of the foreclosure crisis and foreclosure responses on the neighborhood and 
community level.  The significance of the locational variables in the quantitative model confirms the 
reported and observed geographical variation in impact across the county.  In this case it is not the 
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qualitative results that are being confirmed, but rather the quality and accuracy of the statistical 
model.  Likewise, the foreclosure-related control variables in the model behave as expected and are in 
accordance with both the qualitative results and other foreclosure-related research.   
6.3.1 Physical & Economic Impacts 
The physical impact of foreclosure responses on neighborhoods and communities was a key theme in 
the interviews. Residents and government officials in both Slavic Village and South Euclid pointed to 
clear visible impacts as the result of foreclosure responses in their communities.  Foreclosure 
mitigation responses such as neighborhood clean-ups and other efforts to fight blight, demolitions, 
targeting, and planning for the future all impact the physical condition of foreclosure-affected 
neighborhoods and communities. 
The physical condition of many foreclosure-affected areas was improved by neighborhood clean-ups 
carried out by residents, and in some cases, in partnership with municipal officials.  For example, in 
South Euclid, the city government instigated clean-up efforts to show commitment to the community, 
in the hope that residents would respond in turn.  The city also added new infrastructure to particularly 
troubled areas.  Residents did respond, participating in clean-up efforts by mowing lawns, trimming 
hedges, and adding plants and holiday decorations to vacant properties.  Several resident-led block 
clubs were also formed, with a focus on continuing to address blight and other conditions considered 
sub-standard in the community.  The city developed a “Good Neighbor Guide” to familiarize new 
residents with community norms.  As government officials stated, these efforts “saved the 
neighborhood” by halting the spread of blight; one now sees signs of pride of ownership rather than 
signs of the foreclosure crisis. 
Similarly, residents in Slavic Village participated in clean-ups organized by block clubs, put pressure on 
local businesses with respect to property upkeep, used community eyesore cards to report and address 
blight issues, and used Clean Cleveland Service Need Forms to request city services to address blight 
and other signs of disrepair.  In contrast to South Euclid, blight prevention and removal efforts in Slavic 
Village were organized by residents, who then connected with local governments and other entities to 
further their efforts.  This is likely due to the history of organizing in Slavic Village and increased 
awareness of city services. 
Slavic Village and South Euclid’s reliance on blight prevention and removal efforts, as well as the strong 
positive effects reported by residents and governmental representatives, are evidence that a 
neighborhood’s physical condition is of utmost importance to residents’ perceptions of neighborhood 
quality.  These efforts also reduce residents’ perceived risk of crime victimization by removing signs of 
neglect and deterioration in the neighborhood and thus the invitation for criminal activity. 
Targeting was also a key strategy that changes the physical environment of foreclosure-impacted 
areas.  Recognizing that demand far outstripped resources, the SII and NSP2 programs based their 
selection on areas significantly affected by the foreclosure crisis that also had resources such as an 
experienced CDC and amenities that could be developed into anchor areas.  The county land bank used 
targeting to determine which properties to acquire in order to assemble land for future reuse.  
Neighborhood and community groups used targeting in their clean-up efforts and when planning for 
the future of their communities. 
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Demolition was especially important to targeting efforts. Though at first a difficult concept for many 
to embrace, given the negative and destructive connotations of the practice, demolitions have proved 
a highly cost-effective way to remove blight, especially from areas that have been especially highly 
impacted by the foreclosure crisis, such as Slavic Village.  By removing blighted properties, those that 
are cared for come into focus, rather than being overshadowed by houses in severe disrepair.  Despite 
the comparatively low price of demolitions, need far outstrips the available resources.  For this reason, 
targeting demolitions has been especially important.  By removing the majority or all of the blighted 
properties on a street or block, the difference is clearly visible, creating a starting point for additional 
revitalization.  To do so, a coordinated approach is necessary.   This generally means that a 
government- and/or nonprofit-led effort is required to stop the spread of blight and “set the table” for 
private revitalization and redevelopment efforts. 
The quantitative model also captured the economic impacts of physical changes due to foreclosure 
responses, specifically those involving property control and acquisition and targeting.  Examining first 
property acquisition and control responses, the quantile regression provides mixed evidence 
concerning the effect of these tools on the percent change in a tract’s property value.  Both Board of 
Revisions foreclosures and demolitions are positively associated with percent change in tract property 
value, from the 20th to 60th percentile and at and below the 10th percentile, respectively.  Meanwhile, 
land banking is negatively associated with percent change in property value at and below the 50th 
percentile.   
However, the combined effect of these three responses, which do overlap to a large extent—results 
in a corresponding increase in percent change in residential property value significant from the 10th to 
the 60th percentile.  Referring back to the examples of Slavic Village and South Euclid, one can see that 
these responses would be expected to benefit a large proportion of the neighborhoods (Census tracts) 
in these communities:  in Slavic Village, property value change scores range from the 5th to the 67th 
percentile, the unweighted average at the 23rd percentile.  Four of the twelve Slavic Village tracts are 
below the significance range, while one lies above it.  In South Euclid, the values range from the 24th 
to the 66th percentile, the unweighted average lies at the 45th percentile.  Only one of South Euclid’s 
seven tracts is located outside the range of significance. 
Examining targeting responses, the coefficients for the SII are positive and significant from the 50th to 
90th percentile, though negative at the 10th percentile.  At the 10th percentile, assigning a tract to the 
SII would be expected to decrease the change in property value by 6.251%.  The coefficient consistently 
increases from 0.100 at the 50th percentile to 1.688 at the 90th percentile.   That is, assigning a tract at 
the 50th percentile to the SII is associated with an increase in the tract’s change in property value of 
10%, while the same change at the 90th percentile is associated with an increase of 169% (though a 
tract at or above the 90th percentile of percent change in property value is highly unlikely to be selected 
for the SII). Meanwhile, the NSP variable is significant only at the 10th percentile, with a coefficient of 
0.045, translating to an expected 4.5% increase in change in property value for a tract at the 10th 
percentile were it to be assigned to NSP. 
Finally, foreclosure prevention counseling can be regarded as a blight prevention response, or at least 
a response with the side effect of blight prevention.  However, relatively little evidence was found 
supporting the economic impact of foreclosure prevention counseling on the tract level.  The 
foreclosure counseling outcome of keeping the house was significant only at the 70th percentile, and 
unexpectedly negative, with an expected decrease in percent property value change of -0.14% for an 
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increase in the kept house outcome rate of 0.01%.  The outcome of losing the house, but not to 
foreclosure, was positively significant at the 10th, 40th, and 50th percentiles.  Increasing the lost house, 
non-foreclosure outcome rate by 0.01% has an expected increase in percent change in property value 
ranging from 0.48% at the 10th percentile to 0.36% at the 50th percentile.  Losing the housing to 
foreclosure was not significant at any point along the distribution, and unknown outcome rates had 
negative coefficients from the 10th to the 40th percentile, with expected decreases of 0.07% to 0.09% 
for a 0.01% increase in the unknown outcome rate.  Though not decisive, this evidence suggests that 
the foreclosure prevention counseling outcome of losing the house, but not to foreclosure, helps to 
stabilize communities.  In addition to this, foreclosure prevention counseling may be helping with 
neighborhood stabilization, but at a smaller geographic level than captured by the quantitative model. 
The statistical significance of losing the house, but not to foreclosure provides some evidence that this 
may be occurring. 
While the qualitative results concerning the physical impacts of foreclosure responses and the 
quantitative results concerning the economic impacts are not directly comparable, the two provide 
support for one another.  Both show evidence that property acquisition and control efforts and 
targeting are beneficial at the community and neighborhood levels.  The qualitative results are 
stronger, and should be favored for two reasons:  (1) the quantitative component has more 
shortcomings than the qualitative component and, in particular, (2) the quantitative model does not 
account for any temporal lag between the implementation of foreclosure responses and changes in 
local property value.  Thus, supposing there is a lag between the implementation of foreclosure 
responses and changes in property value, changes in property value that occurred toward the end of 
the study period may not be picked up by the model used here.  Thus, if anything, the quantitative 
results reported are likely to be biased downwards. 
6.3.2 Social Impacts 
The social impacts of foreclosure responses were a key theme in the qualitative data.  Though not 
covered by the quantitative model, the interview data strongly pointed to strengthening the social 
fabric as a key outcome of foreclosure responses, particularly those undertaken on the neighborhood 
and community levels.  Respondents in both South Euclid and Slavic Village reported clear changes in 
the mindsets of residents as a result of foreclosure responses, particularly those addressing blight.  
Referring to targeted demolitions in Slavic Village, Frank Ford cited a feeling of momentum and positive 
change among residents.  Barbara Anderson, local residents at the BB70 block club meetings, and Tony 
Brancatelli, the local city councilman, made similar statements.  Likewise, South Euclid chose to make 
strategic infrastructure improvements to show investment and commitment to its residents and 
inspire the same in them.  These physical improvements, whether resident- or government-led, 
demonstrate to residents that it is possible to change their neighborhoods and communities despite 
the often overwhelming effects of the foreclosure crisis.   
Tony Brancatelli of Slavic Village pointed to a change from a “bunker mentality” where residents stayed 
indoors and resigned themselves to the situation to increased participation, the revival of Slavic 
Village’s porch culture, and personal investment in the community.  Barbara Anderson identified 
changes in the behavior of children and seniors in Slavic Village, who once again come outdoors and 
feel safe in their neighborhoods.  She attributes the increased investment in the community to 
experiencing a shared struggle.  Sally Martin of South Euclid recognized a similar change in South 
Euclid, where residents have taken on increased responsibility in their neighborhoods and 
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consequently have more neighborhood pride and an increased feeling of ownership and control.  
These two aspects then reinforce one another, creating a virtuous circle.  Others, having narrowly 
avoided losing their homes, feel an increased obligation to honor and invest in their communities. 
The foreclosure crisis has also provided opportunities to plan for the future (and in many cases made 
planning a necessity).  Prior to selecting candidates for demolition, the case study communities asked 
themselves what they want for the future and how that should look.  Slavic Village hopes to attract 
new, younger residents, and thus strategically demolished properties to open up space and reduce the 
density of houses.  Similarly, South Euclid hopes to retain many of its residents by constructing new 
houses that facilitate aging in place.  Both communities are taking advantage of the vacant land 
resulting from demolitions to create greener communities, adding parks, community gardens, and 
pathways and trails.  Slavic Village is also assembling land in order to attract and retain light industry 
and commercial businesses. 
Planning for the future of neighborhoods and communities provides additional feelings of ownership 
and control and encourages physical and psychological investment.  Residents determine what it is 
that makes their neighborhoods and communities special, what they want to retain, and what changes 
they want to make.  Particularly prominent have been efforts to create modern housing and land use 
patterns and to increase the “green” aspects of communities.  These activities strengthen social bonds 
as residents create and work to implement shared visions for the future of their communities and 
neighborhoods. 
The social impacts of foreclosure responses on neighborhoods and communities have been especially 
important in the face of the foreclosure crisis, which had devastating effects on local social networks 
and the physical condition of neighborhoods and communities.  These swift and undesired changes 
left many feeling powerless, isolated, and overwhelmed.  Thus, local responses that draw on and 
strengthen social bonds resulted in increased feelings of self-sufficiency and control over the 
neighborhood environment are a necessary component of neighborhood-level foreclosure responses. 
6.3.3 Political Impacts 
Responses that employed the strategies of building institutions and organizational capacity and 
advocacy impacted communities and neighborhoods politically; that is, these strategies assisted 
neighborhoods and communities in gaining power and control over resources. 
All foreclosure responses observed in Cuyahoga County built institutions and organizational capacity.  
This occurred in many forms:  the creation of county-level organizations such as the CCFI, VAPAC, and 
the CCRLC; the strengthening of existing organizations, such as code enforcement departments and 
county housing court; and the creation of neighborhood block clubs.  Organizational capacity was built 
by competitively applying for grants and national-level foreclosure prevention and mitigation funding, 
redirecting funds, and especially by increasing resource-sharing and collaboration. 
The results of the efforts of the CCFI gave the county more control over the foreclosure process; 
similarly, VAPAC’s efforts resulted in more power and control of vacant and abandoned properties in 
the county and communities.  By sharing resources among stakeholders, the CCFPP, SII, and those 
involved in the county’s NSP2 funding application were able to have a greater impact and draw toether 
more resources than would otherwise have been possible.  Various parties joined together to develop 
and file public nuisance lawsuits and investigate fraud.  Block clubs and other community groups 
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brought residents together to tackle blight issues, both directly via neighborhood clean-ups and 
indirectly by lobbying for city services, such as demolitions. 
Political impacts also occurred as the result of advocacy efforts.  Advocacy was common to nearly all 
foreclosure responses, though to varying degrees.  Advocacy occurred on many levels, whether it be 
Mayor Welo’s efforts to address issues in the foreclosure process in the county, residents and block 
clubs seeking additional services, or local leaders in the foreclosure response testifying at state and 
federal hearings.  In most cases the effects of these efforts are difficult to capture—for example, to 
what extent to testimony about the foreclosure problem in Cleveland change the discussion of the 
foreclosure problem and responses to it at the federal level?  However, some impacts of advocacy 
were clear, including VAPAC’s successful efforts to establish enabling legislation for the county land 
bank and the lobbying of Jim Rokakis and others to the Treasury Department that resulted in 
permission to use additional federal HHF money for demolitions. 
6.3.4 Summary 
Table 6.8 lists the foreclosure response strategies and their primary types of impacts on the 
neighborhood and community levels.  Targeting and addressing blight have primarly economic and 
physical impacts, as evidenced by both the quantitative and qualitative data.  That these two types of 
impacts overlap is not surprising—property value is based significantly on the physical condition of the 
house as well as surrounding properties.  Thus physical changes are expected to result in economic 
changes as well. 
The strategies of strengthening the social fabric and planning for the future had primarily social 
impacts, though many of the activities undertaken had physical impacts as well.  Block groups and 
community and neighborhood activities encouraged residents to leave their houses and build 
relationships with each other and their communities.  Developing a joint vision for the future 
strengthened bonds and established shared commitment to the community. 
Table 6.8:  Foreclosure Response Strategy Impacts 
Strategy 
Impact Type 
Economic Physical Social Political 
Addressing Blight X X     
Targeting X X     
Strengthening the Social Fabric     X   
Planning for the Future     X   
Building Institutions & Organizational Capacity       X 
Advocacy       X 
 
Using the strategies of building institutions and organizational capacity and advocacy had political 
impacts in the county and for communities and neighborhoods.  These efforts resulted in additional 
resources and rule changes that gave both the county and communities and neighborhoods more 
control over abandoned properties. 
It should be recalled that the data concerning social impacts are limited to the case study communities 
of Slavic Village and South Euclid.  Though not limited to these two communities, evidence of the 
political impacts of foreclosure responses is limited to that drawn from the qualitative data.  Despite 
this, the evidence overwhelmingly points to social and political changes occurring as the result of 
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foreclosure responses in the county.  Further research is needed to establish whether or not this is a 
general phenomenon. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary  
Both nationally and in Cuyahoga County, the foreclosure crisis has contributed to increased 
precariousness of homeownership as the result of deregulation, financialization and the exploitation 
of homeowners, neighborhoods, and communities that deregulation and financialization allowed and 
encouraged.  Financial institutions and certain investors gained during the lead-up to the foreclosure 
crisis, while the majority of the costs fell upon individuals and communities, particularly those already 
disadvantaged racially and economically.  Many strategies were employed to reach this point, including 
ideologically-driven policy changes, particularly at the national level, exploitation of the U.S.-American 
romanticization of the owned home and the financial inexperience of segments of society historically 
excluded from homeownership, appeals to “get rich quick” and to “buy before you’re priced out,” and 
willful blindness by many, including former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, to the 
fact that house appreciation was not boundless and everlasting.  Once the housing bubble burst, moral 
opprobrium was unevenly applied to shame homeowners and discourage default.  Calls to “personal 
responsibility” were one-sided but effective. 
For the vast majority of U.S.-Americans, these developments were negative.  Millions lost their homes 
and experienced severe stress, instability, and often other psychological effects.  Many homeowners 
lost a substantial investment, and nearly all faced large reductions in their credit scores that will 
severely impede their ability to purchase other large items, such as a home or auto, secure a rental 
contract, and obtain a job for the next two to seven years.  Others who did not experience foreclosure 
themselves were also negatively affected, with increased blight, crime, and vandalism in their 
neighborhoods and communities, and the property devaluations that follow.  Neighborhoods and 
communities experienced decreased stability and the destruction of social networks and 
neighborhood cultures, while municipalities and school districts lost enormous amounts of funding 
while service needs increased. 
These developments are negative for the U.S. as a whole.  As homeowners and other individuals 
occupy positions of increasing precariousness, stress increases, negatively impacting the physical and 
psychological health of those directly affected and those only “at risk.” The result is increasing 
inequality, economically as well as with regards to health and access to opportunity.  Foreclosures also 
have destructive and destabilizing effects on neighborhoods and communities, though the extent of 
these effects and their costs remains relatively unknown. 
This research aids in filling this gap by examining the impacts of foreclosure responses on the 
neighborhood and community levels in Cuyahoga County, Ohio by means of a case study.  It was first 
necessary to determine the effects of foreclosures and related consequences on the neighborhood 
and community levels and to examine the national and local contexts under which the foreclosure 
crisis and foreclosure responses occurred in Cuyahoga County. 
Following that, the task of answering the research question was undertaken.  To do so, qualitative 
interviews and a quantitative model were employed.  The interviews were semi-structured and 
included county and municipal officials, individuals involved in foreclosure response programs, and 
local residents.  Two sub-case studies were undertaken to examine community- and neighborhood-
level foreclosure responses.  These were Slavic Village, a working class community on the east side of 
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the City of Cleveland, considered by many to be the epicenter of the foreclosure crisis, and South 
Euclid, a suburban municipality consisting primarily of starter homes.  The quantitative model used 
quantile regression to investigate the association between various quantifiable foreclosure responses 
and the percent change in property value on the tract level between 2000 and 2010. 
The foreclosure responses employed in Cuyahoga County, Ohio provide some alternatives to the 
neighborhood destruction caused by the foreclosure crisis, though within a limited framework (that is, 
Cuyahoga County and others must operate within the larger context defined nationally, in particular 
with respect to regulation and modification).  Many of the foreclosure responses that occurred in the 
county can be categorized as attempts to regain and assert power at the local level.  Leaders and 
advocates testified at the national level to bring attention to the problem and its severe impacts.  The 
mediation program eventually developed court rules that removed servicers’ ability to foreclose unless 
they cooperated to an extent.  Similarly, though more informally, the CCFPP used foreclosure 
prevention counselors to bridge the gap between borrowers and servicers through their knowledge of 
the foreclosure process and jargon.  Many efforts worked to exert more local control, such as the SII, 
which targeted specific areas and was thus able to strategically determine where to intervene.  
VAPAC’s efforts made it easier to gain control of problem properties and mediate the effects of 
foreclosures and abandonment on neighborhoods.  The creation of the County Land Bank made it 
possible to hold and maintain land for redevelopment, facilitating local control.  Likewise, Board of 
Revisions foreclosures simplified and expedited the process of acquiring abandoned properties.  Other 
legal efforts have increased the costs of holding undermaintained properties for financial institutes in 
order to hold REO owners accountable to the neighborhoods and communities the properties are 
located in.  The neighborhood and community level responses observed in Slavic Village and South 
Euclid characterize efforts to assert and regain local control particularly well.  Efforts to “own” the 
community have included the setting and communication of norms, such as South Euclid’s Good 
Neighbor Guide and Slavic Village’s community eyesore complaint forms; the revival and strengthening 
of neighborhood culture through block club meetings and community and neighborhood events; and 
resident-developed plans for the future of the community. 
The foreclosure crisis responses observed in Cuyahoga County have certainly reduced the negative 
impacts of the crisis, economically, physically, socially, and politically.  However, these efforts are 
limited in their impact as long as the national-level debate and policy continue on their current paths, 
as is likely.  The federal response attended far more to the bottom lines of financial institutions, 
providing only lip service to borrowers in trouble and their advocates.  Those efforts aimed at assisting 
borrowers were always optional for financial institutions and had insufficient incentives to induce 
participation.  The sum effect of the federal response was to “foam the runway” as per Tim Geithner, 
or to cushion the landing of financial institutions by slowing down the effects of the crisis.  In some 
cases these efforts did benefit homeowners, but this was dwarfed by the benefits received by financial 
institutions. 
Unfortunately, not only did the federal government provide insufficient resources, and too late at that, 
it also used the doctrine of pre-emption to invalidate state and local laws aimed at curbing predatory 
lending.  Financially and legally, it was and is simply not possible for Cuyahoga County or any of its 
constituent parts to fully address the foreclosure crisis, its causes, or its impacts without substantially 
increased assistance and cooperation from the federal government. 
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7.1.1 Qualitative Conclusions 
Several strategies emerged as themes in the qualitative interviews.  The use of these strategies had 
physical, social, and political impacts in Cuyahoga County and the communities of Slavic Village and 
South Euclid.  These included: 
Strategies with Primarily Physical Impacts 
1. Addressing Blight:  Blight has been the most visible impact of the foreclosure crisis in Cuyahoga 
County, adding to a pre-existing vacant property problem.  Every foreclosure response 
addressed blight in some way, whether by preventing it or removing it.  Dealing with blight 
benefits communities and neighborhoods physically, economically, and socially.  It provides a 
base for further investment by removing physical signs of deterioration and vacancy and 
strengthens residents’ feelings of well-being, control, and commitment in the neighborhood. 
2. Targeting:  The use of targeting foreclosure responses has been necessary and effective, due 
to the fact that need far outweighs the available resources.  Thus, by targeting a limited area, 
a visible change can be effected, rather than spreading resources evenly but thinly, resulting 
in a much more limited impact.  These “pockets” of revitalization provide a base for additional 
mitigation efforts and private investment. 
Strategies with Primarily Social Impacts 
3. Strengthening Community Identity:  Not only did the foreclosure crisis cause many to lose their 
homes, it also weakened neighborhood cohesiveness and identity.  In the two sub-case studies 
of Slavic Village and South Euclid, resident-led efforts to address blight and come together as 
a community both supplemented the limited resources available to address foreclosures and 
built feelings of community ownership.  Residents and community leaders reported increased 
pride, commitment to, and engagement in the neighborhood and community when residents 
organized block clubs and clean-up activities.   
4. Planning for the Future:  Given the extent of the foreclosure crisis, in addition to the long-term 
decline of Cleveland, some communities have chosen to try to make the best of these 
conditions to plan for the future of their communities.  Residents have identified what aspects 
of their communities are important to preserve and strengthen for the future, and in what 
direction they would like to see their communities develop.  These efforts encourage physical 
and psychological investment in the neighborhood and community, and provide residents with 
a sense of ownership of and control over their environment.   
Strategies with Primarily Political Impacts 
5. Building Institutions & Organizational Capacity:  A wide variety of institutions arose in response 
to the foreclosure crisis, from block clubs on the neighborhood level to a county-wide 
foreclosure prevention program.  These institutions often work to increase communication, 
cooperation, and collaboration between groups, especially between jurisdictions and levels.  
However, the continued existence of these groups is often not assured.  For example, a change 
in local government leadership led to the termination of the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure 
Prevention Program.  Before that the program was financed via an ever changing mix of funds.  
Similarly, ESOP has a long history of struggling for resources.  Others, such as the CCLRC, have 
 366 
 
secured permanent funding.  Organizations such as VAPAC and block clubs rely less on funding 
but must maintain member interest and involvement to continue. 
6. Advocacy:  Due to the early and severe impact of foreclosures in Cuyahoga County, it was 
possible (and necessary) to develop innovative foreclosure responses, from the use of 
targeting to systems reform.  As a result, Cuyahoga County gained a national platform and was 
able to use this to advocate for improved foreclosure responses.  In some cases these efforts 
resulted in changes at the state and federal level. 
7.1.2 Quantitative Conclusions 
The quantitative component of the research sheds light on the economic relationships between some 
foreclosure responses and communities.  Summarizing the quantitative results, the quantile regression 
indicates that: 
1. Property acquisition and control foreclosure responses are, on the whole, positively related to 
percent change in tract property value for tracts in the low- to mid-range of the percent change 
in tract property value distribution. 
2. There is mixed evidence for the relationship between targeting and percent change in tract 
property value.  The SII is associated with an increase in percent change in property value for 
the top half of the percent change in property value distribution (≥50th percentile).  On the 
extreme low end of the percent change in property value distribution (10th percentile), the SII 
has a significant negative coefficient.  Inclusion in the NSP is not associated with a significant 
percent change in property value, with the exception of the extreme low end of the percent 
change in property value distribution (10th percentile), where a positive effect is expected.  
3. Counseling outcome rates are not clearly associated with the percent change in tract property 
value.  However, the outcome rate of losing the house, but not to foreclosure, is positively 
related to percent change in tract property value at the 10th, 40th, and 50th percentiles.  This 
suggests a possible beneficial relationship between the incidence of foreclosure alternatives 
and community property values.  Unknown outcome rates, which often indicate unresolved 
loan problems, are negatively associated with percent change in property value for tracts in 
the lower half of the percent change in property value distribution (≤40th percentile). 
4. Comparing the strength of the associations, participation in the SII has the largest effect on 
percent change in property value, ranging from +10% at the 50th percentile to +44% at the 80th 
percentile and +169% at the 90th percentile. 
5. The quantile regression was a much stronger choice for this analysis than OLS regression and 
provided a finer grained set of results.  Comparing the quantile regression and OLS coefficients 
(Figure 6.4 through Figure 6.10), it is clear that the OLS regression estimates provide much less 
information than the quantile regression estimates.   
7.2 Limitations & Further Research 
This research was undertaken in an exploratory manner, in order to better understand what 
foreclosure responses are available, how they function, and whether they have an impact on the 
neighborhood and community levels.  There remain many avenues open for further research on this 
topic.  I will mention only a few here.  Some of these are simply outside the scope of this research, 
while others address the limitations of this study. 
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First, given that this study is an exploratory case study, all of the relationships found between 
community stabilization and foreclosure responses can be used as hypotheses in future research.  With 
respect to generalizability, it is clear that the results of this study apply to the case of Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio; whether the results apply to other weak market regions or even mixed market regions is a 
question that requires further research.  Alternatively, the reader can use “naturalistic generalization” 
(Section 3.1.3) to assess the extent to which these results can be generalized.  Ideally, one can combine 
the results of this study with case specific information to assess the suitability of extending the findings 
to other contexts. 
A shortcoming of this work is the lack of community leader and resident interviews in both sub-case 
studies, particularly in South Euclid.  This was a function of the exploratory and somewhat open-ended 
nature of this work.  Though this shortcoming later became apparent, it was no longer feasible to 
undertake an additional round of fieldwork.  This also reflects a limitation of snowball sampling—some 
potential respondents may be missed, due to a lack of interaction with other respondents or having 
been excluded from the discussion.  The starting point of this research project, which focused the 
impacts of foreclosure prevention counseling, mortgage modifications, and servicer decision-making 
on neighborhoods and communities, explains the fact that the sampling population was weighted 
toward those involved in those processes—representatives of local government, foreclosure 
prevention counseling agencies, and financial institutions (though the pursuit of interviews in this final 
category was largely fruitless).  Had community leaders and residents been better represented, 
particularly in South Euclid, it would be possible to further triangulate the qualitative results. 
Several areas of this research project could be expanded.  An in-depth investigation of how foreclosure 
responses occur on the neighborhood or block level would shed additional light on the workings on 
the intra-neighborhood level.  For example, how did efforts in a particular area start? Internally or 
externally?  Who were the major players, how did these change over time, and what neighborhood 
social networks were employed and/or developed in the process?   Are certain actors key at certain 
points in the process?  How do block and neighborhood-level efforts connect and interact with 
municipal, county, and national foreclosure responses?  What are the necessary conditions and stages 
in the “domino effect” reported on the neighborhood level, particularly with respect to blight 
prevention and removal?   
A second area of interest not fully developed in this research project is the functioning of county-level 
efforts, in particular the CCFPP.  A deeper investigation could reveal more about how the program 
came together and what changes occurred in the actual and espoused values of the organizations and 
departments involved.  Additionally, the role of key players—such as Georgine Welo, Mark Seifert, and 
Jim Rokakis—should be investigated.  The transition from a competitive to a collaborative and 
cooperative relationship between the non-profit and advocacy organizations also provides an 
opportunity for further research. 
Further, this research could be extended to the investigation of a mixed or strong market city.  Given 
the difference in housing market conditions, it is not expected that all of the foreclosure responses 
used in Cuyahoga County could be transferred to other regions impacted by foreclosures; in fact, the 
quantitative model provides evidence that foreclosure responses have different effects in various 
communities and neighborhoods within Cuyahoga County.  The characteristics of mixed and strong 
market cities suggest that in these areas it would be more difficult to prevent foreclosures, but that 
the negative effects associated with REOs and vacancy would be greatly reduced.  Foreclosed 
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properties are much more likely to be reabsorbed by the market, as opposed to remaining vacant, and 
thus a larger emphasis on code enforcement and limited use of property acquisition tools may be more 
effective in this context.  It is also unclear as to whether many of the neighborhood- and community-
level responses that occurred in Cuyahoga County occur and function similarly in other areas that have 
been affected by the foreclosure crisis differently. 
Finally, the quantitative model used in this research could be improved.  For example, the use of panel 
data could at least partially address the time lag issues found in the model in this research.  I attempted 
a two-period model to isolate the period before foreclosure interventions (2000 to 2006) from the 
period with foreclosure interventions (2006 to 2010), in order to investigate the relationships between 
various control variables and the percent change in property value over each period.  However, as that 
model had significant robustness issues and the one-period model did not, I retained the original one-
period model.  Additional investigation and improved data could result in a more informative model.  
In particular, the use of an appropriate instrumental variable to remove or reduce the endogeneity 
present in the model would allow for the investigation of causal relationships between foreclosure 
responses and changes in property value. 
It would also be enlightening to include data on highly local foreclosure responses, such as blight 
removal and prevention efforts and the formation of block clubs.  Though complex and time 
consuming, the collection and incorporation of quantitative data capturing the strength of a 
community’s social fabric, or the change in it, would expand and strengthen the quantitative model 
greatly.  Alternatively, a measure of social capital (to capture the strength of the social fabric of a 
community or neighborhood, such as reported trust levels) could be used as the dependent variable 
to capture the effects of foreclosure responses on another aspect of neighborhood health.  However, 
to do this, it would be necessary to focus on a smaller area—perhaps the SPA level—to make the 
research load feasible.  
7.3 Conclusions & Policy Insights 
In conclusion, the answers to the sub-questions are combined to answer the main research question: 
Do foreclosure prevention and mitigation responses have an impact on neighborhood well-
being?   
Given the results of the qualitative and quantitative instigations undertaken in this research, the 
answer is yes.  However, not all interventions are equally effective, nor do they work in the same way 
in all neighborhoods.  And the impact of some responses remains unclear. 
The most important aspect of designing foreclosure responses is to carefully evaluate the extent of the 
foreclosure impact and the social, economic, and political contexts in which the responses will be 
embedded, in order to craft a response or set of responses that are specific to the municipalities, 
communities, and neighborhoods in which they will operate. 
Secondly, blight and safety issues need to be addressed.  Changes that result from addressing physical 
decay have immediate and visible physical and economic impacts.  In addition to improving the 
physical condition of the community or neighborhood, removing and preventing additional blight plays 
a large role in residents’ assessment of their neighborhood.  Physical changes provide a sense of 
change, hope, and investment, and often spur additional physical and psychological investment in the 
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neighborhood from residents.  Demonstrated buy-in from local government, businesses, and 
institutions furthers feelings of community pride and investment.  Together these efforts strengthen 
the community fabric, setting the stage for additional efforts and creating a “domino effect” of 
investment in the community.   
Given the limited resources and an overwhelming problem, many foreclosure responses in Cuyahoga 
County used targeting as a strategy.  The Strategic Investment Initiative and NSP2 funding are the most 
obvious examples of this.  The SII selected its target areas based on the extent they were impacted by 
foreclosures and whether community resources such as an established CDC and an area with 
noteworthy amenities were present.  Thus, the results of targeted efforts should have the maximum 
effect possible and “set the table” for the expansion of community stabilization efforts and private 
investment. Targeting improves the physical and economic condition of neighborhoods and 
communities, albeit in limited geographies. 
In many cases, efforts to address blight overlap with efforts to strengthen the community fabric, as 
described above.  In addition to the physical environment, community and neighborhood ties were a 
major victim of the foreclosure crisis.  Residents retreated into their homes, due to shame about their 
foreclosure situation or due to fear generated by the unsafe conditions in their communities.  
Neighborhood clean-ups were one way that local social networks were rebuilt.  Block clubs, block 
parties, community events, and efforts to envision a shared future for the community strengthened 
the social fabric as well. 
In weak market areas, particularly those heavily impacted by the foreclosure crisis, planning for the 
future is a necessary step in neighborhood stabilization.   Due to the extent and level of destabilization 
that has occurred in many inner city and inner ring suburban neighborhoods, residents often have two 
choices—to give up or to create a vision for the future.  By envisioning the future of their community, 
residents are able to exert ownership and control over their environments, even when the resources 
are lacking to address all issues in the near future.  Two themes observed with respect to planning for 
the future were increasing green amenities, such as community gardens and pocket parks, and 
developing and capitalizing on housing that fits the preferences of modern homeowners.  This strategy 
has primarily social impacts, as well as physical impacts as residents attempt to lay the groundwork for 
the futures of their communities. 
Building institutions and organizational capacity has been key to the success of foreclosure responses 
in Cuyahoga County.  The process of responding to the foreclosure crisis has resulted in the birth of 
many new institutions, ranging from coordinated, county-level organizations such as the CCFI, the 
county foreclosure initiative, and NEO CANDO, a comprehensive property and demographic data 
system that covers Cuyahoga County and beyond, to neighborhood block clubs that cover a single 
block of a single street.  These institutions house institutional knowledge, human capital, and 
interpersonal networks that allow for quick and varied responses to both the effects of the foreclosure 
crisis and other threats to neighborhood and regional stability.   Likewise, these institutions have 
increased their organizational capacity by winning grants and federal funding, sharing resources, and 
reducing overlapping and incompatible efforts.  The results of this strategy are political:  increased 
control and power over local areas, in particular with respect to abandoned housing. 
Advocacy was a component of nearly all foreclosure responses observed in the county.  Advocacy 
efforts included testimony on the state and federal level, lobbying to establish enabling legislation for 
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the county land bank, efforts to change the foreclosure process in Cuyahoga County, campaigns to 
change the local discourse surrounding foreclosures, and publishing academic and policy articles 
concerning the foreclosure crisis and responses to it in the county.  The results of advocacy efforts had 
political impacts as well, namely legislative and administrative rule changes and additional resources 
to fight the foreclosure problem. 
As a result of the early and heavy impact of the foreclosure crisis, Cuyahoga County developed many 
new and innovative foreclosure responses.  This led to national and international recognition, both for 
the extent of the problem and the county’s status as a forerunner in foreclosure responses.  This 
created a platform for advocacy and resulted in national influence in the foreclosure debate.   
With respect to specific responses in weak market cities, the research offers a few conclusions.  First, 
foreclosure prevention counseling is highly effective on the homeowner level, but, at least within the 
context of this research and at the scale used in Cuyahoga County, it has minor impacts on the 
neighborhood level.   However, it shows potential to be used as a neighborhood stabilization tool if 
the density of counseling were much greater than that observed in Cuyahoga County.  In particular, 
there are indications of positive neighborhood-level effects when foreclosure alternatives are used.  
Secondly, demolitions are necessary in heavily impacted areas, particularly when the housing style and 
density is outmoded.  Thirdly, rehabilitations and new residential construction should be used 
carefully.  Ideally for-sale housing will be designed to fill a specific niche that fits well with the nature 
of the community and the direction it is evolving in.  Fourth, targeting is essential when need greatly 
outstrips resources—as was generally the case during the foreclosure crisis. Finally, neighborhood 
organizations such as block groups play a key role in stabilizing and revitalizing neighborhoods, in 
particular in the areas of strengthening social ties, preventing and removing blight, and shaping future 
plans for their communities.   
The foreclosure crisis will not quickly be forgotten in the U.S., particularly in the hardest hit areas.  It is 
essential that we learn as much as possible from the shock and disruption stemming from the crisis in 
order to help understand how people, communities, and local governments can productively respond 
and how communities can be more resilient in the face of such an economic disaster.
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Appendix A:  Interview Materials 
Intervew Guide 
Section Text
Introduction
Key Components:
Thank you
My name & role
Purpose
Confidentiality
Duration
How interview will be conducted
Opportunity for questions
Signature of consent
[reiterate recording once recording has begun—name, org, pos, date]
Are there any questions about what I have just explained?
Are you willing to participate in this interview?
I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with me today.  My 
name is Jen Washco and I am a PhD student at Ohio State and the 
Technical University of Dresden researching efforts to reduce the 
impact of foreclosures.  I'd like to speak with you today about your 
experiences with the Cuyahoga County Foreclosure Prevention 
Program, and with the effects of foreclosures in the county in general.  I 
am hoping in particular to gain an understanding about how exactly this 
program works, when and where it works best, and how various 
stakeholders work together in order to use this understanding to 
address similar problems in the future effectively.
The interview should take approximately one and a half hours.  If it's ok 
with you, I will be taping the session because I don't want to miss any of 
your comments.  Although I will be taking some notes during the 
session, I can't possibly write fast enough to get it all down.  Is it ok with 
you if I record our interview?
All responses will be kept confidential unless you expressly grant 
permission.  This means that your interview responses will only be 
shared with the research team (myself and my advisors) and I will 
ensure any information included in my dissertation and articles does 
not identify you as the respondent.  In the case that information I wish 
to include would make you identifiable, I will send drafts to you for 
your review and permission before doing so.  Remember, you don't 
have to talk about anything you don't want to and you may end the 
interview at any time.
[Present copy of this text to interviewee for date & signature (include 
witness?).  Provide copy, including my contact information, to 
interviewee.]
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Questions
Introductory Questions
i1. Could you describe your role in the CCFPP?
Probes: i2. How long have you been involved?
Would you give me an example? i3. With whom do you primarily work and communicate with?
Can you elaborate on that idea?  
Would you explain that further?
i4. How has your role or the program in general changed during your 
involvement?
I'm not sure I understand that.
Is there anything else? a. How does the program work?
etc. a1. Can you walk me through the general process you deal with when 
it comes to foreclosure counseling?  How someone gets in touch with 
you, what happens in the process, and how the process ends or if 
there is any follow-up?
a2. How do these programs change the options available to 
homeowners and servicers?
a3. How do these programs change (or not change) the bargaining 
power of the various parties involved?
a4. How do you think this comes about?  What about the programs 
causes these changes?
b. What are the homeowner-level outcomes of the program?
b1. In your experience, does the presence of these programs result in 
different outcomes for loans in default?
b2. What characteristics are important when it comes to whether a 
particular homeowner is likely to be aided by these programs?
c. What are the neighborhood-level outcomes of the program?
c1.What effects (or lack thereof) do these programs have on 
neighborhoods in aggregate?
c2. In your experience, do these programs have a greater or lesser 
effect in certain types of neighborhoods?
c3. In your experience, is there a critical intervention point with 
respect to the density of foreclosures in a neighborhood?
d. What are the specific impacts of modifications on neighborhoods?
d1. In your experience, how do (or don't) modifications aid in 
stabilizing a neighborhood?  Can modifications "counteract" the 
negative impacts of foreclosures in a neighborhood?
d2. How does the timing of modifications impact their neighborhood 
effects?  Do you feel there are any critical intervention periods?
d3. How does the possibility of redefault, or actual redefaults, impact 
the ability of modifications to have an effect on a neighborhood?
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e. Do previous foreclosures and modifications affect servicer decisions?
e1.  In your experience, do previous foreclosures and modifications in 
a neighborhood affect servicers' likelihood to make future decisions 
to foreclose or modify in that neighborhood?
f. What are the impacts of the larger economic and policy context on the 
program?
f1. How have the larger economic and policy climates affected the 
program and it's outcomes?
Closing Questions
z1.  Do you have anything else to add concerning major aspects or 
impacts of the program?
z2. Is there anyone in particular you would recommend I contact to 
better understand the program and it's effects?
Closing
Is there anything more you'd like to add?
Key Components:
Additional Comments
Next Steps
Thank you
Thank you again for your time.
Post-Interview
To do immediately:
Fill in notes
Check audio for clarity
To do:
Notes:
Adapted from Boyce & Neale (2006)
I'll be analyzing the information you and others gave me in the next few 
months.  After that period I may contact you for a follow-up interview, if 
you are willing to participate.  In the meantime, my contact information 
is included on the form I gave you at the beginning of the interview; 
please feel free to contact me with any concerns.  Later, as I write up 
the research, I will be happy to share a copy with you for review if you 
are interested.
Write up summary of key 
information, questions, thoughts
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW 
 
The Effects of Foreclosures and Modifications on Neighborhoods:  A Case Study of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
[Working Title] 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Jen Washco from the City & Regional 
Planning department at the Ohio State University (OSU) and the Technische Universität Dresden (TUD). The 
purpose of the study is to examine and understand how foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts in Cuyahoga 
County work, how various organizations work together in these efforts, and what the impacts are of foreclosures 
and modifications on a neighborhood level.  The results of this study will be included in Jen Washco's doctoral 
dissertation and articles derived from it. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your 
involvement in foreclosure prevention and mitigation efforts in Cuyahoga County. You should read the 
information below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to 
participate.  
 
• This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any time 
or for any reason. We expect that the interview will take about 1.5 hours.  
 
• You will not be compensated for this interview.  
 
• Unless you give us permission to use your name, title, and / or quote you in any publications that may result from 
this research, the information you tell us will be confidential.  
 
• I would like to record this interview digitally so that I can use it for reference while proceeding with this study. 
I will not record this interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for this conversation to be 
recorded digitally, you have the right to revoke recording permission and/or end the interview at any time.  
 
This project will be completed by April 2013. All interview recordings will be stored in a secure work space. 
 
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to 
participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.  
 
(Please check all that apply)  
 
[] I give permission for this interview to be recorded digitally.  
 
 
[] I give permission for the following information to be included in publications resulting from this study:  
 
 
[] my name   [] my title     [] direct quotes from this interview  
 
 
Name of Subject                                                              
 
 
Signature of Subject _____________________________________ Date ____________    
                                
 
Signature of Investigator _________________________Date _________ 
 
Please contact Jen Washco (washco.1@osu.edu, 518-210-3595 [until June 1 2011], 614-364-4199 [permanent 
number]) with any questions or concerns. 
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Informational email to interviewees: 
Hi and thanks for speaking with me earlier.  As I mentioned, I am pursuing a joint PhD in City & Regional 
Planning at the Ohio State University and Technische Universität Dresden.  The focus of my research is 
examining how foreclosure prevention and mitigation programs work and what their impact on 
neighborhoods is.  My plan is to do an in-depth case study of these programs in Cuyahoga County.   
A major aspect of my research is to conduct expert interviews with those involved in the programs.  I 
would like to interview you concerning your role in the process, what effects you have seen on both 
loan outcomes and neighborhood stability, and how the programs fit into the larger housing and 
economic situation in Ohio.  My estimate is that the interview would take approximately an hour and 
a half. 
If possible, I’d like to record the interview. All responses will be kept confidential unless you expressly 
grant permission. This means that your interview responses will only be shared with the research team 
(myself and my advisors) and I will ensure any information included in my dissertation and articles 
does not identify you as the respondent. In the case that information I wish to include would make you 
identifiable, I will send drafts to you for your review and request permission before doing so.  
Thanks and please feel free to respond with any questions. 
 
  
 412 
 
  
 413 
 
Appendix B:  Variable Definitions 
This appendix includes definitions for the variables used in the quantile regression portion of the 
research.  Descriptions of the variables can be found in Section 3.4.2 in the main body of the document.   
Each variable definition includes equations for any calculations done and sources for data used to 
compute the variable.  As in the Quantitative Data section of Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.2), variables used 
in the quantile regression model are divided into four groups:  the dependent variable, general control 
variables, foreclosure-related control variables, and key variables of interest.  Each variable, data used 
to calculate it, and sources for all data used are included here. 
Dependent Variable 
Property Value, Percent Change (2000-2010) 
Percent change in property value (%∆𝑃𝑉𝑖) is calculated by determining total property value (𝑃𝑉) in 
each 2000 (𝑃𝑉_00) and 2010 (𝑃𝑉_10), then calculating the difference and dividing by the total 
property value in 2000 (Equation (A.1)).   Total property value is comprised of total owner-occupied 
property value (𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑤𝑛) and total rental property value (𝑃𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡).  Median single family house sale 
values (𝑉𝑜𝑤𝑛) and median per unit rental property values (𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) are multiplied by the number of 
owner-occupied and rental properties (𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑤𝑛 and 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡), respectively, for both 2000 and 2010 
(Equation (A.2)).   Variable names, symbols, and sources are shown in the table below. 
The numbers of owner-occupied and rental properties come from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey, 
while the median months contract rent comes from the 2000 U.S. sample-based data. 
Median single family house sale prices for 2000 and 2010 come from the Cuyahoga County Auditor. 
Median owner-occupied property value data for 2000 and 2010 are also available from the U.S. Census 
(sf3 and ACS, respectively); however these values are self-reported and thus much more prone to error 
than the sale prices available from the County Auditor.  The Cuyahoga County Auditor also has data on 
median single-family home assessed values, but these values are updated only every three years and 
only thoroughly updated every six years.  Thus in a situation of fast housing depreciation, such as the 
foreclosure crisis, assessed values are unlikely to be accurate for some time.  
Median rental property value (𝑃𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡) is approximated using the income approach to rental property 
valuation (Equation (A.3)); the median monthly contract rent (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡) is divided by a capitalization rate 
of 10% (𝐶) (Jun, 2010).   The median monthly contract rent for 2000 (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00) is from the U.S. 2000 
Census sample data, while median monthly contract rent for 2010 (Rent_10) is approximated by the 
U.S. Census 2006-2010 ACS median monthly contract rent. 
 
 
%∆𝑃𝑉 =
𝑃𝑉_10 − 𝑃𝑉_00
𝑃𝑉_00
 
 
(A.1) 
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 𝑃𝑉 = 𝑃𝑉𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝑃𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
=  𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑤𝑛 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑤𝑛 + 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 
(A.2) 
 
 
𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐶
 (A.3) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑃𝑉 Property value Calculated 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑤𝑛 Owner-occupied units U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 Renter-occupied units U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑉𝑜𝑤𝑛 Median single-family sales price Cuyahoga County Recorder 
(NEO CANDO) 
𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 Median per unit rental property value  Calculated 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 Median monthly contract rent U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐶 Capitalization rate -- 
 
General Control Variables 
The general control variables, twenty-two in total, are divided into the same seven thematic groups as 
in Chapter 3:  property characteristics, income and poverty, age, household characteristics, education 
and employment, race, and tenure.  Descriptions of these variables and why they are included in the 
quantile regression can be found in Section 3.4.2. 
Property Characteristics 
Property Value per Housing Unit (2000) 
Property value per housing unit in 2000 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡_00 ) is calculated in Equation (A.4) by 
dividing the total property value (𝑃𝑉_00) by the number of dwelling units (𝐻𝑈_00) in each tract.  
Property value for 2000 was calculated above in the dependent variable calculation, while the number 
of housing units comes from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡_00  =  
𝑃𝑉_00
𝐻𝑈_00
 (A.4) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡_00  Property value per housing unit (2000) Calculated 
𝑃𝑉_00 Property Value (2000) Calculated 
𝐻𝑈_00 Housing units (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Percent Change in Property Value, Previous Period (1990-2000) 
The percent change in property value from 1990 to 2000 (%∆𝑃𝑉_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣) is calculated identically to the 
dependent variable, percent in property value from 2000 to 2010, but with all 2000 data replaced with 
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1990 data and all 2010 data replaced with 2000 data.  The equation is shown below in Equation (A.5). 
Equations 0 and 0 are used to calculate 𝑃𝑉_00 and 𝑃𝑉_90, with the appropriate years’ data 
substituted. 
As with percent change in property value 2000-2010, median single family house sale prices for 1990 
and 2000 come from the Cuyahoga County Auditor.  Median monthly contract rent for 1990 and 2000 
comes from the U.S. 1990 and 2000 Census sample data, respectively. 
 
%∆𝑃𝑉_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣 =
𝑃𝑉_00 − 𝑃𝑉_90
𝑃𝑉_90
 
 
(A.5) 
 
Proportion Multi-Unit Housing (2000) 
The proportion of multi-unit housing, 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.6) by dividing the 
number of housing units in multi-unit structures in 2000 (𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_00) by the number of housing units 
(𝐻𝑈_00_𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖).  Because information on the number of units in a structure is from the sample-based 
data of the 2000 U.S. Census, the sample-based number of housing units is used in the calculation. 
 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡  =  
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_00
𝐻𝑈_00_𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖
 (A.6) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion multi-unit housing (2000) Calculated 
𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_00 Housing units in multi-unit structures (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐻𝑈_00_𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖182 Housing units, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Residential Structures Built 30+ Years Ago (2000) 
The proportion of residential structures, 𝑅𝑒𝑠30𝑜𝑙𝑑_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.7) by dividing 
the number of residential structures built 30 or more years ago, as of 2000, (𝑅𝑒𝑠30𝑜𝑙𝑑_00) by the 
number of housing units (𝐻𝑈_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝).  Because information on housing structure age is from the 
sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. Census, the sample-based number of housing units is used in the 
calculation. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠30𝑜𝑙𝑑_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡  =  
𝑅𝑒𝑠30𝑜𝑙𝑑_00
𝐻𝑈_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝
 (A.7) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑅𝑒𝑠30𝑜𝑙𝑑_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion residential structures built 30+ years ago 
(2000) 
Calculated 
𝑅𝑒𝑠30𝑜𝑙𝑑_00 Residential structures built 30+ years ago (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐻𝑈_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝 Housing units, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
                                                          
182 The U.S. Census uses a different number for the calculation of the share of multi-unit housing than for other 
calculations based on the sample Census data.   
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Income & Poverty 
Per Capita Income (2000) 
Per capita income on the tract level is available directly from the sample-based data of 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
Variable Description Data Source 
PCI_00 Per capita income (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Poverty Rate (2000) 
The poverty rate, 𝑃𝑜𝑣_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.8) by dividing the number of persons in 
poverty in 2000183 (𝑃𝑜𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_00) by the number of people for which the U.S. Census Bureau was able 
to establish a poverty status in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛_00).  Both base variables are from the 
sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. Census. 
 
𝑃𝑜𝑣_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_00
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛_00
 
 
(A.8) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑃𝑜𝑣_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Poverty rate (2000) Calculated 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_00 Persons in poverty (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝐾𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛_00 Persons for whom poverty status is determined 
(2000) 
U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Age 
Proportion Under Age 18 (2000) 
The proportion of residents under 18 years of age in 2000,  𝐴𝑔𝑒18𝑢𝑛𝑑_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equation (A.9) by dividing the number of persons under the age of 18 in 2000 (𝐴𝑔𝑒18𝑢𝑛𝑑_00) by the 
total population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00).  Both base variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑒18𝑢𝑛𝑑_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑔𝑒18𝑢𝑛𝑑_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.9) 
 
  
                                                          
183 The U.S. Census Bureau’s poverty thresholds vary by family size and composition and are set according to the 
Federal Office of Management and Budget’s Statistical Policy Directive 14. Thresholds are determined annually 
by multiplying the values for the base year (1963) by the change in the Consumer Price Index. 
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Variable Description Data Source 
𝐴𝑔𝑒18𝑢𝑛𝑑_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion residents under 18 years of age (2000) Calculated 
𝐴𝑔𝑒18𝑢𝑛𝑑_00 Persons under 18 years of age (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Age 60 or Over (2000) 
The proportion of residents 60 or more years of age in 2000, 𝐴𝑔𝑒60𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equaton (A.10) by dividing the number of persons 60 or older in 2000 (𝐴𝑔𝑒60𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_00) by the total 
population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑒60𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑔𝑒60𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.10) 
 
Variable 
 
Description Data Source 
𝐴𝑔𝑒60𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion residents 60 or more years of age (2000) Calculated 
𝐴𝑔𝑒60𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟_00 Persons 60 or more years of age (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Household Characteristics 
Average Household Size (2000) 
The average household size in 2000, 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_00, is calculated in Equation (A.11) by dividing the 
population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝) by the number of households in 2000 (𝐻𝐻_00).  Because 
information on the number of households is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. Census, the 
sample-based population data are used in the calculation. 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_00 =  
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝
𝐻𝐻_00
 (A.11) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_00 Average household size (2000) Calculated 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝 Population, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐻𝐻_00 Households (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Marriage Rate (2000) 
The proportion of married residents in 2000, 𝑀𝑎𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated In Equation (A.12) by dividing 
the number of married persons in 2000 (𝑀𝑎𝑟_00) by the population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝). Because 
information on the number of households is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. Census, the 
sample-based population data are used in this calculation. 
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𝑀𝑎𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝
 (A.12) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑀𝑎𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Marriage rate (2000) Calculated 
𝑀𝑎𝑟_00 Number of currently married persons (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝 Population, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Female-Headed Household Rate (2000) 
The proportion of female-headed households in 2000, 𝐹𝐻𝐻_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.13) 
by dividing the number of female-headed families with children in 2000 (𝐹𝐻𝐻_00) by the total 
population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝐹𝐻𝐻_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐹𝐻𝐻_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.13) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐹𝐻𝐻_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Female-headed household rate (2000) Calculated 
𝐹𝐻𝐻_00 Number of female-headed households with children (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Education & Employment 
Proportion with High School Degree or Less (2000)  
The proportion of residents with at a high school degree or less in 2000, 𝐻𝑆_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equation (A.14) by dividing the number of individuals holding a high school degree or less in 2000 
(𝐻𝑆_00) by the population aged 25 and older in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑒𝑑𝑢). Because educational attainment 
information is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. Census, the sample-based population data 
are used in the calculation. 
 
𝐻𝑆_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐻𝑆_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑒𝑑𝑢
 (A.14) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐻𝑆_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion population with high school degree or less (2000) Calculated 
𝐻𝑆_00 Number of persons with high school degree or less (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑒𝑑𝑢 Population aged 25+, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Population with College Degree (2000) 
The proportion of residents with at least a 4-year college degree in 2000, 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equation (A.15) by dividing the number of individuals holding a 4-year college degree or higher in 2000 
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(𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙_00) by the population aged 25 and older in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝). Because information on the 
number of individuals with a 4-year degree is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. Census, the 
sample-based population data are used in the calculation. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝
 (A.15) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion population with college degree (2000) Calculated 
𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙_00 Number of persons with 4-year degree (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00_𝑒𝑑𝑢 Population aged 25+, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Unemployment Rate (2000) 
The unemployment rate in 2000, 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.16) by dividing the 
number of persons unemployed in 2000 (𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝_00) by the civilian labor force in 2000 (𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00). 
Information on the number of persons unemployed is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. 
Census, and thus sample-based population data are used in the calculation. 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝_00
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00
 (A.16) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Unemployment rate (2000) Calculated 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝_00 Persons unemployed (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00 Civilian labor force, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Employed in Manufacturing (2000) 
The proportion of the population employed in manufacturing in 2000, 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equation (A.17) by dividing the number of manufacturing employees in 2000 (𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢_00) by the civilian 
labor force in 2000 (𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00). Because the number of manufacturing employees is from the sample-
based data of the 2000 U.S. Census, sample-based population data are used in the calculation. 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢_00
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00
 (A.17) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion employed in manufacturing (2000) Calculated 
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢_00 Manufacturing employees (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00 Civilian labor force, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
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Proportion Population Professionally Employed (2000) 
The proportion of professionally employed residents in 2000, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation 
(A.18) by dividing the number of professionally employed persons in 2000 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓_00) by the civilian 
labor force in 2000 (𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00). The sample-based population data are used in the calculation, because 
the number of individuals employed in the professions is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. 
Census. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓_00
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00
 (A.18) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Professional employment rate (2000) Calculated 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓_00 Number of professionally employed persons (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟_00 Civilian labor force, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Race 
Proportion Asian (2000) 
The proportion of individuals of Asian racial background in 2000, 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equation (A.19) by dividing the number of persons of Asian racial background in 2000 (𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛_00) by 
the total population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.19) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion Asian (2000) Calculated 
𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛_00 Persons of Asian racial background (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Hispanic (2000) 
The proportion of individuals of Hispanic racial background in 2000, 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in 
Equation (A.20) by dividing the number of persons of Hispanic racial background in 2000 (𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝_00) by 
the total population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.20) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion Hispanic (2000) Calculated 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑝_00 Persons of Hispanic racial background (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
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Proportion Non-Hispanic Black (2000) 
The proportion of individuals of non-Hispanic Black racial background in 2000, 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is 
calculated in Equation (A.21) by dividing the number of persons of non-Hispanic Black racial 
background in 2000 (𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘_00) by the total population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are from 
the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.21) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion non-Hispanic Black (2000) Calculated 
𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘_00 Persons of non-Hispanic Black racial background (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Non-Hispanic White (2000) 
The proportion of individuals of non-Hispanic White racial background in 2000, 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is 
calculated in Equation (A.22) by dividing the number of persons of non-Hispanic White racial 
background in 2000 (𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒_00) by the total population in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are 
from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.22) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion non-Hispanic White (2000) Calculated 
𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒_00 Persons of non-Hispanic White racial background (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Tenure 
Proportion Rental Units (2000) 
The proportion of renter-occupied housing units in 2000, 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.23) 
by dividing the number of renter-occupied housing units in 2000 (𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00) by the total occupied 
housing units in 2000 (𝑃𝑜𝑝_00). Both base variables are from the 2000 U.S. Census full survey. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00
 (A.23) 
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Variable Description Data Source 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion Rental Units (2000) Calculated 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡_00 Renter-occupied housing units (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑃𝑜𝑝_00 Population (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Proportion Households with Tenure in Residence of Less than 10 Years (2000) 
The proportion of households with current residence tenure of ten years or less in their current 
residence as of 2000, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠10𝑦𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.24) by dividing the number of 
households who moved into their current residence less than ten years ago in 2000 (𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠10𝑦𝑟_00) 
by the number of occupied housing units in 2000 (𝑂𝑐𝑐𝐻𝑈_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝). Because information on the 
number of households with tenure of ten years or less is from the sample-based data of the 2000 U.S. 
Census, the sample-based housing unit data are used in the calculation. 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠10𝑦𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠10𝑦𝑟_00
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝐻𝑈_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝
 (A.24) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠10𝑦𝑟_00_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Proportion households with tenure of less than 10 
years in current residence (2000) 
Calculated 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠10𝑦𝑟_00 Households with tenure of less than10 years in current 
residence (2000) 
U.S. Census (s4) 
𝑂𝑐𝑐𝐻𝑈_00_𝑠𝑚𝑝 Occupied housing units, sample-based data (2000) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables 
Foreclosure-related control variables are those that were considered to likely impact changes in 
neighborhood property values and are strongly connected to the foreclosure crisis—i.e. these are 
important variables for this research investigation, but they are not usually included in studies of 
neighborhood change, as the general control variables listed above are. 
Descriptions of these variables and the rationale for including them in the quantitative model can be 
found in Section 3.4.2. 
Civil Foreclosure Filing Intensity (2000-2009) 
The civil foreclosure filing intensity, 𝐶𝑉_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.25) by dividing 
the total number of civil foreclosure filings in each tract between 2000 and 2009 (𝐶𝑉_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒), 
by the average number of housing units (𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔) in the tract.184 Since foreclosure filings cover all 
properties in the tract, full count housing unit values from the U.S. 2000 and 2010 Censuses are used 
in the denominator.185 
                                                          
184 This value is the average of the numbers of housing units in each tract in 2000 and 2010. 
185 It should be noted that this ratio is an imperfect representation of the intensity of foreclosure filings.  Some 
loans cover more than one housing unit, and therefore some foreclosure filings are for more than one housing 
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𝐶𝑉_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡  =  
𝐶𝑉_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.25) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐶𝑉_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Civil foreclosure filing intensity (2000-2009) Calculated 
𝐶𝑉_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 Number of civil foreclosure filings (2000-2009) Cuyahoga County 
Auditor (NEO CANDO) 
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔 Average number of housing units (2000/2010) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Sheriff’s Sale Intensity (2000-2010) 
Sheriff’s sale intensity, 𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated in Equation (A.26) by dividing the total number 
of Sheriff’s sales on properties located in a tract between 2000 and 2010 (𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒) by the average 
number of housing units in the tract (𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔).  Again, full count data from the 2000 and 2010 U.S. 
Censuses are used to calculate the denominator. 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡  =  
𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.26) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Sheriff’s sale intensity (2000-2010) Calculated 
𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 Number of Sheriff’s sales (2000-2010) Cuyahoga County 
Auditor (NEO CANDO) 
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔 Average number of housing units (2000/2010) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Locational Dummy Variables:  East, West, Inner, Outer 
Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas lists the communities (SPAs) located in each of the four areas 
of Cuyahoga County.  Communities categorized as East are within the City of Cleveland and lie east of 
the Cuyahoga River.  Likewise, those categorized as West are within the City of Cleveland and lie west 
of the Cuyahoga River.  Those categorized as Inner are the inner ring suburbs, that is, those that are 
directly adjacent to the City of Cleveland or entirely surrounded by suburbs classified as Inner. 
Communities categorized as Outer are the outer suburbs, which are those non adjacent to the City of 
Cleveland.  In the model, Outer is used as the reference category.   
See Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas for more details on the four subareas, including maps 
with the communities labeled.   
  
                                                          
unit.  Ideally, the denominator would be the number of property deeds—i.e. the number of technically 
foreclosable units.  However, as these data aren’t available, the average number of housing units from the Census 
is used, resulting in a rate that is lower than the reality.  This effect is stronger in neighborhoods with more multi-
unit housing. 
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East  West Inner Outer 
Broadway-Slavic Village Bellaire-Puritas Bedford Bay Village North Royalton 
Buckeye-Shaker Square Brooklyn Centre Bedford Heights Beachwood Oakwood 
Buckeye-Woodhill Clark-Fulton Brook Park Bentleyville Olmsted 
Central Cudell Brooklyn Berea Olmsted Falls 
Collinwood-Nottingham Detroit Shoreway Brooklyn Heights Bratenahl Orange 
Downtown Edgewater Cleveland Heights Brecksville Pepper Pike 
Fairfax Jefferson Cuyahoga Heights Broadview Heights Richmond Heights 
Glenville Kamm’s East Cleveland Chagrin Falls Rocky River 
Goodrich-Kirkland Park Ohio City Euclid Gates Mills Seven Hills 
Hough Old Brooklyn Euclid-Green Highland Heights Solon 
Kinsman Stockyards Fairview Park Highland Hills Strongsville 
Lee-Harvard Tremont Garfield Heights Hopkins Valley View 
Lee-Seville West Boulevard Lakewood Independence Walton Hills 
Mount Pleasant  Maple Heights Lyndhurst Westlake 
North Shore Collinwood  Parma Mayfield Woodmere 
St.Clair-Superior  Parma Heights Mayfield Heights  
Union-Miles  Shaker Heights Middleburg Heights  
University  South Euclid Moreland Hills  
  University Heights North Olmsted  
  Warrensville Heights North Randall  
 
Maximum Vacancy Rate (2007-2010) 
The vacant addresses rate (𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖) and no-stat addresses rate (𝑁𝑜-𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖) were summed for each 
quarter to create a quarterly total vacancy rate (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖) for each tract (Equation (A.27)).  
The maximum value of the total vacancy rate across all quarters from the 4th quarter of 2007 through 
the 4th quarter of 2010 was calculated to create 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡 (Equation (A.28)). 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖 =  𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑁𝑜-𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖 (A.27) 
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  max (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖) (A.28) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Maximum total vacancy rate, 2007-2010 Calculated 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑖 Total vacancy rate, quarterly Calculated 
𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖 Vacant addresses rate USPS (NEO CANDO) 
𝑁𝑜-𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖 No-Stat addresses rate USPS (NEO CANDO) 
 
Key Variables 
Key variables are those variables representing the objects of interest in this research, foreclosure 
prevention and mitigation efforts.  Descriptions of these variables and the programs they represent 
can be found in Section 3.4.2. 
Counseling Intensity (2006-2010) 
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Counseling intensity (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑐𝑡) is determined in Equation (A.29) by calculating the ratio of 
counseling instances over the period 2006 through 2010 (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔) to the average number of 
housing units in that tract (𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔).  Owner-occupied units is used as the denominator rather than 
housing units because only owner-occupied properties were eligible for foreclosure prevention 
counseling in Cuyahoga County.  The number of owner-occupied units comes from the U.S. 2010 
Census full data. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑐𝑡  =  
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.29) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Counseling intensity (2006-2010) Calculated 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 Counseling instances (2006-2010) CSU 
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔 Average number of housing units (2000/2010) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Because it was necessary to code the Census tract in ArcMap by hand for each counseling outcome 
observation, a random sample was used.  Four thousand of the 11,327 observations were randomly 
drawn and coded in ArcMap.  Of these, 617 observations were removed because they were obvious 
duplicates or address data was missing, incomplete, referred to a location outside of the county, or 
was sufficiently ambiguous that the proper Census tract assignment could not be determined.  This 
means that the true foreclosure counseling rates are approximately 2.8 times greater than those 
reflected by the counseling outcome variables. 
Counseling Outcomes (2006-2010) 
The tables below show the assignment of National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMC) 
outcome codes (cite NFMC Reporting Requirements Guideline)186 to the four outcome categories 
described above. 
  
                                                          
186 Some codes have redundant descriptions.  This is due to two reporting code systems being supported, NFMC 
and HUD 9902.  The NFMC outcome descriptions are a more specific superset of the HUD 9902 descriptions.  
Since foreclosure prevention counseling agencies in Cuyahoga County use both sets of codes and descriptions to 
classify outcomes, both types are reported here. 
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“Kept House” Outcome Codes & Descriptions 
Code Outcome 
1 Brought mortgage current 
2 Initiated forbearance agreement/repayment plan 
15 Mortgage refinanced 
16 Mortgage modified 
17 Received second mortgage 
54 Bankruptcy 
103 Brought mortgage current with rescue funds 
104 Brought mortgage current (without rescue funds) 
105 Mortgage refinanced into FHA product 
106 Mortgage refinanced (non-FHA product) 
107 Mortgage modified with PITI187 less than or equal to 38% of gross monthly income 
108 Mortgage modified with PITI greater than 38% of gross monthly income or interest rate 
fixed for less than 5 years and appears to be sustainable 
109 Mortgage modified with PITI greater than 38% of gross monthly income or interest rate 
fixed for less than 5 years and appears not to be sustainable 
 
 “Lost House Foreclosure” Outcome Codes & Descriptions 
Code Outcome 
5 Mortgage foreclosed 
 
 “Lost House Non-Foreclosure” Outcome Codes & Descriptions 
Code Outcome 
3 Executed a deed-in-lieu 
4 Sold property/chose alternative housing solution 
51 Pre-foreclosure sale 
110 Homeowner(s) sold property (not short sale) 
111 Pre-foreclosure sale/short sale 
113 Home lost due to tax sale or condemnation 
 
  
  
                                                          
187 PITI stands for the sum of principal, interest, taxes and insurance on a mortgage—the components that make 
up the actual mortgage payment.  The ratio of PITI to gross monthly income is an indicator of default risk used 
by lenders. 
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“Unknown” Outcome Codes & Descriptions 
Code Outcome 
20 Other 
50 Outcome unknown 
52 Counseled and  referred to another social service agency or emergency assistance agency 
53 Obtained partial claim loan from FHA lender 
55 Outcome unknown 
56 Counseled and  referred for legal assistance 
57 Withdrew from counseling 
100 Currently in negotiation with servicer; outcome unknown 
101 Referred homeowner to servicer with action plan and no further counseling activity; 
outcome unknown 
102 Foreclosure put on hold or moratorium; final outcome unknown 
112 Counseled on debt management or referred to debt management agency 
 
The number of instances of counseling with outcomes in each outcome category are summed up, 
according to the scheme shown in the table above, creating four count variables (𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒, 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐶, 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝐶, and 𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒).  Four ratios (𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡, 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐶_𝑝𝑐𝑡, 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝐶_𝑝𝑐𝑡, and𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡) are calculated by dividing 
the sum of each count variable by the average number of owner-occupied units (Equations(A.30), 
(A.31), (A.32), and(A.33)). 
Because it was necessary to code the Census tract in ArcMap by hand for each counseling outcome 
observation, a random sample was used.  Two thousand of the 11,327 observations were randomly 
drawn and coded in ArcMap.  Of these, 617 observations were removed because they were obvious 
duplicates or address data was missing, incomplete, referred to a location outside of the county, or 
was sufficiently ambiguous that the proper Census tract assignment could not be determined.This 
means that the true foreclosure counseling rates are approximately 2.8 times greater than those 
reflected in the descriptive statistics. 
 
𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.30) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐶_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐶
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.31) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝐶_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝐶
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.32) 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.33) 
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Variable Description Data Source 
𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Kept House counseling outcome ratio Calculated 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐶_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Lost House Foreclosure outcome ratio Calculated 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝐶_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Lost House Non-Foreclosure outcome ratio Calculated 
𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Unknown Outcome outcome ratio Calculated 
𝐾𝑒𝑝𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 Number of Kept House outcomes CSU 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝐹𝐶 Number of Lost House Foreclosure outcomes CSU 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐹𝐶 Number of Lost House Non-Foreclosure outcomes CSU 
𝑈𝑛𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 Number of Unknown Outcome outcomes CSU 
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔 Average number of housing units (2000/2010) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Board of Revisions Foreclosure Intensity (2006-2010) 
The Board of Revisions foreclosure filing intensity, 𝐵𝑅_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated by dividing the 
total number of Board of Revisions foreclosure filings in each tract between 2006 and 2010 
(𝐵𝑅_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒), by the average number of housing units (𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔) in the tract (Equation (A.34)). 
Since foreclosure filings cover all properties in the tract, full count housing unit values from the U.S. 
2000 and 2010 Censuses are used in the denominator. 
 
𝐵𝑅_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡  =  
𝐵𝑅_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.34) 
 
Variable 
 
Description Data Source 
𝐵𝑅_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Board of Revisions foreclosure filing intensity 
(2006-2010) 
Calculated 
𝐵𝑅_𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 Number of Board of Revisions foreclosure filings 
(2006-2010) 
Cuyahoga County 
Auditor (NEO CANDO) 
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔 Average number of housing units (2000/2010) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Landbanked Parcels (2000-2010)  
The maximum percentage of parcels land banked in a tract, Landbank_pct, is available directly from 
the NEO CANDO website.  This indicator captures parcels held by both the Cuyahoga County Land 
Reutilization Corporation and the City of Cleveland Land Bank.  The percentage of parcels land banked 
is available for each year from 2000 through 2010.  From these percentages, the maximum was 
selected and used to represent the degree of land banking occurring in a tract.   
Variable Description Data Source 
Landbank_pct Maximum percentage parcels land banked (2000-
2010) 
NEO CANDO 
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Demolitions (2005-2010) 
The demolitions intensity, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡, is calculated by dividing the total number of demolition permits 
filed in each tract between 2005 and 2010 (𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠), by the average number of housing units (𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔) 
in the tract (Equation (A.35)). Since demolition permit filings cover all properties in the tract, full count 
housing unit values from the U.S. 2000 and 2010 Censuses are used in the denominator. 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡 =  
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔
 (A.35) 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡 Demolition intensity (2005-2010) Calculated 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑠 Number of demolition permits filed (2005-2010) NPI 
𝐻𝑈_𝑎𝑣𝑔 Average number of housing units (2000/2010) U.S. Census (s4) 
 
Strategic Investment Initiative Area (SII) 
Census tracts designated as Strategic Investment Initiative areas receive a value of 1 for the SII variable, 
and a value of 0 if not.  A map of SII areas can be seen in Section 5.3.1, Figure 5.7.  SII areas were 
determined using maps available on the NST WebApp (neocando.case.edu/nst/home.asp).  Census 
tracts partially or fully within an area marked as SII on the NST maps were coded as SII areas for this 
research. 
Variable Description Data Source 
SII SII designation NPI 
 
NSP2 Area 
Census tracts designated NSP2 areas receive a value of 1 for the NSP2 variable, and a value of 0 if not.  
A map of NSP2 areas can be seen in Section 5.4.5, Figure 5.11.  NSP2 areas were determined using maps 
available on the Cuyahoga County Department of Development’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
webpage (http://development.cuyahogacounty.us/en-U.S./Neighborhood-Stabilization-
Program.aspx).  Census tracts partially or fully within an area marked as NSP2 on the Department of 
Development maps were coded as NSP2 areas for this research. Data for NSP rounds 1 and 3 are not 
included in the model due to the fact that geographical data was only available for NSP round 2.   
Variable Description Data Source 
NSP2 NSP2 designation Cuyahoga County 
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Appendix C:  Cuyahoga County Subareas 
This Appendix contains information on the four subareas of Cuyahoga County used in this research.  
They are the east side of the City of Cleveland, the west side of the City of Cleveland, Cuyahoga 
County’s inner suburbs, and Cuyahoga County’s outer suburbs.  For each subarea, lists of the 
municipalities and townships, SPAs, and Census tracts are provided.  Maps of each subarea are 
included. 
The East Side of Cleveland 
The East side of Cleveland is bounded to the north by Lake Erie, to the west by the Cuyahoga River, 
and to the east and south by the City of Cleveland’s municipal boundaries.  One exception in this 
analysis is the Cuyahoga Valley SPA, which includes a thin section to the west of the Cuyahoga River.  
The east subarea is located entirely within the municipality of the City of Cleveland, contains 20 SPAs, 
and 108 Census tracts.  Appendix Table C.1 lists the SPAs located in the east subarea and Appendix 
Table C.2 lists the Census tracts. The SPAs are shown in Appendix Figure C.1. 
Appendix Table C.1:  SPAs Located in the East Subarea 
SPAs 
Broadway-Slavic Village Goodrich-Kirtland Park 
Buckeye-Shaker Square Hough 
Buckeye-Woodhill Kinsman 
Central Lee-Harvard 
Collinwood-Nottingham Lee-Seville 
Cuyahoga Valley Mount Pleasant 
Downtown North Shore Collinwood 
Euclid-Green St. Clair-Superior 
Fairfax Union-Miles 
Glenville University 
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Appendix Table C.2:  Census Tracts Located in the East Subarea (tracts in grey indicate missing data) 
Census Tracts 
107101 111902 115200 117300 119401 121300 
107701 112100 115300 117400 119402 121401 
107802 112200 115400 117500 119501 121403 
108201 112301 115700 117600 119502 121500 
108301 112400 115800 117700 119600 121700 
108400 112500 115900 117800 119701 121800 
108701 112600 116100 117900 119702 121900 
109301 112800 116200 118101 119800 122100 
109707 113101 116300 118200 119900 122200 
109807 113500 116400 118301 120200 122300 
110501 113600 116500 118400 120400 126100 
110801 113801 116600 118500 120500 127501 
110901 114100 116700 118602 120600 196500 
111202 114300 116800 118700 120701  
111401 114501 116900 118800 120702   
111500 114600 117101 118900 120801   
111600 114700 117102 119100 120802   
111700 114900 117201 119202 121100   
111800 115100 117202 119300 121200   
 
 
Appendix Figure C.1:  SPAs of the East Subarea of Cuyahoga County 
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The West Side of Cleveland 
The West side of Cleveland is bounded to the north by Lake Erie, to the east by the Cuyahoga River, 
and to the west and south by the City of Cleveland’s municipal boundaries.  The west side is located 
entirely within the municipality of the City of Cleveland.  It contains 14 SPAs and 67 Census tracts.  
Appendix Table C.3 lists the SPAs of the west subarea and Appendix Table C.4 lists the Census tracts. 
Appendix Figure C.2 shows the locations of the SPAs in the west subarea.  
Appendix Table C.3:  SPAs Located in the West Subarea 
SPAs 
Bellaire-Puritas Jefferson 
Brooklyn Centre Kamm's 
Clark-Fulton Ohio City 
Cudell Old Brooklyn 
Detroit Shoreway Stockyards 
Edgewater Tremont 
Hopkins West Boulevard 
 
Appendix Table C.4:  Census Tracts Located in the West Subarea (tracts in grey indicate missing data) 
Census Tracts 
101101 102401 104300 106300 123603 
101102 102402 104400 106400 123700 
101200 102700 104600 106500 123800 
101300 102800 104800 106600 123900 
101400 102900 104900 106800 124100 
101501 103100 105100 106900 124201 
101603 103300 105300 107000 124202 
101700 103400 105400 123100 124300 
101800 103500 105500 123200 124500 
101901 103602 105602 123400 124600 
102101 103800 105700 123501 196400 
102102 103900 105900 123502  
102200 104100 106100 123601   
102300 104200 106200 123602   
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Appendix Figure C.2:  SPAs of the West Subarea of Cuyahoga County 
The Inner Suburbs 
The inner suburbs ring the City of Cleveland to the west, south, and east.  To the north of Cleveland 
lies Lake Erie.  In this research, all municipalities that share a border with the City of Cleveland were 
designated inner suburbs, plus the Village of North Randall, which is nearly encircled by the inner 
suburb of Warrensville Heights, and the City of Parma Heights, which is nearly surrounded by the inner 
suburb of Parma.  The inner suburbs include 22 municipalities, 22 SPAs, and 163 Census tracts.  The 
municipalities and SPAs of the inner suburbs correspond one-to-one and are listed in Appendix Table 
C.5. Appendix Table C.6 lists the Census tracts found in the inner suburbs subarea. Appendix Figure C.3 
shows the SPAs located in the inner subarea. 
Appendix Table C.5:  Municipalities and SPAs Located in the Inner Suburbs Subarea 
Municipalities/SPAs 
Bedford Garfield Heights 
Bedford Heights Lakewood 
Bratenahl Maple Heights 
Brook Park Newburgh Heights 
Brooklyn North Randall 
Brooklyn Heights Parma 
Cleveland Heights Parma Heights 
Cuyahoga Heights Shaker Heights 
East Cleveland South Euclid 
Euclid University Heights 
Fairview Park Warrensville Heights 
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Appendix Table C.6:  Census Tracts of Inner Suburbs Subarea (tracts in grey indicate missing data) 
Census Tracts 
132100 140900 152202 154603 171104 177607 185201 
132200 141000 152301 154604 171203 177608 185202 
132301 141100 152302 154700 171204 177609 185203 
132302 141200 152303 160100 171205 178101 187103 
133103 141300 152400 160200 171206 178102 187104 
133104 141400 152501 160300 177101 178201 187105 
137101 141500 152502 160400 177103 178204 187106 
137102 141601 152603 160500 177104 178205 188103 
137103 141602 152604 160601 177201 178206 188104 
138105 141700 152701 160602 177202 183100 188105 
138106 150100 152702 160700 177302 183200 188106 
138107 150300 152703 160800 177303 183300 188107 
138108 150400 153103 160900 177304 183401 192300 
138109 151100 153104 161000 177403 183402 192800 
138110 151200 153105 161100 177404 183501 193800 
140100 151300 153106 161200 177405 183502 195600 
140301 151400 153107 161300 177406 183603 196000 
140302 151500 154100 161400 177501 183604 196100 
140400 151600 154200 161500 177503 183605 196200 
140500 151700 154300 161600 177504 183606  
140600 151800 154400 161700 177505 185101   
140701 152101 154501 161800 177604 185102   
140702 152102 154502 171102 177605 185103   
140800 152201 154601 171103 177606 185104   
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Appendix Figure C.3:  SPAs of the Inner Subarea of Cuyahoga County 
The Outer Suburbs 
The remainder of the municipalities and townships in Cuyahoga County not designated as inner 
suburbs make up the outer suburbs.  They form a second ring to the west, south, and east of the inner 
suburbs.  The outer suburbs include 33 municipalities and 2 townships, 35 SPAs, and 105 Census tracts.  
As with the inner suburbs, the governmental boundaries and SPA boundaries have a one-to-one 
relationship.  Appendix Table C.7 lists the governmental units and SPAs located in the outer suburbs 
subarea.  Appendix Table C.8 lists the Census tracts in the outer subarea.  Appendix Figure C.4 shows 
the SPAs found in the outer subarea. 
Appendix Table C.7:  Municipalities, Townships and SPAs Located in the Outer Subarea 
Municipalities & Townships/SPAs 
Bay Village Hunting Valley Orange 
Beachwood Independence Pepper Pike 
Bentleyville Lyndhurst Richmond Heights 
Berea Mayfield Rocky River 
Brecksville Mayfield Heights Seven Hills 
Broadview Heights Middleburg Heights Solon 
Chagrin Falls Moreland Hills Strongsville 
Chagrin Falls Township North Olmsted Valley View 
Gates Mills North Royalton Walton Hills 
Glenwillow Oakwood Westlake 
Highland Heights Olmsted Falls Woodmere 
Highland Hills Olmsted Township   
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Appendix Table C.8:  Census Tracts located in the Outer Suburbs Subarea (tracts in grey indicate missing data) 
Tracts 
130103 135105 172103 174205 180104 186104 189112 
130104 135016 172201 174206 181100 186105 190502 
130105 136101 172202 174207 181201 186106 190503 
130106 136102 173103 175103 181203 186107 190504 
131102 136103 173104 175104 181204 186201 192900 
131103 155101 173105 175105 182103 186202 193900 
131104 155102 173106 175106 182104 186203 194100 
134100 156101 173107 175201 182105 186205 194300 
134203 156102 174103 175202 182106 186206 194500 
134204 170101 174104 176100 184103 189105 194800 
134205 170102 174105 176200 184104 189107 194900 
134206 170201 174106 179101 184105 189108 195700 
134300 170202 174107 179102 184106 189109 195800 
135103 172101 174203 180102 184108 189110 195900 
135104 172102 174204 180103 186103 189111 196300 
 
 
Appendix Figure C.4:  SPAs of the Outer Subarea of Cuyahoga County 
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Appendix D:  Quantile Regression Output 
This appendix includes the output of the nine quantile regressions run for this research.  The model 
can be found in Section 4.3 and analysis of the results can be found in Section 6.2.  A description of the 
method can be found in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.  
Each quantile regression output table includes the coefficient estimate, standard error, t-value, 
significance level, and 90% confidence level for each independent variable included in the regression.  
Several model-level statistics are included as well:  the number of observations, raw sum of deviations, 
minimum sum of deviations, and the pseudo-R2 value. 
10th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.1 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 42.85357 (about -.70745718) 
Minimum sum of deviations 21.58663 Psuedo-R2 0.4963 
 
 
  
0.1 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0070709 0.0040584 -1.74 0.082 -0.0137620 -0.0003798
PCI 2000 0.0007268 0.0064910 0.11 0.911 -0.0099748 0.0114283
Poverty Rate 2000 0.0707187 0.1252491 0.56 0.573 -0.1357771 0.2772146
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.6070087 0.0759155 8.00 0.000 0.4818483 0.7321691
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1630321 0.0494297 -3.30 0.001 -0.244526 -0.0815383
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.1555692 0.0603522 -2.58 0.010 -0.2550707 -0.0560677
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.2393924 0.0906409 -2.64 0.009 -0.3888303 -0.0899544
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1590234 0.0318279 -5.00 0.000 -0.2114974 -0.1065493
West side of Cleveland -0.2060664 0.0450088 -4.58 0.000 -0.2802715 -0.1318612
East side of Cleveland -0.2332183 0.0493462 -4.73 0.000 -0.3145745 -0.151862
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.2083389 0.1168314 -1.78 0.075 -0.4009566 -0.0157211
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -0.9489699 0.1562096 -6.07 0.000 -1.20651 -0.69143
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 0.23896 1.185187 0.20 0.840 -1.715035 2.192955
Demolitions (rate) 1.859908 0.5382205 3.46 0.001 0.9725535 2.747262
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.5667524 0.2361283 -2.40 0.017 -0.9560527 -0.1774521
Strategic Investment Initiative area -0.0625089 0.0212227 -2.95 0.003 -0.0974984 -0.0275193
NSP2 area 0.0448637 0.0244078 1.84 0.067 0.004623 0.0851044
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) 8.041688 5.317865 1.51 0.131 -0.7257777 16.80915
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 48.23453 24.29295 1.99 0.048 8.183191 88.28586
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) -18.47635 25.94582 -0.71 0.477 -61.25275 24.30005
Unknown Outcome (rate) -9.268213 3.325261 -2.79 0.006 -14.75051 -3.785916
Constant -0.0087594 0.0879368 -0.10 0.921 -0.1537392 0.1362203
[90% Confidence Interval]
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20th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.2 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 76.91258 (about -.61289608) 
Minimum sum of deviations 38.12977 Psuedo-R2 0.5042 
 
 
  
0.2 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0053307 0.0034591 -1.54 0.124 -0.0110337 0.0003723
PCI 2000 0.0029934 0.0060426 0.50 0.621 -0.0069689 0.0129557
Poverty Rate 2000 0.0436334 0.1154720 0.38 0.706 -0.1467432 0.2340100
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.5304091 0.0869188 6.10 0.000 0.3871076 0.6737105
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1063416 0.0528233 -2.01 0.045 -0.1934305 -0.0192528
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.1006739 0.0601979 -1.67 0.095 -0.1999210 -0.0014268
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.1483512 0.0903120 -1.64 0.101 -0.2972470 0.0005446
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1496177 0.0278973 -5.36 0.000 -0.1956115 -0.1036238
West side of Cleveland -0.1797924 0.0391535 -4.59 0.000 -0.2443441 -0.1152406
East side of Cleveland -0.1846429 0.0464579 -3.97 0.000 -0.2612372 -0.1080485
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.4264014 0.1316012 -3.24 0.001 -0.6433699 -0.2094329
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -0.9799623 0.1970970 -4.97 0.000 -1.3049130 -0.6550121
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 2.8170560 1.6822020 1.67 0.095 0.0436413 5.5904710
Demolitions (rate) 0.7736364 0.8295003 0.93 0.352 -0.5939455 2.1412180
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.7814448 0.3684530 -2.12 0.035 -1.3889060 -0.1739832
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.0227589 0.0392550 0.58 0.562 -0.0419600 0.0874779
NSP2 area 0.0243100 0.0423520 0.57 0.566 -0.0455149 0.0941349
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) 0.6301260 5.9296810 0.11 0.915 -9.1460300 10.4062800
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 39.1397100 25.0170500 1.56 0.118 -2.1054430 80.3848600
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) -18.3109400 27.3940500 -0.67 0.504 -63.4750000 26.8531200
Unknown Outcome (rate) -8.0659730 2.8123610 -2.87 0.004 -12.7026600 -3.4292850
Constant -0.0468614 0.0804120 -0.58 0.560 -0.1794352 0.0857123
[90% Confidence Interval]
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30th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.3 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 104.1247 (about -.53474492) 
Minimum sum of deviations 51.09672 Psuedo-R2 0.5093 
 
 
  
0.3 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit -0.0065564 0.0033533 -1.96 0.051 -0.0120849 -0.0010279
PCI 2000 0.0019398 0.0057566 0.34 0.736 -0.0075510 0.0114307
Poverty Rate 2000 0.2282076 0.1230679 1.85 0.064 0.0253078 0.4311074
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.7255825 0.0973729 7.45 0.000 0.5650456 0.8861193
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1232884 0.0502873 -2.45 0.015 -0.2061961 -0.0403807
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.0983446 0.0597988 -1.64 0.101 -0.1969338 0.0002445
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.2370948 0.0990254 -2.39 0.017 -0.4003561 -0.0738335
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1171132 0.0281228 -4.16 0.000 -0.1634787 -0.0707476
West side of Cleveland -0.1395220 0.0397125 -3.51 0.000 -0.2049954 -0.0740487
East side of Cleveland -0.1368121 0.0442397 -3.09 0.002 -0.2097492 -0.0638749
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.4598774 0.1368365 -3.36 0.001 -0.6854772 -0.2342776
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -1.0031500 0.1922307 -5.22 0.000 -1.3200770 -0.6862227
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 4.2712530 1.6479190 2.59 0.010 1.5543590 6.9881480
Demolitions (rate) 0.6140102 0.7704123 0.80 0.426 -0.6561544 1.8841750
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -1.2440740 0.3534163 -3.52 0.000 -1.8267450 -0.6614028
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.0361825 0.0389374 0.93 0.353 -0.0280129 0.1003779
NSP2 area 0.0160984 0.0476401 0.34 0.736 -0.0624449 0.0946417
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -3.7510660 5.9789960 -0.63 0.531 -13.6085300 6.1063930
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 31.8562600 23.2853100 1.37 0.172 -6.5337970 70.2463200
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) 7.8715930 26.7830500 0.29 0.769 -36.2851300 52.0283100
Unknown Outcome (rate) -6.6196570 2.8045910 -2.36 0.019 -11.2435300 -1.9957800
Constant -0.0554056 0.0800317 -0.69 0.489 -0.1873523 0.0765412
[90% Confidence Interval]
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40th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.4 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 123.8824 (about -.42099661) 
Minimum sum of deviations 61.36365 Psuedo-R2 0.5047 
 
 
  
0.4 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0080444 0.0027469 -2.93 0.004 -0.0125732 -0.0035156
PCI 2000 0.0019801 0.0048525 0.41 0.683 -0.0060201 0.0099803
Poverty Rate 2000 0.3440365 0.1015967 3.39 0.001 0.1765359 0.5115371
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.7613073 0.0800096 9.52 0.000 0.6293969 0.8932176
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1627442 0.0390453 -4.17 0.000 -0.2271175 -0.0983708
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.0675816 0.0478148 -1.41 0.158 -0.1464130 0.0112497
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.1831557 0.0852936 -2.15 0.032 -0.3237776 -0.0425337
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1430787 0.0234330 -6.11 0.000 -0.1817123 -0.1044451
West side of Cleveland -0.1914344 0.0317576 -6.03 0.000 -0.2437926 -0.1390763
East side of Cleveland -0.1499373 0.0362431 -4.14 0.000 -0.2096907 -0.0901839
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.5367387 0.1206649 -4.45 0.000 -0.7356767 -0.3378007
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -1.0506850 0.1598330 -6.57 0.000 -1.3141990 -0.7871711
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 3.7832850 1.4461390 2.62 0.009 1.3990630 6.1675070
Demolitions (rate) 0.3545542 0.6402075 0.55 0.580 -0.7009440 1.4100520
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.8487036 0.3120966 -2.72 0.007 -1.3632510 -0.3341557
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.0490046 0.0324892 1.51 0.132 -0.0045597 0.1025690
NSP2 area 0.0097675 0.0360854 0.27 0.787 -0.0497258 0.0692607
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -2.9710560 4.9376270 -0.60 0.548 -11.1116300 5.1695180
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 37.0002100 20.0554000 1.84 0.066 3.9352420 70.0651900
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) 11.1834000 21.4678200 0.52 0.603 -24.2102000 46.5770000
Unknown Outcome (rate) -6.7788840 2.3294660 -2.91 0.004 -10.6194300 -2.9383360
Constant -0.0485619 0.0674051 -0.72 0.472 -0.1596914 0.0625676
[90% Confidence Interval]
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50th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.5 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 133.0075 (about -.2971763) 
Minimum sum of deviations 68.761 Psuedo-R2 0.483 
 
 
  
0.5 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0087627 0.0029924 -2.93 0.004 -0.0136962 -0.0038293
PCI 2000 0.0020638 0.0055718 0.37 0.711 -0.0071224 0.0112499
Poverty Rate 2000 0.2076734 0.1164636 1.78 0.075 0.0156621 0.3996848 
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.7767318 0.0913294 8.50 0.000 0.6261588 0.9273048 
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1485705 0.0421672 -3.52 0.000 -0.2180908 -0.0790502 
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.0997491 0.0540068 -1.85 0.065 -0.1887891 -0.0107091 
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.1917197 0.0964064 -1.99 0.047 -0.3506631 -0.0327763 
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1143935 0.0269523 -4.24 0.000 -0.1588293 -0.0699578 
West side of Cleveland -0.1420901 0.0362243 -3.92 0.000 -0.2018125 -0.0823677 
East side of Cleveland -0.1297776 0.0406461 -3.19 0.002 -0.1967901 -0.0627651 
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.3820662 0.1303841 -2.93 0.004 -0.5970281 -0.1671044 
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -1.3281500 0.1789846 -7.42 0.000 -1.6232390 -1.0330620 
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 5.2794360 1.6276810 3.24 0.001 2.5959080 7.9629640 
Demolitions (rate) 0.1364005 0.8096441 0.17 0.866 -1.1984450 1.4712460 
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.9501458 0.3439478 -2.76 0.006 -1.5172060 -0.3830855 
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.1001830 0.0370545 2.70 0.007 0.0390919 0.1612740 
NSP2 area 0.0069926 0.0453767 0.15 0.878 -0.0678192 0.0818044 
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -3.9971230 5.4847710 -0.73 0.467 -13.0397600 5.0455190 
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 36.2495300 21.7558500 1.67 0.096 0.3810669 72.1180000 
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) 17.7285800 24.8895100 0.71 0.477 -23.3063000 58.7634600 
Unknown Outcome (rate) -3.5088720 2.5824600 -1.36 0.175 -7.7665260 0.7487816 
Constant -0.0042942 0.0756225 -0.06 0.955 -0.1289716 0.1203832 
[90% Confidence Interval]
 444 
 
60th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.6 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 132.1697 (about   
Minimum sum of deviations 73.29373 Psuedo-R2 0.4455 
 
 
  
0.6 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0098331 0.0042772 -2.30 0.022 -0.0168848 -0.0027814
PCI 2000 0.0170976 0.0096989 1.76 0.079 0.0011072 0.0330880
Poverty Rate 2000 0.2841433 0.1685984 1.69 0.093 0.0061782 0.5621084
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.7383441 0.1305283 5.66 0.000 0.5231446 0.9535437
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1460645 0.0569899 -2.56 0.011 -0.2400228 -0.0521063
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.0907202 0.0757356 -1.20 0.232 -0.2155841 0.0341437
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.1249480 0.1352012 -0.92 0.356 -0.3478518 0.0979558
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1130956 0.0378333 -2.99 0.003 -0.1754706 -0.0507206
West side of Cleveland -0.1409729 0.0508933 -2.77 0.006 -0.2248797 -0.0570660
East side of Cleveland -0.1064278 0.0574504 -1.85 0.065 -0.2011452 -0.0117104
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.4593079 0.1790461 -2.57 0.011 -0.7544980 -0.1641179
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -1.4110110 0.2582317 -5.46 0.000 -1.8367520 -0.9852689
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 5.7121960 2.3424410 2.44 0.015 1.8502580 9.5741340
Demolitions (rate) -0.5634213 1.1170770 -0.50 0.614 -2.4051250 1.2782820
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.5055053 0.5058293 -1.00 0.318 -1.3394570 0.3284461
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.1204996 0.0519180 2.32 0.021 0.0349034 0.2060959
NSP2 area 0.0604969 0.0629027 0.96 0.337 -0.0432096 0.1642034
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -10.0213900 7.8700830 -1.27 0.204 -22.9966500 2.9538760
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 33.0885000 29.6519200 1.12 0.265 -15.7980700 81.9750700
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) 21.1153000 32.0409100 0.66 0.510 -31.7099700 73.9405600
Unknown Outcome (rate) -1.7336040 3.7247240 -0.47 0.642 -7.8744870 4.4072800
Constant -0.0332445 0.1068114 -0.31 0.756 -0.2093425 0.1428536
[90% Confidence Interval]
 445 
 
70th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.7 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 121.8405 (about -.0797809) 
Minimum sum of deviations 73.83386 Psuedo-R2 0.394 
 
 
  
0.7 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0111088 0.0048091 -2.31 0.021 -0.0190375 -0.0031801
PCI 2000 0.0166981 0.0094988 1.76 0.080 0.0010376 0.0323585
Poverty Rate 2000 0.4116334 0.1869995 2.20 0.028 0.1033308 0.7199360
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.8023156 0.1386141 5.79 0.000 0.5737852 1.0308460
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.2113956 0.0571931 -3.70 0.000 -0.3056887 -0.1171025
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.1540689 0.0781804 -1.97 0.049 -0.2829635 -0.0251743
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.0753683 0.1457452 -0.52 0.605 -0.3156557 0.1649190
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1028226 0.0397108 -2.59 0.010 -0.1682931 -0.0373522
West side of Cleveland -0.1411537 0.0537592 -2.63 0.009 -0.2297854 -0.0525219
East side of Cleveland -0.0305059 0.0607419 -0.50 0.616 -0.1306501 0.0696382
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.5601516 0.1756274 -3.19 0.002 -0.8497052 -0.2705980
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -1.2978670 0.2779733 -4.67 0.000 -1.7561560 -0.8395771
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 3.5555390 2.6584510 1.34 0.182 -0.8273996 7.9384780
Demolitions (rate) -1.5323770 1.2360200 -1.24 0.216 -3.5701810 0.5054269
Landbanked Parcels (rate) 0.2781064 0.5351223 0.52 0.604 -0.6041398 1.1603530
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.3391137 0.0546167 6.21 0.000 0.2490682 0.4291591
NSP2 area 0.0401042 0.0660147 0.61 0.544 -0.0687330 0.1489414
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -14.4261100 8.3748190 -1.72 0.086 -28.2335200 -0.6187031
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 16.4006800 30.8138200 0.53 0.595 -34.4015000 67.2028600
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) 8.6767090 38.0141100 0.23 0.820 -53.9964500 71.3498700
Unknown Outcome (rate) 0.6539814 3.9981680 0.16 0.870 -5.9377240 7.2456870
Constant 0.0138422 0.1141402 0.12 0.904 -0.1743386 0.2020230
[90% Confidence Interval]
 446 
 
80th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.8 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 104.4431 (about -.0109475) 
Minimum sum of deviations 68.94795 Psuedo-R2 0.3399 
 
 
  
0.8 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0134804 0.0093707 -1.44 0.151 -0.0289297 0.0019688
PCI 2000 0.0300408 0.0168837 1.78 0.076 0.0022050 0.0578767
Poverty Rate 2000 1.2875510 0.3734963 3.45 0.001 0.6717750 1.9033280
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.9124729 0.2615503 3.49 0.001 0.4812598 1.3436860
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.2957127 0.0984492 -3.00 0.003 -0.4580240 -0.1334014
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.2768418 0.1455644 -1.90 0.058 -0.5168312 -0.0368524
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.1604416 0.2963590 -0.54 0.589 -0.6490432 0.3281600
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.0895350 0.0751200 -1.19 0.234 -0.2133839 0.0343140
West side of Cleveland -0.0556715 0.0920437 -0.60 0.546 -0.2074222 0.0960793
East side of Cleveland -0.0085405 0.1135695 -0.08 0.940 -0.1957804 0.1786994
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.7705940 0.3204591 -2.40 0.017 -1.2989290 -0.2422591
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -1.0988140 0.5047868 -2.18 0.030 -1.9310470 -0.2665817
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 5.4620940 5.3057240 1.03 0.304 -3.2853560 14.2095400
Demolitions (rate) -3.5941800 2.4477340 -1.47 0.143 -7.6297130 0.4413534
Landbanked Parcels (rate) 0.7498370 0.9254425 0.81 0.418 -0.7759230 2.2755970
Strategic Investment Initiative area 0.4427242 0.1003977 4.41 0.000 0.2772004 0.6082481
NSP2 area 0.0022753 0.1198720 0.02 0.985 -0.1953554 0.1999060
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -14.2707100 15.6412900 -0.91 0.362 -40.0582100 11.5168000
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 36.4618700 59.0668700 0.62 0.537 -60.9205900 133.8443000
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) -16.3136900 67.5201700 -0.24 0.809 -127.6329000 95.0055700
Unknown Outcome (rate) 0.3386485 7.5716600 0.04 0.964 -12.1446100 12.8219100
Constant 0.0825201 0.2268934 0.36 0.716 -0.2915548 0.4565951
[90% Confidence Interval]
 447 
 
90th Percentile Regression 
Model Statistics 0.9 Quantile Regression  
Number of Observations 421     
Raw sum of deviations 79.55883 (about .1211851) 
Minimum sum of deviations 51.79017 Psuedo-R2 0.349 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.9 Quantile Regression Coef. Std. Error t P> |t|
General Control Variables
Value/Housing Unit 2000 -0.0229702 0.0119171 -1.93 0.055 -0.0426176 -0.0033228
PCI 2000 0.0866241 0.0229117 3.78 0.000 0.0488501 0.1243982
Poverty Rate 2000 1.7695730 0.4745915 3.73 0.000 0.9871226 2.5520230
Professional Employment Rate 2000 0.8558971 0.4023818 2.13 0.034 0.1924977 1.5192970
Non-Hispanic Black Proportion 2000 -0.1172590 0.1317741 -0.89 0.374 -0.3345126 0.0999946
Housing 30+ Years Old Proportion 2000 -0.4481049 0.1706237 -2.63 0.009 -0.7294091 -0.1668007
Resident <10 Years 2000 -0.1097093 0.3892162 -0.28 0.778 -0.7514028 0.5319843
Locational Control Variables
Inner Suburb -0.1148057 0.0857686 -1.34 0.181 -0.2562108 0.0265995
West side of Cleveland -0.1305965 0.0958487 -1.36 0.174 -0.2886205 0.0274275
East side of Cleveland -0.1209547 0.1365264 -0.89 0.376 -0.3460433 0.1041338
Foreclosure-Related Control Variables
Max Residential Vacancy (rate) -0.4884973 0.3831773 -1.27 0.203 -1.1202350 0.1432400
Completed Foreclosures (rate) -2.3772360 0.5686044 -4.18 0.000 -3.3146840 -1.4397890
Foreclosure Prevention & Mitigation
Board of Revisions Foreclosures (rate) 10.9081800 6.7943660 1.61 0.109 -0.2935626 22.1099300
Demolitions (rate) -4.2498330 2.9837530 -1.42 0.155 -9.1690910 0.6694256
Landbanked Parcels (rate) -0.5295491 1.1217570 -0.47 0.637 -2.3789690 1.3198710
Strategic Investment Initiative area 1.6875330 0.1145227 14.74 0.000 1.4987220 1.8763450
NSP2 area -0.1570618 0.1523223 -1.03 0.303 -0.4081928 0.0940692
Counseling Outcomes
Kept House (rate) -1.4074450 17.6999100 -0.08 0.937 -30.5889700 27.7740800
Lost House, non-foreclosure (rate) 49.2722800 72.4802300 0.68 0.497 -70.2245300 168.7691000
Lost House, foreclosure (rate) 33.3818100 71.2838100 0.47 0.640 -84.1424900 150.9061000
Unknown Outcome (rate) 10.6326800 8.6530420 1.23 0.220 -3.6334340 24.8987900
Constant 0.2424302 0.2677867 0.91 0.366 -0.1990647 0.6839252
[90% Confidence Interval]
